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  There is only one law in the universe, whether we choose to call it sacred or secular, 
  and it is this law which is the foundation of order and justice in society. […] It is the 
  nobility of the soul which allows us to understand what the universe is. 
 
         Naguib Mahfouz 
 
  In light of the infinite laws or the laws of infinity which lie beyond our reach, God 
  cannot not exist. GOD is a word to comfort human beings, who struggle to feel the 
  essence of the beyond, the unknown, the unknowable. In a moral sense, God is love. 
  In order for people to live without harming others, there needs to be an ideal, an  
  ideal in the sense of a spiritual, moral conception of law. Morality is inside us. 
 
         Andrei Tarkovsky  
          
  Confucian humanism […] is not a form of secular humanism, but a humanism that 
  entails both naturalist and spiritual dimensions. […] A person so conceived is an 
  observer, appreciator, partner, and co-creator of the evolutionary, indeed the cosmic, 
  process. Human responsibility must be expanded from the self, community, nation, 
  world, nature, and ultimate, to the 'great transformation' of the cosmos.  
 
         Tu Weiming 
 
  Matthew Arnold, in his classic collection of essays Culture and Anarchy (1869),  
  famously described culture as 'a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting 
  to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought 
  and said in the world.' […] It is my belief that culture in this sense [...] points always 
  towards the transcendental. […] And when we lose our sense of that thing […] all 
  human life is cast into shadow. We approach the point at which even the St. Matthew 
  Passion and the Rondanini Pietà have nothing more to say to us than a shark in  
  formaldehyde. That is the direction we have taken. But it is a direction of drift, a  
  refusal to adopt the posture that is inherent in the human condition, in which we  
  strive to see events from outside and as a whole, as they are in the eyes of God. 
 
         Roger Scruton 
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Introduction: Genesis, Overview and Defence of the Project 
 
   The thing that stayed in my mind was simple. It was the image of   
   someone inadvertently damaging the thing they love because they fail to  
   recognise it. In the magnificent lecture room, I had witnessed the hurling of 
   javelins. But what had been hit? My fear was that, thinking that the idea of 
   civilisation was a threat, the speakers had launched their darts. But my  
   suspicion was that something precious was hidden in the bushes; that seen 
   more clearly, the idea of civilisation might turn out to be something we need 
   and love. 
 
      John Armstrong, In Search of Civilisation: Remaking a 
      Tarnished Idea (2009) 
 
 
This doctoral project began as a vague desire to contribute to what primatologist Frans de Waal has 
called the challenge of our century: 'globalisation for a tribal species'
1
. I was first sure that Naguib 
Mahfouz would be a part of it; his sublime Arab wisdom and good humour could not have been 
more relevant after the terrible events of September 11, 2001 and the wars which followed them. 
The reality of a growing Sinosphere also encouraged me to include a Chinese element; initially, I 
had considered working on the reception of Naguib Mahfouz in China, but when I chanced upon the 
work of New Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan and his heir Tu Weiming in the course of my 
Chinese studies, the parallels with Mahfouz were so striking that I felt compelled to pursue them. 
Then, when the European Union doctoral programme to which I was accepted gave me the chance 
to spend a year in Russia, I considered adding a Russian dimension; in another accident of fate, I 
found Andrei Tarkovsky addressing the same civilisational themes as Mahfouz and the New 
Confucians, and decided to profit from my time in Russia by exploring these themes further.  
 This project, however, also inserts itself squarely into contemporary Western debates on 
religion and multiculturalism. If multicultural experiments and the postmodern relativist ideologies 
which accompanied them have failed, can we create a single global culture comprised of, in 
Matthew Arnold's immortal phrase, 'the best that has been thought and said in the world'? Is this 
what the humanities should be busy doing? And if so, what should we include? For sheer 
                                                 
1  See Frans de Waal, 'The Evolution of Empathy', 
http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/the_evolution_of_empathy, 1/9/2005. For a broader discussion of the 
'globalisation for a tribal species' theme, see Frans de Waal, The Age of Empathy: Nature's Lessons for a Kinder Society, 
(Broadway Books, 2010). 
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demographic and geopolitical reasons, any canon deprived altogether of Arab, Russian or Chinese 
voices would be a non-starter. This thesis aims to show that it is possible to find, close to our time, 
Arab, Russian and Chinese voices which harmonise with each other as well as with certain 
contemporary strands of Western humanism. Whether this common civilisational bedrock can or 
should form the basis of an emerging global civil society is a question which does not go beyond 
the scope of the humanities; the three men studied, as well as their Western counterparts, all agree 
that it should, and strongly argue that, in the 21
st
 century more than ever, it must if we are to have 
any common future at all. 
    Opposition to the Global Ethic Project, particularly in Europe, is loud: we should learn to 
respect differences, the 'otherness' of the Other, if we are to consider ourselves civilised. Naguib 
Mahfouz, Andrei Tarkovsky, Tu Weiming and their Western counterparts all show that civilisational 
unity, belief in a single Moral Law, need not mean ruthless imperialism or boring uniformity; the 
Moral Law contains within itself the respect for plurality and disagreement so necessary for healthy 
individual and communal life without justifying passivity in the face of immoral behaviour. It is not 
only when we subscribe to the wrong moral law, but moreover, our warriors argue, when we throw 
out the idea of a Moral Law altogether - one dictated in our human hearts and elaborated in human 
rather than heavenly scripture - that civilisation stagnates and regresses; leaving people alone may 
indeed be a major moral step up on invading and enslaving them, but such an ethic of non-
interference in the lives of others, such exaggerated respect for the nevertheless important idea of 
'negative freedom', falls short of a higher humanistic ideal: namely, a global republic of letters in 
which ideas are debated openly in a climate of respect for truth and in which the 'best that has been 
thought and said' is sought by all, a society in which individuals want, like Confucius himself, to 
teach and learn simultaneously out of love for the fragile human civilisation to which they belong. 
 The thesis consists of four parts: an initial chapter on contemporary Western debates around 
the 'civilisation' theme; a chapter on Mahfouz (though with extended references to the Western 
debates discussed in the first chapter), focusing on his Nobel Lecture and newspaper columns 
written for Al Ahram newspaper over the last three decades of his life (in which the Arabic word 
hadara - 'civilisation' - recurs countless times) followed by readings of the novels Akhenaten: 
Dweller in Truth (1985) and Arabian Nights and Days (1982); a chapter on Tarkovsky, in which his 
seven films are discussed in chronological order with reference to the civilisation theme established 
in the first two chapters and complemented by translations of previously untranslated Russian 
Tarkovsky criticism as well as Tarkovsky's own diaries; and a final chapter in which Tu Weiming's 
'anthropocosmic' vision of human civilisation is introduced into the discussion.  
 The broad argument can be summarised as follows: the humanities are not social sciences 
and should not be treated as such. Instead, they provide access to a participatory form of knowledge 
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which no sociological or anthropological theory could ever reproduce. Explanation is no substitute 
for experience in this sphere: art or literature or philosophy or even music are not forms of 
knowledge which can be made useful to society via private discussions at élite conferences, in the 
way that biology or computer science can – I need only know how to use a computer rather than 
understand exactly how it works - but must rather take hold in the minds of as many people as 
possible. What exactly is this 'participatory knowledge' for the warriors we will examine? I would 
summarise it as 'civilisational awareness', a feeling of belonging to a single community which 
extends beyond one's present-day tribe to encompass not only all of currently existing humanity but 
past and future generations as well, and which in fact extends beyond the human community to 
include all living and even all non-living things, and indeed all the way to Heaven itself. Such a 
civilisational awareness is diametrically opposed to the philistine, mercantile, frankly imperial logic 
of the 'machinery'-dependent homo economicus so memorably derided by Matthew Arnold in 
Culture and Anarchy; like Arnold, the 'warriors for civilisation' presented in this thesis, while 
largely preferring the word 'civilisation' - hadara, tsivilizatsia, wenming - in their respective 
languages (Arnold preferred the word 'culture' but also said he was happy to accept synonyms
2
), 
seek to set up a defence against the philistine 'anarchy' which ensues when imperial instincts, in the 
absence of 'civilisation' or 'culture' (Arnold's 'best that has been thought and said in the world'), are 
inevitably indulged. Mahfouz was relatively optimistic, at least by the time of his 1988 Nobel 
Lecture, about our collective progress as a species in the direction of 'civilisation', arguing that 
empire-building 'has become a worn out pride the mention of which modern conscience, thank God, 
feels uneasy about'
3
. Tarkovsky's defence of culture, meanwhile, assumed an increasingly 
apocalyptic tone in the years before his death from cancer in 1986: humanity as a whole urgently 
needed to recover a thirst for spirituality and sacrifice and to combat the prevailing philistinism of 
the day before it was too late: 'the meaning of art is in the search for God in people, the search for 
the Way for people'
4
, he says, before arguing that modern art has lost touch with this Arnoldian 
quest for perfectibility, a battle in which, for Arnold as for the 'warriors for civilisation' presented 
here, including the Confucian Tu Weiming ('morality is not only a means of preserving the 
community; it is also the very reason why the community is worth being organised in the first 
place.'
5
), culture and religion – or at least an honest, post-literalist, ecumenical theology - are the 
closest of allies.      
                                                 
2  See Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 1
st
 ed. 1869, 
http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4212/pg4212.html, pp. 195-196. 
3  Naguib Mahfouz, 'Nobel Lecture (1988)', 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1988/mahfouz-lecture.html (accessed 23/10/11).. 
4  Andrei Tarkovsky, Martyrolog: Diaries (Martyrolog: Dnevniki), (Istituto Internazionale Andrej Tarkovskij, 
2008), p. 433. 
5  Tu Weiming, Centrality and Commonality:An Essay on Confucian Religiousness, (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1989)., p. 68.  
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 Some critics have objected to the use of the apparently anachronistic terms 'warriors' and 
'civilisation' in my title, arguing that the words have become synonymous with precisely the 
philistine imperialism which the three men studied, as well as their 'Western counterparts', spent 
their lives opposing. I nevertheless believe that the title Warriors for Civilisation reflects the 
unashamedly determined attitude with which our chosen subjects defend their humanistic creed in 
their respective oeuvres (the hero of Tarkovsky's first film, to cite just one example, was himself a 
boy soldier fighting for justice against a wicked and 'uncivilised' enemy) and with which our 
discipline must now defend itself if it is to survive in a globalising world in which the study of 
narrowly national canons is being rendered obsolete and the place of the humanities itself in schools 
and on university campuses is under threat from a variety of institutional enemies. The greatest 
enemy of all, however, may lie within, in the very idea that nothing is worth fighting for and that 
zealous attachment to values of any kind is dangerous, an idea, bordering on an ideology, preached 
either directly or indirectly by many humanities departments around the world, which have 
abandoned the Arnoldian quest for human perfection and embraced instead – often under the 
umbrella known as Theory – the idea that difference itself is the only value worth celebrating. This 
debate – namely, whether 'fighting for civilisation' is part of the problem or part of the solution – is 
addressed in our first chapter. 
 A broader criticism of the project, moreover, concerns the attention to similarity rather than 
difference among the three warriors and their Western counterparts: by stressing the similarities 
between an Arab novelist, Russian film director and Chinese philosopher, I have been accused of 
'neutralising', or at least trying to neutralise, differences between them. The very prevalence of such 
a criticism, however, really only proves the point I make in my first chapter about the widespread 
fetishisation of difference and the reflexive scorn for even the attempt to unite or 'make same' 
within the humanities academy. I would rather have thought that the fact that Mahfouz, Tarkovsky 
and Tu have anything meaningful in common at all given their diverse backgrounds was more 
extraordinary than any of the myriad differences I could have reported back from my time in the 
field. I don't pretend to hide these differences, and address them where I think they are relevant to 
my comparison or to the contemporary European context in which I am conducting it – Mahfouz's 
views on freedom of speech, Tarkovsky's attitude to female artists, Tu's strident environmentalism – 
but I am simply not willing to assume a priori that the inevitable differences between three such 
different thinkers – formal as well as cultural and aesthetic (we are, after all, dealing with a novelist, 
a film director and a philosopher) - are more important than the overwhelming similarity of moral 
vision I believe I have uncovered through the privilege of sustained direct contact with their work. I 
would stress, to those for whom it were not already obvious, that I am arguing for a radical 
'similarity' rather than an absolute 'sameness' of vision among them; critics have pointed out that the 
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meaning of core concepts such as 'truth' and 'unity' which recur in the work of all three warriors as 
well as their Western counterparts varies, as if this were some kind of knockout blow to my entire 
project rather than an inevitable result of it. All successful attempts at truth, unity, or Arnoldian 
moral perfection by any other name will inevitably turn up different corners of it, for the source – 
God or Heaven or Love, as our warriors variously call it - is inexhaustible.   
 Other frequent misunderstandings have concerned my attempt to allow Mahfouz, Tarkovsky 
and Tu to 'stand in' for Islamic, Orthodox and Confucian civilisations respectively. I would repeat, 
however, that my goal has simply been to show that one can find figures from within each tradition 
– or at least one major and relatively contemporary figure from each, arguably the most prominent 
global ambassadors of Arab, Russian, and Sinic high culture respectively of the last 50 years - who, 
through a kind of magic coincidence, agree radically with each other about most of what matters. 
My goal has most certainly not been to show that all voices claiming to be 'Islamic', 'Orthodox', or 
'Confucian', let alone 'Western', are essentially reducible to one another; on the contrary, part of the 
point of juxtaposing my three warriors in three consecutive chapters rather than trying to treat them 
all at the same time was to build a cumulative picture which emerges through each of the chapters 
to create, by the end, an intimate whole which is nevertheless greater than the sum of its parts. 
Together, our Western warriors, Mahfouz and Tarkovsky give us a new Tu Weiming; this does not 
mean that the Tu Weiming chapter cannot be read on its own, but rather that the reader will 
appreciate it in a fuller way if she has digested the Western warriors, Mahfouz and Tarkovsky first. 
This structural decision also partly explains the fact that the Tu chapter is the shortest of the four; 
rather than repeat material from previous chapters unnecessarily, I decided instead to begin each 
chapter in the spirit in which the previous one leaves off and to build, implicitly as well as 
explicitly, material from the earlier chapters into each new one, while nevertheless endeavouring to 
allow each chapter to remain entirely readable on its own. This relatively unorthodox approach also 
allowed me to be consistent with the view of the humanities and humanities 'research' presented in 
the first chapter and in turn by our respective global warriors. 
 I have also been criticised for not offering more background on my three warriors, for 
example on the historical and political context of Mahfouz's output, in particular under Nasser, or 
the roots of Tarkovsky's concept of sacrifice in the Russian literary tradition in general and in 
Dostoyevsky in particular, or more detail of the Communist and Maoist assault on Confucianism 
and the politics of the Chinese Communist Party's recent embrace of Tu and his New Confucian 
creed. My reply to this criticism is simply to say that any one of these contextualisations would 
deserve an entire thesis on its own, and that my primary goal has been to provide a picture of a 
moral vision which could be of use in our present and immediate future rather than to write an 
intellectual history of the recent past. If Anglo-American departments of Philosophy are routinely 
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divided into 'History of Ideas' and 'Problem-Solving' groupings, I would extend that distintion to the 
humanities in general, and, without in any way disdaining the noble philological attempt to 
document the History of Ideas, confirm that this project was firmly conceived as a Problem-Solving 
one (namely, De Waal's problem of 'globalisation for a tribal species'). I have nevertheless 
endeavoured to offer a minimum of context to allow the relatively uninitiated reader the chance to 
involve herself in the main argument without discouraging her from seeking further background for 
general edification should she so desire it, and on the contrary, hoping to kindle enough interest to 
encourage her to do so where she might otherwise not have bothered.  
 While I have been accused of not offering enough general historical and cultural context for 
my warriors' work, I have also simultaneously been criticised for offering too much specific 
biographical detail. My brief forays into Mahfouz's and Tarkovsky's love lives, such as they are, are 
intended as explorations of apparent contradictions between the life and the work of the two artists, 
contradictions which, if confirmed as genuine, would throw the entire moral vision they present into 
jeopardy by exposing its hypocrisy. Only amoral artists get to live as they please and to have their 
biographies interpreted separately from their art; it quite obviously matters that moralising artists at 
least aim, in their daily lives, to achieve the ideals of moral truth and unity that they preach: the 
very assumption that artistic criticism and biography are entirely independent from each other 
suggests that one has already made up one's mind that there can be nothing moral or unifying about 
art in the first place. If I have avoided entering into the details of Tu's biography, it is partly out of 
respect for the living and partly because I did not find any apparent contradictions between the life 
and the work worth commenting on. Nevertheless, this thesis is in no sense an attempt at biography 
or hagiography; once again, the goal is to elucidate the broadly similar civilisational vision of our 
warriors in a problem-solving spirit relevant to our day, and I have called on biographical resources 
where necessary to achieve that.                          
   The problem of reining in the sprawling scope of this project, however, goes beyond 
questions of biography. Each of my three warriors would have deserved multiple theses on his own, 
and I was thus inevitably faced with the task of deciding which parts or aspects of their total output 
to focus on. In the case of Mahfouz in particular, with nearly three dozen novels, more than a dozen 
short story collections, hundreds of interviews and over a thousand newspaper articles to choose 
from, it was simply not possible to cover it all, particularly after having made the decision to read 
him primarily in Arabic. The decision to focus on his newspaper articles and his novels Akhenaten: 
Dweller in Truth and Arabian Nights and Days boiled down to the following: the repeated use of 
the word hadara or 'civilisation' in dozens of his newspaper articles; his reference to Akhenaten as 
the first monotheist, and hence as the father of this hadara, in his 1988 Nobel Lecture; and his claim 
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that Arabian Nights and Days was the novel of which he was most proud.
6
 The fact that these 
sources were all from Mahfouz's less-studied mature period following the assassination of Sadat, 
when he was already approaching his 70
th
 birthday, also adds a modicum of internal coherence and 
originality to the partial portrait I build of him, although again, reference to earlier and more 
familiar works such as the Cairo Trilogy and Children of Gebelawi is made where such recourse 
elucidates or advances the civilisation argument which is my central concern.  
 In the case of Tarkovsky, seven films were a much more manageable œuvre with which to 
grapple, and since each of those films addressed the civilisation theme in its own unique way, I 
thought it proper to devote a chapter, albeit brief, to each. The decision to skip over the entire œuvre 
at the expense of delving into greater detail on one or more of the films engendered the wrath of the 
film studies community, who at more than one of the universities where I presented my project 
complained that I treat as merely incidental the fact that Tarkovsky employed and in many ways 
revolutionised the medium of film. My reply to these critics is again to say that my primary focus is 
the civilisation theme, and that I raise formal issues to the extent that they inform that particular 
discussion instead of trying to take on the sprawling world of Tarkovsky scholarship in general. I 
also heavily cite untranslated Russian secondary sources, both to advance the civilisation theme and 
to bring these sources to English-speaking audiences for the first time, and conclude with an 
analysis of a series of excerpts from Tarkovsky's diary which also address the civilisation theme and 
show that his life was not as much a betrayal of the civilisational principles he professed as certain 
recent portraits have endeavoured to show.  
 Though not quite as prolific as Mahfouz, Tu Weiming nevertheless presented a similar 
challenge insofar as a good portion of his output is in Chinese, and insofar as the English portion of 
his œuvre covers too much ground for me satisfactorily to synthesise or summarise it while still 
having time adequately to address the civilisation theme which is my main concern. Tu's colleagues 
at the Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies at Peking University were generous enough to gift 
me with a copy of his 2010 collection of essays entitled The Global Significance of Concrete 
Humanity: Essays on the Confucian Discourse in Cultural China when I visited in 2013, and I 
found the essays, drawn from across the span of his œuvre, to be an ideal synopsis for my purposes, 
in particular the 90-page 'The Confucian Way' and the shorter essays 'Beyond the Enlightenment 
Mentality', 'Chinese Philosophy: A Synoptic View' and 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic 
Vision'. While I also address other New Confucian sources and scholars and other works by Tu 
himself, my goal was once again to avoid opening too many distracting side doors from the central 
                                                 
6  See, for example, Mohamed Salmawy, 'Bad News About Arabian Nights and Days!' ('Layālī 'Alf Layla... wa 
al Ḫabar al Aswad!') and http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=314314, 17/10/2011 (accessed 
3/3/2012). 
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civilisation theme which I extract, albeit quickly and roughly given the time available, from the 
imposing body of Tu's work.   
 But perhaps the biggest criticism of all of this project has been my reluctance to define what, 
exactly, my warriors mean by 'civilisation'. The most prominent of my Western warriors, Peter 
Hitchens, perhaps comes closest to a pithy definition when he says that 'love is the opposite of 
power', and that 'the human race', unless it turns in the direction of love and away from the imperial 
logic of old, 'will find itself doing very great and serious harm to itself over and over and over again 
in generation after generation after generation'.
7
 All my warriors are engaged in this 
intergenerational anti-imperial struggle: Mahfouz dramatises it most famously in Children of 
Gebelawi and The Harafish but also, as we address directly, in his depictions of Akhenaten and 
Shahriyar and again in his 1988 Nobel Lecture; the heroes of Tarkovsky's films, from Ivan to 
Andrei Rublev, Kris Kelvin, Alyosha, the Stalker, Gorchakov and Alexander are all, as we will see, 
directly engaged in it; and Tu and his Confucians are above all teachers, tamers of imperial lust and 
advocates of a form of self-cultivation which is rooted in ren or fellow-feeling. Without this turn 
away from the instincts of empire and towards a form of ren we would, in the view of Hitchens and 
my three warriors, 'be missing civilisation completely'.
8
  
 My reluctance to define 'civilisation', then, has to do with the inexhaustible nature of the 
love or ren on which it is based, and the infinite forms that such fellow-feeling can take and which 
the humanities, in their glorious variety, depict and engender. The humanities, my warriors argue, 
are engaged in the ongoing, inexhaustible search for this love and in the celebration and sharing of 
the purest forms of it we can find, and constitute above all a profession of faith in the power of this 
love to improve and rescue us. It is extraordinary that such a view has seemingly become so 
extraordinary within humanities circles, but such is the institutional reality in which this thesis has 
been written; it seemed high time to remind frequently cynical Western proponents of alternative 
models of humanities study that voices from the Arab, Orthodox and Confucian worlds, as well as a 
growing number of voices from within, are calling for a return to the unfashionable Arnoldian 
model of culture as 'the best that has been thought and said in the world' and to the study of a stock 
of civilisational knowledge which can act as a bulwark against empire rather than, as is so often 
asserted of the best of our culture, as an inevitable tacit apology for it. 
 One leading voice in this battle is John Armstrong, whose 2009 book In Search of 
Civilisation: Remaking a Tarnished Idea seeks to restore the word 'civilisation' to its rightful place 
in our language – as a synonym of love rather than empire - and to return it to its 'native centre' in 
                                                 
7  Peter Hitchens, 'Love is the Opposite of Power', http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKUrFP3ys9w, 22/2/14. 
8  Hitchens, 'Love is the Opposite of Power'.  
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'the arts and humanities'.
9
 In the same problem-solving spirit which has inspired this thesis, 
Armstrong asks, 'What should our idea of civilisation be? We are not merely passive receptors of 
existing strategies of thinking. Philosophy is the project of discovering and creating the ideas we 
need.'
10
 Armstrong himself then describes as a key element in the civilising process 'the attempt to 
make what is best also what is shared'.
11
 This seems to me as good a definition of the 'civilisation' 
our warriors defend as any other, perhaps only rivalled by Armstrong himself when he describes 
civilisation as the narrow way between the Scylla of barbarism and the Charybdis of decadence: 
'Barbarism is strength without sensitivity; decadence is sensitivity without strength.'
12
 The word 
'warriors', it is hoped, is not too strong a term to describe these quixotic uniters of strength and 
sensitivity celebrated by Angus Kennedy in his 2014 book Being Cultured: In Defence of 
Discrimination. Kennedy picks up from where Armstrong left off and defends the importance of 
'sharing the best' in the hope that we will freely, as autonomous individuals, arrive at 'civilisation' 
together: 
 
  Freedom without any limits – at least the limit of self-discipline – is indeed anarchy, 
  and culture without standards is undistinguished and meaningless. But tell people 
  where to ride their horses to and they are not free. Use culture as a tool and it is no 
  longer an idea we can ride towards – no longer an end but a means. […] The  
  autonomous individual, while free, submits himself to his own laws. Won’t we all go 
  in different directions? No, because when we act to improve ourselves, strive toward 
  our best selves, we do act in our own interest. But that interest, while it is of course a 
  self-interest, is equally a shareable interest. […] Culture is one way of bettering  
  oneself. It is also, and importantly so, something that helps us recognise our own 
  human freedom and acts as a reminder that some things are better than others.
13
 
                                                 
9  See John Armstrong, In Search of Civilisation: Remaking a Tarnished Idea, (London: Penguin, 2009), Chapter 
2, 'Wider and Wider Still'. 
10  See Armstrong, In Search of Civilisation, Chapter 2, 'Wider and Wider Still'. 
11  See Armstrong, In Search of Civilisation, Chapter 3, 'The Clash of Civilisations'. 
12  Angus Kennedy, 'Matthew Arnold's Error: The State is Bad for Culture', http://www.spiked-
online.com/review_of_books/article/matthew-arnolds-error-the-state-is-bad-for-culture/14909#.U05mQRybFwd, 
11/4/2014.  
13 Kennedy, 'Matthew Arnold's Error'. Kennedy's broader argument is that Arnold defends state coercion in the sphere 
of culture:  
 
  In the end, Arnold, a classic liberal, was forced, despite his faith in individual reason and free thinking, to 
 come down on the side of society – against the individual – and the use of the state as an engine of culture 
 to shape and direct the people into an organised and harmonious whole. If freedom had to be sacrificed so 
 the ‘sweetness and light’ of culture could lift as many from darkness as possible, so be it.   
 
 This argument about Arnold's apparent pessimism regarding the power of culture to speak for itself, while 
interesting on its own terms, will not concern us directly here (Terry Eagleton will also make essentially the same 
criticism of Arnold in the coming chapter); suffice it to say that Arnoldian ideas, such as I present them, merely provide 
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It is in precisely this spirit of 'sharing the best' that I have chosen to bring together the work of 
Naguib Mahfouz, Andrei Tarkovsky, Tu Weiming and their Western counterparts for the first time, 
returning to an idea of 'civilisation' which, like Armstrong's, is about more than tribal belonging – 
the Huntington 'clash' thesis - or narrowly material progress, and which focuses above all on the 'art 
of living' and creation of genuine 'spiritual prosperity'
14
 in the belief that such wealth exists and can 
be spread via the humanities.
15
    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the inspiration for our discussion and do not constitute the subject under discussion itself. A brief and partial defence of 
Arnold against Kennedy's charges nevertheless seems warranted here: Kennedy appears to be forgetting that no culture 
at all can be transmitted without the prior coercion of children via education.     
14 Parts Three and Four of Armstrong's In Search of Civilisation are headed 'Civilisation as the Art of Living' and 
'Civilisation as Spiritual Prosperity' respectively. 
15  A brief note regarding translation policy is also worth including here. All translations from non-English 
sources are my own unless otherwise stated. Instead of clogging my text and footnotes with original citations from the 
languages I have quoted from, ranging as they do from French and Spanish to Arabic, Russian and Chinese, I have 
opted instead to preserve the flow of the English text. Readers with the means or inclination to compare my English 
renderings with the original source material cited are strongly encouraged to do so.      
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1) Western Warriors 
1.1 The Culture Wars 
  Once the defence of the humanities is made to rest on the 'culture' they transmit,  
  they become vulnerable to deconstruction. One can summon any number of theories 
  — the Marxist theory of “ideology,” or some feminist, post-structuralist, or  
  Foucauldian descendant of it — in proof of the view that the precious achievements 
  of our culture owe their status merely to the power that speaks through them, and 
  hence that they are of no intrinsic worth. In this way the whole idea of culture as an 
  autonomous sphere of moral knowledge, one that requires learning, scholarship, and 
  immersion to enhance and retain, is cast to the winds. On this view, instead of  
  transmitting culture, the university exists to deconstruct it, to remove its aura. The 
  university’s purpose is to leave the student, after three or four years of anxious  
  dissipation, with the view that anything goes and nothing matters.
16
 
          Roger Scruton 
 
Permit a series of short personal anecdotes here to situate the discussion to follow. In my first year 
as an undergraduate at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, in 2000, the Philosophy 
Department, where I was studying, was torn down to make way for library expansions and a new 
business school designed to attract fee-paying international students. We were moved from our 
historic villa at the geographic heart of the university to the fifth and sixth floors of a nondescript 
10-storey office block which the university had leased 500 yards down the road.  
 Five years later, in 2005, postgraduate students were invited to present their work to a 
university-wide audience in a corporate-sponsored quest for outstanding research. If I recall 
correctly, there was a $5000 prize for the Faculty of Arts division. My exploration of the links 
between Borges's fiction and his love life, along with other projects like it, did not make it past the 
first round; the eventual winner in the Arts Faculty was a presentation on the ways in which local art 
could be exploited to grow the New Zealand economy. Even bastions of humanism like Italy and 
France, where I have spent the majority of my time as a graduate student, are witnessing dilutions 
and vocationalisations of curricula on an unprecedented scale as a result of European Bologna 
reforms. The inaugural address for new graduate students at the European University of St. 
                                                 
16 Roger Scruton, 'Scientism in the Arts and Humanities', http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/scientism-in-
the-arts-and-humanities, Fall 2013. 
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Petersburg, Russia, where I spent the fourth semester of my PhD programme, was delivered by the 
CEO of a Swiss tobacco company, a major corporate contributor to the university's endowment.  
 Should we care, or perhaps even applaud? Terry Eagleton, a vocal critic of the capitulation 
of universities in the Anglophone sphere to market forces, gives us reason for pause by sketching 
some 'momentous developments in culture over the last hundred years' in a 2012 debate with Roger 
Scruton. Eagleton argues that culture in the 20
th
 century lost its independence from the productive 
economy and thereby its critical distance as an arbiter of social practices. The wider consequence of 
this integration of culture into the mundane sphere of economic production was a loss of faith in the 
power of culture to act as a surrogate for, or companion to, religion; in Eagleton's words, 'the idea 
that the arts will save us, which in some ways is the theme of modernism, is gradually discredited'.
17
 
The idea of a global literary canon, which had once promised to 'distill our deep, shared values'
18
 
and enshrine our belonging to a universal and eternally self-perfecting human community, gave way 
to an essentially philistine conception of literature and the arts as an obstacle to the economic and 
political self-realisation of hitherto marginalised identity groupings and as part of the problems of 
economic and social injustice rather than part of the solution to them. No longer trusted as a 
universal human inheritance capable of morally improving all those who came into contact with it, 
culture became instead 'the very language in which political demands were framed and articulated, 
which meant that culture could no longer take the high ground'; from being regarded as a collection 
of 'the best that has been thought and said in the world' and a route to human self-realisation and 
perfection, culture is for us today 'what people are willing to kill for, or die for', which for Eagleton 
means not the 'pre-Raphaelite brotherhood' or other potential symbols of a universal cultural canon, 
but rather local questions of 'religion, identity, community, ethnicity, lineage and so on'.
19
   
 In many respects, this chapter is less interested in exploring the reasons for the loss of faith 
in the power of 'literature' or the humanities to act as a surrogate religion, or as a 'marvellously 
portable way to carry a deep consensus of values'
20
, than it is in rebuilding this faith by setting the 
tone for the deep consensus of values I uncovered among sources as seemingly disparate as Naguib 
Mahfouz, Andrei Tarkovsky and Tu Weiming. Nevertheless, any academic text must deal squarely 
with the institutional context in which it is written, even as it aims to shape that context for future 
generations. The influence on the humanities of the view of culture as 'part of the problem' has been 
enormous and, as my 'Western warriors' will argue, both morally and materially disastrous; in recent 
years, however, a growing number of practitioners of the discipline, some of whom will be 
                                                 
17 Terry Eagleton, 'Terry Eagleton in Conversation with Roger Scruton', Intelligence Squared Debate, 13/9/12, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qOdMBDOj4ec (accessed 17/12/12). 
18 Eagleton, Intelligence Squared Debate.  
19 Eagleton, Intelligence Squared Debate.  
20 Eagleton, Intelligence Squared Debate. 
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introduced here, have returned to the older, Arnoldian view that only the humanities – culture as an 
inheritance of a 'best that has been thought and said in the world' - could inspire people to care 
about distant others and care better for proximate others, and to re-engage in the energetic quest for 
human perfection that Arnold thought was intrinsic to culture and which Stephen Fry calls 'the 
eternal adventure of trying to discover moral truth in the world'
21
. Culture, then, on the Arnoldian 
view, is the key to everything: individual meaning, social justice, and ultimately the survival of 
Pascal's universal man, the intergenerational human entity who 'exists always and learns 
continually', and whom Arnold himself took for granted as a unit of concern even as he refused to 
admit that individuals, including generations of 'philistines' imprisoned in the 'machinery' of 
material wealth and unexposed to the surpassing majesty of the cultural realm, should ever be 
'sacrificed' for it.
22
  
 Arguably the most prominent 21st-century proponent of a neo-Arnoldian turn in 
Anglosphere humanities has been Martha Nussbaum. As a graduate student in classical Greek 
literature, Nussbaum grew tired of her professors' obsession with formal textual detail at the 
complete expense of the moral dilemmas at play in, for example, Sophocles.
23
 Having left classical 
scholarship formally behind, Nussbaum then navigated her way between the Scylla of an analytic 
philosophy uninterested in emotions and the Charybdis of a continental philosophy unconcerned 
with empirical evidence in search of an interdisciplinary interzone which would allow her 
simultaneously to tackle the ethical dilemmas of Greek tragedy on a personal moral level and 
questions of law and justice on a social level.
24
 Such efforts remain, however, the exception rather 
than the rule, and humanities departments remain caught in an existential crisis as the noose tightens 
around their neck. Unable to justify their utility to business as incubators of entrepreneurial or 
managerial thinking, humanities departments have developed a hermetic, pseudoscientific language 
of textual analysis and cultural critique widely ridiculed by the very scientists they are seeking to 
emulate with their obtuse terminologies in a desperate bid to survive by sounding important, a 
scandal most famously uncovered by physicist Alan D. Sokal in his 1996 hoax article 
'Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformational Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity'.
25
 
Yet the quest for moral truth, if that is indeed what the humanities are ultimately about, cannot be a 
science in the same way that physics is a science; I do not need to know how to build a hi-tech 
computer in order to use one – only a few people need to understand the complex language required 
                                                 
21 Stephen Fry, 'Stephen Fry on Catholicism', http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NL5WVecNdhk (accessed 17/12/12). 
22 See Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, pp. 33-35.  
23 See Martha Nussbaum, 'Conversations with History', http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qy3YTzYjut4, 31/1/2008 
(accessed 24/10/12). 
24 Nussbaum, 'Conversations with History'. 
25 See Alan D. Sokal, 'Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformational Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity', 
Social Text, nos. 46-47, Spring/Summer 1996, pp. 217-252. 
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to do so - but the whole point of the search for moral truth is that it matters only insofar as people 
everywhere can understand, and are exposed to, the language in which it is conducted. There will be 
a group of people who devote their lives to it, but their job is not primarily to communicate with 
other specialists, as scientists do in complex scientific papers; their primary job is to popularise their 
findings so that ordinary lives can in some way be improved. Otherwise, the social utility, and 
justification for public funding, of such endeavours is precisely zero, and the humanities are 
reduced to a parlour game for idle élites. Having lost their self-confidence as defenders of 
civilisation after a century of, in Eagleton's words, 'capitalist attack', the humanities are now caught 
in a death-spiral of shrinking student numbers and shrinking funding.
26
 The prospects for 
humanities graduates the world over are dire; the dream of a tenured position and a salary 
commensurate with the years of effort required for doctoral and post-doctoral study more resembles 
the long odds of a professional football contract than the natural progression through one of the 
traditional professions. Supply ludicrously outweighs demand, and demand is shrinking with every 
passing year.   
 Jacques Derrida, one of the chief culprits and obfuscators of our Theory-laden age, was 
nevertheless right, though hardly alone, when he traced the etymology of the word 'professor' back 
to the profession of a faith.
27
 Once upon a time, humanities scholars believed that the arts could 
save people, or at least improve them, and spent their lives proselytising from their lecterns and 
cosy university chairs. What happens when the professors lose faith in what they are doing, as we 
have seen in the humanities over the last decades of the 20
th
 century and on into our own, is that 
everyone else eventually does too. Fortunately, the odd cry for civilisation is still audible in 
humanities departments behind the ebbing but still high tide of deconstruction and identity politics. 
Eagleton's opponent in the 2012 debate cited above, Roger Scruton, is one such voice, and worth 
quoting at length for the purposes of this chapter: 
 
  What is culture, why should we teach it now, and how can we teach it? This is very 
  important for people in the humanities, because that is how we define our subjects. 
  Terry Eagleton teaches literature, which is a part of culture. I teach philosophy, in 
  particular those aspects of philosophy that border on the arts. There is no point  
  teaching them if I don't think there is something to be learned. But what exactly? I 
  think there are two contrasting views: [...] I defend a view of culture which aspires to 
                                                 
26 One recent feature squarely to address the so-called 'crisis' in humanities education is the New Republic's 
appropriately named 'Humanities Deathwatch' series, including, in one prominent recent example, Gordon Hutner 
and Feisal G. Mohamed's 'The Real Humanities Crisis is Happening at Public Universities', 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114616/public-universities-hurt-humanities-crisis, 6/9/13.   
27  See Jacques Derrida, 'The Future of the Profession or the University without Condition', in Jacques Derrida 
and the Humanities: A Critical Reader, (Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
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  be a form of wisdom that is to be imparted to people, that is to say, something which 
  contains elements of knowledge which they wouldn't otherwise acquire and which is 
  imparted in its own particular way, not as the sciences are, but in another way. It is 
  this other way which is difficult to define. But there are those who teach in  
  universities, in humanities departments, who see culture as something quite different: 
  as part of the ideology of the ruling class, or the ideology of a particular social order. 
  The purpose of teaching it is not to impart it, but on the contrary to undermine it, or 
  to expose the powers that secretly advance behind it. This second approach started 
  what I think of as the culture wars: wars between those people who regarded their 
  role as teachers of culture as one of imparting a form of wisdom, a form of  
  knowledge that would not only be useful for the student but part of the continuity of 
  the social order to which the student belongs, and those who see their primary duty 
  as one of debunking, deconstructing, or showing the 'structures of domination', to use 
  the Foucauldian idiom, that lie behind our ways of thinking, our ways of speaking, 
  and our ways of enjoying the art and music of our civilisation. The origin of this  
  second view is, I think, the Marxist theory of ideology, which became prominent not 
  at the time Marx wrote, but much later, in the Frankfurt School in Germany between 
  the wars, and of course in France in 1968, under the influence of people like  
  Foucault. […] I think it is very important to reaffirm another vision of culture as  
  something not only worth imparting but also as containing knowledge. The kind of 
  knowledge that it contains is not, like scientific knowledge, a collection of facts and 
  theories, and when people start thinking of culture in terms of theory, it is largely 
  because they are taking the Marxist approach of debunking it by finding the  
  explanation of it. I think of culture as a form of practical knowledge, something that 
  gives you a sense of what to do, what to feel, how to be towards other people in a 
  community, in ways that will enhance your own social and emotional competence. I 
  think this is what you learn from literature, and I think in particular you learn it from 
  music, an aspect of culture so often overlooked. The greatest achievement of our 
  civilisation, if you leave religion and science to one side, has been music, a  
  continuous tradition of reflection through articulate sound on what it is to be human, 
  and a constant attempt to take that reflection further, to build abstract structures in 
  which nevertheless we see mirrored our own emotional nature as rational and social 
  beings. This great achievement is something which can be imparted to the young, 
  and it changes their lives. It changes their way not only of thinking about the world 
  but of seeing each other. Nothing can be done to enhance this enculturation by giving 
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  a Marxist theory of where it all came from; here is something you impart by  
  encouraging young people to love it, and to find reflected in it all that is best in  
  themselves. That is, I think, what a real cultural education should be: imparting that 
  kind of self-knowing and reflective conception of why one is the sort of thing one is, 
  and how to find it mirrored in the world around you.
28
   
    
While Eagleton goes on to defend Marx and his later followers against some of these charges, 
arguing that access to culture is an important socialist concept and that Marx himself can be 
regarded as a humanist who, like Arnold and 21st-century cosmopolitans such as Thomas Pogge, 
saw individual self-realisation as inextricably linked to collective or communal flourishing 
everywhere
29
, Scruton's key point remains: culture is imparted with love when enthusiastic teachers 
who profess a faith in their material actually put cultural products in the hands of their students, not 
when they force students to learn a prior set of 'critical tools' or 'scientific instruments' with which 
to understand and 'decode' them. The debate about what to include in this canon should be 
continually waged in an open university setting, as one generation of 'professors' inspires a new 
generation of students with their faith in their material. 
 If professorial authority in the humanities has been eroded as professors themselves have 
lost their sense of mission, and if fewer students are attracted to the humanities in the first place 
given increased emphasis on science and business studies all across the globe, it is not hard to 
imagine that the kind of cultural knowledge that Scruton talks about – difficult to measure though it 
is - is being rapidly lost. In a free society, however, adults cannot be forced to read or listen to 
difficult but ultimately edifying cultural products. Without investment in the formation du goût of 
the young, the wisdom – the knowledge - of Averroës or Bach or Confucius or whoever one regards 
                                                 
28 Roger Scruton, 'Terry Eagleton in Conversation with Roger Scruton'.  
29 While Eagleton savagely attacks Arnold as a defender of unjust class relations, for example in the 2012 Firth 
Lectures at the University of Nottingham (Terry Eagleton, 'Culture and the Death of God', Firth Lectures 2012, 
University of Nottingham; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zmmRsvIfEVI), and defends the Marxist 
revolutionary spirit against what he, in my view unfairly, regards as the empire-justifying conservatism of Arnoldian 
thought, Eagleton's defence of Marx's humanism in Why Marx Was Right (Yale University Press, 2011) fits perfectly 
with the Arnoldian idea, developed in this chapter and recovered in the work of Mahfouz, Tarkovsky and Tu, that all 
self-realisation or 'salvation' is necessarily communal and that one therefore has a responsibility for all that happens 
in the world. On the other hand, Arnold-champion Roger Scruton, in a 2012 lecture on moral relativism delivered in 
Budapest ('Roger Scruton on Moral Relativism', Common Sense Society, Budapest, 25/1/2012; 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l5BXyvMU80Q), actually denies the claims of distant strangers on us beyond 
mere respect for negative freedoms. Thomas Pogge, meanwhile, argues in a more Arnoldian (and also, on Eagleton's 
reading, a more 'Marxist') spirit, and most famously in 'Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty' (Ethics 103, 1992, pp. 
48-75), both that individual 'persons' are ultimate units of concern and that 'this special status has global force'; 
namely, 'persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone', or in other words, 'everyone is a unit of concern for 
everyone else'. There may be little that one can practically do, Pogge claims, for the inhabitants of a distant village, 
and it may make sense to concentrate international political reform on local and regional institutions capable of 
making meaningful improvements in people's lives, but the broad humanist thesis regarding the communal nature of 
all individual self-realisation stands. 
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as wise will eventually be lost, not in the sense that the libraries or servers where such wisdom can 
be found will no longer be maintained (although this may also be the eventual result), but in the 
sense that a majority of people will live their lives without ever coming into contact with such 
wisdom. Clive James brilliantly diagnoses and actively opposes this spreading 'cultural amnesia' in 
his 2007 book of the same name
30
, while Eagleton warns that 'the end of the humanities'
31
 is coming 
precisely at a time when questions of cultural identity – 'what people will kill or die for' – are being 
radically reevaluated in the light of rapid technological development and globalisation. Eagleton 
summarises the status quo as a 'stalled dialectic' between the global and the local: 
 
  Culture which has been narrowly nationalistic isn't really able to make much  
  headway in a globalised world. On the other hand, a purely rootless, postmodern 
  cosmopolitan culture doesn't seem able to speak to certain deep demands and needs 
  in people where they are. We're living in a kind of misalignment of the global on the 
  one hand and the local on the other. The more rootlessly global and brittly  
  cosmopolitan people become, the more other people are going to retreat to their  
  mountain hideouts and say, 'This is my patch.'
32
 
 
Scruton, however, responds that the only culture worth defending is already a post-nationalistic one 
based on Renaissance and Enlightenment values: 
 
  The high culture that we've been talking about has not really been national, or  
  nationalistic. I had an education in which I was brought up on the sacred books of the 
  ancient Hebrews, the Greek New Testament, the Latin literature of Rome, the Greek 
  epic, the Thousand and One Nights. There is nowhere in this where you can really 
  pin it down to a particular national inheritance. This is part of the great achievement 
  of Europe, that it has erected this high culture as a critical apparatus which enables us 
  to put our national histories in question if we need to.
33
         
  
In other words, for a small, privileged group exposed in youth to the 'professors' of faith in high 
culture, cosmopolitanism is more than a weak glue; it comes to form part of the very core of their 
being. The challenge of humanities education, its very raison d'être in a globalising world fraught 
                                                 
30 See Clive James, Cultural Amnesia: Necessary Memories in History and the Arts, (W.W. Norton, 2007).  
31 See Terry Eagleton, 'The End of the Humanities', University of Notre Dame Public Lecture, 24/4/2013, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ANa4srh5Xww.  
32 Eagleton, 'Terry Eagleton in Conversation with Roger Scruton'. 
33 Scruton, 'Terry Eagleton in Conversation with Roger Scruton'.  
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with sectarian strife and local power struggles, is, or so our warriors will argue, precisely the  
diffusion of professorial enthusiasm for a global literary or cultural canon. Although dilemmas of 
loyalty will always remain to define our lives, an awareness of the fullest possible range of human 
experience and the broad civilisational context of our daily decisions is a prerequisite for moral 
action; only literature, or in a broader sense culture, can offer this unfathomably broad panorama in 
a 'portable' way. 
 Nussbaum is right when she suggests that a globalising world is one in which the dilemmas 
of Greek tragedy – choosing between a mother and a father, or between family and the state – are 
multiplied. The capacity for moral as well as immoral action facilitated by our increased wealth and 
ability to travel is quite literally mind-boggling, and our choice of causes often arbitrary. The 
question of moral truth becomes more urgent, not less, as our possibilities for moral and immoral 
action increase. At the same time, however, if we believe in moral truth, it cannot have changed 
much in recent millennia. Military historian Victor Davis Hanson argues that the search for such 
timeless moral truth has largely stopped within the Western academy and that doctrines of 
multiculturalism and appeasement of violent totalitaranisms - the kinds of postcolonial guilt 
complexes that have stopped many Western humanities professors from professing any faith in the 
idea of a universal civilisation or moral truth at all in recent decades – have gained the upper hand 
in Western élite circles and pose a threat to the continuity of civilisation itself. Hanson argues 
instead for the maintenance of a 'symbiotic relationship' between security and freedom, defending 
the superiority of the Athenian solution ('we throw open our city to the world, and never by any 
alien acts exclude foreigners from the opportunity of learning or observing') over the closed Spartan 
alternative, arguing that the Athenians were 'just as ready to encounter every legitimate danger' and 
that 'although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit' from such liberality, the decision to 
trust 'less in system and policy' than in the 'native spirit' of citizens had been a cornerstone of 
Western civilisation, 'with us from the beginning'.
34
 A vital aspect of this 'native spirit', however, is a 
reluctance to self-censor, a Socratic willingness to examine one's beliefs critically and publicly 
through open, frequently adversarial dialogue; in Hanson's view, 'there is a collective mood in the 
West that is self-censoring, is not self-reflective, and has had a deleterious effect on free 
expression'.
35
 He traces the origins of this self-censorship back to a widespread feeling of survivor 
guilt among Western populations at the end of the colonial era:   
 
  Many Westerners find explanations of Western material superiority based on  
                                                 
34 Victor Davis Hanson, 'In Defence of Liberty', 6/3/2008, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_NtAWoBrvoc&feature=g-vrec (accessed 1/9/12). 
35 Hanson, 'In Defence of Liberty'. 
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  cultural superiority chauvinistic; one of the ways you relieve this contradiction  
  within yourself - I guess we could call it Western guilt - is, in the abstract, on things 
  that you don't think are absolutely essential to your own life, to make concessions. 
  You censor yourself. [...] What is the psychological satisfaction of this? You don't 
  have to make any great sacrifice in your own life. You don't have to give up the  
  cocoon of Westernism when you can do it in the abstract. Some of the fiercest critics 
  of Western civilisation find these abstract outlets of expression, which they feel, in 
  the short term, don't endanger their own privilege.
36
 
 
The longer-term consequence for Hanson of such a spurning of the idea of a 'best that has been 
thought and said in the world' in favour of an empty, self-censoring, multiculturalist embrace of 
identity politics on behalf of marginalised groups is that we 'lose the precious symbiosis between 
security and freedom'. To illustrate his point, Hanson offers the controversial example of Muslim 
integration in Europe:  
 
  In theory, it wouldn't matter how many Muslims came if they became good  
  Europeans. That's not happening for  two reasons; the European left is multicultural, 
  that is, they don't believe in themselves. They can't argue that Europe is better than 
  the alternative. They have no concept of the history or appreciation of the  
  Renaissance or Enlightenment. They don't see themselves as exceptional; so then 
  why should people who come see them as exceptional? [… Muslim immigrants to 
  Europe] want to escape the autocracy of the Middle East, the poverty; they come to 
  the West, and they are given freedom, but then they resent the fact that they are  
  unequal. They want instant parity, because that's what they're told the EU does; then 
  the EU says, 'Well, we gave them all this money, we give them all these entitlements 
  so long as they don't come into our neighbourhoods, why are they angry? [...] The 
  problem is insoluble.
37
 
 
What role can literature or culture play, if any, in solving these problems? Fairly obviously, co-
existence in a finite environment entails material sacrifice; I want to eat, but to the extent that I also 
want other people to eat, I will leave enough and as good for others. Culture enables this sacrifice 
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37 Victor Davis Hanson, 'The New Old World Order', http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=go8uMp-gUsY, 14/10/10 
(accessed 31/8/12). 
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by reminding us of a shared, universal humanity; when we engage socratically with foreign 
interlocutors, both we and our interlocutors have a chance of being improved, and when we read a 
contemporary Arab or Chinese author, we are forced to confront the fact, otherwise absent in our 
everyday lives, that millions of people we have never met live, breathe, love and suffer like us on 
the same planet. The logic of free-market liberalism, now the bread and butter of education systems 
across most of the world, encourages the student to believe that markets best solve most if not all 
human problems, and that, historically, the rise of manners and morality is connected with trade 
anyway: you need to be nice to your client if you want him to buy your wares. But what if a free 
market for some or most material goods is necessary, but not sufficient, to sustain civilisation, 
especially in our globalising century? As Hanson suggests, we may be unaware of the longer-term 
dangers of self-censorship in the name of guilt complexes and narrowly economic interests. More 
than this instrumental reasoning, however, is it not in some sense the case that moral engagement, 
identification with the thoughts and feelings of others, is the goal of life, its own reward, and that 
we teach this to our children in the hope that they will be happy, and know God, or God's 
contemporary secular equivalent? This concept of civilisation perhaps sounds as if it belongs more 
in the 16
th
 than the 21
st
 century, but does it not remain true? Is it not precisely this faith that the 
majority of Western humanities 'professors' have lost? This thesis explores the views of three non-
Western 'warriors' and, in the remainder of this chapter, a series of 'Western counterparts' who seek 
to remind us of this threatened civilisational heritage. 
 Meanwhile, Scottish historian Niall Ferguson, a self-confessed 'empirical thinker' with little 
time for groundless philosophising, has arguably done more than anyone to redefine the meaning of 
the word 'civilisation' in English in the first decade of the 21
st
 century. In Civilisation: The West and 
the Rest,  Ferguson explains the rise of Western civilisation to global dominance after the 
Renaissance in terms of six 'killer apps' – economic competition, the scientific revolution, private 
property rights and the rule of law, modern medicine, the birth of the consumer society, and the 
work ethic - and points to recent evidence of rapid improvements in living standards in East Asia 
and other BRICS economies brought about by the 'downloading' of most or all of these 'apps' to 
suggest that religion, or 'culture', religion's surrogate, plays no real role in the march of 
civilisation.
38
 Just as the myth of Western racial superiority has been gradually discredited, so too, 
Ferguson argues, has the idea that Christianity or Protestantism or the Western literary canon are  
necessary for civilisation been exposed for what it is. Contrary to Max Weber's famous thesis about 
the link between Protestantism and people's willingness to work, Ferguson claims that 
Protestantism's real contribution to modern history was to increase literacy rates, thereby freeing 
                                                 
38 See Niall Ferguson, Civilisation: The West and the Rest, (Penguin Press, 2011).  
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millions of people for more productive economic activity. Non-Protestant nations eventually 
worked this trick out, and are now, to Ferguson's chagrin, out-educating the West and churning out 
more productive generations of workers.  
 It would be absurd, however, to suggest that these six 'killer apps' can rest on anything other 
than a strong bedrock of moral values. Ferguson himself says as much: 
 
  I have a personal philosophy but I'm always trying to modify it. [...] I've never had 
  any religious faith. I have, however, a profound belief that, as a basis for ethical  
  conduct, the Ten Commandments are pretty good, and that actually, the   
  monotheisms, and particularly Christianity, offer a really quite good guide to how to 
  live well. By well, I mean to live morally. It's very hard for an atheist to invent, from 
  first principles, a good ethical basis for behaviour, because actually, in the natural 
  state, human beings don't behave well; they're quite strongly tempted to behave  
  badly. We're evolved in ways that actually encourage bad behaviour. We're designed 
  to kill strangers, we're designed, in fact, to steal, and so it's very important that there 
  should be an ethical framework within which we live. My dilemma is that I don't 
  really believe in any divine policeman or any afterlife payoffs, but I do believe that 
  we should live well.
39
    
 
As a cold-eyed human scientist rather than a humanist bathed daily in the 'sweetness and light' of 
Arnoldian high culture, Ferguson regards himself as 'instinctively a Hobbesian - in other words, I 
think that the state of nature is pretty ugly and that civilisation is all about trying to rein our natural 
impulses in'.
40
 He nevertheless concedes that he is 'prepared to be argued out of that'; if somebody 
can persuade him that 'human beings in fact innately have a preference for order and social 
cooperation rather than killing one another, and that their killing one another is the exception rather 
than the norm', then he will 'certainly listen, and be prepared to be convinced'.
41
 Surely the role of 
the humanities, of culture, is precisely to do this job of convincing, to provide the 'ethical basis for 
behaviour' which the monotheisms as literally interpreted no longer provide, to give people a reason 
not to kill each other and steal from each other and to respond instead to the better angels of their 
nature, to become more fully themselves. While many still believe in the power of civilisation to 
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40  Niall Ferguson, 'Niall Ferguson on Belief'. 
41  Niall Ferguson, 'Niall Ferguson on Belief'.  
 29 
 
improve individuals and society – Steven Pinker, author of a book titled precisely The Better Angels 
of Our Nature (2011), is one prominent recent example
42
 - Eagleton and others suggest that this 
hope is no longer real, and that we have lost our faith in culture's power to save or improve us. 
 Postmodern philosophy and art are at least partly to blame for this loss of faith, 
paradoxically because they distort, in ways we will see below, the original Socratic idea of an 
'examined life' by turning it into a narcissistic end in itself, much as Arnold's philistines made ends 
out of wealth accumulation and physical exercise. And yet, in its original formulation, the Socratic 
call to look within is motivated not first and foremost by a dandyish and self-regarding 'curiosity' – 
a largely pejorative, effete term in the lexicon of Arnold's day
43
 - but by social concerns, a care for 
the fate of a civilisation of which one is an organic part. Costica Bradatan praises Bettany Hughes 
for reminding us of this in her book The Hemlock Cup: Socrates, Athens and the Search for the 
Good Life; Hughes's Socrates 'practiced his philosophy in a day-to-day context', revealing its 
essence in 'the way he relates to the other guests', 'acutely observing', and engaging with them in a 
way which is 'immediate, comradely, corporeal, concrete, flirtatious, fond'. Socrates, 'drinking, 
chatting, eating around a low dinner-table on a warm Athenian night', reveals himself as a 
'philosopher of the people, someone who did not divorce the physical from the metaphysical', or 
personal from social salvation.
44
    
 Niall Ferguson is emphatically not suggesting that we can do without the Socratic spirit, or 
that his 'killer apps' can survive without a hunger for moral truth which must be coached in us. It is 
not the business of a humanist to question the validity of Ferguson's widely praised historical 
scholarship, but rather to provide the coaching that he himself calls for by illustrating that certain 
forms of self-sacrificing behaviour are better or truer than others. Philosophy endeavours to show 
this by rational argument; literature, as well as the more holistic forms of philosophy such as one 
finds in the Confucian tradition, go a step further by actually implanting love in the hearts of readers 
in a direct, uncontrollable, inevitable way. This form of knowledge, what Nussbaum calls 'love's 
knowledge'
45
, is utterly unmonetisable, but, to the extent that it exists, no less real than other 
empirical knowledge.  
 Ferguson, for his part, stresses that knowledge gained through love in the form of free 
association - 'institutions established by citizens with an objective other than private profit' - is 
central to his vision of 'civilisation' or what he also calls 'the black box labelled civil society', and 
that the rapid decline of free association in the Western world in recent decades ought urgently to be 
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reversed.
46
 Though hardly alone in this (left-wing luminaries like Noam Chomsky have made 
careers out of making the same point), the distinctly right-of-centre Ferguson argues that positive 
social change – rights for ethnic and sexual minorities, say – comes from grassroots organising, and 
only at the end of a long struggle becomes codified in law. The same could be said, in reverse, of 
the humanities, now struggling to hold onto their place in universities and the public consciousness 
because of a decline in the reading and study of serious literature among the general adult public – 
itself largely a form of free association – consistent with the decline in other forms of free 
association over the last 40 years in the Western world. Here we are close to the loss of cultural 
knowledge lamented by Scruton: as fewer and fewer people are exposed to 'love's knowledge' 
through direct contact with literature, music, art, philosophy and serious criticism and journalism, 
the less likely they are to want to cooperate with each other, or sacrifice for one another, or refrain, 
in the name of a higher moral or civilisational ideal, from exploiting one another. Even thinkers as 
hard-headed and groundedly 'empirical' as Niall Ferguson imply that the humanities must be part of 
the solution. 
 Before we get to the solution, however, it behooves us at least to sketch this seemingly 
inexplicable loss of faith in the humanities, in 'culture', and in the very concept of 'civilisation' itself 
over the last century. Scruton argues in his debate with Eagleton and elsewhere that the humanities 
are threatened by the virus of postmodern Theory on the one hand – 'theory about that for which 
there can be no theory' in his felicitous phrase - and science, particularly neuroscience and 
evolutionary biology, on the other.
47
 Yet in the end, the problem is one and the same: namely, 
treating the humanities as 'sciences' rather than participatory practices in which the practitioner 
achieves knowledge through a certain kind of moral attention. 'It is the nobility of the soul which 
allows us best to apprehend the universe,' Naguib Mahfouz once said in an interview
48
; this is not a 
scientific hypothesis to be tested, although it remains an empirical claim. Mahfouz's life's work 
consisted in convincing people of the truth of this claim through his own writing by effecting a 
moral change for the better in his readers. Unlike the empirical claims of science, however, 
including the human sciences, which remain more or less valid whether we like them or not, truth in 
the humanities is entirely dependent on what we as moral beings feel. A claim like Mahfouz's is true 
to the extent that people believe it to be true; the humanist is powerless in the face of the true 
sociopath. As humanists, however, we can all agree that true sociopathy is both worse for 
individuals and society as a whole, and associate freely to encourage outcomes which engender 
what we consider to be healthy moral development for ourselves and the people in our care: a broad 
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humanistic education. This kind of commonsense approach, however, is regarded with routine 
suspicion by both active defenders and unconscious inheritors of postmodern Theory, and we need 
to understand why, and how this state of affairs came about.     
 The story could of course be traced back much further, but it makes sense for our purposes 
to begin with Marcel Mauss and Emile Durkheim and the rise of the human sciences in the late 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 centuries, for it is at precisely this point that the humanities were first directly 
challenged by science, as religion had been by the Enlightenment. 
 
 
1.2 From Mauss and Monet to Postmodern Relativism      
However obvious it may seem, it is worth stressing that the founders of the social sciences were 
themselves humanists who were deeply concerned with the fate of human civilisation; they viewed 
their empirical work as a part of, and as a justification for, a larger civilisational project in an age of 
globalisation. Here is Marcel Mauss: 
  Religions are born in the form of sects. A new religion, however transcendent or  
  controversial it may be, is always formed in the heart of another. It sometimes aims 
  only to reform [the existing religion], to bring it back to the purity of the initial  
  revelation. This is the case of the religions produced by Christianity. More often than 
  not, when it is born, the new religion opposes itself to the mother religion in the form 
  of a sect; even when it does away with most of the old notions and most of the old 
  rites, the new religion does not deny the old, it simply wants to introduce modes of 
  behaviour and collective thought that it considers better. Thus neither Jesus nor Paul 
  detach themselves completely from Moses, the Buddha and the Jina do not deny the 
  reality, if only phenomenal, of the gods of Brahmanism. At the beginning, the new 
  religion bears the stamp of its sectarian origin. […] Religion, as with all social  
  phenomena, is in a constant state of becoming; the number of possible   
  fragmentations and innovations, failed and viable, of which it is possible is likely 
  undefined. The sect is the natural product of the functioning of religion.
49
  
   […] It doesn't seem right to say that legal codes and customs have always and 
  everywhere been independent of religious law. Except in our Western societies,  
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  everywhere religion, law and morality are narrowly intertwined.
50
  
   […] Let us pause to consider the idea of a common fund, a general  
  inheritance of societies and civilisations. In our opinion, this is what the idea of  
  'Civilisation' corresponds to: a limit of fusion. […] This idea of a growing  
  inheritance, of an intellectual and material fund shared by an ever more reasonable 
  humanity, is, we sincerely believe, founded in fact.
51
  
 
Mauss's disciple, Emile Durkheim, takes this faith in an acquis commun or common inheritance 
even further: 
 
  [Religious] dogma, taken literally, is, it has often been said, unsustainable; but why 
  should we hold so to the idea of literal expression? Words have no meanings by  
  themselves; it is up to the spirit to seek the essence. Even the most sacred text must 
  be interpreted. […] Once the believer had been authorised by Luther to interpret [the 
  Bible], she was pushed to put her own thoughts where godly thoughts had once  
  been, and soon saw nothing more than symbols in even the most central doctrines, 
  even in the idea of revelation itself. Christ and the miracles now do nothing more 
  than stand in for the Divine; why then wouldn't God Himself be seen as a symbol? 
  And indeed, we have come to see God as the personification of the moral ideal. Is it 
  not clear that such a doctrine is philosophical and no longer warrants the name  
  religion? If Christ is not a God, why pray to him, why see in his words the full and 
  final words of the truth? Because he was a man of extraordinary genius? It goes  
  against the continuity of history and the idea of progress to see in one man, even a 
  superior man, the expression of all centuries.  
   But beyond the dogma, taken literally or interpreted symbolically, there is 
  something in religion which seems to survive critique and keep us believing:  
  morality. Morality developed within religion, which served as a protective envelope 
  for it. Will the need for such protection remain forever? […] Fear [of God] is a  
  pathological sentiment which has nothing moral about it. As for love, religions have 
  corrupted it by claiming it for God alone. This mystical love detaches individuals 
  from the world and from themselves, rendering them indifferent to all that surrounds 
  them and leaving them in a state of disillusionment and disinterest. Today this inert 
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  and contemplative love is being replaced by an active and living love of family,  
  humanity and the ideal. As for prayer, that great auxiliary of religious piety, nothing 
  shows that it is indispensable. Through love and charity, action will take the place of 
  prayer; the nirvana in which the [religious] spirit drowns itself in sterile exaltation 
  will be replaced by thought and philosophical reflection with concrete benefits for all 
  concerned. In other words, what will remain of religion is the metaphysical and  
  philosophical instinct, the love of inquiry, free inquiry.
52
  
 
Durkheim here makes an empirical prediction, albeit with limited historical and sociological 
evidence, about the future moral unity of a post-religious global age. Implicit in this claim is the 
positive role of sociology and the other human sciences, as well as continued free, Socratic 
exploration in humanities disciplines like philosophy and literature, in inspiring this predicted moral 
improvement.  
 Fellow social science pioneer Norbert Elias also concludes that civilisation both is, and 
ought to be, heading in one direction only: towards global integration based on a single monopoly 
of physical and moral force. It is only when all human beings, not just a privileged few, are able to 
achieve a happy marriage between their role in an inevitably highly differentiated social order and 
their personal strivings – a marriage made possible by a mixture of moral education and legal 
constraint - that we can begin to speak of 'civilisation'.
53
 In other words, after a long process of 
education, in which fear plays an unavoidable role – we will see how the young Mahfouz and the 
young Tarkovsky were both terrified of retribution for their petty sins – the morally mature adult 
comes to see that life in a highly differentiated modern society, with all the rights and 
responsibilities that this entails, is the highest form of existence. If Elias stresses the importance of 
sticks – the state's monopoly on violence, the authority of parents and teachers54 – he also 
recognises that the carrots provided by the humanities have a role to play in this ongoing process of 
socio-moral development. When Elias talks about the urgency of an 'identification of the individual 
beyond her borders' and 'our identity at the level of humanity'
55
,  he is referring to the same process 
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that pioneering comparatist H.M. Posnett championed in his 1886 classic Comparative Literature: 
the triumph 'of individual over communal life', or of cosmopolitanism over tribal identity.
56
 
However much modern communications technology may yet improve, and however much global 
trade may force individuals into ever more complex webs of interdependence, even an 
anthropologist like Elias implicitly recognises at least an ancillary role for the humanities in 
accelerating this vital expansion of conscience to embrace ideas of universal human rights. But 
more than this, his very work as an anthropologist is quite openly inspired by his own identification 
'beyond his own borders' and 'at the level of humanity', itself the result of the humanities education 
he received.  
 Consider, then, the enormous difference between the humanistic faith of Mauss, Durkheim 
and Elias in their common civilising mission and the paralysing relativism of their heir, Claude 
Lévi-Strauss: 
 
  If we judge the accomplishments of other social groups in terms of our own, we  
  would in certain respects be forced to acknowledge their superiority; but in doing so 
  we give ourselves the right to judge them, and therefore to condemn all those ends 
  which do not correspond to those of which we approve. We implicitly grant a  
  privileged position to our own society, to its customs and norms... Under such  
  conditions, how could our [ethnographic] studies claim to be scientific? To obtain 
  any kind of objectivity, we must refrain from all judgments of this type.  
   […] Behind the abuses and the crimes, we therefore seek the unshakable base 
  of human society. Ethnographic comparison contributes to this quest in two ways. It 
  shows that this base cannot be found in our civilisation; of all societies observed, it is 
  surely the one that is furthest from it. […] Rousseau believed that the form of life 
  that we today call neolithic was the closest empirical approximation. One can agree 
  with him or not, but I am rather inclined to agree that he was right.  
   […] Other societies are perhaps not better than ours; even if we are inclined 
  to believe it, we have no means at our disposal to prove it. Knowing that for  
  millennia man has only managed to repeat himself, we achieve a nobility of thought 
  that, beyond all repetition, gives our reflections the undefinable grandeur of a  
  beginning.
57
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After two world wars and a rapidly expanding awareness of its own colonial crimes, it is hardly 
surprising that a new generation of Western intellectuals would adopt en masse the kind of openly 
self-loathing, anti-progressive, Year Zero stance on display here. On the one hand, the desire to 
understand the 'structure' of the world through free empirical inquiry more or less remains in Lévi-
Strauss, behind the guilt; on the other, the desire to create a new, more advanced 'civilisation', the 
belief that positive moral advancement is even possible, has died. Lévi-Strauss arguably represents, 
or at least coincides with, the beginning of the shift from civilisation-building to civilisation-
undoing, to 'debunking' and 'unmasking', described by Eagleton and lamented by Scruton. Lévi-
Strauss's structuralism was, however, only the beginning: Derrida's deconstruction, Foucault's 
poststructuralism, Lyotard's postmodernism, and ultimately the united pantheon of 'Theory' - the 
aforementioned names plus a handful of others (Adorno, Lacan, Deleuze, Agamben et al.) would all 
take the 'unmasking' motif even further to reveal a naked wasteland of amoral power behind every 
attempt to educate, to discipline, to 'civilise'. By this point, all concern for empirical evidence, in the 
rapidly developing fields of evolutionary biology and neuroscience in particular, had perished in the 
dark vacuum of this prior nihilism of power. We will return to these themes, and to Theory and its 
legacy, in due course.      
 This decline of faith in civilisation, or better, in the power to civilise, can be traced through 
the history of 20
th
 century art as well. Nobody tells this story with the same flair and insight as 
Robert Hughes, whose main thesis in his iconic book and television series The Shock of the New is 
precisely that art has lost its ability to act as a guide to behaviour, to 'save' or 'improve' people. Now 
more than 30 years old, and written on the cusp of the 'postmodern turn', The Shock of the New 
remains a rollicking chronicle of civilisational decline.  
 Although World War One was clearly the first nail in this coffin, Hughes argues that 
something of the old spirit of faith in the transformative power of art nevertheless survived the war. 
For all its faith in the power of art, however, the Dada movement signified, as the 1968 movement 
also would, 'the desire to go back to scratch, the impossible project of starting culture all over again 
from the beginning, uncontaminated by the language of the elders'.
58
 By 1980, however, even this 
faith - the original spirit of Berlin Dada in the '20s with its hope of 'changing society rather than 
amusing it' - had been extinguished: 'as far as today's politics are concerned, art aspires to the 
condition of muzack: it provides the background hum for power.'
59
 World War Two, with its Nazism 
and Stalinism, had intervened to make virtually all forms of civilisational 'improvement' and 
collective identity-fashioning through art taboo. Hughes quotes Hitler's chief architect Albert Speer:  
'When Goethe [...] saw the Roman Arena in Verona, he said: 'When people who are of different 
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minds are in such a surrounding, pressed together, they all get unified to one mind.' I think this was 
the aim of [my grandiose plans for Berlin], not what the small [individual] man will feel 
personally.'
60
 If there could be 'no poetry after Auschwitz' as Adorno preposterously suggested, it 
was because the consensus was that the horrors of Auschwitz had been caused by an excess rather 
than a lack of civilisational zeal; what now mattered most was to leave people alone with their 
beliefs and feelings rather than to 'invade' them with one's own. In Isaiah Berlin's famous 
formulation, 'negative freedom' – the freedom 'from' – was now the supreme goal of politics. All 
forms of 'positive freedom' – the right 'to' certain goods, such as Arnold's 'best that has been thought 
and said in the world' – were now viewed with suspicion in the liberal democracies, and for largely 
understandable reasons: the abuses of the concept of 'positive freedom' were still painfully fresh in 
the memory.  
 The very last vestiges of Victorian faith in moral progress, and the role of art in this 
progress, were, so the story goes, torn down in an orgy of negativity in 1968. The last major artist to 
reflect the lost wholeness, the 'sweetness and light' of prewar Western civilisation and Arnoldian 
culture at its best, was, for Hughes, Henri Matisse: 'Nowhere in the span of his work do you feel a 
trace of the alienation and conflict to which modernism consigned us.'
61
 The Arnoldian faith in 
perfectibility survives unscathed in Matisse ('Matisse loved pattern, and through it, he gives you the 
illusion of a completely full world'), and would go on informing his work even after World War 
Two had 'killed the classical Mediterranean'.
62
 Matisse's 'The Swimming Pool' (1952) was 'his 
farewell to a subject which had been one of the tests of an artist's virtuosity since the 15th century: 
the human animal in energetic movement, the body stripped of its guilt.'
63
 This is not at all to 
suggest that Matisse lacked a fully-developed conscience or sense of the moral unity of the 
civilisation which made such free juvenile play and happiness – Arnold's 'sweetness and light' - 
possible. On the contrary, between 1947 and 1951, 'Matisse was continuously busy with what he 
called the last stage in an entire lifetime of work, the apex of an immense, sincere and difficult 
effort', which Hughes also describes as 'probably the last major work of art that Catholicism would 
be able to evoke in our century': the Dominican chapel in Vence.
64
 The anachronistic nature of the 
project 'wasn't a question of style; it was a matter of a complete attitude towards life and how to live 
it and how to sustain human relationships which came out of the 19th century and which, for 
thousands of people, was wrecked by the last world war.'
65
 
 Hughes's real point here is that, after Matisse, and in the aftermath of the two world wars, 
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victimhood and the unhealthy self-absorption that go with it were now unavoidable for Catholics 
and Protestants alike: the Western world as a whole, including 'post-Freudian America'
66
 with its 
unhealthy attachment to guilt, was unable, as Matisse was, to forget the horrors of its two great wars 
and colonial enterprises, to confess and move on, and to recover its old faith in moral unity and 
progress. The kind of meditation required for art, as Hughes puts it, 'needs pleasure and not pain', or 
a normal, happy upbringing rather than a traumatised, deprived one; art, and the taste for art, 'come 
from the centre of the self and not from its disturbed edges', or as Flaubert put it, 'art is a luxury; it 
requires calm, clean hands'.
67
 By 1968, this was impossible; Hughes's broad explanation why can be 
summarised in the following terms: world wars and colonial guilt had left millions of Western 
parents traumatised, and in a postwar reiteration of W.H. Auden's famous 1939 rhyme 'I and the 
public know / What all schoolchildren learn, / Those to whom evil is done / Do evil in return'
68
, 
subsequently left too many of their offspring improperly loved, 'spoilt' in the proper sense, feeling 
stifled and in need of 'escape', a heaven that they found in newly available sex, drugs and rock-and-
roll rather than in the best of the Western civilisational heritage, which had been inadequately 
bequeathed to them. Such narcissistic victimhood is, as Hughes argues here and as Mahfouz in 
particular will also show (Tarkovsky's Ivan is a heroic exception to this rule) as old as warfare and 
trauma itself: 
 
  The wish for absolute freedom is one of the constants of intellectual life, and in  
  France it amounts to a tradition. [...]  It seeks spontaneity, but is doomed to failure 
  when it runs up against the real world. Its enemies are priest, cop, bureaucrat, boss, 
  and censor. But it's too high-brow to have a broad base; it breathes the air of  
  privilege, and is self-indulgent. Generally, workers don't like it, and socialists reject it 
  as impractical, which it is. It is the product of young middle-class people fed up with 
  their assigned social role. The last time it surfaced in France was in May 1968, but 
  the time before that, it took a more complicated and aesthetic form, and called itself 
  surrealism.
69
  
 
Just as the surrealists had, in Max Ernst's formulation, sought to fight the madness of the century's 
dictators with their own brand of madness, the 1968 generation sought to oppose all attempts to 
promote active values with their own negative, 'debunking' ontology. Hughes stresses the lingering 
effect of surrealism on sixties culture, unbeknownst to those participating in it, who thought their 
                                                 
66 Hughes, The Shock of the New, '3. The Landscape of Pleasure'. 
67 Hughes, The Shock of the New, '3. The Landscape of Pleasure'. 
68 W.H. Auden, 'September 1, 1939', http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/15545 (accessed 4/3/14). 
69 Robert Hughes, The Shock of the New, '5. The Threshold of Liberty'. 
 38 
 
calls for 'freedom' from tradition and civilisation were new - 'the old contracts torn up in a new 
way'.
70
 The key was simply 'being yourself, whatever that self might be. […] The word went out 
that art is me, me, me. But is the self, that great sacred cow of our culture, automatically 
interesting?'
71
 The sixties were like the twenties, 'a dandyistic theatrical revolt, based upon a cult of 
youth', in which 'old Dionysus' was trying to reassert himself amid 'nattering about hobbits and 
cosmic consciousness'.
72
 The link between the sixties and surrealism lay, for Hughes, in 'the illusion 
that youth was truth', and in the idea that 'by finding reality intolerable, one became a prophet.'
73
 
This Dionysian narcissism 'loves everything that is contrary, extravagant, and free', and is 'a very 
durable spirit, hard to exorcise'.
74
         
 In the final episodes of The Shock of the New, Hughes explores the trendy ideas that 'after 
World War Two, reality had outstripped art', that 'there was no testimony art could give that would 
rival the photographs' of Auschwitz, and that 'there were few who believed that art could carry the 
burden of major social meanings anymore.'
75
 The modernist optimism of the likes of Paul Klee, 
whose central theme was 'the garden of paradise, all life composed under the eye of natural order', 
and Vassily Kandinsky, who thought 'a new age of spirit was coming', gave way to Francis Bacon's 
'cannibal's world from which all moral relationships had been erased'.
76
 In a postwar, post-
television, 'me' age, 'indifference becomes our second skin; everything the camera give us is slightly 
interesting, not for long, just for now'.
77
 The artist who dramatised this condition, and who 'became 
a famous artist by proclaiming that art can't change life, whereas others once did by loudly giving 
the impression that it could', was Andy Warhol.
78
 Whereas the Renaissance idea of fame had 
retained a self-sacrificing, moral, even chivalrous connotation, the postwar cult of celebrity in 
which Warhol so prominently participated was in fact 'the most cunning form of dandyism'; 
Warhol's 'baleful mimicry of advertising without the gloss', a mere repetition of 'sameness within 
glut', had lost all touch with the 'discrimination within abundance' which had been 'the essence of 
Monet's painting' less than a century before.
79
 Yet 'like a radioactive isotope', Warhol's self-
regarding, openly entrepreneurial art 'had a half-life: boredom became boring.'
80
   
 As boring as Warhol-inspired modern art would become, however, there would be no going 
back: nobody extracted 'the essential information for the conduct of their lives from looking at 
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paintings anymore.'
81
 This, for Hughes, was the beginning of the end: 'The pop-art idea that the 
medium is the message boils down to the idea that it doesn't really matter what art says,' and once 
art 'gives up its claims to seriousness, it's shot', for 'even in a culture which is split as disastrously in 
as many ways as ours has, the problems of choice, taste, and moral responsibility for images still 
remain. In fact, they get harder.'
82
 By abdicating that responsibility in an orgy of selfish negativity 
in the 1960s and 1970s, the avant garde as we had known it 'sank'.
83
 Indeed, for Hughes, 
   
  the famous 'radicalism' in '60s and '70s art turns out to have been a kind of dumb 
  show, a charade of toughness, a way of avoiding feeling. I don't think we are ever 
  again obliged to look at a plywood box or a row of bricks and think, 'This is the real 
  thing, this is the necessary art of our time'. [...] The fact is that anyone except  
  children can make such things, because children have a kind of direct, sensuous and 
  complex relationship with the world around them that modernism in its declining 
  years was trying to deny. That relationship is the lost paradise that art wants to give 
  back to us, not as children but as adults. [...] The basic project of art is always to  
  make the world whole and comprehensible, to restore it to us in all its glory and its 
  occasional nastiness, not through argument, but through feeling, and then to close the 
  gap between you and everything that is not you, and in this way to pass from feeling 
  to meaning. This is not something that committees can do; it is not a task achieved by 
  groups or movements. It is done by individuals mediating in some way between a 
  sense of history and an experience of the world. This task is literally endless, and so 
  although we don't have an avant garde anymore, we are always going to have art.
84
  
 
On the one hand, modernism accelerated the shift 'from communal to individual life' that Posnett 
and others both predicted and welcomed, but on the other, it threatened to cut the individual off 
completely from the vast global civilisational inheritance - 'the best that has been thought and said' - 
that was meant to take the place of the local tribe. While in the 15
th
 century 'painting was one of the 
primary, dominant forms of public speech' the task of which was to make the Christian message 
'vivid and tangible and credible' and to 'insert the legend into the life of the people who gathered' in 
churches so as to 'strengthen their faith, alter their beliefs, and so compel behaviour', and while art 
retained this 'didactic purpose', showing people 'what values to adopt' right up to the end of the 19
th
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century, by the 1960s the 'whole issue of the use of public art' was in question.
85
 The avant garde 
died with Warhol because 'if art doesn't embody values, then it can't act as a conscience, and that 
was what the avant garde set out to be'.
86
  
 By 1980, however, 'nobody [felt] threatened by works of art the way that Dumas felt 
threatened by Courbet'.
87
 Dumas had 'used the kind of language that societies use to protect 
themselves and to punish offenders' and which no artist in a philistine society could hope to 
inspire.
88
 The new 'could only shock if it was underwritten by the old'; a loss of belief in the idea 
that 'it matters what art says' led to the idea that 'modern art owed nothing to the past and was 
actually opposed to all tradition', an idea which Hughes describes as 'nonsense, but durable 
nonsense'.
89
 Nazism and Stalinism had accelerated this retreat to the 'nirvana of boredom' which 
'museum-dependent minimalist art' had offered; indeed, such art was the 'exact opposite of the 
fantasies of action and involvement that political art held out'.
90
 But this rejection of the horrors of 
totalitarian ideology took the form of a rejection of the very idea of human perfectibility through 
social engagement at all, an idea which was central to Arnold's definition of culture as a marriage of 
the desire to act with the constant need to refine our motives for action.
91
 Hughes argues that 'the 
real field of modernist experience lies somewhere between dumb mass propaganda on one hand and 
the silences of a dying avant garde on the other'.
92
 The difference between Nazi propaganda and the 
work of a universal and great artist like Matisse is that the experience of it 'is not collective'; 'in 
front of a Matisse, you do not hear the chant of surging millions. You hear one voice carefully 
explaining itself to one person, the interested stranger, yourself.'
93
  
 Art, then, in a post-tribal age, does not engage 'in the old collectivities: religion, nation, 
history', as William Rubin puts it in his interview with Hughes, but rather grasps after the higher 
collectivity of a global republic of letters in which all relationships are between free and equal 
individuals. In the words of Hilton Kramer, whom Hughes also interviews, art 'prepares the 
educated segment of a society to question the values that have been handed down, and creates a 
kind of ferment which prepares the way for vast political change. Its role is to create a model of 
dissent.'
94
 With this, we are back to Eagleton and Scruton, where we started. Somehow, the primacy 
of this 'dissent model' for art, Eagleton's idea of 'culture as critique', has been challenged since 1968 
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by an apparent 'model of dissent' par excellence: Theory. How did something so radically 
committed to critiquing 'power' end up destroying, as Warhol and the art market destroyed the avant 
gardes, the humanities as they were traditionally known, and colluding with the very market forces 
which were happy to see Arnoldian high culture marginalised? 
 It is not altogether difficult to understand why dogmatic and logically self-contradicting 
ideas like 'Everything can be deconstructed' and 'Everything is power' should become so popular a 
generation after the Second World War and in the dying days of European colonialism. Unable to 
compete with the 'greatest generation' when it came to martial valor or self-sacrifice, postwar 
Western teenagers rebelled and, aided by the dubiousness of the cause in Vietnam, affirmed their 
own superiority by affirming that all possible wars were acts of aggression and therefore wrong, and 
that all calls to self-sacrifice were sublimated power games. A Copernican shift in the understanding 
of history and culture was envisaged; inspired by too-easy slogans like Benjamin's claim that 'every 
document of civilisation is also a document of barbarism', the 1968 generation sought a total break 
with the 'dead white men' of the past, and to erect a culture of free, self-indulgent love based 
simultaneously on two parallel ideas: that others have no right to impose their brand of 'civilisation' 
on the individual, as parents and Nazis and rigid social institutions, including schools, universities, 
prisons and psychiatric hospitals had done, and that, correspondingly, the individual has no right to 
impose her brand of 'civilisation' on others. 
 After decades of colonial brutality and two cataclysmic world wars caused by an excess of 
totalitarian collectivism, the emergence of such a self-regarding, patricidal philosophy represented a 
breath of clearly needed fresh air. It was not, however, without serious longer-term consequences. 
Rather than line up with those who claimed that Western humanism had actually saved Europe and 
the world from even greater trauma in the first half of the 20
th
 century, the 1968 generation threw 
their chips in with the masters of suspicion – Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and their heirs – and sought a 
total overhaul of curricula everywhere. Everything in the old 'dominant cultures' of Western Europe 
and North America was now worthy of suspicion and deconstruction; little care was given to 
whether the precious baby of our Renaissance and Enlightenment heritage would be thrown out 
with the bathwater of postcolonial cultural revolution. A new language was sought, one which 
would give the revolutionaries enough freedom to say what they wanted while at the same time 
bathing their pronouncements on the relativism of all things in an aura of scientific authority. The 
opaque but profound-seeming prose of Adorno, Barthes, Deleuze and the other Pantheon members 
fit the bill perfectly: to demand greater clarity and ease of comprehension, let alone to disagree 
outright, was to declare oneself stupid and reactionary.  
 In 'The Theory Generation', Nicholas Dames summarises the experience of Theory as that of 
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'being spoken over rather than spoken to'.
95
 As if suffering from a lack of sound parental discipline 
following the trauma of war, the 1968 generation sought parental guidance and reassurance from 
gurus they could not fully understand but who spoke to their simultaneous desires for freedom and 
self-esteem: we who have not endured war have nevertheless traversed the prose of the Theorists, 
who tell us, or seem to tell us, that you, parents, are not better than us, are in many ways worse, and 
no longer have the right to tell us what to read or what to do. By 1980, Theory had all but 
conquered humanities departments in the United States and Europe; few have explored the 
consequences of this revolution in more detail than Bruce Bawer: 
 
  [The] inability of many young Americans to express a simple or even grammatically 
  coherent thought, in Bawer’s view, owes to a variety of academic fads that in the 
  early 1980s captured the American university. One was postmodernism, of course, 
  which traced its roots to the great anthropologists, but from which, alas, was derived 
  a form of crude cultural relativism that achieved the ignominious trifecta of  
  insipidity, incoherence, and blithe ignorance of a philosophical literature treating the 
  idea of relativism from the Sophists to, at the very least, G. E. Moore. From this  
  followed the conclusion that values, such as individual liberty, were not universal, 
  and as the Canadian poet David Solway put it, that we must perforce believe that 
  “[t]here are no barbarians, only different forms of civilised men.” 
   […] The chief objective of an education in the humanities today, Bawer  
  argues—with abundant anecdotal evidence to support the claim—is to appreciate that 
  life is all about hegemonic power and to use 'theory' to uncover its workings.  
  Depending upon their sex, skin color, or sexual orientation, students are asked to 
  accept as axiomatic that they are either the unconscious instrument of such power or 
  the repository of its collective grievance and victimhood.
96
 
The whole thrust of Theory-inspired identity politics – that one is first and foremost a victim (or 
perpetrator) – is hostile to the older humanist ideal enshrined in the Great Books canon of the 1950s 
and dating back to the Renaissance and Enlightenment themselves, namely that we are all potential 
inheritors of the best of an unfree and unequal past. While the Theory revolution in Western 
humanities departments has indeed coincided with major progress for ethnic and sexual minorities 
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as well as women, it is not altogether clear just how much of a role Theory itself can be said to have 
played in these positive developments. As Martha Nussbaum writes of notorious Theory-acolyte 
Judith Butler, echoing Hanson on the problem of self-censorship, 
 
  many feminists in America are still theorizing in a way that supports material change 
  and responds to the situation of the most oppressed. Increasingly, however, the  
  academic and cultural trend is toward the pessimistic flirtatiousness represented by 
  the theorizing of Butler and her followers. Butlerian feminism is in many ways easier 
  than the old feminism. It tells scores of talented young women that they need not 
  work on changing the law, or feeding the hungry, or assailing power through theory 
  harnessed to material politics. They can do politics in the safety of their campuses, 
  remaining on the symbolic level, making subversive gestures at power through  
  speech and gesture. This, the theory says, is pretty much all that is available to us 
  anyway, by way of political action, and isn't it exciting and sexy?  
   In its small way, of course, this is a hopeful politics. It instructs people that 
  they can, right now, without compromising their security, do something bold. But the 
  boldness is entirely gestural, and insofar as Butler's ideal suggests that these  
  symbolic gestures really are political change, it offers only a false hope. Hungry  
  women are not fed by this, battered women are not sheltered by it, raped women do 
  not find justice in it, gays and lesbians do not achieve legal protections through it. 
  Finally there is despair at the heart of the cheerful Butlerian enterprise. The big hope, 
  the hope for a world of real justice, where laws and institutions protect the equality 
  and the dignity of all citizens, has been banished, even perhaps mocked as sexually 
  tedious. Judith Butler's hip quietism is a comprehensible response to the difficulty of 
  realizing justice in America. But it is a bad response. It collaborates with evil.  
  Feminism demands more and women deserve better.
97
  
 
Those sympathetic to Theory will, like their Salafist brothers in victimhood when it comes to their 
own sacred texts, no doubt view these summary dismissals of all that Theory hath wrought as unfair 
and, by some margin, insufficiently nuanced. Unfortunately for these critics, my goal here, I must 
say thankfully, has not been to engage with the arguments of the leading Theoreticians one by one 
(as Nussbaum so patiently does with Butler in the outstanding article the conclusion of which is 
cited here), but simply to trace, as briefly as possible for our purposes, the rise of Theory in the 
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Western humanities and the death of the grand narrative of Civilisation in the last three decades of 
the 20
th
 century, before moving on to propose, or at least contribute to, a possible antidote. 
 Over the last decade, indeed, and perhaps partly in response to the shock of September 11, 
2001, postmodern Theory has finally begun to lose some of its hold on humanities education in the 
Western world. Dames argues that 'by the end of the 1990s, the easy equation that Theory gave 
you — realism is a tool of  capitalist rationality, a product and not an imaginative artifact, a tool 
of the status quo — had the feel of a truism', and that a response was 'already underway'98. Even the 
partially Theory-sympathetic Eagleton's 2003 book After Theory was engaged in a serious 
reevaluation of the whole Theory phenomenon; Eagleton was now willing to laugh, in John 
Mullan's words, at 'all those earnest undergraduates (and lecturers) attaching the same arguments 
about sexual transgression to whatever they are studying' and writing 'uncritical, reverential essays 
on Friends' where earlier generations had been writing 'uncritical, reverential essays on Flaubert'.
99
 
Nevertheless, for those who were caught up in the middle of the Theory revolution, rather than 
those of us who were educated through its death throes, there was no doubt much to identify with 
and much to love about the Theorists – Dames cites the examples of Jonathan Franzen (Swarthmore 
'81), Jeffrey Eugenides (Brown '83) and Jennifer Egan (Penn '85) as novelists who have reviewed 
their 'Theory Years' with one degree of nostalgia or another – but we must nevertheless share 
Dames's conclusion that, some time around the turn of the century, Theory was 'was no longer the 
key to all the world’s things, but rather just another thing-in-the-world'.100 
 There is not yet, however, a post-postmodern consensus on what the humanities in the 21
st
 
century are for. In the next section I will attempt to sketch such a consensus by drawing on a wide 
range of recent sources which aim to reconnect the humanities with their old civilising mission.  
 
 
1.3 Beyond the Postmodern: Towards A New Unifying Vision of the Humanities 
 
One response to the 'postmodern moment' of the 1990s has been to embrace hard, empirical science 
as a possible saviour of the humanities. New terms like 'literary Darwinism', 'neurohumanities', 
'neurophilosophy' and so on have entered humanists' vernacular over the past decade. Whatever 
reservations one may have about the limits and even reductive dangers of possible neurological or 
evolutionary explanations of humanism, to deny that the attempt to understand our humanistic 
selves empirically is itself highly worthwhile is to remain trapped in the kind of wholesale 
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scepticism and relativism about knowledge which characterised the humanities in the 'postmodern 
moment' of the 1990s and which led The Times to print an article entitled 'Can Neuro Lit Crit Save 
the Humanities?'
101
 Whatever the solution to the humanities' crisis, however, it is clear that science 
– good science – can only be an ally in our quest for humanistic understanding, even if one remains 
committed to a humanism which is not itself a science. Arnold himself thought so, and defended a 
'true scientific passion' even in people of 'culture' who strive above all for moral perfection: 'the 
very desire to see things as they are implies a balance and regulation of mind which is not often 
attained without fruitful effort'.
102
 The more we know about neuropsychology, in other words, the 
better we will be able to understand what is psychologically and morally possible for human beings, 
and this knowledge will inform our humanistic judgments. It is at least partly because much of the 
work of Freud and Lacan in psychology, for example, has been proven to be empirically false or 
superseded by more recent work that literary critics must stop relying on them as critical authorities. 
It clearly behooves humanists and literary scholars, therefore, to keep abreast of developments in 
the human sciences in particular to the best of their ability, no mean feat in a world of exponential 
knowledge growth.  
 A good deal of recent work in the humanities, however, has tried to show that science can 
never be sufficient for humanism even as it remains deeply necessary, and that the humanities are a 
discipline apart, and not merely a source of data for empirical analysis (although they are also that). 
Massimo Pigliucci is one prominent voice in the debate about consilience; he argues that 
distinguishing clearly between science – the desire to understand the world on its own terms – and 
the humanities – the desire to achieve moral or spiritual perfection through some kind of praxis or 
informed action – might actually 'reflect a natural way in which human beings understand the world 
and their role in it'.
103
 Pigliucci is clear that this is not 'a suggestion to give up, much less a mystical 
injunction to go beyond, science. There is nothing beyond science. But there is important stuff 
before it: there are human emotions, expressed by literature, music and the visual arts; there is 
culture; there is history.'
104
 Pigliucci concludes that this respect for the autonomy of the humanities 
from science is 'a more humble take on human knowledge than the quest for consilience, but it is 
one that, ironically, is more in synch with what the natural sciences tell us about being human.'
105
   
 We nevertheless live in a world where, entirely rightly in a time of economic crisis as well as 
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in any other, publicly funded academic disciplines must justify their existence as a concrete social 
good. Few academics have done more to justify the humanities to the wider public in recent years 
than Harvard Professor Elaine Scarry. In 'Poetry Changed the World: Injury and the Ethics of 
Reading', Scarry asks the simple question 'What is the ethical power of literature? Can it diminish 
acts of injuring, and if it can, what aspects of literature deserve the credit?'
106
 Scarry's three-part 
answer echoes Niall Ferguson's aforementioned claims about the link between literacy and 
civilisation and also draws on Steven Pinker's work on declining violence rates, but ultimately goes 
much further to reserve a special role for literature itself. She argues that 'the dispute structure of 
poetry from Homer forward helps to nourish three arenas of disputation in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries whose purpose—at least in the parliaments and law courts—is diminution of injury.'107 
Together with the development of the novel form in Europe in subsequent centuries, which Scarry 
argues is a development of the 'dispute structure' of poetry insofar as 'all that has happened is that 
the factual side has fallen away and we are presented only with the counterfactual', the legacy of 
such a literary culture, which Scarry uncovers in Eastern as well as Western traditions, is a 
requirement 'to think counterfactually, to think the thing that one does not oneself hold to be the 
case.'
108
 Such a culture allows not just for 'the recognition that there are multiple points of view, two 
sides to every coin, but also the chance to practice, and thereby to deepen and strengthen that 
recognition'.
109
 
 But it is beauty itself which is above all central to Scarry's vision of what the humanities are 
for: 
 
  Beautiful artworks and poems are, according to Pater, the surest way to bring about 
  “this quickened, multiplied consciousness” and hence to fold 200 (or perhaps 2,000) 
  years of perception into an ordinary lifespan, which in Pater’s case was 55 years. 
   But though the ethics of reading can surely include the benefits to the reader 
  herself, our focus here is on the way other, often unknown, persons are the  
  beneficiaries of one’s reading. There are at least three paths by which beauty  
  contributes to this outcome. 
   First, beautiful things (whether poems, mathematical equations, or faces)  
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  have attributes—such as symmetry, vivacity, unity—that anticipate those same, but 
  much more difficult to achieve, attributes in the realm of justice. Symmetry is at hand 
  in, for example, the meter of a poem, and provides inspiration and guidance for the 
  centuries it will take to bring about symmetry in the realm of justice—whether it is 
  John Rawls’s justice as fairness, which requires “the symmetry of everyone’s  
  relations to each another”; or Plato’s aspiration for a symmetry between crimes and 
  punishments, which we are still a very long way from; or Hume’s symmetry  
  between expectations and their fulfillment. 
   Second, beauty interrupts and gives us sudden relief from our own minds. Iris 
  Murdoch says we undergo “an unselfing” in the presence of a beautiful thing; “self-
  preoccupation” and worries on one’s own behalf abruptly fall away. Simone Weil 
  refers to this phenomenon as a “radical decentering.” I call it an “opiated adjacency,” 
  an awkward term but one which reminds us that there are many things in life that 
  make us feel acute pleasure (opiated) and many things in life that make us feel  
  sidelined, but there is almost  nothing—except beauty—that does the two   
  simultaneously. Feeling acute pleasure at finding oneself on the margins is a first step 
  in working toward fairness.
110
 
 
If, as Scarry suggests, 'feeling sidelined', feeling that one's own bodily interests are somehow less 
important than those of beautiful others, or at least not more important, is a 'first step' towards 
fairness and justice, then a free-market society can only be said to function fairly or justly if its 
citizens are first educated to 'feel sidelined', to feel that their own material and psychological 
fulfilment are not the ultimate goal of existence, and that higher civilisational values are real. To 
summarise Scarry, citizens of a civilised community must be educated in beauty, as well as 'dispute' 
and 'empathy'. Scarry spells out some of what this means for the humanities as a social institution, 
arguing that 'shifts in ethical behavior require a sea change across wide populations of readers'.
111
 
The corollary of this is that, far from debunking or destroying inherited cultural traditions, 'the main 
work of the humanities is to ensure that books are placed in the hands of each incoming wave of 
students and carried back out to sea.'
112
 Nevertheless, the true humanist's Arnoldian zeal to turn 
book-learning into real-world 'diminution of injury' impels both teachers and students alike to go 
further and to make clear 'the lines of responsibility to real-world injuries and the call to that work 
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that is embedded in the three key features of literature.'
113
   
 Another prominent American humanist who wholeheartedly shares this robust, injury-
reducing vision of the humanities is Anthony T. Kronman. In Kronman's view, the humanities really 
can and do improve both individuals and society, even if the bulk of humanities 'professors' have 
lost their faith in what the humanities do. Kronman specifically blames the rise of the 'research 
model' for obscuring the primary task of a university education in the humanities; after leaving 
university to pursue a career as an activist, Kronman realised that he 'missed reading - for which I 
now had almost no time - and the aimless conversations of college life that the hard realities of my 
organising work discouraged', and upon returning to university, was lucky enough to enrol in a 
course in existentialism taught by Nathaniel Lawrence:  
 
     At the heart of the seminar was the question of how best to live, of what to care  
  about and why, the question of the meaning of life. […] The seminar became the 
  centre of everything I did that fall, in class and out. Partly it was because the  
  readings were deep and enlightening, partly because I discovered I could keep up 
  with my more advanced classmates and even make a contribution or two, partly  
  because Professor Lawrence's wisdom and kindness enveloped us all. But mostly it 
  was because I made a discovery in that class that has been a central conviction of 
  mine ever since. I discovered that the meaning of life is a subject that can be studied 
  in school.
114
  
 
Kronman argues that the vocationalisation of universities has deprived humanities teachers of 'the 
unique authority they once enjoyed as guides to the meaning of life', and that 'only the humanities 
have had the inclination and ability to provide such guidance'.
115
 It is precisely this deeper 
commitment to moral perfection as well as curiosity for its own sake (or for the sake of narrowly 
economic development) which sets the humanities 'apart from the natural and social sciences and 
defines their special contribution to the work of higher education'.
116
 The loss of faith in this ideal 
after the Second World War left 'a void' into which 'the political ideas of the 1960s and 1970s 
entered - the ideas of diversity and multiculturalism, and the theory that values are merely disguised 
acts of power.'
117
  
 By contrast, for the current, post-postmodern generation of American humanists, which 
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includes Scarry and Kronman as well as Martha Nussbaum, the question of the meaning of life is 
central to the question of order and justice in society, and it therefore matters deeply to the health of 
a society how citizens answer it. In Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defence of Reform in Liberal 
Education (1997), Nussbaum identifies three core capacities for 'global citizenship': 1) the Socratic 
ability to examine one's life and beliefs critically (i.e. 'what are your reasons for believing what you 
believe?'), which is necessary for a political culture which goes beyond soundbites; 2) knowledge of 
the world, including the geography, history, literature and language of other countries as well as 
one's own, not to mention scientific knowledge and an openness to empirical evidence in order to 
make sound moral reasoning – the examined life - possible; and 3) cultivation of the moral 
imagination ('putting yourself in the shoes of another').
118
 Nussbaum worries aloud about the global 
over-emphasis on vocational education and about future 'nations of docile engineers who won't 
know how to examine the claims of a political leader', citing the example of Gujarat as the Indian 
state with simultaneously the least humanities-friendly education system and most authoritarian 
political culture.
119
 Learning to express reasons honestly, publicly and respectfully is, Nussbaum 
reminds us, a complex skill requiring years of practice, not just science education and lessons in 
corporate order-following, important though these things also are in a complex modern society. Of 
course, to reduce the humanities to a social good while ignoring their benefits for individuals is to 
miss the prior point that individuals have a right to know 'the best that has been thought and said in 
the world' in the first place, and nobody could be said to be more aware of this than Nussbaum 
herself; books like Love's Knowledge (1992) are celebrations of literature's power to connect us to 
our true selves via empathic connections with others and the work of others.
120
 But in recent years 
Nussbaum has focused on the link between humanities education and global justice, the question of 
'why love matters for justice', the subtitle of her latest book
121
, and on concrete ways of improving 
the lives of the world's less fortunate.   
 Michael Sandel is another contemporary American humanist who reminds us that the right 
to a humanities education, the right to access 'the best that has been thought and said in the world' 
and thereby to cultivate a concrete conception of individual virtue, is directly connected to the quest 
for justice in society, and that it is meaningless to talk about one without reference to the other. 
Sandel argues that freedom of expression matters not only because 'government should be neutral 
with respect to the content of people’s speech and respect the fact that it is the speech of a freely 
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choosing self', as postwar liberals have affirmed, but moreover because engagement in public 
deliberation 'makes us better' and 'enables us to develop our human capacities more fully'.
122
 Sandel 
calls this 'an Aristotelian defence of freedom of speech because it does refer to a certain conception 
of the good life and maybe even virtue'.
123
 The central point is not, as the traditional liberal position 
has it, that freedom of speech is 'an instrument to enable each individual to have a say and therefore 
get what he or she wants from public policy', although it may also, as a happy by-product, achieve 
such ends; the point is that deliberating freely in a public setting is itself character-building: 'when 
we concern ourselves with public affairs, and when we take responsibility for the fate of the 
community as a whole, we exercise human faculties that would otherwise lie dormant.'
124
  
 In other words, the traditional liberal ideal of a neutral state which does not try to impose 
any conception whatsoever of the good life on its citizens is itself a denial of the value of the 
humanities either as a public institution or as a private right: the negative freedom to choose one's 
own conception of the good life, however morally flawed that conception may be, trumps the 
positive freedom to access 'the best that has been thought and said in the world' and the freedom to 
use that humanistic knowledge to further the cause of justice in society. It is no coincidence, 
therefore, that the rapid atrophy of the humanities in Western universities has coincided with the 
'end-of-history' triumphalism of the champions of liberal democracy; to believe that the state has no 
business trying to cultivate virtue other than a passive liberal respect for the negative freedoms of 
others, to deny that individuals themselves have a right to learn about virtue or that society benefits 
from a virtuous citizenry, is to fall prey to the very brand of postmodern moral relativism that not 
uncoincidentally accompanied the victory of Western liberalism in the Cold War.  
 The idea that individuals everywhere should be left to pursue merely vocational or local 
educations and to develop their own conception of the good life without any formal access to the 
store of civilisational knowledge represented by the best of the global humanities has been 
challenged since the turn of the century by two major global crises: more recently, a financial crisis 
widely blamed on the moral failings of the world's political and business élites, most of them 
Western; and a cultural crisis in the Islamic world, which resulted in a wave of global jihadist 
violence most spectacularly brought to the world's attention on September 11, 2001. With the latter 
crisis, the old liberal paradox of how to tolerate the intolerant has been forced back to the top of 
political philosophers' agendas, with a broad consensus of opinion agreeing that the kind of 
extremism represented by Osama bin Laden and his followers simply cannot be coexisted with. 
While the violence of the 'war on terror' has been a central pillar in the strategy of Western liberal 
                                                 
122  Michael Sandel, in 'Michael Sandel and A.C. Grayling in Conversation', 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/michael-sandel-ac-grayling-transcript/#.UY4MOBzfZwc, 10/5/13. 
123  Sandel, 'Michael Sandel and A.C. Grayling in Conversation'. 
124  Sandel, 'Michael Sandel and A.C. Grayling in Conversation'.  
 51 
 
democracies' reaction to the wave of terror attacks, there has also been a recognition in policy and 
intellectual circles of the need to win the 'hearts and minds' of the global Muslim community, which 
has in turn forced a re-engagement with theological questions once thought to be irrelevant in a 
postmodern 21
st
 century world.  
 The first publicly prominent manifestation of the Western intelligentsia's collective return to 
the theme of religion was the so-called New Atheist movement, led by evolutionary biologist 
Richard Dawkins, journalist Christopher Hitchens, and psychologist Sam Harris. It is both 
criminally negligent and existentially dangerous, these men argue, for children to be left in the care 
of religious leaders whose literalist interpretations of sacred texts have been proven to be absurd by 
modern science; global civil society has an obligation to protect the right of children to access 'the 
best that has been thought and said in the world', and thereby also to protect itself from messianic, 
apocalyptic ideologies which, if allowed to fester in the intellectual slums and ghettoes of the world, 
may cause exponentially more destruction than ever before in coming decades as their militants 
gain access to ever more advanced weaponry. We will have occasion to return to the pioneering 
work of these three gentlemen in due course; for now, suffice it to say that the second phase of 
reaction to 9/11, coinciding with the financial crisis of 2008 and some long-overdue civilisational 
navel-gazing by Western intellectuals, has forced many to question the very foundations of the 
liberal capitalist order, and to wonder aloud whether some form of public religion, purified of 
archaic literalisms and updated for the 21
st
 century, may in fact be necessary for both individual 
flourishing and social cohesion.    
 In Germany, even candidates as unlikely as Jürgen Habermas and Peter Sloterdijk are now 
asking whether the myth of the isolated postmodern individual, the ideal citizen of a market society, 
may have run its course. Habermas, for all his insistence that 'the now well-studied history of the 
"invention" of national consciousness by historiography, the press, and school curricula during the 
nineteenth century, in view of its horrible consequences, does not provide an inviting example' of 
collective identity-fashioning in Europe and beyond in the 21
st
 century, nevertheless now argues 
that the genesis of the postwar European dream is rooted in a distinctly Christian, if secularised, 
conception of human dignity.
125
 Sloterdijk, meanwhile, although he does not think that literature can 
play the civilising role it once did and that the humanist project has failed, nevertheless now seeks 
in his work to reinstate a 'grand narrative' of faith in something beyond mere individualism.
126
 
Meanwhile, Italy's most prominent public intellectual, Roberto Benigni, has been busy in recent 
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years touring his country reading Dante and celebrating the heroism of the very 19th-century 
nation-builders and defenders of a single Italian high culture and curriculum of precisely the kind 
that the entire postwar intellectual class in Europe, including Habermas and Sloterdijk, have been so 
routinely suspicious.
127
  
 In Spain, theological authorities like Andrés Torres Queiruga are now publicly proclaiming 
that 'up-to-date theologians do not believe in miracles', and that, in an age when both Hebraistic and 
Hellenistic wisdom – or in other words, religion and high culture, for Arnold the two sides of the 
coin of human perfectibility – are under threat from the 'new cultural paradigm' of philistine 
capitalist globalisation supported, at least until recently, by postmodern relativist ideology, 'we run 
the risk of not really being understood'.
128
 Theology, moreover, 'still does not have adequate 
categories for dealing with the dialogue between religions, which was an unthinkable form of 
transcendence prior to the advent of globalisation.'
129
 Nevertheless, in a burst of genuine optimism, 
Queiruga observes that 'both 21st-century theology and the lived experience of an enormous 
number of male and female believers is fostering this dialogue and aiming for a new and fraternal 
coexistence.'
130
 
 In France, the great survivor of the country's poststructuralist and postmodernist intellectual 
experiments, Alain Badiou, is now insisting, in not un-Christian language, that 'love is not a contract 
between two narcissists. It's more than that. It's a construction that compels the participants to go 
beyond narcissism.'
131
 At 75, Badiou now feels assured that 'the women I have loved I have loved 
for always' and that 'solving the existential problems of love is life's great joy'.
132
 Politics, far from 
mere liberal 'tolerance' and multicultural 'respect' for people's 'otherness' and negative freedoms, is 
in fact an extension of the loving relationship: 'Real politics is that which gives enthusiasm. Love 
and politics are the two great figures of social engagement. Politics is enthusiasm with a collective; 
with love, two people. So love is the minimal form of communism.'
133
 This bottom-up approach to 
community-building is consistent with the old humanist project described as 'dead' by Eagleton, and 
diametrically opposed to the attempts of Habermas and others to fashion a European community out 
of unenthusiastic pragmatism and a commitment to divided sovereignty rather than a single 
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European identity. 
 In Britain, Peter Hitchens, brother of the late Christopher, has waged a lonely and poignant 
public battle to preserve his country's Christian heritage against what he calls the 'century of the 
self'. The word 'civilisation' features prominently in Hitchens's work; in his view, Britain has been in 
civilisational decline since the decision to go to war in 1914 and the subsequent loss of Christian 
faith among both ordinary Britons and their ruling élites. Hitchens describes himself politically as 
'someone who believes that liberty depends on conscience, and that if people behave themselves, 
they don't have to be oppressed by law or government', and that 'ultimately, humans are under God', 
or in other words, a single Moral Law: 'If you believe that there is a Moral Law, then you would be 
failing in your duty if you didn't try to persuade other people to adopt it. [...] To do nothing would 
be feeble and irresponsible.
134
 Hitchens argues, not at all differently from his avowedly atheist 
brother Christopher, that this Moral Law is discoverable inside ourselves, in conscience, and that it 
may be accessed through critical engagement with canonical texts but not in the texts themselves; 
his passion for the humanistic canon of his own childhood, in which Scripture as well as the Book 
of Common Prayer and hymns played a central role along with Shakespeare and the Romantic poets 
as well as other English and European classics, is rivalled only by his dismay at its replacement by a 
'state multiculturalism' which has destroyed Britons' faith in their own civilisational heritage. 
Debating the causes of the 2011 London riots which shocked the world, Hitchens argued that 'it isn't 
a matter of governance; it's a matter of culture. We have been dismantling in our society something 
much, much more important than money. Money doesn't actually, despite Mrs. Thatcher's apparent 
belief in this, make the world go round. Money doesn't hold societies together.'
135
 The key to social 
harmony and individual flourishing is, for Hitchens, 'morality, people's willingness to behave well 
towards their neighbours without being coerced into doing so.'
136
 What is required to fight the 
cultural crisis responsible for the London riots and the general decline of British society is a 
'cultural and moral determination of the kind which current and previous governments have lacked, 
which academics have lacked, which teachers have lacked, which policemen have lacked, and 
which, in general, our society has lacked, and which need to be put back in if we are to have a 
civilisation.'
137
  
 The key to a moral education for Hitchens is a humanistic education, an engagement with 
'what our ancestors knew' and a determination to pass down civilisational wisdom to the next 
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generation in the belief that this process of transmission – 'the furnishing of new minds with beauty' 
to paraphrase Hitchens himself - ultimately matters more than our own pleasure or material 
prosperity.
138
 Although Hitchens stresses the non-negotiability of a Christian, or more accurately, 
Protestant, Church-of-England relationship with the inner God of conscience, he also points out that 
the very thing worth defending about this 'English' culture is its universality and 'openness'; he 
argues for a 'serious dialogue' with Muslims in which, socratically, Muslims are invited into locals' 
homes but in which the British should 'also not be cowardly about what we believe'.
139
 As Hitchens 
puts it, 'that’s certainly the way I feel in defending my faith; I’d much rather have an honest 
assailant who says ‘I don’t agree with you’ than somebody who grovels. […] A dialogue between us 
is much to be desired, but it has to be an honest and a robust one.'
140
 The situation of virtual 
apartheid in which local and Muslim communities live, for example, in the Pennine towns in the 
north of England, 'is catastrophic if you want to have a society which performs the basic function of 
a civilisation – that is to say, an organisation of human beings in which it is possible to be 
effectively unselfish.'
141
 Despite his apparent desire to overcome the 'solitudes' of the contemporary 
cultural landscape and to create a single civilisation based on conscience and genuinely free, 
Socratic debate and exchange, Hitchens's pessimism regarding the future of a Britain he regards as 
in terminal decline coincides with his contempt for the European project as a whole and his clinging 
to a Christian vocabulary in an era when a new, more globally inclusive humanism is clearly in 
order. At his best, however, Hitchens boils his religion down to faith in the importance and 
possibility of justice: 
 
  From our side of the argument, what we say is that if we desire justice for ourselves, 
  we also desire it for other people, and likewise, if we desire it for other people, we 
  require it of ourselves and we bring it upon ourselves. And on the basis of that, we 
  construct, with some difficulty, with a certain amount of historical knowledge, in the 
  case of some of us with an enormous amount of scientific knowledge of the universe, 
  a belief which helps us to discover, insofar as it is possible, what it is we ought to do 
  and how it is we ought to live, in the belief that there is justice, there is hope […] and 
  that our actions have a significance beyond what we immediately do. […] This is 
  why, after many, many years of not believing in God, I came round to the view that I 
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  would choose to do so and act as if there is a God. God is the principal opposition in 
  our society to lawless, ruthless power – to the bully, to the  autocrat, to the despot, to 
  the criminal, to the person who treats his neighbours like dirt.
142
  
 
Atheists like Peter’s late brother Christopher argue that there is something servile and immoral 
about choosing to behave morally only because ‘God’ commands it. But once God has been fully 
and finally reduced to a concept of Moral Law innate in us, what’s the difference? What both Peter 
and Christopher are saying is that we should act well for its own sake, and try as hard as we can to 
find out what ‘acting well’ means in practice, in the belief, cultivated through contact with beauty, 
that 'our actions have a significance beyond what we immediately do' and beyond direct material 
costs or benefits to our own selves. What Peter and Christopher Hitchens disagree about, 
fundamentally, is the historical role of the monotheisms in this ‘moral awakening’; Peter argues that 
they have acted primarily as a glue, Christopher as a yoke. Surely the answer is both, or rather, first 
one and then the other. The idea of 'acting well', however much we may disagree about what acting 
well concretely means, is nevertheless a single concept which was made possible by the rise of 
Platonism and syncretism in Greece and monotheism elsewhere – including, as we shall explore, 
Confucian China, with its belief in a single 'sky' and single 'mandate of Heaven' - and which could, 
our 'warriors for civilisation' will all be arguing (and Tarkovsky most vividly with his nude pagan 
scenes in Andrei Rublev), never have arisen in a truly polytheistic culture governed by multiple 
competing deities. That the monotheistic traditions would come in for serious rational scrutiny was 
inevitable because they themselves, even and perhaps especially Islam (as we will see in greater 
detail in our chapter on Mahfouz), called for it; both New Atheists like Christopher Hitchens and 
contemporary 'as-if' God-defenders like Peter Hitchens are heirs to this tradition, the common 
enemy of which is not the pluralism which inevitably results from an aggregation of serious 
attempts to 'live well', but the relativism which insists on a multiplicity of gods and a denial of the 
possibility of 'living well' or 'living better' in the first place.   
 Just as European intellectuals have been busy reevaluating Europe's Christian heritage over 
the past decade and aiming to salvage the kernel of moral and civilisational truth from Christianity's 
chequered centuries of gradually declining cultural dominance on the continent, so too has the 
civilisational legacy of Judaism been the subject of serious public and scholarly debate, with most 
controversy surrounding the work of Jan Assmann. Evaluating Assmann, Richard Wolin writes that, 
according to a number of critics, 'biblical monotheism represents a significant ethical breakthrough' 
in the history of civilisation, 'providing a normative basis for the idea of universal human 
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brotherhood—a characterization diametrically opposed to the "exclusionary" mentality that 
Assmann considers predominant.'
143
 Assmann instead throws his lot in with 'postmodern pluralism', 
which he regards as a 'desirable, 21st-century epistemological corollary to the spirit of ancient 
polytheism'.
144
 Wolin, meanwhile, argues that 'whereas ancient polytheism sanctified the injustices 
of fate—humanity’s entrapment in the world as it is—the Mosaic religion protested against that 
condition and its moral inadequacies. The covenant at Sinai represents the promise of an elevated 
life: a moral life'.
145
 This covenant need not entail a dualism based on some form of implausible 
revelation, but rather introduces into the world 'the idea that the moral life is something that must be 
achieved by a demanding process of existential reorientation and conversion. It "alienates" men and 
women not from the world as such, but from the world conceived as a locus of oppression and 
injustice.
146
 
 Although Assmann wrote in 2008 that 'monotheism itself pushes us to go beyond the logic 
of exclusivity and the language of violence', he has mostly sought in his work to denigrate the 
'exclusionary' logic of Judaism and the other Abrahamic monotheisms while affirming a 'pluralistic' 
or polytheistic alternative.
147
 In Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism 
(1997), Assmann describes what he regards as a 'positive reconfiguration' of ancient Egypt during 
the Renaissance and Enlightenment, which sought 'emancipation from ecclesiastical dogma' by 
depicting Egypt as 'the ultimate fount of biblical monotheism and as providing an evidentiary 
historical basis for Spinoza’s heretical pantheism'.148 Wolin argues that Assmann's work aims to 
show that 'this historiographical reassessment represented a conscious attempt to ruin the sacred 
truths by demonstrating that Western monotheism had its origins in pagan practices and rituals'.
149
 
While such a rebranding may indeed have helped, to however limited an extent, to 'defuse 
Christianity’s eschatological, sectarian zealotry' by weakening Christian faith on the European 
continent, this attempt to paganise Christianity's roots by associating them with Egypt overlooks the 
fact that monotheism had existed in Egypt too during the reign of Akhenaten; Freud's Moses and 
Monotheism, for example, which argues that 'the historical Moses was in fact a disaffected Egyptian 
priest who imposed monotheism on the Jews once it had been banned in ancient Egypt following 
the reign of Akhenaten', is one prominent if highly contested canonical work which makes this 
association.
150
   
 Whatever one's views on Spinoza or the historical accuracy of the arguments of Assmann or 
                                                 
143  Richard Wolin, ‘Biblical Blame Shift’, http://chronicle.com/article/Biblical-Blame-Shift/138457/, 15/4/13. 
144  See Wolin, 'Biblical Blame Shift'.  
145  Wolin, 'Biblical Blame Shift'.  
146  Wolin, 'Biblical Blame Shift'.  
147  Wolin, 'Biblical Blame Shift'.  
148  Wolin, 'Biblical Blame Shift'.  
149  Wolin, 'Biblical Blame Shift'.  
150  Wolin, 'Biblical Blame Shift'.  
 57 
 
Freud – indeed, Assmann has been widely 'accused of providing an overly sanguine and harmonious 
portrait of interstate relations among the proponents of ancient polytheism (Babylon, Assyria, and 
so forth)' - the attempt to 'demonstrate that Western monotheism had its origins in the nature-
centered religion of ancient Egypt'
151
 rather than in the distinction between life as it is and life as it 
should be risks missing the wider point, dramatised so effectively, as we shall see, by Naguib 
Mahfouz, that Akhenaten himself made an ethical distinction of his own 'between justice and 
injustice, what is and what should be, mere life versus life led according to principle'
152
 – a 
distinction retained by the likes of Spinoza and Andrei Tarkovsky for all their apparent 'pantheism' - 
and sowed the seeds of monotheism in the region by insisting on the existence of a single Moral 
Law for the first time. For all that we can agree with Assmann that 'a cultural semantics of religious 
intolerance' promoted by the Abrahamic monotheisms at their literalist worst has been and 
continues to be a violent threat to civilisation, we must also recognise that, in Akhenaten – or at 
least the Akhenaten dramatised in our time by the likes of Naguib Mahfouz (this Akhenatenian 
'warrior prototype' will be outlined in the Chapter 2) - we have an Egyptian precursor to Moses who 
was not an amoral 'nature-worshipper' given to 'worldly corruption (“the fleshpots of Egypt”) and 
soulless idolatry' as ancient Egyptians have been stereotypically portrayed to be in the West down 
through the centuries, but rather a proto-Enlightenment figure committed to the very concept of a 
single Moral Law which has driven, and continues to drive, Western civilisation, and indeed all 
possible civilisations, despite the ever-present threat of polytheism, of which the postmodern 
relativism embraced by Assmann is but the latest historical example.     
 It is not the case, therefore, that we need to go back to the worst of Egyptian polytheism – 
against which Akhenaten himself rebelled – in order to recover, or finally accede to, the best of our 
civilisation, but rather to recognise that the universal civilisational impulse – the impulse to 
distinguish between what is and what should be - which took root in Judaism and Christianity and 
eventually led to the Western Renaissance and Enlightenment, was first felt in Egypt by Akhenaten, 
and survived in the 'East' of the Abrahamic world in the form of Islam; Naguib Mahfouz, indeed, 
described himself as a 'son' of these two civilisations – Pharaonic and Islamic - who then went on to 
drink the 'nectar' of Western civilisation. But there will be a great deal more to say on Mahfouz in 
the next chapter.           
 For now, the focus is the West, and its battle to recover its faith in the concept of civilisation 
after decades of relativist assault. The Arab Spring of 2011, centred precisely in Egypt, provided 
Western intellectuals with another golden opportunity to miss an opportunity; one notable 
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exception, who has written extensively on the West's 'feeble'
153
 response to events in Egypt and 
throughout the Arab world – and most recently, in Syria - has been Timothy Garton Ash. Like 
Nussbaum and other humanist 'warriors' of his generation, Garton Ash has been busy in recent years 
using his humanism not just as an excuse for narrow academic research but simultaneously to 
defend the cause of justice in the spirit of Arnoldian praxis.
154
 As Ash asks rhetorically, 'if the 
Responsibility to Protect does not extend to the catastrophic manmade situation in Syria, what is it 
for?'
155
 Comparing the West's responses to Yugoslavia, Syria and Congo, Ash argues that 'on the 
worst and most shameful interpretation, this suggests that the life of an Arab is not worth as much 
as the life of a European. And let's not even mention the life of an African.'
156
  
 Officially, the current leader of the Western world, Barack Obama, portrays himself, as we 
shall see further, as a direct spiritual descendant of Mahfouz's Akhenaten and a defender of 
humanitarian interests everywhere: 
  The non-violence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been  
  practical or possible in every circumstance, but the love that they preached - their 
  faith in human progress - must always be the North Star that guides us on our  
  journey. [...] So let us reach for the world that ought to be - that spark of the divine 
  that still stirs within each of our souls. [...] And yet, I do not believe that we will have 
  the will, or the staying power, to complete this work without something more - and 
  that is the continued expansion of our moral imagination; an insistence that there is 
  something irreducible that we all share. [...] The one rule that lies at the heart of  
  every major religion is that we do unto others as we would have them do unto us. 
  Adhering to this law of love has always been the core struggle of human nature.
157
 
 
In practice, however, the nation-state system makes it impossible even for a leader as civilised as 
Barack Obama to regard, or 'love', citizens of other nations as equals although Obama knows that 
'there is nothing weak - nothing passive, nothing naïve - in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King', 
he is nevertheless bound by the terms of his oath of office: 'As a head of state sworn to protect and 
defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it is, and cannot 
                                                 
153  See Timothy Garton Ash, 'IQ2 Interview', http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qOgJt518tDo, 26/5/11. 
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156  Ash, 'Syria: What's Coming Over Us'.  
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stand idle in the face of threats to the American people.
158
 A remark attributed to Obama in early 
2013 – 'I did not get re-elected to intervene in Syria'159 – says it all about the state of Western 
civilisation in the second decade of the 21
st
 century: for all their humanism, elected officials are 
bound not to universal principles but to the particular, and often selfish, concerns of their local 
electorates, making sacrifice and compromise on an international level in the wider name of 
'civilisation' all but impossible. If local electorates are not willing to sacrifice at least some of their 
material prosperity in the name of a higher Moral Law, then their elected representatives will be 
limited in their ability to act morally. 
 From the logic of President Obama's 'Akhenatenian' pronouncements, it follows that the 
humanities are not politically neutral; they are part of a concrete conception of the good life which 
takes seriously the idea of a single Moral Law, even if we will always disagree about the content 
and application of that Law. While we may agree that democratic elections are, at every level from 
local to regional to global, the best and fairest way of choosing governments, that is not the same as 
saying that the state has no interest or business, between elections, in educating its citizens to think 
and behave morally, as Obama himself repeatedly tries to do in his public pronouncements. If we 
take seriously the idea that civilisation, and even democracy, rests on a foundation of widespread 
public commitment to a Moral Law, then the humanities become an indispensable public good, 
prior in a sense to democracy itself. Democratic decisions to slash humanities funding or to promote 
the teaching of doctrines hostile to humanism thus come to be viewed as a threat to the democratic 
order of a society in the same way that overly tolerant democratically-approved policies towards, 
say, Islamic extremism or neo-Nazism are. The question whether to enshrine protection against the 
democratic erosion of humanist values in a state's constitution or whether to insist on a total 
separation of church and state – or in the post-Enlightenment world, of humanism and state – thus 
remains as current as it did in the 18
th
 century. Martha Nussbaum, for example, has called for a '21
st
 
Century Enlightenment' which recognises the absolute centrality of a humanities education to 
democratic citizenship and the emergence of a global civil society; her 2010 book Not for Profit: 
Why Democracy Needs the Humanities is a passionate and renewed plea for more direct student 
engagement with the Socratic tradition and Socratic method, more knowledge of the world's 
civilisations and religions and more critical engagement with them, and generally more attempts at 
empathy, especially in those cases where empathy is most urgent and most difficult.
160
     
  The European Union today faces precisely this crisis of faith in humanism and in the 
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very concept of a Moral Law traceable back through the European Enlightenment and Renaissance 
to early Islam, the rise of Christianity in Rome, the ancient Jewish heritage and even to the 
monotheism of Akhenaten in Egypt. Citizens of individual EU member-states overwhelmingly 
oppose transfers of wealth between members in the name of European unity and justice, let alone 
costly interventions in the Arab world or elsewhere, whatever civilisational ideals may be at stake 
there. As the euphoria of Cold War victory and the perceived 'end of history' wears off amid a 
prolonged economic crisis played out in the shadows of rising authoritarian powers, European 
humanists like Timothy Garton Ash seem unable to encourage voting publics to embrace yet more 
sacrifice in the name of higher moral truth or perfection. And in an age when the world hurtles 
toward collective environmental and military disaster, Ash's rhetorical question, 'If we can't make 
Europe work, what hope has the world got?'
161
 assumes a poignancy and urgency of an apocalyptic 
degree.            
 One European intellectual to address the European identity crisis on precisely these high-
civilisational terms, and on the eve of the financial crisis when everything about Europe was still 
'pretty on the surface', was Portuguese essayist Eduardo Lourenço: 
  The essence of French culture, that which has conferred to it, almost since Abelard, a 
  role apart in the cultural history of the West, has been its sustained attempt, down 
  through the centuries, its pugnacious effort to create a structurally secular  
  civilisation. The great revolution – the only one that deserves the name – was nothing 
  but the logical conclusion of this long odyssey. (...)  Devoted to the gods of a pseudo-
  universalism, a cosmopolitanism without a centre, [our] culture could offer nothing 
  that would compare to the inheritance of Montaigne, Voltaire, or Victor Hugo, French 
  because universal, and universal because French. If no other culture finds itself today 
  in a position to take up and pass on the mantle of this inheritance, of a universalising 
  vocation because neither ethnocentric nor theocratic, but secular and for this very 
  reason democratic, then [our culture] is already, before even being born, a mere  
  economic and political structure, a form perhaps still pretty on the surface, but  
  hollow underneath.
162
   
Once upon a time, literary France was a window into this ‘anti-utopian utopia’ or ‘open society’, 
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‘Europe’ par excellence, the true Europe, the Europe we have all lost. In this Europe reigned ‘a 
universalising vocation, universalising because it is neither ethnocentric nor theocratic’, a vocation 
with complex historical roots – Greek, Jewish, Roman, Christian - but culturally open and secular, 
and an enemy of the imperial model of economic and cultural hegemony. This openness does not 
equate to a negation or dilution of identity, personal or national, but is rather the sine qua non of 
such identity. Here we have one of the main contradictions in Eduardo Lourenço’s heterodox 
philosophy: there can be no meaningful identity without a full and unconditional acceptance of 
other people, but no meaningful identity is just an acceptance of difference. The most we can say is 
that ‘Europe’ is a result of two parallel processes: one of closure in oneself, in local traditions and 
histories, and a second, which derives and grows out of the first, of openness and curiosity towards 
the foreign. What counts is the energy with which the individual oscillates between these two 
processes.             
 For Lourenço ‘European’ heroes come in many forms: Salman Rushdie, Sheherazade, Walt 
Whitman, maligned ‘orientalist’ scholars, Goethe with his mythic image of the divan, Averroës, 
Milton, Portuguese Jesuits (because 'no one applied themselves with greater conscience and energy 
to the task of breaking out of the "European" mindset and becoming another, so that God could be 
everything in everyone'
163), Bartolomeu de las Casas (for his ‘glorious defence of the Indians'164 
against the Spanish empire's machine of domination and cruelty) and Pablo Neruda, bard and 
creator of a new, mythically secular continent. The most curious example is perhaps that of the 
Jesuits, precursors of the modern secular warrior in their urgent determination to open up to the 
other for the sake of their cause; this example shows how the 'secularism' so dear to Eduardo 
Lourenço is built not in a historical or spiritual vacuum but on the remains of obsolete ethnocentric 
and theocratic myths (like those of Catholicism, in the case of Jesuits, or the nationalistic myths of 
the Portuguese discoveries created by Camões). Studying these historical roots is a vital part of our 
continual attempt to recognise and transcend 'the ghosts of our imagined identity' and to recognise 
the 'divine spark' even beyond our own tribe.        
 Still, in Eduardo Lourenço we find more than a simple mythification of poetry or literature, 
even if he goes so far as to call literature ‘the spiritual driving-force of modernity’165. His humanism 
is more than this: as early as Time and Poetry (1974), we learn in his essay ‘The Humanist Despair 
of Miguel Torga and the Young Generation’ that his goal is not simply to love literature the way we 
loved the old gods, but to allow and even to love the despair of poets who don’t allow themselves 
the luxury of believing in literature without critically questioning themselves about the good it can 
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do; this is the ‘mythical dialectic of our modernity’, as one of his other essays from this volume is 
entitled. Any mythology of the Creator-Poet – the myth of Orpheus, for example – must somehow 
avoid hardening or degenerating into mythomania. Only ‘when it is maintained within reasonable 
limits’ can this humanism ‘create a climate of attention and love for works of art that, since it isn’t 
blind, is the paradigm example of the natural courageous exercise of human understanding’.166 For 
Lourenço, the true ‘critical act’ is always an act of love, and lays the foundation stone of a ‘Europe’ 
that needs no other justification than that of the mutual invention of existence in which all love 
consists.
167
             
 On Lourenço's utopian 'European' continent, it is conscience alone, sharpened by study of 
the humanities, which ensures that Europe makes it through the horrors of the first half of the 20
th
 
century 'intact'. Perhaps more than anyone else, it is Antero de Quental who embodies Lourenço’s 
European dream. ‘There is no one in our literature, not even Camões, who could be considered so 
universal a poet as Antero,' Lourenço writes in Antero or The Intact Night (2007).
168
 Antero and the 
Portuguese 'Generation of 1870' learned 'something new' – to 'think against themselves' and 'to put 
themselves in the shoes of the Other'.
169
 But the so-called ‘secular saint’ of the 1870 generation also 
embodies, in his ‘scandalous and tragic’ suicide, the failure of socialism; we have all been born, like 
Fernando Pessoa, ‘on the ruins of the Anterian dream’.170 Lourenço, however, sees in Antero a sign 
of a new conscience, a new faith in the ‘intact night’ of a modernity that, in Antero's readers if not in 
Antero himself, survives the death of the old certainties and the old hopes, and will go on to found 
his ‘Europe’. This ‘unfinished and unappeased quest for the Absolute, undertaken knowingly’ forms 
what Joaquim de Carvalho famously called ‘Antero’s spiritual drama’, and this struggle for faith in 
a Moral Law, faith in the centrality of conscience and empathy to the good life, Lourenço argues, is 
still our drama too.
171
               
 The humanities' function, in this context, is precisely to bolster faith in conscience, in the 
existence of a Moral Law. Rational argument and philological 'research' is only a part of this 
process; both literature and literary criticism produce knowledge 'in another way', as Roger Scruton 
said, 'even if that way is difficult to define'. To reduce academic work in the humanities to the 
'research model' of the sciences, the very degradation lamented by Kronman, is to deny the 
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possibility of this empathic, disputational or aesthetic magic - to return to Scarry - in the first place; 
Martin Amis was surely right when he joked that criticism is preparing to quote the bits you like, or 
in other words, condensing the magic of a work of art so that the reader of the criticism may 
experience the essence of the work under review plus the critic's own contribution to the field of 
knowledge opened up by engagement with the original. The point of humanities 'research' is not 
only to clarify or summarise what an author or artist has said, but to pick up the ball you have been 
thrown by the author or artist and run with it oneself.             
 Contact with the works of Naguib Mahfouz, Andrei Tarkovsky and Tu Weiming has felt like 
nothing if not an enormous simultaneous opening-up of knowledge and invitation to take their 
pioneering work further. Hopefully this thesis will stand alone as a piece of 'academic research' in 
which I try to show that all three men, in radically different cultural contexts, and along with their 
Western counterparts whose work I have briefly sketched in this section, defended the existence of a 
single Moral Law the content of which involves a love for the idea of civilisation and a willingness 
to sacrifice oneself in the name of civilisation, in the manner of Socrates ('the man who gave up life 
itself for the pursuit of the argument'
172
) and Jesus in the Western tradition; but I would be lying if I 
said that I was prompted to write this thesis only out of a desire to tell the philological truth about 
what the authors actually said; this project unashamedly started out of a belief in the content of what 
they said, and in a desire to build on their work by juxtaposing them for the first time and 
constructing out of that juxtaposition a single narrative which could serve both as an example in its 
own right of Lourencian Europeanism - of 'going out into the world' as the Jesuits did and trying to 
universalise the Moral Law through direct contact and critical engagement with other cultures - and 
as a lesson to Europe and Western civilisation as a whole from Islamic, Slavic and Confucian 
civilisation simultaneously. Beyond that, the ultimate goal is to create a blueprint for a 21st-century 
global civil society, one based on a solid humanist foundation of bricks drawn from as many 
civilisational heritages as possible. To attempt any less would be to contradict the very message I 
have had the privilege of studying in each of its respective local forms.    
 The central pillar of all these civilisational forms, indeed, is love – a love rooted in 
conscience and exercised under the purview of reason, to be sure, but love no less. It is no surprise 
that as Western intellectuals try to recover from the deleterious reign of Theory and its sado-
masochistic insistence on the irreducible 'otherness' of other people and the repressive nature of 
lifelong marriage, love between two people as traditionally conceived by Western civilisation 
survives mainly at the margins of society, and most notably in the gay and lesbian community in its 
struggle for equality and marriage rights. Among defenders of the gay marriage cause, none puts the 
                                                 
172  See Martha Nussbaum, 'Humanistic Education and Global Justice', 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_IR1ClD3Ns, 19/9/10.  
 64 
 
case more eloquently or relevantly for our purposes than Andrew Sullivan. Sullivan defends the 
idea that homosexuals may be even more monogamous and committed to the idea of lifelong 
marriage than heterosexual people now are; after being forever denied the right to commit publicly 
to another person through marriage, the homosexual community - 'the 3.5%' as Sullivan calls them - 
now wishes to argue that this form of exclusive, eternal commitment is the highest realisation of our 
adult humanity and a microcosm of human 'civilisation' in the most humanistic sense of that word. 
For Sullivan, sex is only a comparatively small part of this metaphysical, civilisational equation; 
what matters is the transcendental commitment to one being beyond oneself. We desire and deserve 
it for ourselves, Sullivan implies, and we all ultimately want to do it ourselves if we are properly 
educated and prepared for it, on the condition that we are free to choose when and with whom, and 
free, it should go without saying, not to commit to anyone if some other calling commands our full 
attention.
173
              
 Among contemporary Western intellectuals, Sullivan's traditionalist position finds surprising 
support in the form of Slavoj Zizek, who for all his faults agrees with Marx that 'you don't simply 
dissolve marriage; divorce means that you retroactively establish that the love was not the true 
love'.
174
 Nussbaum goes further in the direction of dramatising the dilemmas faced by a person who 
must balance the practical demands of family with public responsibilities to civilisation, but even 
for Nussbaum, intimate family relations are a microcosm of the morally healthy person's wider 
commitment to civilisation as a whole
175
: the loved one enshrines the civilisation to which one has 
developed an intense attachment via a long humanistic education and is therefore worthy of ultimate 
sacrifice.           
 Without denying, therefore, the centrality of marriage and family to Western civilisation, and 
on the contrary affirming it, the post-postmodern generation of Western 'warriors for civilisation' is 
busy, à la Badiou, trying to reestablish lifelong marriage as the template for an empathic 
consciousness eventually capable of embracing the whole of humanity. While we are concerned 
with solving the problem of 'globalisation for a tribal species', and while even Slavoj Zizek has 
admitted that 'the big question today is how to organise to act globally, at an immense international 
level, without regressing to some authoritarian rule'
176
. we will see that Mahfouz's Akhenaten, for 
example, combined the ideal of commitment to his wife and commitmment to public service 'at an 
immense international level' in much the same terms that Barack Obama so publicly does today; in 
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Obama's own terms, it is possible to love one's wife more than anything and at the same time 'to see 
the world through the eyes of those who are different from us—the child who’s hungry, the 
steelworker who’s been laid off, the family who lost the entire life they built together when the 
storm came to town'.
177
 Indeed, for Obama it is precisely his love for his wife which gives him the 
ongoing energy to broaden his 'ambit of concern and empathise with the plight of others'; in such a 
family climate 'it becomes harder not to act, harder not to help'.
178
     
 Jeremy Rifkin makes the race to global empathy the urgent theme of his book The Empathic 
Civilisation (2010).
179
 For Rifkin, only empathy can save humanity from impending environmental 
catastrophe and possible extinction. One needn't share Rifkin's ecological pessimism, however, or 
disagree with critics like Paul Bloom on the importance of reason as well as the 'gut wrench' of 
empathy when it comes to making moral decisions and forming social policy to think, as Barack 
Obama does, that 'the world needs more empathy'.
180
 Empathy matters first and foremost because it 
makes individuals better, and connects them to truth inaccessible by other means. This is part of the 
faith 'professed' by humanities scholars, forgotten in the West in recent years but now being 
recovered by the 'warriors' mentioned in this chapter and an army of others.    
 Empathy, however, is only part of the humanistic creed; even sociopaths are capable of it. 
Words like love, conscience, marriage, rights, sacrifice, truth, even reason, must be believed in too. 
This cluster of concepts adds up to what I call simply 'civilisation', or what Arnold called 'culture' 
even if he said himself that the choice of word matters little
181
; what matters is that the humanities 
be seen as the study of this single overarching Law, and as the the active attempt to bring us all 
closer to it in our daily lives. As such, and only as such, they deserve their place at the heart of the 
modern university. Such departments would differ from the Theology departments which dominated 
the medieval university primarily because they would no longer attempt to stifle or ignore scientific 
enquiry, for true humanism by definition has nothing to fear from science or the expression of 
empirically reasoned arguments, and on the contrary requires them. The remainder of this thesis is 
an attempt to persuade the unpersuaded more by example than anything else, as art can sometimes 
do; but it is also a narrowly academic attempt to show that the concept of 'civilisation' rooted in a 
single Moral Law and envisaged as a unifying power for our century is, whatever one happens to 
think of it, in no way a Western invention promoted by armies of neo-imperialist Western 
intellectuals; faith in it is professed just as eloquently, if not more eloquently, by Islamic, Orthodox 
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and Confucian voices too. Claude Lévi-Strauss and his heirs were wrong, dangerously wrong, to 
suggest that we have no means of comparison and no right to say so. But before we finally get to 
these non-Western voices and engage in what will hopefully be viewed as fruitful comparison of 
them with each other and with their Western counterparts, there remain some contemporary Western 
sceptics of moral and civilisational progress whose claims ought briefly to be addressed.      
 
1.4 Beyond Animal Mysticism: Warriors for a New Global Civilisation  
Even those openly hostile to the idea of civilisational progress nevertheless recognise that the theme 
of civilisation looks set to dominate 21
st
 century intellectual life. For all its flaws, Samuel 
Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' thesis marked perhaps the beginning of the end of post-Cold 
War Western triumphalism and the realisation that we will have no choice but to face our 
Abrahamic, Confucian and other brothers and sisters on an increasingly level economic, political, 
military and cultural playing field. The broad question of how individually and collectively best to 
negotiate this potential minefield of cultural misunderstandings, resource wars and general 
unprecedented cheek-by-jowl living made possible by mass migration and the Internet demands the 
urgent attention of everyone; humanists the world over will have a leading role to play in how this 
'globalisation for a tribal species' plays out.        
 Not all humanists, not even all those freed from the worst rhetorical excesses of postmodern 
Theory, agree on the possibility or desirability of constructing a new global civilisational narrative 
out of the best available constituent parts. Some recalcitrant pessimists, perhaps most prominent 
among them John Gray, argue that the call of civilisation is itself the problem, a Siren's call leading 
to cyclical reiterations of barbarism and no real moral progress. Time after time, Gray argues, myths 
of progress have ushered in periods of unconscionable brutality and instrumentalisation of human 
individuals; if we were to judge the idea of civilisational progress on its empirical and historical 
merits, Gray concludes, we would be forced to throw it out: 'the difference between advances in 
science and advances in civilisation is that the lessons that are learnt in ethics and politics are 
invariably lost and forgotten.'
182
 Although Gray admits that 'things have improved in many respects 
in the last hundred years', a dangerous myth has accompanied such progress, namely that 'the long-
run impact of the growth of human knowledge is to make the world, human life, more civilised'.
183
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Contrary to the Arnoldian perfectibility thesis which underlies his definition of culture and his 
commitment to the idea of a continually evolving 'best that has been thought and said in the world', 
human beings for Gray remain stuck in a Sisyphean historical condition: 'new knowledge produces 
new forms of civilisation and new forms of barbarism.'
184
       
 One can believe in the 'fragility of civilisation', however, as Gray does and indeed as 
Mahfouz, Tarkovsky and Tu all do, without assuming that there has been no civilisational progress 
whatsoever or that civilisational progress has been shown to be historically impossible. Mahfouz's 
Children of Gebelawi, to cite the most relevant and prominent example for our purposes, is a 
dramatisation of the repeated intergenerational loss and regaining of ethical knowledge, knowledge 
which is always prone to oblivion but which is ultimately refined and built upon with every 
iteration. The difference between Gray and our 'warriors for civilisation' is faith in the idea of 
civilisation-building; while Gray assumes that those who are not energised and thereby incorporated 
into any civilisational project are invariably barbarically eliminated by it (he cites Joseph Conrad's 
experiences in the Belgian Congo) and retreats instead into an anti-civilisational mysticism, our 
'warriors' all affirm that, for all the crimes committed in the name of civilisation, the goal of 
civilisation itself remains a noble one.           
 Instead of civilisation, indeed, Gray opts for what he calls 'the silence of animals', a position 
brilliantly encapsulated by Simon Critchley as a 'fusion of his quasi-Burkean critique of liberalism, 
underpinned as it is by a deep pessimism about human nature, with a certain strand of Taoism'.
185
 
Critchley argues that, for Gray, 'what has to be given up is the desperate metaphysical longing to 
find some anchor in a purported reality'; the way to do this is to realise that 'the highest value in 
existence is to know that there is nothing of substance in the world. Nothing is more real than 
nothing. It is the nothingness beyond us, the emptiness behind words, that Gray wants us to 
contemplate.'
186
 In this 'strident defense of the ideal of contemplation against action' which 
Critchley wrongly describes as unfashionable, Gray asks us to give up our utopian longings, 
whether 'daydreams such as a new cosmopolitan world order governed by universal human rights', 
the idea that 'history has a teleological, providential purpose that underwrites human action', the 
'Obamaesque delusion that one’s life is a narrative that is an episode in some universal story of 
progress', Arnoldian or 'Arendtian fantasies of idealized praxis', or general 'liberal ideas of public 
engagement and intervention' as forms of the good life, and instead admit that such fantasies merely 
'provide consolation for killer apes like us by momentarily staving off the threat of 
                                                 
184  Gray, 'On Progress'. 
185  Simon Critchley, ‘John Gray’s Godless Mysticism: On The Silence of Animals‘, 
http://lareviewofbooks.org/article.php?type=&id=1722&fulltext=1, 2/6/13. 
186  Critchley, 'John Gray's Godless Mysticism'. 
 68 
 
meaninglessness', and that we should aspire instead to the animal silence of hermithood.
187
 
 In the end, there is no middle ground here, and one must take sides, just as Confucius, our 
warrior prototype in Chapter 4, takes sides against the Madman from Chu: either one believes, in 
'Obamaesque' fashion, that 'one’s life is a narrative that is an episode in some universal story of 
progress' and that our moral natures are improvable via a combination of private self-cultivation and 
social engagement, or one does not. Andrei Tarkovsky, for one, and for all his flirting with Taoism, 
openly defends human action and sacrifice against against 'animal' contemplation of the Taoist, 
Grayist variety; for Tarkovsky, 'it is difficult to imagine wanting to be an animal. One would have to 
want to regress spiritually, one would need a kind of frozen soul.'
188
      
 A more contemporary voice in this debate is Thomas Nagel, who also takes on Gray's The 
Silence of Animals. Although 'humanity’s historical record  provides plenty of material' for Gray's 
pessimism, Nagel contends that 'those who have more hope for humanity than Gray are not unaware 
of the facts'.
189
 Since evolution works too slowly to transform inherited human nature from one 
generation to the next, the question for Nagel 'concerns cultural progress'. Since human beings can 
behave 'monstrously' if they find themselves 'in the wrong circumstances and with the wrong 
formation', and since we retain fundamentally 'the same brains and mental faculties as humans born 
5,000 years ago', Nagel concludes that 'any victory over our species’ destructive tendencies will 
likewise have to come from institutional and cultural development.'
190
 Nagel is clear about what 
such development would entail: 'Moral and political progress is inevitably more difficult than 
scientific progress, since it cannot occur in the minds of a few experts but must be realized in the 
collective lives of millions; but it does happen.'
191
      
 Nagel's own most recent book, Mind and Cosmos, has caused a storm in Anglosphere 
intellectual circles for suggesting that Darwinian evolution does nothing to disprove teleological 
belief systems and is entirely consistent with visions of moral and civilisational progress which 
have been inherited by the modern world from the earlier monotheisms. In his review of Nagel's 
book, Andrew Ferguson claims that although the 'heretical' Nagel unheretically affirms that 'we are 
products of the long history of the universe since the big bang, descended from bacteria through 
millions of years of natural selection', he disturbs the complacent triumph of the scientific 
community in the face of the humanities by reminding them that their materialism 'is a premise of 
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science, not a finding'.
192
 Although 'the materialist assumption works really, really well—in 
detecting and quantifying things that have a material or mechanistic explanation', the problem is 
that 'the success has gone to the materialists’ heads. From a fruitful method, materialism becomes 
an axiom: If science can’t quantify something, it doesn’t exist.'193 The bravery of Nagel's book, 
Ferguson argues, lies in his insistence that 'we know some things to exist even if materialism omits 
or ignores or is oblivious to them. Reductive materialism doesn’t account for the "brute facts" of 
existence—it doesn’t explain, for example, why the world exists at all, or how life arose from 
nonlife'.
194
 Above all, materialism is of limited use to us when it comes to 'the fundamental beliefs 
we rely on as we go about our everyday business: the truth of our subjective experience, our ability 
to reason, our capacity to recognize that some acts are virtuous and others aren’t.'195   
 If, as we have agreed, the humanities are not sciences, but rather have everything to do with 
'our capacity to recognise that some acts are virtuous and others aren't', and if, as we have agreed, 
belief in moral and civilisational progress remains a choice that reasonable, reasoning people armed 
with 21st-century educations can freely and in good conscience make, what follows? What in our 
century should those committed to virtue and progress via the humanities be labouring after? 
Beyond the eternal call of virtue and progress, the risks of climate change, apocalyptic war and 
environmental degradation, which need no elaboration here, add an existential urgency to 
humanists' labours. Along with primatologist Frans de Waal, with his call for us to take up the 
urgent challenge of 'globalisation for a tribal species' in the coming century, New Atheist 
spokesman Sam Harris has argued that 'it has long been obvious that we need to converge, as a 
global civilisation, in our beliefs about how we should treat one another':     
  How can we persuade all of the people who are committed to silly and harmful  
  things in the name of "morality" to change their commitments, to have different goals 
  in life, and to lead better lives? I think that this project is actually the most  
  important project facing humanity at this point in time. It subsumes everything else 
  we could care about — from arresting climate change, to stopping nuclear  
  proliferation, to curing cancer, to saving the whales. Any effort that requires that we 
  collectively get our priorities straight and marshal massive commitments of time and 
  resources would fall within the scope of this project. To build a viable global  
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  civilization we must begin to converge on the same economic, political, and  
  environmental goals. 
   Obviously the project of moral persuasion is very difficult — but it strikes me 
  as especially difficult if you can't figure out in what sense anyone could ever be right 
  and wrong about questions of morality or about questions of human values.
196
 
 
Nagel and Harris converge in their calls for universal moral education, a universal humanities 
curriculum to sit alongside the specialised scientific educations which have made the astonishing 
technological progress of the last century possible. In precisely the same vein, Lee Siegel stresses 
that it is 'intimate introduction' to works of literature and art, mere loving exposure to 'the best 
which has been thought and said', which makes this moral education possible, rather than formal, 
philological, 'scientific' literary study. Siegel traces the growth of the modern humanities in the 19
th
 
century out of classical Greek and Latin study on the one hand and Bible studies in church on the 
other, 'the necessary other half of a full education' as enshrined in Arnold's marriage of the 
Hellenistic and Hebraistic in Culture and Anarchy. Although more modern sources of humanistic 
knowledge were gradually introduced into the canon 'with the waning of religious authority' and 
with a view to 'ministering truth to souls parched for higher meaning', the most modern such source, 
Siegel argued, remained Shakespeare.
197
 The advent of literature departments in the early 20
th
 
century did little, initially, to alter this balance, for such departments 'consisted mostly of 
philologists who examined etymology and the history of a text'.
198
 It was only after World War Two 
that, in America at least, 'the study of literature as a type of wisdom, relevant to actual, 
contemporary life, put down widespread institutional roots'.
199
 The GI Bill allowed such studies to 
reach their 'zenith' around the time that Kronman wrote of his life-changing existentialism class in 
the early 1960s, before 'the very popularity of literature in the university' allowed 'tendentious 
pedants of various stripes' to 'accelerate the academicisation of literary art'.
200
 In Siegel's view, it 
was the Vietnam War rather than any hangover from World War Two which facilitated this 
acceleration: the 'purposeless bloodshed' of Vietnam 'made all authority suspect', and 'that was when 
teaching literature acquired an especially intense ideological fervor, when university radicals started 
their long (and fruitless) march through academic institutions armed with that fig leaf for mediocrity 
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known as "Theory"'.
201
 The humanities in general, and the English major in particular, have been in 
'slow decline' ever since.
202
    
 Siegel is robustly certain that 'literature changed my life long before I began to study it in 
college and then, in a hapless trance, in graduate school', filling him as it did with 'a beauty that 
repelled the forces that were making me sad'.
203
 Alas, 'once in the college classroom, this precious, 
alternate life inside me got thrown back into that dimension of my existence that vexed or bored me. 
Homer, Chekhov and Yeats were reduced to right and wrong answers, clear-cut themes, a welter of 
clever and more clever interpretations.'
204
 It was the confusion of the humanities and social 
sciences, the myth of 'interdisciplinarity', that was the source of the problem: 'Books that 
transformed the facts were taught like science and social science and themselves reduced to mere 
facts. Novels, poems and plays that had been fonts of empathy, and incitements to curiosity, were 
now occasions of drudgery and toil.'
205
 In Siegel's straightforward formulation, 'every other 
academic subject requires specialised knowledge and a mastery of skills and methods. Literature 
requires only that you be human. [...] Why does Hector’s infant son, Astyanax, cry when he sees his 
father put on his helmet? All you need to understand that is a heart.'
206
  
 Echoing Scarry, Siegel argues that it is literature's 'sudden, startling truth and beauty' which 
'make us feel, in the most solitary part of us, that we are not alone, and that there are meanings that 
cannot be bought, sold or traded, that do not decay and die.'
207
 Siegel inexplicably calls this 
experience 'socially and economically worthless'
208
 when in fact, as Scarry, Nussbaum and others 
have shown, a just and prosperous communal life may be impossible without it. Nevertheless, 
Siegel longs for a return to the days in which literature was merely 'a part of everyday life' for 
adults, and to achieve this end, he argues for the return, at high school if not also at university, of 
'the literature survey course, where books were not academically taught but intimately introduced—
an experience impervious to inane commentary and sterile testing.'
209
 Although not everyone will 
major in the humanities at university, and many will go on instead to 'search for a cure for cancer, 
and things like that', properly humanistically educated individuals will nevertheless know how to 
turn to art and literature 'when they are touched by inexpressible yearnings the way they will eat 
when they are hungry.'
210
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 If we accept the claim about the innate power of literature, when properly introduced, to 
educate and to civilise, the question then becomes: which books, in our century, should be 
'intimately introduced' to facilitate the moral and political progress that Nagel argues can only be 
'realised in the collective lives of millions' and to lead us towards Harris's convergence 'in our 
beliefs about how we should treat one another', so that we might actually make a fist of de Waal's 
'globalisation for a tribal species'? A commonsense answer to this question would include Islamic, 
Orthodox and Confucian voices as well as Western ones, for these are, in demographic terms, 
among the major civilisational forces of our time, and any canon which excluded any or all of these 
cultural heritages would be dooming itself to charges of specifically Western neo-imperialism rather 
than the charges of global neo-imperialism which all attempts to build a global literary canon 
inevitably face. This commonsense realisation was the starting point for this thesis. But the 
wonderful discovery of my research has been the radical convergence of the civilisational 
representatives I have chosen with each other and with the Western voices for civilisation I have 
variously invoked here. The exercise of comparison itself has been the strongest evidence I could 
have hoped for to support faith in the idea of a Moral Law, and I hope this shows through; while 
mysticisms of animal silence exist across the globe, Islam, Confucianism and Orthodox Christianity 
all have modern representatives more than capable of holding their own with the best of Western 
civilisation.            
 Warriors for civilisation within the academy, however, face serious institutional oppostion. 
One delicious microcosm of an example is NYU Abu Dhabi, initially envisaged as an oasis for 'the 
best that has been thought and said in the world' in a region for so long deprived of access, but now 
hijacked by those who despise the very concepts of 'convergence', 'world literature' and 'the best that 
has been thought and said' in the first place. Jacques Lezra proudly tells this tragic story as one of 
victory for the 'comparatist method'; drawing extensively from the NYU Abu Dhabi experience, 
Lezra argues in his 2012 article 'The Futures of Comparative Literature' that Comparative Literature 
must seek to distinguish itself entirely from World Literature in the battle for survival in 21st 
century humanities programmes. 'World Literature' for Lezra is 'a notion unmistakably conditioned 
on one side by a colonial, elitist imaginary at work when Goethe was conceiving the term, and on 
the other by the tendential creation of forms of universal equivalence associated with global 
capitalism': in short, 'the worlds of Comparative Literature are not the world of "World 
Literature"'.
211
 
 As a defender of World Literature in the 21st-century university and a fierce opponent of the 
relativism that Lezra and departments of Comparative Literature continue to promote 45 years after 
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1968, I would like to say that I at least agree that we would all be better off if 'Comparative' and 
'World' Literature, as Lezra defines them, were left to lead entirely separate institutional lives. Both 
unashamedly promote values which cannot co-exist with each other; may the worthier discipline 
win the hearts and minds of the public. Lezra and I also agree that Comparative Literature 
departments 'make nothing happen'; but while Lezra argues that 'continental philosophy' or Theory 
was 'excluded from departments of philosophy in the United States' and found an 'exile's home' in 
departments of Comparative Literature where it was 'perceived to have no disciplinary and, more 
importantly, no social consequences'
212
, I would rather argue that the content of Theory-laden 
'cultural studies' syllabi is itself largely responsible for this spiralling irrelevance in the first place.  
While ordinary people can understand, or at least imagine, what world literature – the study of the 
world’s best literature – is and why it might matter for people to be exposed to ‘the best that has 
been thought and said in the world', comparatists like Lezra have nothing but scorn for the very 
concepts of 'best' and 'world', and seek to build a house out of pure ‘negativity’ and ‘difference’, 
concepts which are incomprehensible to all those without advanced degrees in continental 
philosophy, and downright disgusting to many of those who do have them. There is a direct 
connection between this incomprehensibility and the irrelevance of Comparative Literature and its 
practitioners; a discipline which faces such a challenge continually to explain and justify itself will 
quickly lose customers among the wider public.       
 Lezra, meanwhile, singles out the United Arab Emirates as an important front in the battle 
for a more humane 21st century global order. In dreaming up the idea of a liberal arts college in Abu 
Dhabi, however, the Emir was, in Lezra’s view, was stuck in the 19th century with such an 
Arnoldian view of the humanities as the study of 'the best that has been thought and said in the 
world'. Instead of 'pursuing, by means of the study of cultural universals, "total perfection"',
213
 the 
NYU people to whom the Emir entrusted his eminently sensible and understandable project 
smashed it: 
  When the curriculum at NYU Abu Dhabi was developed, however, it took a  
  surprising angle on this Arnoldian story. The notion that there is a 'best that has been 
  thought and said in the world' has turned out to be controversial both within and  
  outside of the academy – as decolonisation, the opening of canons, on up to the so-
  called culture wars and the theory wars of the past twenty years have shown. In the 
  place held by this cultural superlative, by this notion that ‘the best which has been 
  thought and said in the world’ exists as such, and that if it exists it is accessible, and 
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  that if it is accessible it is teachable, and that if it is teachable its teaching is desirable 
  – in this place a different value was installed. […] A humanities core [was] built  
  around topics and notions drawn from the field of Comparative Literature.  
  Comparativism, in short, stepped into the controversial spot where reference to ‘the 
  best that has been thought and said in the world’ had stood.214 
In place of a single global community based on common values refined through the ongoing 
practice of the humanities, we are led to a world, actively desired by Lezra, in which the only 
certainty is that there is that there is no moral certainty, and that there is more than one world. This 
‘comparativist’ dream, in my view a nightmare, 'can produce, or at least model, a civil society 
whose juridical frame is neutral with respect to differences. It can attend to and produce a wholly 
different sort of world than the one Arnold envisions, a world that is not one.'
215
 Lezra then embarks 
on a history of Comparative Literature as a discipline oppressed until the end of the Cold War, only 
now freed to fulfil its world historical mission of ending the empire of oneness born at the dawn of 
monotheistic civilisation in both Europe and Asia and surviving right down through the European 
Renaissance and Enlightenment and on into our 21st century global flux. Rather than build a new 
global super-civilisation out of the best of our respective civilisational inheritances, Lezra’s goal is 
to replace the very concept of civilisation with postmodern difference, to situate the discipline of 
Comparative Literature 'at the heart of an enterprise oriented both toward an alternative future – 
alternative to the disasters of  monoglot European national culture, which seems always to produce 
friend-enemy distinctions – and away from a specific past.'216 The attempt to build a single global 
civil society in the 21st century is, for Lezra, an unjustifiable extension of previous nation-building 
exercises. He prefers a rejection of the very concept of national unity on any level, even and 
especially a single global level. The challenge is not to get everyone to agree on ‘the best that has 
been thought and said in the world’, or even to engage in open debate about what ‘the best that has 
been thought and said in the world’ might be, but rather to get everyone to agree that there is no 
such thing as the best that has been thought and said in the world’ in the first place, that the only 
truth is that there is no truth, and that therefore, anything goes, and nothing matters, except the fact 
that nothing matters. This is an intellectual, moral and historical dead-end actively desired by 
people who, like Lezra, despise human civilisation in all its historical forms and believe that the 
very concept of ‘civilisation’ as something to be loved and treasured, as something worth 
contributing to and worth living and dying for, is primitive and barbaric and wrong.  
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 Ordinary people, thankfully, are largely immune to this virus precisely because it is couched 
in such inaccessible language and divorced from their concerns. It is the insecure, partially educated 
adolescent for whom the Sirens’ call of postmodern negativity is dangerous, on whom the arrogance 
and certainty of the true relativist acts as a charm. It requires a certain maturity and humility to 
admit that our parents and forefathers may have been right about some things, even as they were so 
obviously wrong about so much; the baby of civilisation must not be thrown out with the bathwater 
of human stupidity and barbarism we have all inherited. Without such maturity and humility, 
without the courage to admit that we are part of something – one big thing – beyond ourselves, we 
end up in a desert of pure meaninglessness, in which hope itself is by definition extinguished. 
Comparative Literature as Lezra defines it embraces this nihilism; World Literature fights to save 
the flame of civilisation before the moral relativism so loved by political leaders everywhere 
because it allows them to do what they want (contrary to Lezra’s view of the unholy alliance 
between World Literature and 'global capitalism', it is the comparatists who have the charge to 
answer) engulfs our universities, our media, and our free selves, and prevents a global republic of 
letters from ever emerging.           
 If NYU Abu Dhabi stands as a microcosm of the Arab world's struggle to access 'the best 
that has been thought and said in the world', Tu Weiming's new Institute of Advanced Humanistic 
Studies at Peking University provides a more promising model. Inaugurated in 2010 with research 
centres devoted to 'Communication Between Civilisations' and 'Religions Around the World and the 
Universal Ethics', among others, the IAHS promises to take up de Waal's challenge where others 
have so far feared to tread. But we will have much more to say on Tu Weiming and his efforts to 
unite Abrahamic and Confucian civilisations in our final chapter. In the West, meanwhile, the work 
of Fred Dallmayr on civilisational dialogue and convergence remains an important scholarly 
reference. Dallmayr's famous 2003 article, 'Cosmopolitanism: Moral and Political' celebrates the 
work of Martha Nussbaum and German theologian Hans Küng to build a universal ethics while also 
giving the fairest hearing imaginable to postmodern sceptics of the project such as Michel Foucault 
and Luce Irigaray, concluding that, whatever one's views on convergence and difference in the 
moral sphere, the need for a 'global political praxis' remains. Dallmayr's arguments are worth 
exploring briefly here.         
 Taking Küng's 1991 book Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic and the 
1993 'Parliament of the World's Religions' in Chicago as the starting points for his discussion of 
post-Cold War attempts to build a single Global Ethic, Dallmayr quotes Küng's clear views on the 
urgency of convergence: 'No survival without a world ethic. No world peace without peace between 
the religions. No peace between the religions without dialogue between the religions. […] The one 
world in which we live has a chance of survival only if there is no longer any room in it for spheres 
 76 
 
of differing, contradictory, and even antagonistic ethics.'
217
 As Dallmayr concludes, 'the upshot of 
[these] considerations is that globalization cannot be limited to political, economic, and cultural 
domains but must be above all a normative enterprise'
218
. Küng's hand in the 1993 Parliament's 
'Declaration toward a Global Ethic' is highlighted by Dallmayr, the other signatories of which 
affirmed Küng's basic position that the global ethic is 'new only in application, not in basic 
inspiration' and that the common set of core values to which the best of the world's religions have 
historically aspired have 'yet to be lived in heart and action'
219
, or in other words, yet to be 
globalised via contact with other civilisational versions of the same core moral truth.     
 Dallmayr then revisits some of Nussbaum's early arguments for 'moral globalism', 'world 
citizenship' and 'cosmpolitan moral education' laid out earlier in this chapter before moving on to 
the postmodern critics of the enterprise. Dallmayr himself voices his own concerns regarding an 
apparent 'sameness of treatment' in the cosmopolitan enterprise which is somehow 'morally 
deficient by extending recognition to fellow beings only in the respect in which they are identical 
with ourselves.'
220
 Although Nussbaum and others including Kathryn Schulz
221
 have argued 
repeatedly that the much-beloved 'Do unto others' Golden Rule of folk morality is deficient on 
precisely these terms, and argued for empathy as a way of moving meaningfully beyond it to less 
selfish forms of moral engagement, nevertheless, even such attempts at empathy for Dallmayr are 
'egocentric' in the sense that they 'appropriate or reduce the alter to the rational self (or ego), instead 
of recognizing the distinct otherness of fellow beings.'
222
       
 Dallmayr's claim here cuts to the heart of the entire debate. Is it really 'egocentric' or 
'morally deficient' to wish oneself and others to uphold a single set of universal values? Dallmayr 
quotes Foucault on the importance of the process of 'moral self-formation' and the limits of mere 
rule-following for a full ethical life, but then reminds us that Foucault himself did not believe in an 
ideal process of moral self-formation at all. The disagreement between Nussbaum and Foucault on 
the legacy of Diogenes the Cynic shows us what is at stake here: 
  Curiously, Foucault's later texts appeal precisely to the same set of mentors invoked 
  by Nussbaum in her defense of universal rules: the Cynics and Stoics, and above all 
  Diogenes the Cynic. Like Nussbaum's writings. The History of Sexuality refers to the 
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  'scandalous' behavior of Diogenes and his habit of confounding public and private 
  spheres of conduct. However, far from figuring as the exemplar of a universal reason 
  captured in invariant rule systems, the accent here is placed on Diogenes as teacher 
  of moral self-formation and 'performance criticism' - a criticism directed at the  
  homogenizing and 'normalizing' rule systems of society.
223
 
  
For Foucault, it is 'homogenising and normalising rule systems' which are always and everywhere 
the enemy, whatever their content happens to be, and whatever the potential benefits of such 
systems, including the Socratic, empathetic, self-cultivating one envisaged by Nussbaum, happen to 
be. Dallmayr argues that moral globalists like Nussbaum 'summarily denounce […] a group of 
contemporary thinkers often loosely grouped under the rubric of "postmodernism"' and united by 
'their opposition to "foundationalism," which is another word for a homogenizing universalism'
224
, 
and by a 'Nietzschean or post-Nietzschean antifoundational zeal' which 'takes the form of a radical 
reversal celebrating particularism or dissensus for its own sake', and argues that 'matters are rarely 
that simple'.
225
 Sometimes, however, they really are; no one on the convergence side of the debate, 
not even Peter Hitchens, is arguing that moral authority should not always and everywhere be 
questioned by feeling, reasoning moral agents. But the reason why such feeling and questioning 
matters in the first place is because we care about the well-being of ourselves and those around us 
on whatever terms we care; the choice, a deeply political one as Dallmayr himself reminds us, is 
about whether we want to accept the challenge of trying to make everyone care in the same way, 
which will surely involve both giving and taking – quite literally taking, from 'the best that has been 
thought and said in the world' - or whether instead we want to celebrate the very fact of not caring 
in the same way by denying the very idea of a 'best that has been thought and said' in the first place.          
 For the time being, the Arab Spring and its fervent protagonists, which Naguib Mahfouz did 
not quite live to see even as he did so much to make it and them possible, provide more hope and 
inspiration than any number of privileged Western humanities professors on either side of the 
debate about civilisation and convergence. Yemeni activist Tawakkul Karman, the youngest ever 
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011, echoed in her acceptance speech both the tone and 
content of Naguib Mahfouz's 1988 Nobel Lecture with an insistence on hadara, civilisation, and its 
role in our century: 
  Mankind’s feeling of responsibility to create a decent life and make it worth living 
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  with dignity, has always been stronger than the will to kill life. Despite great battles, 
  the survival of the human race is the clearest expression of mankind’s yearning for 
  reconstruction, not for destruction, for progress, not for regression and death. This 
  tendency is strengthened day after day with all available means of communications, 
  thanks to the rapid and astonishing development of information technology and the 
  communications revolution. Walls between human societies have fallen down and 
  the lives and destinies of societies have converged, marking the emergence of a new 
  phase, a phase where peoples and nations of the world are not only residents of a 
  small village, as they say, but members of one family, despite differences in  
  nationality and race or in culture and language. All the members of this one family 
  interact in all corners of our planet and share the same aspirations and fears. Despite 
  all its missteps, humanity will go on in its march towards what is 'beneficial to the 
  people' and will make different cultures, identities and specific characteristics of  
  civilisations come closer to each other on the road towards positive convergence and 
  interaction, both in taking and in giving. Thus, understanding will gradually replace 
  dispute, cooperation will replace conflict, peace will replace war, and integration will 
  replace division.
226
 
Even in her moment of personal triumph, Karman does not forget her humble place in the 
millennial world-historical march of hadara: 'the Nobel Prize did not come only as a personal prize 
for Tawakkul Abdel-Salam Karman, but as a declaration and recognition of the whole world for the 
triumph of the peaceful revolution of Yemen and as an appreciation of the sacrifices of its great 
peaceful people.'
227
 She also calls on the world to act in Yemen on the side of justice: 'the 
democratic world, which has told us a lot about the virtues of democracy and good governance, 
should not be indifferent to what is happening in Yemen and Syria. […] All of that is just hard 
labour during the birth of democracy which requires support and assistance, not fear and caution.'
228
 
In perfectly Arnoldian language, Karman expresses her 'hope for a better future for mankind will 
always drive us to speak noble words and do noble deeds. Together, we will push the horizons, one 
after another, towards a world of true human perfection.'
229
     
 Toleration of difference for difference's sake only takes one so far; in the end, one must 
choose for oneself whether one believes in human perfectibility, in the possiblity of moral and 
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civilisational progress, or not. While generations of Western intellectuals from anthropologists like 
Claude Lévi-Strauss down to the likes of John Gray in the present have done all they can to 
persuade the world of the personal and collective dangers of embracing utopian ideologies and 
universal codes of human rights and moral conduct and of the general need to 'stay out' of other 
people's lives and refrain from moral judgment, Arab activists like Tawakkul Karman prescribe 
precisely the empathy and convergence that Western warriors for civilisation like Martha Nussbaum 
and others introduced in this chapter also advocate. The three 'warriors for civilisation' to whom this 
study is dedicated will all do the same. Matthew Arnold himself summarises the spirit of the 
remaining chapters, and of the current one, when he says that  
  there is a view in which all the love of our neighbour, the impulses towards action, 
  help, and beneficence, the desire for stopping human error, clearing human  
  confusion, and diminishing the sum of human misery, the noble aspiration to leave 
  the world better and happier than we found it,—motives eminently such as are called 
  social,—come in as part of the grounds of culture, and the main and pre-eminent 
  part. Culture is then properly described [...] as having its origin in the love of  
  perfection; it is a study of perfection. It moves by the force, not merely or primarily 
  of the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral and social passion 
  for doing good. […] And because men are all members of one great whole, and the 
  sympathy which is in human nature will not allow one member to be indifferent to 
  the rest, or to have a perfect welfare independent of the rest, the expansion of our 
  humanity, to suit the idea of perfection which culture forms, must be a general  
  expansion. Perfection, as culture conceives it, is not possible while the individual 
  remains isolated: the individual is obliged, under pain of being stunted and enfeebled 
  in his own development if he disobeys, to carry others along with him in his march 
  towards perfection, to be continually doing all he can to enlarge and increase the  
  volume of the human stream sweeping thitherward; and here, once more, it lays on 
  us the same obligation as religion.
230
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2. Naguib Mahfouz 
2.1 Warrior for Monotheism 
   I am the son of two civilisations that at a certain age in history have formed a 
   happy marriage. The first of these, seven thousand years old, is the  
   Pharaonic civilization; the second, one thousand four hundred years old, is 
   the Islamic one. [...] Pharaonic civilisation [...] was guided for the first time 
   to the existence of God. [...] Islamic civilisation [...] called for the  
   establishment of a union between all Mankind under the guardianship of the 
   Creator, based on freedom, equality and forgiveness.
231
 
           Naguib Mahfouz 
 
Monotheism is a necessary condition for civilisation: welcome to the radically un-postmodern 
world of Naguib Mahfouz. God exists, and we can all find Him, or at least get closer to Him, if we 
know where to look. Chinese Arabist Lǐ Chēn puts it as well as anyone when he says that Mahfouz 
is not as interested in the traditional historical or scriptural evidence for God's existence as he is in 
the 'moral evidence'.
232
 Mahfouz never repudiated his allegiance to Islam, but his was no literalist 
faith; indeed, Mahfouz's Islam looks a lot like heresy, and is widely condemned as such by Islamic 
literalists. In an interview with Ahmad As-Shahawy, Mahfouz aligns himself with the Pakistani poet 
and intellectual Muhammad Iqbal; for Iqbal, as Mahfouz quotes him, 'prophecy in Islam reaches its 
final plenitude in the realisation of the need to do away with prophecy itself.'
233
 Such a development 
implies, for Iqbal, 'a realisation of the impossibility of a continued existence dependent on this 
leash; in order to reach a full understanding of Islam, one must leave the leash behind, and come in 
the end to rely on one's own means alone.'
234
 Mahfouz takes this to mean that 'a human being 
should not live waiting for a new revelation, or depend on a means of knowing which resembles 
revelation in its automaticity and comprehensiveness, but should rather limit the scope of possible 
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knowing to her conscience and instincts alone.'
235
 One may rightly ask whether the English word 
'monotheism' is an appropriate translation of this 'faith', especially in the context of a New Atheist 
breeze currently blowing through the Anglosphere which defines God as precisely the leash that 
Mahfouz believes Islam was the first to overcome; but whether Mahfouz's case for humanistic self-
reliance can be described as 'theistic' or not, it is definitely 'mono-': there is a single Moral Law 
discoverable by immersion in a life of both contemplation and action, and we enjoy intimations of 
heavenly perfection when we conform to this law. Monotheistic civilisation is everything to 
Mahfouz because without it, the moral chaos of polytheism and relativism, most famously depicted 
by Mahfouz in Children of Gebelawi, reigns.       
   In order to contextualise, for our contemporary debates, Mahfouz's 
simultaneous reverence for monotheistic civilisations and denial of the absolute or inimitable truth 
value of the revelations on which those civilisations would seem to be based, we could do worse 
than to cite Peter Gordon from 2011: 
  Every culture begins by holding certain truths as sacred and virtually unquestionable. 
  Still [...] it is difficult to see how anything in human experience could be permitted to 
  remain wholly immune from rational scrutiny. It follows that, as reason expands its 
  reach, the contents of our religious heritage must undergo a trial of rationalization. 
  The ideas that a civilization once considered beyond scrutiny must eventually be re-
  fashioned into propositional claims that are susceptible to criticism. Habermas calls 
  this process 'the linguistification of the sacred.”' A good illustration (and one that 
  Habermas endorses) is the transformation in world religions that Karl Jaspers  
  described as the 'Axial Revolution', when cultures in the Near and Far East began to 
  re-conceive their divinities as no longer immanent but transcendent beings, who  
  articulated the society’s sense of the highest good in principles or commands. Plato’s 
  idea of a Good beyond Being is one example; the monotheistic idea of God as author 
  of the revealed law is another. But once these ideals were drawn into human  
  discourse, they were exposed to rational reflection. We may have begun by  
  imagining the divine as the sole source of our moral codes, but when we were  
  awakened to the possibility that these codes can be challenged, our capacity for self-
  direction eventually outstripped our original experience of religious awe. The  
  critique of the sacred therefore turns out to be the original model for the ongoing 
  historical drama by which humanity came to understand itself as author of its own 
  fate. Religion and Enlightenment are not eternal foes, since religion serves as  
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  reason’s point of departure. But the departure is necessary.236 
To attack revealed religion as primitive and backward is therefore to miss the point that we owe it 
everything; Mahfouz's thesis about the first emergence of monotheism in ancient Egypt may or may 
not be historically accurate, and may or may not have parallels in China or elsewhere, but what 
matters above all is that the seed of moral unity has been planted; it is now up to us to protect this 
flower of civilisation and pass it on to future generations, because God's law itself commands it: 
'The developed world and the Third World are but one family. Each human being bears 
responsibility towards it by the degree of what he has obtained of knowledge, wisdom, and 
civilisation.'
237
          
 Mahfouz's faith, then, is less a direct faith in God than a faith in the power of civilisation to 
bring us closer to God; social and political conditions may bring us closer to, or alienate us from, 
the Divine Essence, and we must strive always to improve them. In a 1976 article entitled simply 
'Faith', Mahfouz stresses the social conditions which make an Arnoldian belief in human 
perfectibility easier, thereby creating a virtuous circle in which moral improvement across whole 
populations becomes possible. This 'faith' is 'created from the humanity of the citizen' in a climate 
of 'fair balance between rights and duties', 'respect for the citizen's beliefs and allegiances' and 'a 
consensus that 'the State is labouring on behalf of a broad base in order to ease suffering and 
promote flourishing'.
238
 In such a climate, the 'flame of faith' provides 'a light for consciences, a fuel 
for thought and power for the will'.
239
 In the absence of such a climate, faith atrophies, as Mahfouz's 
own did following the 1952 revolution and Egypt's fall into corruption under Nasser, and again 
following the naksa of 1967.          
 The inescapable social and political dimension of Mahfouz's monotheism, its decidedly un-
monastic character, behooves us to put to bed, or at least to put into context, the widely held view 
that Mahfouz was some kind of neo-Sufist. Chinese critics - chief among them  Lǐ Chēn - have been 
especially determined to push this angle, with interestingly flawed results. Lǐ's overarching interest 
in Islamic mysticism is no doubt at least partly responsible for the general over-emphasis on 
Mahfouz's Sufism among Chinese scholars. 'The most important thing to notice about the world's 
religions is that they point to the world's unity, and do away with ethnic differences,' Lǐ quotes 
Mahfouz as saying, but already in Lǐ's introduction Sufism is advanced as the key to this unity: 'For 
Sufists, God is not the end of some chain of logical reasoning, nor is He the idealised product of 
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social research; He is the best of what we feel in our hearts and perceive in the world around us. [...] 
Sufism's sense of good and evil, of conscience, guides us to the existence of God.'
240
 Lǐ could so 
easily have drawn parallels with Confucianism here; among contemporary neo-Confucians, Tu 
Weiming, for example, stresses the primacy of self-cultivation over concern for others in essentially 
the same terms as Mahfouz here - you can't help others if you don't have the heart for it - but the 
discussion is limited, artificially to suit Lǐ's purposes, to Sufism and the immediate Arab context of 
Mahfouz's world. Nevertheless, Lǐ is clear that Mahfouz's commitment to the 'moral unity' of the 
world is not dependent on 'religious' faith in any literal sense: 'He is not keen on any of the 
historical evidence for God's existence, but rather is interested in Sufism's experience of the moral 
evidence.'
241
 This is, however, more than a little misleading; Lǐ partially contradicts himself here, 
and in his later conclusion, by quoting, in the first section of his chapter on Mahfouz, a key passage 
which shows Mahfouz was, at bottom, no kind of Sufist: 'real Sufism rejects life. I could never 
reject life, and I do not promote hatred of life. I have always loudly advocated deep immersion in 
life.'
242
 Although Sufism, according to Mahfouz, is 'good and gentle' and 'only rejects life for lofty 
spiritual reasons', he is unequivocal about its overall inadequacy as a moral teaching: 'I use my 
readings in Sufism as a kind of rest, and regard them as beautiful poetry. But I do not in any sense 
live what they advocate.'
243 He says essentially he same thing again in a 1992 interview with 
Charlotte El Shabrawy: 'I love Sufism as I love beautiful poetry, but it is not the answer. Sufism is 
like a mirage in the desert. It says to you, come and sit, relax and enjoy yourself for a while. I reject 
any path which rejects life, but I can’t help loving Sufism because it sounds so beautiful... It gives 
relief in the midst of battle.'244          
 Lǐ's emphasis on the role of Sufism in Mahfouz's work is therefore largely misplaced; the 
'battle' to fulfil one's full moral nature, to be the best one can be as a social animal, is ultimately 
worth more to Mahfouz, just as it is to Confucians, than the mirage of meditative repose, and alone 
can provide true fulfilment or access to higher realms of being. Far from convincing the reader of 
Mahfouz's Sufism, Lǐ is much more convincing when he suggests simply that Mahfouz 'believes in 
both God and humanity', and that he 'does not view metaphysical questions in absolute terms, but 
shows how, in essence, they all have a social dimension, and are all fundamentally tied to this 
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world.'245 This exploration of the social dimension of human perfection is made possible by 
Mahfouz's 'full use of literature's capacity as a "cunning art"', with which, in the course of his 
œuvre, he 'describes from every possible angle the relationship between God and humanity, 
humanity and the function of faith and religion, and other similar questions.'246 Lǐ gets even closer 
to the heart of Mahfouz when discussing an episode from the work dearest to Mahfouz's heart247 
(and to which we will return in detail): Arabian Nights and Days. In this novel, Mahfouz 'again 
reiterates the importance of the nobility of one's spirit and morals for realising ideals', and 'raises the 
idea that it is only by overcoming selfish desire and purifying one's soul, building faith in the power 
of acting for the benefit of others, that one can achieve happiness, and reach the horizon of spiritual 
perfection.'248 Or again, quoting Mahfouz’s 1977 novel The Harafish (1977): "The doors of the 
temple are forever open wide to those of childlike purity, those with angelic hearts, those who 
struggle on behalf of others."249          
 Lǐ is interested in what he calls 'the edge of union between humanity and God' in Mahfouz. 
Lǐ's problem is that he sometimes does more than walk this line; he can't resist occasionally 
crossing it for the purpose of explicating the Islamic mysticism which is his core concern. If he 
doesn't cross it on p. 186, when he talks about 'overcoming one's own selfish longings and 
concerning oneself oneself with others' happiness as a necessary qualification for entry into the 
doors of God, for union with God'250, he certainly does when discussing the drunken episode from 
Mahfouz's short story 'Zaabalawi': 'The loss of consciousness symbolises the loss of self, the 
attainment of the edge of selflessness. In his drunken hour, he enjoys feelings of unrivalled 
wonder... His joy is none other than the feeling of union with God, what Buddhism calls 
fǎxǐchōngmǎn.'251 This parallel with Buddhism is an extremely rare reference by a Chinese critic 
of Mahfouz to a Chinese cultural context. It is also the wrong time to be drawing such a 
comparison; Mahfouz's interest in mysticism is, as we have seen, strictly as a leisure activity. To 
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make this comparison, but to fail to make any comparison whatsoever with Confucianism and its 
calls to 'unite heaven and earth' (tianrenheyi) through ceaseless social engagement, is to risk 
missing the point of Mahfouz's entire oeuvre.       
   The fourth and final part of Lǐ's essay, unpromisingly titled 'The Special 
Nature of Mahfouz's Sufism', even goes so far as to make the claim that Mahfouz can be regarded 
as some kind of neo-Sufist: 'the knowledge of life, philosophy of action, continual progress, ending 
of man-made tragedies, making of the world into Heaven, selfless public spirit of Islam and so on 
contained in Mahfouz's writings can all be regarded as part of his modern interpretation of Sufist 
ideals.'252 For Lǐ, it is primarily Sufism on which Mahfouz draws to call for the 'moral renewal' of 
Egyptian society and the Arab world at large.253 Yet in the end, even Lǐ realises that 'Mahfouz is 
not a Sufist, but has a deep understanding of his Islamic and Sufistic cultural inheritance. It is only 
because of this that he is able to provide a modern interpretation of the spirit of Sufism.'254  
   Another Chinese scholar to have inherited Lǐ’s preoccupation with Mahfouz’s 
Sufism is Xuē Qìngguó. Xuē’s short but incisive 2008 paper 'Mahfouz’s Mystic Quest' draws 
directly on Lǐ’s pioneering work in Chinese studies of Mahfouz. Like Lǐ, Xuē starts off making 
some questionable and misleading claims about Mahfouz’s Sufism, such as when discussing a 
drunken episode from Mahfouz’s Echoes of an Autobiography. For Xuē, 'the tragedy of the Sufist 
experience' consists in the realisation that 'one cannot rely on temporary intoxication to free oneself 
from human suffering.'255 Yet surely Sufism as commonly understood, and as understood by 
Mahfouz, is the affirmation of the possibility of mystic union, not, as Xuē affirms, the tragic 
realisation of its transience. Mahfouz's attitude to Sufi mysticism matches his attitude to 
drunkenness as expressed in Echoes of an Autobiography: 'The transports to lofty wonder could not 
have lasted long. They were merely the special effects of a drunken state; human life cannot be one 
long drunken purple patch. Thus, when the narrator emerges from his stupor, his ills and afflictions 
are much as before.'256  Xuē is nevertheless right about the role of Sufist characters in 
Mahfouz, seeming, in her description, to contradict her earlier 'tragic' definition of Sufism: 'in many 
Mahfouz novels, the characters representing passive Sufist ideals are blindly immersed in the quest 
for absolute truth and meditation over metaphysical concepts; they are cut off from the world, and 
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evade their earthly responsibilities.'257 Although these Sufi characters 'do not lack wisdom and 
knowledge', they are 'always slightly out of step with the times', and 'in depicting these characters, 
the author does not shy away from ridicule or criticism.'258 Like Lǐ, however, Xuē comes to a 
robust conclusion about Mahfouz’s moral vision despite her misleading claims about the role of 
Sufism in Mahfouz's work: 'By working to resolve social tragedies, the tragedy of existence can 
perhaps itself be resolved or lightened. Ultimately, such work can give life meaning, making it 
 worthwhile for us to go on living.'259 Rather than invoking God at every turn as an excuse 
for our own vices and shortcomings, Mahfouz's brand of Islam reminds us that 'the expectation of 
fathers and gods is not that we unnecessarily search for them, but that we work, act, create; that we 
turn God’s world into Heaven on Earth.260        
     In the course of her article, however, Xuē also raises the 
spectre of atheism that haunts even serious Mahfouz criticism, particularly in the Arab world. The 
sheer length and creative energy of Mahfouz's 'pessimistic period' under Nasser - the paradigm text 
of which is Children of Gebelawi (1959) - has led many critics, and even many of Mahfouz's 
personal friends, to conclude that Mahfouz was at bottom an unbeliever, or that at best, as Xuē puts 
it, 'Mahfouz’s quest stories all have some things in common: they all prove the existence of the 
target of the quest, but they all deny the possibility of a meeting'.261 In his 2006 obituary to 
Mahfouz, for example, Muḩammad Al Bāz recounts that, in the days following his death many 
people, 'not just writers loosely associated with him or unwanted intruders at his table, but friends 
who considered themselves on intimate terms with him and lived with him and spent a long time in 
his neighbourhood', told him that, 'by the way', Mahfouz was 'an unbeliever'.262 For Al Bāz, the 
fact that many of Mahfouz's protagonists 'failed to find God' was a reflection of 'the intellectual and 
psychological state in which Naguib himself lived'; despite his 'calm demeanour', Al Bāz reports 
that Mahfouz was 'full of worries and anxieties', a sufferer of some kind of post-metaphysical stress 
disorder: 'his feeling of lost justice led him to search for the lord of justice, but it seems that his 
journey tired him out, drained him, exhausted him. He returned from it with his will broken, and 
never recovered a thirst for revenge.'263  How completely this misunderstands the man, especially 
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in his later decades: even at the height of his pessimism during the Nasser years, Mahfouz was far 
from 'broken' in his quest for justice. Looking back on Children of Gebelawi (1959) following the 
attack on his life by extremists in 1994, Mahfouz suggests that the novel, which dramatises the 
struggles of Moses, Jesus, Muhammad and a modern scientist for social justice, is less pessimistic 
about God than many, including his attackers, asserted. The work was not, as his attackers and other 
critics who had 'obviously not read the novel' supposed, an attempt to supplant the wisdom of the 
Qur'an by attempting to rival it as a 'religious text', but was rather 'a literary work dealing with the 
struggle between Good and Evil'.264 The book 'did not include any daring transgression of the 
Divine Essence, or any slur against the Abrahamic religions', but rather 'presented a vision of Good 
and Evil and affirmed that religion saved Humanity from injustice and that Science is capable of 
promoting human progress provided that it does not stray from the principles of religion'.265 
Although the final 'prophet' in the novel is a scientist who comes after Muhammad, this bold 
narrative decision is an affirmation of Mahfouz's view of the Qur'an as above all a call, the final 
Abrahamic call, to self-responsibility and hard, empirical study. The novel finishes, in Mahfouz's 
words, 'by affirming the importance of faith in the existence of the Divine Essence, and by arguing 
that life is built on science and the principles of religions.'266 Moreover, Mahfouz 'affirmed in the 
novel that religion played an important role in the development of Humanity and in defending 
human beings from injustice.'267      Mahfouz's path to faith, however, was by 
no means straightforward, as he himself freely admitted. In a 1989 interview for which the editors 
chose the title 'After a Tough Period of Doubt and an Arduous Journey of Reason, He Proclaimed 
His Faith... and His Belonging to the House of Islam', Mahfouz traces his spiritual journey: 
   I imbibed Islam - initially, and mixed as it was with myths and distortions - from the 
   environment into which I was born. When I became a young man, and I started to 
   subject everything I encountered to my powers of reason, I had no choice but to  
   reject these myths and distortions and filter them out of my worldview, but I fell into 
   a big error of reason, namely that I thought that these myths and distortions were an 
   integral part of religion, and that I was filtering out part of the essence of religion 
   itself. There was a period of doubt in my life, and I expressed that in many of my 
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   stories, and especially in the Trilogy, which depicted the crisis of a generation which 
   grew up with religion and the Islamic heritage. For me, the truth of religion got  
   mixed up with the myths, and so as I learnt more about life and subjected more of 
   life to my critical faculties, there was a clash between the faith I had inherited and 
   the reality of my life. I am proud of my faith and my belonging to the House of  
   Islam, which I entered after a period of doubt, and I came to identify with it with 
   conviction, spurning all the myths that were incompatible with its majesty. I can truly 
   say that I did not come to believe in this religion through mere inheritance from my 
   forefathers, but rather after a wide-ranging study of different doctrines and theories 
   and ideas, and even of the religion itself, and in the end I found myself completely 
   convinced by Islam. My faith - Praise Be to God - is a faith based on personal  
   conviction and not an aping of others... Islam contains within itself all the  
   components for the building and success of nations. It calls for work, honesty,  
   hygiene, clean hands, and stands against oppressors and hypocrites and corruptors. 
   But some - who unfortunately seem pious - put all this to one side, and call for an 
   exaggerated adherence to certain formalities, and I think the threat posed by these 
   people to the Islamic nation and to Islam itself is not less serious than the threat  
   posed by those who call for a casting of the whole religion to one side.268           
As we will see in detail in the course of this chapter, reform based on reason, science and 
conscience is inscribed into Mahfouz's vision of Islam; as counter-intuitive as it may seem in an age 
in which 'Islam' has come be represented by those calling for 'an exaggerated adherence to certain 
formalities', this spirit of reform is, for Mahfouz, the essence of Islam itself, and our stairway to 
heaven. The reform process is described by Mahfouz as an eternal struggle between 'tradition and 
existing law' on the one hand and the forces of reform and 'freedom' on the other, in a quest for an 
'ever-deepening humanity' (insāniyyatun a'maq): 'Out of the struggle between these two forces 
society progresses, changes, and new horizons open before it for hearts and minds and wills. This is 
truly an eternal struggle, a continuing battle, and we do not wish for an end to it or a truce or a 
peace.'269 It was this ongoing struggle for perfection which 'lifted Humanity out of caves and to the 
conquest of space. May conservatives fulfil their duty and may freedom live forever.'270  
   Mahfouz would have felt right at home at an important 2005 debate between prominent 
New Atheists Stephen Fry and Christopher Hitchens, for despite his professions of allegiance to 
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Islam, Mahfouz arguably belongs more on the side of New Atheists like Fry and Hitchens than in 
the ranks of their religious opponents.271 Fry on the Enlightenment is a distinct echo of Mahfouz 
on Islam and the 'eternal struggle' for reform and civilisational improvement: 'Simply to say that 
there is a religious world and a secular world, and that the two are enemies, is hopeless. It seems to 
me that the greatness of our reason - if it is great - is that it can accommodate and teach and 
enlighten.'272 Just as Mahfouz views the struggle for cultural perfection as intergenerational and 
eternal, so too does Fry argue that the Enlightenment 'should not be considered to be over - it's a 
project that will never end, after all' -  and that 'the understanding of the human heart, the 
understanding of the universe, the understanding of all the things that surround us is a mission, a 
project we each in our lifetimes embark upon and will never finish, and the next generation will 
too.'273     For all his apparent Abrahamic or 'Hebraistic' credentials, Mahfouz is 
equally well understood as an heir to the Hellenistic half of Arnoldian 'culture'. Like Fry, Mahfouz 
embraces the Promethean myth according to which 'whatever is divine is in us as humans'; just as 
Islam is threatened by those who preach an 'excessive adherence to certain formailities' at the 
expense of new human discoveries, so too has organised religion in Europe, in Fry's words, 'become 
a feeble and anemic nonsense because we understood that the fire was within us, not in some idol 
on an altar - whether it was a gold cross or a Buddha or anything else.'274 Christopher Hitchens, 
during the same debate, makes a similar attack on revealed religion as 'the highest form that wish-
thinking takes', and as  'the highest form that that cheap, narcissistic and solipsistic ambition 
takes.'275 Echoing Marx, who argued that the ongoing criticism of religious tradition made possible 
by the forces of reason and reform 'has plucked the flowers from the chain, not in order that men 
shall wear the chain without any consolation, but so that they may break the chain, and cull the 
living flower', Hitchens states unequivocally that 'the history of our civilisation has been that it 
starts when theocracy ends. There are no exceptions. Only when people separate the church from 
the state [...] can art or science or philosophy have a chance.'276      
       Mahfouz, it would seem in this context, is best understood 
as a modern-day Averroës, a believer in a 'divine spark' for whom art, science and philosophy ought 
not just to be given 'a chance', but vigorously promoted as the very core of religion. Robert Pasnau 
contrasts Averroism with the Ghazalism which eventually gained prominence in the Islamic world 
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and prevented the European Renaissance and Enlightenment from happening there. In the Decisive 
Treatise, Averroës 'argues at length for the value of philosophy: not just that it should be permitted, 
but that its study is, in fact, required for those who would truly understand religion. To ban 
philosophy would be 'a wrong to the best sort of people and to the best sort of existing things'.277 
In his defence of the Averroëan spirit of Islam at its best, Pasnau takes aim at Abū Hamid al-
Ghazālī, who a century earlier had 'urged Muslims to set aside secular learning in favor of a Sufi-
influenced program of spiritual purification'.278 In his 'opposition to the great earlier figures of 
Islamic learning such as al-Fārābī and Avicenna, who had been at the forefront of incorporating 
Aristotle’s philosophy into the Islamic worldview', Ghazālī sought to 'tear down that whole edifice 
of learning founded on Greek philosophical thought, and to put in its place the sort of spiritual 
practices promoted by Sufism.'279 To show that he meant it, Ghazālī, like a parodied Sufi character 
in a Mahfouz novel, 'famously acted on these principles when, at the height of his own academic 
career, he abandoned his distinguished position as professor of theology in Baghdad, and devoted 
the next decade to a life of ascetic meditation.'280         
      Mahfouz makes his adherence to Averroism and his rejection of 
Ghazalism abundantly clear in his Nobel Lecture; indeed, Averroism is presented as the spirit of 
Islamic civilisation itself: 'I will introduce that civilization in a moving dramatic situation 
summarizing one of its most conspicuous traits: In one victorious battle against Byzantium it has 
given back its prisoners of war in return for a number of books of the ancient Greek heritage in 
philosophy, medicine and mathematics.'281 This openness of Islam to all forms of human wisdom 
is 'a testimony of value for the human spirit in its demand for knowledge, even though the 
demander was a believer in God and the demanded a fruit of a pagan civilization.'282   
           We will have occasion to explore 
further the ancient Egyptian roots of Mahfouz's monotheism when we turn our attention to 
Mahfouz's 1985 novel Dweller in Truth, where particular attention will be paid to the 'first 
monotheist' Akhenaten and his religion of universal love. The goal of this first section, however, 
was to construct a base-camp from which to explore Mahfouz's vision of civilisation, and to 
establish the underlying moral unity or 'unicity' of the Mahfouzian worldview, the faith in a Divine 
Essence discoverable through hard moral work in the face of the obvious presence of random evil in 
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the world (Fry offers the unforgettable example of 'plate tectonics destroying children'283). Of all 
the summaries we could dream up for this muscular, 'grown-up' monotheism, none would serve us 
better than this one from Mahfouz himself in 1993: 
  It is one world, despite its differences and contradictions and gradations: One World. 
  Its races and nations are in dialogue, and its problems and hopes and sufferings are 
  being exchanged via various means of communication. It cannot be kept hidden from 
  any of its children that there has been stunning progress in some areas and deplorable 
  retardation in others. We may therefore say that optimists have as much right to be 
  optimistic as pessimists do to be pessimistic. Meanwhile, life continues on its way 
  without turning its gaze from the goals of victory and triumph. We often dwell on 
  injustice and oppression, aggression and selfishness, but we should also think of the 
  mutual aid, the loans, the sharing of expertise and knowledge and the defence of  
  human rights with hearts and tongues and sometimes even hands. Still, the Third 
 World must believe that its role is more than merely to wait and hold out its hand and  
 beg people of science and expertise. It has more to offer than mere population   
 numbers and raw materials, and has established that it is capable of sacrifice and  
 redemption, and that it possesses the will and knows the Highest Example, and is  
 sustained by a heritage which sanctifies moral values, science and work. It must   
 kindle in its spirit the best of what it has in order to set out on the neverending path  
 of life. And it should know that it is living in the age of a new flood, and that only  
 those endowed with faith and science and a determination to work to immortalise  
 existence will make it onto the Ark. Woe unto those who remain underdeveloped.284       
 
 
2.2 Warrior for Conscience 
 
   As for Pharaonic civilization I will not talk of the conquests and the building 
   of empires. This has become a worn out pride the mention of which modern 
   conscience, thank God, feels uneasy about. Nor will I talk about how it was 
   guided for the first time to the existence of God and its ushering in the dawn 
   of human conscience. [...] Gone now is that civilization - a mere story of the 
   past. One day the great Pyramid will disappear too. But Truth and Justice 
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   will remain for as long as Mankind has a ruminative mind and a living  
   conscience. [...] In the olden times every leader worked for the good of his 
   own nation alone. The others were considered adversaries, or subjects of  
   exploitation. There was no regard to any value but that of superiority and 
   personal glory. For the sake of this, many morals, ideals and values were 
   wasted; many unethical means were justified; many uncounted souls were 
   made to perish. Lies, deceit, treachery, cruelty reigned as the signs of  
   sagacity and the proof of greatness. Today, this view needs to be changed  
   from its very source. Today, the greatness of a civilised leader ought to be 
   measured by the universality of his vision and his sense of responsibility  
   towards all humankind. [...] I would not be exceeding the limits of my duty if 
   I told them in the name of the Third World: Be not spectators to our miseries. 
   You have to play therein a noble role befitting your status. From your position 
   of superiority you are responsible for any misdirection of animal, or plant, to 
   say nothing of Man, in any of the four corners of the world.
285
  
         Naguib Mahfouz, Nobel Lecture 
 
For Mahfouz, there is no getting beyond good and evil; there is a single Divine Essence and a single 
Moral Law which we discovered at a certain point in our civilisational development, one which 
demands an abandonment of imperial selfishness and an embrace of humanitarian altruism. 
Mahfouz, indeed, is the anti-Nietzsche, an antidote to all that Nietzsche's perspectivism and anti-
moralism have wrought in 20th century Western philosophy and society. This chapter is conceived 
as an exploration of the fertile Mahfouz-Nietzsche nexus, one which has inspired several Mahfouz 
critics, including Lǐ Chēn. Once again, Lǐ's errors will enlighten us, and lead us to a deeper 
understanding of Mahfouz's concept of civilisation. For reasons which will become clear in due 
course, this journey will also entail a brief detour through Nietzsche's reception in the United States.
 Lǐ rightly believes that Mahfouz saw the fundamental mistake made by large chunks of 
humanity as "putting one's destiny in God's hands. Mahfouz's view runs counter to both religious 
doctrine and secular understanding, and clearly blends religion, science and socialism”.286 From 
here, however, Lǐ makes an extraordinary and unwarranted leap to Nietzscheanism: 'Mahfouz's 
view is not different from Nietzsche's "God is dead"; both intend to make humanity live and think 
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in a society which does not rely on God.'
287
  Despite the fact that Mahfouz and Nietzsche are about 
as different from each other as two thinkers could possibly be - Mahfouz believed that conscience, 
the empathic connection with others and a commitment to reducing their suffering, was necessary 
for civilisation and the key to higher experience, while Nietzsche believed precisely that 
conscience, worrying about suffering at all (one's own or that of others), was the enfeebling cancer 
at the heart of civilisation and an obstacle to human progress towards the superhuman – Lǐ's main 
point would seem to be the fairly uncontroversial one that Mahfouz believed in morally motivated 
activity rather than passive faith in God or a withdrawal into a life of private meditation as the path 
to human perfection. The parallel with Nietzsche, however, is extremely misleading; one is a hyper-
moralist, the other an anti-moralist.           
 At bottom, the quarrel between Mahfouz and Nietzsche concerns suffering; the Nietzsche of 
The Genealogy of Morals and Beyond Good and Evil thought that conscience was a deplorable 
product of our fear of suffering, a primitive psychological 'leash' to be cast off when we learnt to 
accept even the most horrific forms of suffering as a necessary and desired part of the carnival of 
life. Nietzsche's two most famous doctrines - the Superman and the Eternal Recurrence - are best 
understood as two sides of this same life-affirming coin; even if life turns out to be a boiling inferno 
of pain - or perhaps just as bad, an endless and pointless repetition of what we have already 
experienced - we should be brave enough to affirm even these nightmare scenarios. Nietzsche goes 
so far as to suggest that 'suffering is a necessary stage on the way to ultimate pleasure', and that 
'pleasure and pain may be "so knotted together that whoever wants as much as possible of the one, 
must also have as much as possible of the other"'.
288
 The ethics that Nietzsche derives from this 
pleasure-pain binary - be willing to maximise pain in order to maximise pleasure - leads  
straightforwardly to unspeakable horrors if it is admitted. While Nietzsche is not the Marquis de 
Sade - he does not advocate causing pain to others in order to gain pleasure for oneself - he does 
call on us to have the courage to seek out opportunities for maximum pain for ourselves in order to 
maximise our own pleasure. And if you think this is what humans should be, then that is likely to 
affect how you treat other people; there may be a tacit understanding and respect among Supermen, 
but no friendship or solidarity or humanitarian sympathy in the traditional sense of these terms.  
 Mahfouz, by contrast, has no trouble affirming that some forms of suffering are well worth 
avoiding, and that civilisation protects us from them and elevates us above them. It is only able to 
do so, however, because individuals discover a Moral Law inside themselves which emanates 
directly from the Divine Essence and adapt their behaviour accordingly. As we have seen, Mahfouz 
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thinks that this Moral Law must constantly be reelaborated, in individuals and then in society as a 
whole, in a dialectical struggle between tradition and freedom. Mahfouz and Nietzsche do agree that 
blind obedience to tradition is a dangerous threat to individual and social health, but they do so for 
opposite reasons: for Nietzsche, tradition (i.e. the Christian tradition) must be done away with 
because it keeps people enslaved to their fear of suffering, while for Mahfouz, it is precisely 
because we are called by the Moral Law inside us to minimise suffering in the world that we should 
be alive to its presence in novel and unexpected forms, and not get stuck blindly following rules 
formulated in the past and complacently assuming that these rules work just as well to reduce 
suffering and promote flourishing and justice in the present.     
 Some of this may seem, to committed Nietzscheans, unfair to their hero. There are indeed 
times when Nietzsche – an unrivalled master of self-contradiction - sounds almost Mahfouzian in 
his moral demandingness, perhaps never more so than here in The Gay Science: 
  The intellectual conscience.—I keep having the same experience and keep resisting 
  it every time. I do not want to believe it although it is palpable: the great majority of 
  people lacks an intellectual conscience. Indeed, it has often seemed to me as if  
  anyone calling for an intellectual conscience were as lonely in the most densely  
  populated cities as if he were in a desert. [...] I mean: the great majority of people 
  does not consider it contemptible to believe this or that and to live accordingly,  
  without first having given themselves an account of the final and most certain  
  reasons pro and con, and without even troubling themselves about such reasons  
  afterward: the most gifted men and the noblest women still belong to this 'great  
  majority'. But what is goodheartedness, refinement, or genius to me, when the person 
  who has these  virtues tolerates slack feelings in his faith and judgments and when he 
  does not account the desire for certainty as his inmost craving and deepest distress. 
  [...] To stand in the midst of [… the] whole marvellous uncertainty and rich  
  ambiguity of existence without questioning, without trembling with the craving and 
  rapture of such questioning; [...] that is what I feel to be contemptible, and this is the 
  feeling for which I look first in everybody. Some folly keeps persuading me that  
  every human being has this feeling, simply because he is human. This is my type of 
  injustice.
289
   
We know that Nietzsche eventually threw his arms around a horse in Turin because he couldn't bear 
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to see it suffering; it is hard, and not our purpose here, to know whether this was Nietzsche 
returning to his true philosophical roots or falling into the madness which would soon consume 
him. What matters is that Nietzsche made his name in the West as an 'anti-Christ' or 'anti-
conscience' figure, and that his legacy has been such that it would scarcely be an exaggeration to 
describe the Nietzsche we have inherited as the enemy of the 'conscience' that the Abrahamic 
monotheisms defend, the enemy of the very divine spark inside us all that Mahfouz went to his 
grave defending.            
 For the purpose of introducing Mahfouz's concept of civilisation, it will be worth exploring 
just a little further Nietzsche's ambiguous reception in the United States. Not everyone, indeed, 
agrees that Nietzsche's legacy has been quite so 'anti-Mahfouzian'; Ross Posnock certainly makes 
the case for a benign, 'Mahfouzian' Nietzsche in his review of Janet Ratner-Rosenhagen's American 
Nietzsche, aligning Nietzsche with Emerson and the American pragmatists. 'The time was ripe: how 
thrilling it must have been for Americans long shackled to the agonised conscience of Puritan 
rectitude, the yoke of the genteel,' Posnock writes of Nietzsche's arrival in the United States.
290
 
While H.L. Mencken described Nietzsche's Superman as a 'Dionysian aristocrat' of 'absolute and 
utter individualism', theologian and Baptist minister George Burman Foster saw a direct line from 
Jesus to Nietzsche: 'despite the philosopher’s hatred of Christianity, Jesus and Nietzsche would have 
been friends, for Jesus too was a 'revaluator of values' and 'lived dangerously'.
291
 For Foster, 
'Christianity had to be reinvented for the new century, its absoluteness and otherworldliness 
irreconcilable in a world 'where the fixed had yielded to flux". Ratner-Rosenhagen concludes that 
for Foster, Nietzsche is "a saviour who teaches man to find the saviour in himself"'.
292
   
 Contrast this with Adam Kirsch's take on the same book. Kirsch makes the vital point that 
Nietzsche's metaphysical scepticism is one thing, but that his moral scepticism, and his active 
loathing of the 'agonised conscience' as a vehicle for reducing suffering in the world, is entirely 
another; one can, like Richard Rorty or Mahfouz, affirm that individual conscience is real and good 
without a slave-like adherence to revealed religion: although 'Ratner-Rosenhagen shows how 
Nietzsche provided the inspiration for Rorty’s controversial view that philosophy’s search for 
stable, objective truths was misguided—a hunt for something that did not exist', Rorty was able to 
'give up the idea of objective truth' without succumbing to Nietzsche's 'unstoppable fall' into moral 
nihilism and the self-sufficiency of the Superman, arguing that 'people should continue to fight for 
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social justice even while acknowledging that justice, like truth or goodness, is an essentially 
meaningless term'.
293
 The American intelligentsia's ability to import elements of Nietzsche 'without 
becoming Nietzschean', Ratzen-Rosenhagen argues, allowed them to maintain a post-metaphysical 
philosophy that nevertheless kept its 'humanistic promises', at least until 'the rise of the postmodern, 
radically relativist 'French' Nietzsche of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida' in the 1970s.
294
 We 
will have occasion to explore the relationship between Mahfouz and the 'postmodern, radically 
relativist French Nietzsche of Foucault and Derrida' soon; for now, labouring the point about 
Nietzsche's ambiguous reception in the United States has served the purpose of throwing Mahfouz's 
unambiguous defence of conscience into the starkest possible relief: while Mahfouz advocates 
continual moral reform and improvement, he does so from a base of faith in the power of reason 
and conscience to arrive at Truth. Our earthly laws are eternally subject to reform, and Mahfouz, 
like Posner's Nietzsche (and Emerson, Rorty and company), regards them not as metaphysical but 
as agreed upon and revisable. However – and this is the central point of this chapter – there is 
something un-Rortian and unrevisable and uncontingent and absolute about the Moral Law inside 
us. The kind of 'Dionysian individualism' that Mencken attributes to Nietzsche - which Kirsch 
translates as the 'admiration of conflict and conquest' - simply has no place in Mahfouz, who, not 
least as a colonial subject whose early work and lifelong values were forged in the furnace of 
British imperialism, had no admiration for self-centred imperialism whatsoever. It is precisely 
because we are right to fear certain forms of suffering and humiliation caused by Dionysian 
individualism and conflict and conquest that the Moral Law commands us to prevent them from 
happening. The Nietzschean response to suffering in the world - embrace it at all costs! - fails in the 
end, not necessarily because it is not humanly possible but because it is not desirable. As Dante, 
Milton and countless others in both Eastern and Western canons have affirmed along with Mahfouz, 
the result of such illusory 'freedom' from fear and conscience is diabolical solitude. Conscience 
brings us closer to each other as well as to God, and ultimately gives us more of a connection to the 
universe than Satanic pride, allowing us to understand better 'what the universe is'. If Mahfouz 
chose a life in literature - and we will explore Mahfouz on the how and why of his life in literature 
in a later chapter - it was because he shared this dream of communion with Ivorian poet Bernard 
Dadié: 
  My dream          
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  is not to be            
  a solitary giant         
  in a marble castle         
  a luxury-class traveller.        
  [...]           
  My dream          
  is           
  to be           
  with you          
  Tonight.          
  Forever.
295
 
This being with, or being in, others is ultimately only possible if you accept the absolute necessity 
of both rights and responsibilities; the contents of these rights and responsibilities will need 
constant reelaboration over time, but the process of reelaboration itself – possible thanks to what 
Mahfouz calls 'a ruminative mind and a living conscience' – is as old as civilisation itself; indeed, it 
is one of civilisation's very pillars. If you fear nothing, or believe that nothing should be feared, then 
rights and responsibilities - the feelings of other people, even your own feelings - can mean nothing 
to you. This diabolical, imperial pride is the very negation of civilisation for Mahfouz; indeed, as 
we will have occasion to explore if only briefly, a good portion of his oeuvre is spent chronicling 
the deleterious effects of such pride on individuals and societies.      
 One final aspect of the Mahfouzian defence of conscience worth exploring is the 
relationship between reason and conscience. Reason, though necessary for civilisation, is not 
strictly sufficient; or perhaps better put, it is only through exposure to a wide range of life 
experiences via literature and culture that reason realises that it is not enough: 'Reason is the 
greatest gift which has been granted to Humanity.' Mahfouz wrote in 1991, and 'humanity must 
realise that it has not been granted it for other than what it was meant for, but in order that it may be 
a guiding light in life. […] Indeed, there are spheres for which there is no other trick to gain entry 
than conscience and sensibility and suggestion.
296
  It is in precisely this ancillary sense that 
Mahfouz goes on to use reason - self-aware of its subordination to the Moral Law of 'general 
humanitarian responsibility' - as the yardstick for measuring civilisation: 'As for the rest of life - 
social, political, economic, environmental issues and so on -  we must depend entirely on 
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reason.'
297
 The world in general, and Egypt in particular, needs 'a scientific research programme and 
policy planning and a comprehensive push for development, one based on specialisation and 
culture, and which avoids capricious preferences through objectivity and a willingness to leave 
outdated ideas behind.'
298
 Such a development programme should be elaborated 'in a climate of total 
freedom, in which there is no pressure on how the programme is conceived or implemented other 
than the pressure of general humanitarian responsibility and freedom for the individual as regards 
her opinions and destiny.'
299
 As a useful shorthand, Mahfouz concludes, without contradicting his 
stated views on the primacy of conscience, 'we can measure the degree of civilisation of a given 
society by the prominence of the role of reason and the respect for reason in that society'.
300
     
     To help us better to understand Mahfouz's defence of reason in 
the service of conscience and the contemporary relevance of his vision, it will be worthwhile to 
conclude this chapter by returning to Peter Gordon on Jürgen Habermas. While Mahfouz concludes 
that reason exposed to 'civilisation' (literature and culture) can free itself from the illusory freedom 
of infernal pride, Gordon paints us a Habermas who is slightly less sure of himself:  
  Habermas would eventually conclude that his teachers (Adorno and Horkheimer) had 
  backed themselves into a pessimistic corner: their condemnation of the 'instrumental 
  reason' that had culminated in Auschwitz left them helpless when it came to  
  explaining the validity of their own critical efforts. What they called 'the dialectic of 
  Enlightenment' ended in a totalizing critique of reason as such. […] What is  
  'missing' is the genuine unity of a world reconciled with itself, a world that is  
  rational not merely in promise but also in substance. […] What Habermas actually 
  meant, it seems, was far more modest: reason is fallible, and as such it should not 
  dismiss the possibility that religious traditions may bear invaluable gifts. […]  
  Against the intolerance of a secularism that is dogmatically certain of its   
  independence from religion, and against the intolerance of a religiosity that is no less 
  certain that it retains exclusive ownership rights on human morality, Habermas  
  prudently — but on theoretically defensible grounds—refuses to take sides.301  
Mahfouz, we can by now clearly see, goes a crucial step further than Gordon's Habermas: it is not 
merely that 'reason is fallible, and as such it should not dismiss the possibility that religious 
traditions may bear invaluable gifts'; it is that reason is the invaluable gift that religious traditions 
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bear us from our civilisational past. Civilisation - the ongoing dialogue 'between tradition and 
freedom' - matters more than anything to Mahfouz because it sustains our faith in reason by 
simultaneously pushing beyond it: it is literature and culture, the life of the 'ruminative human mind' 
and the 'living human conscience', that alert us to the Divine Essence by 'cunningly' unlocking for 
us 'spheres of conscience and sensibility and suggestion' unavailable to 'instrumental reason' alone. 
From there, Mahfouz paradoxically argues, humanity's faith in itself as a single, united, post-
imperial entity – and with this faith, faith in human reason to produce scientific and social progress 
- are likely to flow in a virtuous cycle.  
 
2.3 Warrior for Socialism 
   Religion and socialism are my two core concerns. [...] Regardless of how 
   much we depend on pure reason, we still see before our eyes a Heaven which 
   blocks our line of sight, and we still long to uncover the things behind  
   Heaven. [...] The reason why Communism aroused my sympathy was the  
   social justice represented in the idea 'From each according to ability, to each 
   according to need'. This is a standard for humanity's interaction with itself, 
   and would, if implemented, turn us into a single, noble global family. We 
need    to do plenty to get there. I do not, however, believe that one needs to hold a 
   strictly materialist view of the world, or deny the existence of God, to believe 
   in this vision.
302  
           Naguib Mahfouz 
 
A Chinese critic will once again introduce us to a key front in Mahfouz's battle for civilisation. It is 
in discussing the theme of socialism in Mahfouz that a handful of Chinese critics come closest to an 
internationalist or ultra-Arabist reading true to the spirit of the Mahfouzian oeuvre. While several of 
these Chinese articles crudely present Mahfouz as an honorary member of the Chinese Communist 
Party and common enemy of Western imperialism, Lù Yíwěi's 'The Cairo Trilogy and Mahfouz's 
Faith in Socialism' (2009) provides a more nuanced and balanced account. Lù describes Mahfouz as 
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a 'lifelong socialist, highlighting the importance of Mahfouz’s university studies in philosophy and 
his relationship with liberal reformer Salama Moussa in the development of his socialist ideals.303 
The remainder of the article is then spent examining precisely what those socialist ideals were.  
 The vision Lù offers us is a human rights-based vision, an international rather than a merely 
Arab or Egyptian socialism. 'Independence is not the final goal,' Lù quotes Mahfouz as saying; 'it is 
merely a means to achieving constitutional, economic and general human rights.'304 Nor is the 
Maoist solution the answer: 'In fact, as far as I am concerned, Marxist concern for social justice, its 
thoroughgoing humanism, and its privileging of science are all praiseworthy. I do not share, 
however, either its authoritarianism or its materialism.'305 Lù goes on to paint Mahfouz in 
essentially Fabian socialist terms; the main thing distinguishing Mahfouz from a British socialist, 
however, is the spiritual background. Lù rushes to label this an Islamic background: 'Like the 
majority of Arab socialists, Mahfouz’s love of religion and adherence to Islamic cultural tradition 
are embedded in his socialism, so he is unable to make the step to becoming a materialist and fully-
fledged revolutionary.'306 It is only at the end of Lù's article that we get a clear endorsement of 
Mahfouz's socialism: 'Mahfouz’s true goal is [...] comprehensive, healthy human development, 
justice for all of humanity, universal love, harmony, culminating in freedom of the soul. This is 
indeed a lofty humanist goal.'307          
   In concrete terms, then, Mahfouz was a democratic socialist; after the horrors 
of Lenin and Stalin and the venality and corruption of Brezhnev and his cronies, the fall of the 
Soviet Union was an unambiguously good thing, just as the fall of the Chinese Communist Party 
will be ('I think that there is only one human destiny, and that what happened in the Soviet Union 
will happen in [China]'308). None of this Sino-Soviet tyranny, however, ever had anything to do 
with the true, democratic spirit of socialism. Just as there is no contradiction between God and 
Reason in Mahfouz, nor is there any contradiction between socialism and democracy. The end of 
the Cold War offered an unparalleled opportunity for this synthesis, and provoked a spate of 
enthusiastic articles from Mahfouz begging his readers to heed the call of 'civilisation' (hadara). 
The best of these articles is arguably the 1993 article 'Freedom and Justice', in which Mahfouz gets 
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very excited about the victories of left-wing parties in Poland and Greece: 
  The Communists won with democracy and not with oppression and force, and will 
  govern in the shadow of democracy and under its observation, and not through  
  tyranny and oppression and the confiscation of freedom and the violation of human 
  rights. The door will remain open for a devolution of power; the word of the People 
  is Highest. Thus does Democracy continue to reign; the new Communism is a  
  democratic Communism, one which aims to unite socialist justice and democratic 
  freedom. Perhaps this is the very order which will come to shape the New World 
  Order. Can we deny that even the strongest bastions of liberalism have been  
  influenced by Socialism, and that their governments are engaged in providing a wide 
  array of services to their peoples in the spheres of health and education? East and 
  West are sharing their advantages with one another for the good of all peoples, and 
  with every passing day the certainty grows that Humanity cannot do without two 
  great values: Freedom and Social Justice.309     
In Mahfouz, then, the struggle for social justice is one with the struggle for democratic freedom. 
Faith in democracy is the social corollary of faith in God: just as faith in God leads to a flowering of 
reason, science and progress, faith in democracy leads to a flowering of social justice. The imperial 
logic which eternally threatens the spread of monotheism and conscience is directly linked to the 
anti-democratic logic which survived even beyond the French Revolution, and which has inhibited 
the spread of socialism:  
  
   Perhaps tyranny in ancient times had some justification, for People Power had not 
   yet made itself felt, and society was divided into two classes: the class of kings and 
   emirs, and the slave class. The kings granted themselves absolute power and  
   complete authorisation to act in all matters without recourse to anyone, making all 
   decisions as they saw fit, whatever the consequences. With the development and  
   spread of religions and democracy, the powers of the common people began to grow, 
   but even in the early days of capitalist democracy, the lower classes got smashed. 
   When you read the novels of Charles Dickens, you discover that this system knew no 
   mercy. [...] The French Revolution had a big role in establishing the principles of 
   freedom, democracy and human rights throughout the whole world, and awakening 
   the peoples of the world from their slumber. […] A democratic system is the best 
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   system for the life of Humanity; even if it throws up the odd mistake, it is the only 
   system capable of righting itself on its own, the only system which gives the people 
   the right to hold their rulers accountable and to review their performance, and even 
   to replace them if necessary, as happened with US President Nixon.310   
 
Mahfouz's faith in democracy as the motor of socialism extended even to Egypt; the fact that as 
many as 80% of the Egyptian population was illiterate did not imply that they could not be trusted 
with the power freely to elect their own government. Mahfouz may even have been the first to coin 
the phrase 'Democracy is the solution!' later famously and repeatedly used as a revolutionary 
rallying cry by Alaa al-Aswany in his articles for the newspaper Al Masry Al Youm following events 
in Egypt in January 2011; when writing in praise of India in 1997, Mahfouz argues that 'if it were 
not for democracy, India would have disintegrated some time ago, what with its plurality of races 
and religions and languages, and all the contrasts and differences in customs and traditions that this 
plurality implies.'311 Without democracy, indeed, 'the very unity of India as a nation may have 
been threatened; just as Pakistan separated from it, so too might other mini-states have broken off 
for each religion and language.'312 India provides a model both to the world as a whole - 'it was 
democracy that united the country,' and by extension will one day unite the diverse peoples of the 
Earth in some form of global democratic order – and, in the meantime, to countries like Egypt in 
particular: 'the message which India is sending to every Third World country is this: Democracy is 
the solution. It has also established the groundlessness of the idea that democracy is unsuitable for 
underdeveloped countries.'313 After all, 'India is a proverbial example of a developing country 
grappling with illiteracy and poverty and backwardness perhaps even more desperately than others, 
but through democracy it has consolidated and developed. Hail to India and its great 
experiment.'314  
 An important question to ask at this point is whether, as it may thus far appear, Mahfouz 
really thought that democracy was not only necessary but also sufficient for social justice and the 
realisation of socialist principles. For Mahfouz, faith in God is arrived at through conscience, and 
only then consolidated in reason; surely the same would have to be said of his faith in democracy. 
Just as it is reason allied to conscience which tells us that religious freedom is a universal human 
right, at one with the Divine Essence and the Moral Law, so too must it be reason allied to 
conscience which tells us that democratic freedom is a universal human right. However, as  
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Aristotle already knew and warned, there is no guarantee that the citizens of a democracy will vote 
with their consciences. In the end, the Mahfouzian call is for more than democracy: it is a call for 
socialism, a socialism of which democracy is but one integral part. Once conscience and reason 
have established the necessity of democracy, the individual of faith must nevertheless labour 
incessantly on behalf of conscience in order to ensure that socialist principles are actually realised 
within the democratic system. It is certainly not as if socialism flows from democracy as a matter of 
pure procedural justice.     
  We will return to Mahfouz's views on rights to healthcare and education - the twin bastions 
of a socialist conscience concerned with human suffering and human flourishing - and to Mahfouz 
on human rights generally in a later chapter. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to 
Mahfouz and markets. We have already seen how, in a democratic system, even an idealised one in 
which all citizens were devout followers of conscience, there would remain, for Mahfouz, an eternal 
and healthy disagreement between conservatives and reformers about how best actually to ensure 
both core rights and general well-being. The question of the role of markets - how free they should 
be, what there should and should not be markets for - is thus for Mahfouz an essentially empirical 
rather than an ideological one, to be answered democratically through the regular exercise of 
collective reason at elections in which political parties are free to present more or less market-
friendly policies. In a 1981 article, Mahfouz makes the scope of his pragmatism clear by comparing 
civilisation to a ship: 'It is our right to disagree with one another; indeed, disagreement is a natural 
part of  life and a symbol of freedom and creativity', and 'it is our right to struggle and debate, and 
for each faction to aspire to the realisation of its vision', but it is 'above all our right and our 
responsibility to remember the origin, the base, the ship; everything is  permitted, except that the 
ship be allowed to sink, or get stuck before it has set off on its journey.'315 Mahfouz certainly 
changed his views on markets over the course of his lifetime, and this journey is worth briefly 
tracing, not least because it illustrates the most unfortunate consequence of his decision to avoid 
overseas travel, namely an overreliance on a perennially unreliable Egyptian media. As early as 
1930, Mahfouz was writing about socialism as the 'theory of the future', but he was 'identifying with 
British (Fabian) socialism and not Marxism-Leninism. This was because news of the Communist 
Revolution was forbidden in Egypt; our information about it was scant, and we didn't know what 
was going on in Moscow.'316 Although Mahfouz rightly attributes this information gap to the 
British occupation – the colonial authorities did what they could to prevent news of socialist 
revolution in Russia from spreading among the Egyptian people – the media situation improved 
little after 1952: one party line was merely exchanged for another, In the deep of the Cold War 
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(1976) and after more than two decades of pro-Soviet propaganda in Egypt, Mahfouz seems caught 
in a thick fog, buying the official Egyptian government line about the virtues of central economic 
planning behind the Iron Curtain: 'There are living examples of faith and its effects in our modern 
life. It is the driving force behind the revival of the Soviet Union, which has managed to carve out 
in 50 years what Europe took 300 years to achieve. It is the power behind the rise of the People's 
Republic of China...'317  By the end of the Cold War, however, the fog has cleared, and Mahfouz 
recognises that hi-tech Western economies are, broadly speaking, the models to be emulated: 'I 
think the Arab world can benefit from these global developments and go with the prevailing trends 
around the world towards democracy and a market economy and the adoption of modern 
technology and scientific methods.'318   
 In a 1997 article entitled 'The Social Role of Capital', Mahfouz makes his support for a mixed 
economy even clearer; private capital is here to stay, and we need to make sure that it is put to the 
best possible social use: 
 
   In our modern society, the role of private capital has grown considerably beyond 
   mere aid for the needy to become one of the fundamental resources for a   
   comprehensive process of development in society, especially when we have already 
   chosen the path of the free market, in which the government does not have a  
   monopoly on all forms of activity. In this context, private capital should assist with 
   the financing of scientific research, for example, and with the renewal of artistic and 
   cultural activity, not to mention healthcare, the building of hospitals, and so on. I 
   would say that capital has been a part of our lives for a quarter of a century or so 
   now, and that it is time for its social role to be fixed to match its growing economic 
   role. All financial institutions should insert a clause into their budgets protecting the 
   public interest, and aligning the various facets of their social activity with it.319  
 
It may be tempting to conclude that Mahfouz's primitive understanding of Western financial 
institutions could not possibly offer us a way out of current or future economic crises. This would 
be to fail to do justice, however, to Mahfouz as a social thinker. About the underlying moral crisis 
at the heart of a global economic system which has institutionalised greed at the expense of core 
socialist values, Mahfouz indeed had plenty to say. The Mahfouzian justification of free markets is 
a socialist one; it has nothing whatsoever to do with the 'greed is good' motto with which we have 
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grown familiar. If the empirical evidence tells us that markets are more effective than central 
planning when it comes to securing positive outcomes for large numbers of people, then so be it; 
Mahfouz is not ideologically opposed to decentralisation even in healthcare or education if this 
decentralisation makes everybody better off. This does not, however, free the individual from the 
bonds of conscience, and the responsibilities that our equal membership of the human community 
entails.  
  For all this, and despite his university background in philosophy, Mahfouz was neither a 
political philosopher nor an economic theorist; his concern as a novelist and public intellectual was 
first and foremost the diffusion of a conscience - a faith in a single Divine Essence and a single 
Moral Law - that will lead people to care about more than their own material advantage and 
superiority (and those of their tribe) and to view Humanity as a 'single, noble global family'. When 
he says that 'we need to do plenty to get there', he is referring first and foremost to the prior moral 
challenge of getting people to care in this global way; once people have the welfare of the whole of 
Humanity (and beyond) in their hearts, debates about how best to maximise and distribute that 
welfare will continue to rage eternally between conservatives and reformers, centralisers and free-
marketeers, and rightly so, but the battle for civilisation will essentially be in safe hands.  
  Mahfouz's centrist pragmatism regarding markets is perhaps best summarised in a 1992 
article entitled 'Cultural Independence', in which he argues that a free market for culture - necessary 
in a free society - does not imply that government has no role to play in promoting certain forms of 
culture. Indeed, culture 'develops and consolidates itself in the age-old struggle between the Highest 
Example and commercial demands in a climate of freedom and without imposed decisions'320. 
This does not imply, however, the disappearance of the State, which retains an influential and active 
role. Mahfouz goes on in this article to cite examples of government promotion of culture beyond 
the central one of establishing institutes for the 'scientific' study of literature and the arts to include: 
protecting heritage sites; promoting artistic and literary prizes to encourage production useful to the 
state and the uncovering of new talent; supporting writers' and artists' unions; free speech legislation 
and generally defending the rights of writers and artists to express themselves; sponsoring cultural 
events and festivals, and so on.321 However, Mahfouz is equally clear that 'there will be no free life 
for art, literature or thought until they are free from state supervision'.322 In other words, 
government has a duty to provide, or ensure a basic provision of, education and artistic freedom, 
and may even act as a sponsor of certain forms of culture, but ultimately has no business trying to 
regulate the culture market by force. 
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  In the end, the goal is a pragmatic 'Just Freedom' in accordance with the Divine Essence 
and the Moral Law, as the 1992 article of the same name makes clear: 'In recent times, the State has 
expanded to the point that it has become Everything. It is security, defence, education, healthcare, 
transport, agriculture, industry and  culture, Everything. Everything.'323 The corollary of this over-
centralisation is that 'the people's role has diminished to Nothing.'324 With the end of the Cold War, 
however, 'the wind of democracy is blowing through our climes, the scent of free activity is wafting 
through our spirits, and there is enough to promise a return to responsibility, and an end to passivity 
and laziness.'325 Mahfouz goes so far as to call this 'return to responsibility' the 'road to salvation', 
providing the 'impetus' needed to fight endemic problems 'which defy our hopes', such as terrorism, 
drugs, pollution, corruption.'326 While government should 'remain dominant in strategic industries', 
as well as remain 'responsible for education and health, a guide for values and culture, and a force 
of resistance against social and environmental scourges, within the scope of which fall the fight 
against unemployment and poverty', the idea that government can solve all social problems on its 
own belongs in the dustbin of history, along with the idea that individual freedom is a threat to the 
social order: 'Freedom and respect for human rights will never strike out against justice, and we will 
not kill freedom and dignity in the name of justice or by recourse to oppression and tyranny and 
official terrorism.'327 This lesson of hope - and of the power of faith in the Moral Law and the 
Divine Essence to realise itself over time - is the very lesson that Mahfouz draws from the 
endurance of the Russian people through the worst of Soviet tyranny:  
 
   Human nature is more powerful than any theory and stronger than any Iron Curtain. 
   Time was not wasted in vain with this [Soviet] experiment; there were heavy  
   spiritual, moral and economic costs associated with it to be sure, but humanity  
   gained a valuable lesson which it will not forget, namely that it should monitor its 
   surrounding reality with empirical observation and study, and that it should not let 
   itself be held hostage to the past or to the opinion of any one individual, however 
   attractive it may seem. Whoever said 'Where there is life there is hope' was right. [...] 
   If the Soviet experiment had arisen in a democratic system and been born in a  
   climate of freedom, it would have benefitted from ongoing criticism of its economic 
   and philosophical foundations, and would have developed admirably, free from all 
   the problems which plagued it. Communism could be the last failed experiment in 
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   the life of Humanity if nations resolve to pursue freedom, democracy and respect 
   for human rights, and share their experiences in a free, humanitarian climate. [...] We 
   must not forget this happy moment in human history, in which freedom won a  
   decisive - and we hope eternal - victory, and the rule of oppression suffered a defeat 
   that we likewise hope is eternal. We must not forget the heroic role played by the 
   Russian people on both the positive and negative sides of this experiment, and we 
   must remember always their sacrifices for human civilisation.328   
 
 
2.4 Warrior for Internationalism 
 
    I believe there is another way to compare civilisations, namely by taking an 
    ordinary individual at random from the collective, a person embodying all 
    the strengths and weaknesses of that civilisation; in the end, this person will 
    be the most loyal testament to that civilisation, testament to it in the vision of 
    the universe and life and people that she carries with her, in her degree of 
    physical, mental and spiritual health, in the extent to which her heart beats in 
    happiness or misery, in the amount of creative and moral energy she  
    possesses, and last but not least, in her degree of readiness to love and  
    respect others and the quality of her intercourse with them, even if they differ 
    from her in colour, language, religion or all three.
329
  
        
       Naguib Mahfouz, 'The Meaning of Civilisation' (1981) 
 
 
Henri Bergson was arguably the single biggest Western philosophical influence on the young 
Mahfouz, an influence to which many Mahfouz scholars - most notably Rasheed El Enany - have 
rightly devoted substantial critical attention.
330
 Nowhere, however, can we tie Bergson to Mahfouz 
more directly, or more importantly for our purposes, than in the Bergsonian distinction between 
'open' and 'closed' societies elaborated in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932).
331
 For 
Bergson, 'closed' societies based on obedience and duty - in essence, fear - must give way to 'open' 
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societies based on love and empathy. Bergson was adamant that this transition from Hobbesian to 
Humean 'sources of morality and religion' required a moral genius of the kind that Mahfouz 
attributed to, among others, Muhammad ('As for Islamic civilization I will not talk about its call for 
the establishment of a union between all Mankind under the guardianship of the Creator, based on 
freedom, equality and forgiveness. Nor will I talk about the greatness of its prophet. For among 
your thinkers there are those who regard him the greatest man in history.'
332
). Civilisation for 
Mahfouz is by definition 'open', its history a struggle of internationalist impulses against tribal and 
imperial instincts.  
  Mahfouz inherited from Bergson the idea that universalist impulses are transmitted to 
society through the high example of moral leaders: 'sure of themselves, because they feel in 
themselves something which is better than them, they reveal themselves as great men of action,' 
wrote Bergson of his open society heroes.
333
 'What flows inside them has descended from on high 
and aims, through them, to reach other men: they feel the need to spread outwards from themselves 
what they have received, in a spirit of love'.
334
 In return, this love 'acts in such a way as to make 
them loved for who they are, ensuring that, through them and for them, other men will allow their 
souls to open up to the love of humanity.'
335
 Children of Gebelawi is the most famous Mahfouzian 
dramatisation of the power of this Bergsonian moral leadership, and of the fragility of its example: 
after brief periods of flowering, the message of one great moral leader after another is lost to the 
dustbin of history, and thuggery and fear gradually return to reign in the alleys. Children of 
Gebelawi, and indeed all of Mahfouz's middle period, is characterised by a certain degree of 
ambiguity and pessimism; we will argue, however, in Chapter 2.9 that Dweller in Truth (1985) is 
the definitive Mahfouzian statement of faith in the durability of the message of civilisation as it is 
transmitted from Akhenaten to Meri Moun. Throughout the Mahfouzian oeuvre, however, Egypt - 
and more often than not, the narrow alleys of Cairo - is the microcosm in which this universal 
struggle plays out. Why would such an avowedly internationalist author focus so much of his 
attention on one piece of land? One reason is that a young Mahfouz was convinced, most notably by 
James K. Breasted, that internationalism and conscience had actually first arisen there. Breasted's 
The Dawn of Conscience (1933) exerted an even more obvious influence on Mahfouz than 
Bergson's The Two Sources of Religion and Morality, first and foremost by encouraging Mahfouz to 
see beyond Egypt's contemporary struggles and to take the long, and hence the more optimistic, 
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view of human civilisational development. 'The most fundamentally important thing in the 
developing life of man has been the rise of ideals of conduct and the emergence of character, a 
transformation of human life which can be historically demonstrated to have begun but yesterday,' 
Breasted writes of the 'dawn of conscience' and the 'Age of Character' which was ushered in with 
it.
336
 The shallowest foray into prehistory reveals at once that 'man began as an unmoral savage'; 
how was it possible, then, that 'he ever gained any moral dictates or eventually submitted to the 
moral mandate when once it had arisen? How did a world totally without any vision of character 
rise to social idealism and learn to listen with reverence to voices within?'
337
 Echoing Mahfouz's 
Nobel Lecture some fifty years later with its celebration that, 'thank God', imperial values are losing 
their hold on humanity, Breasted wonders how, 'over against the visible and tangible advantages of 
material conquests [...] did it eventually happen that there arose the first generation of men with 
comprehension of unseen inner values?'
338
, a question taken up directly by Mahfouz in Akhenaten: 
Dweller in Truth and to which we will return in greater detail.   
  The Christian Breasted also provided Mahfouz with a model with which to confront his 
own doubts about Islamic revelation. At a certain point in his inner development, Breasted began to 
question the code of morals he had inherited, 'but it was a long time before I raised the interesting 
question: How has my own realisation of this imperfectation arisen? Where did I myself get the 
moral yardstick with which I discovered this shortcoming in the Decalogue?'
339
 The initial reaction 
was one of shock; the discovery of his own inner moral faculties marked 'a dark day for my 
inherited respect for the theological dogma of "revelation"'.
340
 Breasted's orientalist studies also led 
him to the conclusion that the 'Age of Character' had begun not with the Hebrews but rather with 
the ancient Egyptians: 'our moral heritage therefore derives from a wider human past enormously 
older than the Hebrews, and it has come to us rather through the Hebrews than from them.'
341
 The 
subsequent comforts of religion – summarisable as 'faith' - thus come to form the icing on the cake 
of human existence, a kind of reward for moral self-cultivation rather than the cause or purpose of 
it, and available only to those who recognise in revelation the paradoxical need to 'do away with 
revelation itself' and to engage in the moral activity which made Abrahamic revelation possible in 
the first place: 
 
     The rise of man to social idealism took place long before the traditional  
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    theologians' 'age of revelation' began. It was a result of the social experience of 
    man himself and was not projected into the world from the outside. The fact that 
    the moral ideas of early men were the product of their own social experience is 
    one of profoundest meaning for thinking people of today. Out of prehistoric  
    savagery, on the basis of his own experience man arose to visions of character. 
    That achievement which transformed advancing life, human or animal, on our 
    globe was one from a characterless universe, as far as it is known to us, to a world 
    of inner values transcending matter - a world for the first time aware of such  
    values, for the first time conscious of character and striving to attain it. With that 
    achievement man had discovered a new country, but he had not yet explored it. 
    The discovery itself was an incomparably more difficult achievement than the 
    subsequent explorations. The discovery is a recent event and the explorations have 
    consequently but just begun. They are an unfinished process which must be  
    continued by us - by every generation.
342
    
 
This passage from Breasted helps us to explain why Mahfouz focused his energies on Egypt: not 
because, or not primarily because, he felt 'at home' there, but because he felt that he 'had discovered 
a new country, but had not yet explored it'; in other words, there was more than enough 'social 
experience' in the alleys of Cairo to keep a single internationalist busy for a lifetime. For Mahfouz, 
as for Eduardo Lourenço, shiny foreign capitals tell us relatively little of the progress of human 
civilisation; the alleys of Cairo are a more accurate thermometer. Internationalising those alleys - or 
in other words, bringing moral leadership to them - is as urgent a civilisational challenge as any 
other, a challenge to which Mahfouz ultimately devoted his life. The relentlessly and unashamedly 
moralising tone of Mahfouz's weekly column for Al-Ahram over the last three decades of his life is 
a direct reflection of this civilising mission, even more direct than his fictional output itself. The 
central goal of this mission was to 'internationalise' the sentiments of an isolated Egyptian 
readership chronically prone to sectarian myopia and pride and thirsty for international recognition. 
At times, this internationalism required a paradoxical focus on the local, as Mahfouz explained in 
an interview entitled 'We Haven't Yet Achieved the Local: How Can We Think About Achieving the 
Global?': 
 
  Literature presents human experience; the main thing is that the experience be honest 
  and deep. If it achieves this result, well, there's no need for any other experience. 
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  Literature must give everything; the writer must give what he is best placed to give; 
  there is no bigger mistake in literature than seeking breadth at the expense of one's 
  own expertise, and venturing to write about things of which one has only a  
  superficial understanding. That's not a good way to go about it... for example,  
  visiting a foreign country and writing a novel about that country; how can you write 
  a novel about this country without drinking deep its spirit? That's why I cited Hardy 
  for example, and Faulkner too, who always wrote about a single village in the  
  American south. […] All of his protagonists, male and female, were from this one 
  village. [...] I am truly a man of limited horizons, and I write about what I know,  
  without pretensions.
343
     
 
If the prior goal of Mahfouzian internationalism was to create a sense of Egyptian national identity 
rather than to aim directly at international integration, it was primarily because Mahfouz, born into 
a fierce anti-colonial struggle, understood that international integration was literally meaningless 
without a prior community of independent, free-thinking individuals and nations. As we have seen, 
independence for Mahfouz was a means rather than an end: 'Independence is not the final goal.[...] 
It is merely a means to achieving constitutional, economic and general human rights”344. If the 
degree of civilisation of the international community can best be measured by taking, for example, 
the average Egyptian citizen and measuring 'the quality of his intercourse with those who differ... in 
colour, language, religion, or all three', then it makes sense to concentrate on developing the 
character of that citizen, developing a sense of independent identity denied under colonialism, an 
identity from which to build healthy relationships with others. Mahfouz's first phase of fiction - his 
dramatisations of ancient Egypt, and his realistic depictions of Cairo life culminating in the Cairo 
Trilogy - is best understood as an attempt to make Egyptians proud of themselves, to give them a 
stable base from which to understand, and quite literally to join, the rest of the world. Having spent 
the first part of his life laying the cultural foundations for this integration, Mahfouz shifted focus in 
the second part of his life towards making this integration a reality (without at any stage forgetting 
how fragile Egyptian independence and identity was). In one newspaper article after another from 
the 1980s on, Mahfouz calls on Egyptians to stand up and take notice of the best that the world can 
offer them, in the best tradition of Islamic openness to foreign learning stretching back to the time 
of Muhammad himself ('perhaps the first import was from the time of the Prophet himself, the most 
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prominent example being the trench, which was an idea of Persian origin'
345
). The real flowering of 
this 'open society', however, came centuries later, with the coming of the 'Ages of Enlightenment' 
and their 'translations of Greek, Persian and Indian philosophies and sciences. Leaders found 
encouragement in the Qur'an with its calls to empirical observation, meditation, and the seeking of 
knowledge [...] and in the hadith "Seek knowledge even in China"'.
346
  Indeed, all great civilisations 
have been pragmatic enough to import ideas from outside: 'It is not a question of importing or 
exporting but above all of what Humanity needs to support its development in the direction of 
Progress. This applies equally to ideas and creeds on the one hand, and finance and consumer goods 
on the other.'
347
 Instead of fearing and loathing the West, Arabs should be rushing to embrace the 
best it has to offer: 
 
  Western civilisation is the wealthiest and most advanced human civilisation in terms 
  of intellectual and material achievements and humanist values. This does not make it 
  a perfect civilisation free from faults, but it does retain a unique place in history. This 
  might have been enough for it to be welcomed everywhere with open arms, but  
  people - especially in the Arab world - violently disagree about its legacy, perhaps 
for   some of the following reasons: 
  
   1. They regard it as a foreign civilisation. 
   2. They find it difficult to forget its dark history of crusades and colonialism.  
   3. They fear that certain Western ideas may invade the sphere of Islam.  
   4. They are uneasy about obvious contradictions in certain values.   
   5. They are partial towards their own civilisation and refuse to except that 
   Time has overtaken it.  
   6. They fear the threat that Western civilisation poses towards the   
   environment and life on Earth with some of its industrial methods and  
   destructive inventions.
348
 
 
Mahfouz replies to each of these in turn: 
 
  First: I do not agree that it is a foreign civilisation insofar as it was born from all  
  previous civilisations, and especially Greek and Islamic civilisation. It is like a giant 
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  corporation to which the whole of Humanity has contributed; it is more Humanistic 
  than specifically 'Western'. 
   Second: I do not deny its dark history, but I also know that its evils arose in 
  certain specific historical and economic circumstances; we shouldn't overlook the 
  positive side, and we should hope for an ever greater triumph of these positive  
  values.   
   Third: The fear of its impact on the sphere of religion is entirely   
  ungrounded... 
   Fourth: There is no doubt that some of its values are a cause for distress and 
  aversion, but we are free, and no one is forcing us to adopt that which is not  
  compatible with our firmly held principles.  
   Fifth: Openness to modern civilisation does not mean the abandonment of our 
  ancient civilisation; it is a process which involves marrying the two, generating the 
  new, and allowing our civilisation to thrive.  
   Sixth: I am not unaware of the dangers that threaten life on our planet, but I 
  have not yet lost hope in our ability to right our destiny through science and wise 
  judgement.  
   Let us welcome life in a way befitting those who are sure of themselves,  
  those who seek the Highest Example.
349
   
   
Rasheed El Enany argued in his 1993 book Naguib Mahfouz: The Pursuit of Meaning that the later 
Mahfouz was in the process of shifting towards a less Western-friendly and more pluralistic 
worldview. After quoting Mahfouz's belief that 'there is no  escape from the supremacy of the 
more efficient culture, and this can only be for the good of mankind, and not otherwise', Enany goes 
on to argue that Mahfouz eventually 'came to believe that different civilisations upheld essentially 
different worldviews. He feels that this has caused his enthusiasm for Western civilisation to shift 
towards an enthusiasm for a universal human need such as science, which in turn can be used in the 
service of the world view of one's own culture.'
350
 I do not, however, see any contradiction between 
Mahfouz's glorification of Western civilisation and his call to embrace the best of all civilisations, 
or any real change of heart regarding the unicity of civilisation itself; it is extremely misleading of 
Enany to suggest that 'Mahfouz came to believe that different civilisations upheld essentially 
different worldviews' (italics mine), for as we have seen, Mahfouz is no cultural relativist: 
Mahfouzian hadara is a single, unitary concept. What Mahfouz does go on to stress, however, is 
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that developing countries like Egypt might do well to follow the examples of other developing 
countries, like India (as we have seen), Cold War Japan, and - in the spirit of the hadith quoted 
above – 21st-century China:    
 
  I fondly followed President Mubarak's visit to China. It is a genuinely great country, 
  to which the world owes one sixth of its entire population. The Chinese are the  
  purveyors of an astoundingly successful experiment in progress and civilisation,  
  moreover, from which we must take inspiration. For we have lived since the time of 
  Mohamed Ali thinking that progress is the exclusive property of the West. We kept 
  up with what was happening in Europe, sent our children to receive an education 
  there and perused all that was available to us of its cultural products. The truth,  
  however, is that knowledge of Eastern cultures would have been more beneficial. 
  China, for one such ancient culture, has chosen paths to progress not available to the 
  West, for all the latter's glory. It is, moreover, a country with circumstances similar to 
  ours: economically, socially, politically, historically. […] This makes its   
  achievements more pertinent to the Egyptian environment than those of the West. Of 
  all the news that has reached us from China since the president's visit, I was  
  particularly interested in the information that progress is taking place there with such 
  remarkable speed that those who accompanied the president on his previous visit, in 
  1999, saw a radically different country on their return. The 21st century does not 
  belong to the United States alone. We must understand this and diversify our sources, 
  gleaning all the benefit that we can.
351
   
Here, in 2002, a 90 year-old Mahfouz is still busy trying to 'internationalise' his beloved Egypt, for 
this internationalist path is the path of civilisation itself. The sight of China on the rise appears to 
have filled the nonagenarian Mahfouz with regret that he himself had failed to cultivate the kind of 
knowledge of Eastern cultures that he had acquired of Western culture through his extensive 
reading of Western philosophy and literature. While Enany goes on to say that this 'shift in his 
thinking' has 'probably come too late in his life to be able to be substantiated in his work'
352
, one can 
easily picture the 20-something Mahfouz engrossed in Bergson and Breasted in the 1930s 
ploughing into the study of Chinese and the reading of Confucius if he were a twenty-something 
today.      
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2.5 Warrior for Human Rights 
 
   I do not say with Kant that Good will be victorious in the other world. Good is  
   achieving victory every day. It may even be that Evil is weaker than we imagine. 
   In front of us is an indelible proof: were it not for the fact that victory is always on 
   the side of Good, hordes of wandering humans would not have been able in the 
   face of beasts and insects, natural disasters, fear and egotism, to grow and  
   multiply. They would not have been able to form nations, to excel in creativeness 
   and invention, to conquer outer space, and to declare Human Rights.
353   
            
         Naguib Mahfouz, Nobel Lecture 
 
We have seen that Mahfouzian civilisation is built on the twin foundations of pragmatism and faith 
in an underlying Moral Law (indeed, the second commands the first). We have also seen how this 
Law commands both socialism and internationalism, or at least a commitment to the socialist ideal 
'from each according to ability, to each according to need' applied internationally to Humanity as a 
whole. Disagreement about how to achieve this noble goal - for example, whether through a 
preponderance of decentralised markets or centralised bureaucracy - is both inevitable and healthy, 
but Mahfouz is unequivocal that a baseline of rights - to vote, to education and literacy, to 
healthcare and freedom from hunger, to free expression - is a necessary part of civilisation, and he 
vigorously applauded the development of international Human Rights Law in the course of his 
lifetime. It is nevertheless true that Mahfouz spent more time taking 'Human Rights' for granted 
than he did arguing for what they were or why they were useful. This could largely be explained by 
the fact that the absence of Human Rights in Egypt - democratic rights, rights to education and 
healthcare, rights to social security, rights to free expression - was so obvious and so urgent that 
there was no point for Mahfouz to waste time on empty philosophising about what did and did not 
deserve to be counted as a Human Right. This apparent impatience with - or ignorance of - debates 
about the nature of Human Rights should not obscure the fact, however, that Mahfouz's views on 
the subject were extremely nuanced, and are still relevant to contemporary debates.  
 One prominent sceptic of the contemporary Human Rights culture that so excited Mahfouz 
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is a man whose name has already been mentioned: John Gray. Gray's scepticism regarding human 
rights is clearly expressed in his review of Samuel Moyn's The Last Utopia, where he attacks the 
'cosmopolitan vision of universal humanity', the prevailing contemporary view that 'the prominence 
of rights is the almost-inevitable conclusion of a long process of moral development' from Greco-
Roman and Judeo-Christian origins on through 'the English Civil War, the French and American 
Revolutions, various antislavery movements, the Second World War, and the struggles against 
colonialism and racism.'
354
 Whereas natural law theorists from Locke to Kant and beyond argued 
that 'rights were dictates of natural law, which had to be obeyed because they emanated from God', 
Gray dismisses the human rights agenda as 'impossible even in theory, for there are ethical and 
political conflicts that admit no single, right solution', and accuses defenders of human rights of 
'nurturing the sickly dream of a time when the intractable dilemmas of ethics and politics will be 
overcome, transcended in an empire of law.'
355
 The problem with the human rights project as Gray 
sees it is that it aims to 'place certain basic freedoms in a realm of constitutional law where they are 
beyond any possibility of political attack. [...] At the back of the rights movement is a vision of an 
ideal constitution that could in principle be installed everywhere.'
356
 This desire to do away with the 
struggles of politics once and for all is 'utopian' for Gray because 'all the panoply of rights will not 
stop a government from violating the most basic protections when political elites—along with most 
people—support such encroachments, or simply do not care.'357      
 It is telling that Gray takes for granted that the Lockean and Kantian position, which is also 
the Mahfouzian position - that Human Rights are 'dictates of Natural Law' - is not even worth taking 
seriously. Yet the fact that there may be myriad ways of securing specific rights (e.g. to healthcare, 
education) and myriad decisions to be made about how to use scarce resources to protect as many 
rights as possible does not mean that rights and the Moral Law do not exist. Mahfouz himself 
argued, as we have seen, for a 'constant battle' between conservatives and reformers, and did not by 
any means dream of 'an ideal constitution which could be installed everywhere' and applied 
eternally. Despite his commitment to Human Rights and a single Moral Law, Mahfouz was not 
dogmatically committed to a centralised civilisational bureaucracy based on a single, immutable 
founding document, and even, in his pragmatism, admitted the possibility of regional civilisational 
autonomy: 
  There has always been competition and confrontation and opposition between the 
  world's different civilisations, both in our unipolar age of one global Superpower and 
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  in past multipolar ages. What we must avoid is that the relationship between  
  civilisations becomes a clash. What we are most in need of now is intercivilisational 
  dialogue. The world is smaller than ever before; we are finding for example that the 
  Internet has opened all windows on the world. [...] This may well help with dialogue 
  between civilisations. Why insist on the 'clash' thesis? It is true that there will be  
  competition between all these civilisations, but such competition is welcome: may 
  the best rather than merely the strongest survive. For no matter how strong a given 
  civilisation is - militarily, economically, or politically - it will not be able impose its 
  customs and way of life on any foreign people, unless that people is themselves  
  convinced by the superiority of the incoming civilisation. If they are so convinced, 
  then the incoming civilisation is welcome, because it shows that the new civilisation 
  is superior to what was there before. There is no compulsion in the competition  
  between civilisations, and such competition should not be allowed to reach the level 
  of a clash, because if it reached the level of a clash, that would be proof of the fact 
  that it was not yet a struggle between civilisations, but rather a political struggle, a 
  quite different matter. Civilisation has no path but dialogue, persuasion and more 
  persuasion, and the result will be one of the following: either one civilisation will 
  prevail because it is best and most persuasive, or there will remain a situation of  
  friendly understanding between sister civilisations. For there will always be scope for 
  such plurality in art, ideas and customs.
358
  
Despite appearances, Mahfouz and Gray in fact share a faith in pragmatism and the transformative 
power of the present. Like Mahfouz, Gray agrees that 'we would be better off if we put an end to 
our obsession with endings. Humans are sturdy creatures built to withstand regular disruption. 
Conflict never ceases, but neither does human resourcefulness, adaptability or courage.'
359
 Although 
we inevitably 'look forward to a future state of fulfilment in which all turmoil has ceased', it is in 
fact the case that 'living in fear of the end is as stultifying as living in hope of it. Either way our 
lives are spent in the shadow of a future that's bound to be largely imaginary.'
360
     
 The real difference between Gray and Mahfouz, however, is Gray's obvious lack of faith in 
civilisation beyond individual fulfilment and the 'animal silence' of private mysticism outlined in 
Chapter 1: 'The task that faces us is no different from the one that has always faced human beings - 
renewing our lives in the face of recurring evils. Happily, the end never comes. Looking to an end-
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time is a way of failing to cherish the present - the only time that is truly our own.
361
 Mahfouz, by 
contrast, feels himself acutely to be a member of an intergenerational community which, in Pascal's 
memorable phrase, 'exists always and learns continually', and must continue to do so. Burdened 
with the responsibility of passing on the fragile flame of civilisation to future generations, 
Mahfouz's pragmatism is in the service of something he holds to be true, beyond the present and 
beyond himself. Mahfouz would undoubtedly have recoiled from Gray's embrace of meaningless 
'animal silence'; whereas Gray aims entirely to do away with 'the faith that the future can be better 
than the past', and worries that 'when we look to the future to give meaning to our lives, we lose the 
meaning we can make for ourselves here and now'
362
, Mahfouz argues, as Tarkovsky will argue 
even more explicitly in the next chapter, that any meaning we could make for ourselves alone would 
be meaningless; that the future – even the future we will not personally see – is an intimate part of 
ourselves, and that working to improve it for others – for example, by continually elaborating and 
improving human rights norms – gives meaning to our lives. Mahfouz's tolerance, however, of 
those who would openly and tastelessly attack this faith - the very heart of his vision of civilisation - 
has its limits. It is a truism that every civilisation has its tenets, and that even a civilisation which 
values free speech, for example, has to deal with those who would seek to use speech to shut free 
speech down. Mahfouz's views on free speech will be an examplary case study of his pragmatism 
regarding Human Rights generally.          
 Mahfouz had plenty to say about the international diplomatic incident involving the 
publication of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses and the subsequent fatwa issued by Iran's 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. After a series of misunderstandings and misquotations, Mahfouz 
definitively clarified his position in the article 'The Truth About the Article I Didn't Write About 
Salman Rushdie' (1993): 'The freedom of the writer or intellectual is necessary, and one can choose 
to respond through debate and dialogue,' Mahfouz argues, but 'I think there must be a distinction 
between freedom of thought and blasphemy. Thought and creativity are debated, whereas 
blasphemy is judged in a court of law; if a writer is free to say what she wants, those who are 
harmed have the right to defend themselves and their creeds.'
363
 Mahfouz opposed Ayatollah 
Khomeini's fatwa calling for Rushdie to be killed because 'it was issued without giving the other 
side a chance to defend himself, and also because, in the end, Rushdie showed his repentance in a 
meeting with the Egyptian Minister of Religious Endowments.'
364
 Worst of all in this episode was 
not Rushdie's book, but the Iranian refusal to accept Rushdie's apology, a reaction which was 
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'contrary to the teaching of Islam, because Islam is a religion of tolerance and grants even the 
apostate the opportunity to repent. The Prophet Muhammad - Peace Be Upon Him - did not waste 
the blood of those who opposed him or attacked him.'
365
      
 In order better to understand the spirit of this response, it will be useful here to return to the 
2005 debate on blasphemy between Stephen Fry and Christopher Hitchens introduced in the first 
chapter. Fry and Hitchens discuss the outrage of the Sikh community in Britain following the 
staging of a sensitive play: 
  Fry:  There's a very dreary and typical comment people made about the Salman 
   Rushdie fatwa - a very British kind of thing - 'Well, it's a rather dreadful kind 
   of book, isn't it?', as if that is of any relevance.  
 
  Hitchens:  The crime is in those who close the theatre, not those who demand it 
    be closed. The Sikhs claim to be universalists - how can you be  
    offended 'as a Sikh'?   
 
  Fry:  Because they were offended as a people, not as a religion. 
 
  Hitchens:  Narcissism.  
 
  Fry:  Yes, but... You can offend a Jew in two ways: you can offend a Judaic Jew if 
   you wish to by being incredibly rude about Judaic religion, though not many 
   rabbis are likely to be offended... But there's also the idea that a Jew could be 
   a person, who could be Sigmund Freud, who could be an atheist - Karl Marx - 
   and you attack the rights of those people. And I think the Sikhs, in an excess 
   of excitability - I don't mean that to sound patronising - felt that it offended 
   them as a people, not the tenets of their religion, which they probably didn't 
   consider in that. They just felt, 'Hang on! We need to be counted as well. We 
   live in Birmingham, we're part of a community, we want our community to be 
   "respected'''... They weren't having a theological debate about the play and 
   whether it went against Sikhism - as Christopher says, you almost by  
   definition can't (i.e. because it considers itself to be universal).  
 
  Hitchens:  Yes, but Jews used to protest very much about productions of The  
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    Merchant of Venice, for example. They said, 'It makes us feel uneasy 
    and uncomfortable'. They don't do that because they feel much more 
    secure in England - it has taken quite a long struggle. 
  
  Fry:  That's exactly what I'm saying.  
 
  Hitchens:  We hope that this will eventually be true of Sikhs, but they're not  
    going to do it by impersonating the worst of the old Jewish self-
pity.
366
   
 
Mahfouz, who self-identified as a Muslim and spent his life trying, indirectly at least, to get his 
people and culture, and the Third World in general, 'counted' on the international stage, clearly felt 
that The Satanic Verses disrespected his 'community', as Fry says. We may agree or disagree with 
Hitchens that, in the Sikh case, this amounts to 'narcissism' and 'self-pity', but for Mahfouz, the real 
concern is for the health of civilisation itself, and in this case, for a Western civilisation which fails 
to take Muslims and Muslim contributions to civilisation seriously, reducing them to mere 
caricatures. This anxiety is best reflected in his 2006 response to the Danish cartoon scandal; 
Mahfouz believed that the Danish editors involved, as representatives of a Danish culture which has 
'distinguished itself for its humanism and civilisation', ought to have known better.
367
 'What 
happened hurt the feelings of all Muslims, and above all of moderates who have been calling for 
years for the necessity of openness to the Other and for dialogue between civilisations and the 
coexistence of religions.'
368
 The problem here is not Muslim self-pity, but Western ignorance and 
arrogance; the Danish cartoon scandal weakened the argument of self-confident Muslims who 
believed their civilisation had something serious to offer the Western world and vice versa because 
'the Other now looks capable only of mockery, and to be uninterested in dialogue and 
coexistence'.
369
 Much as Tariq Ramadan criticised a French magazine in 2011 for printing similarly 
two-dimensional and unfunny images of Muslims
370
, Mahfouz wondered whether the effect of 
publishing such trivial images of Muhammad would not be to push Muslims 'to oppose and 
challenge this "infidel West" which does not respect religions or their symbols, and to ask 
themselves: "How can we build a dialogue with them?" […] Such is the reaction that this shameful 
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incident, which should never have happened, has provoked.'
371
 Even if a magazine or newspaper 
remains free, both in theory and in practice, to publish what it wants, we must ask why it would 
want to publish such things in the first place; the Moral Law commands respect for other people - 
not for the views they hold, but for their right to hold views, and above all for their right to belong 
to a human community in which views are openly debated by people who take each other seriously. 
Without mockery among friends and equals, relationships may struggle for health and vitality, as in 
the Confucian example to be cited in Chapter four of playing a single boring note on a zither; but a 
relationship in which one side is capable only of mockery is no longer a relationship among equals. 
Speech which reflects a lack of respect for this 'community' or 'ship' on which we are all aboard is 
contrary to the spirit of civilisation itself, and may, as Gray himself suggests, warrant restriction or 
even punishment in certain contexts ('If neo-Nazism could be countered in the countries where it is 
reemerging by curbs on free expression and political association, would it be wrong to impose such 
limits? The answer depends […] on the effectiveness of the restrictions.'372).   
 There is, we may conclude, a distinct Humean quality to Mahfouz's pragmatic endorsement 
of Human Rights, as Martha Nussbaum's colleague Amartya Sen shows us. Like Mahfouz, Hume 
stressed 'the central role of information and knowledge for adequate ethical scrutiny, and the 
importance of reasoning without disowning the pertinence of powerful sentiments'.
373
 Hume was 
also consumed by 'such practical concerns as our responsibilities to those who are located far away 
from us elsewhere on the globe, or in the future'; with rapidly expanding trade and communications 
technology, Hume felt keenly 'the growing need to think afresh about the nature of justice, as we 
come to know more about people living elsewhere, with whom we have come to develop new 
relations', and stressed, like Mahfouz, the importance of reason allied to moral sentiment in an ever 
more crowded world.
374
 While worried that 'people very often are too guided by self-interest in their 
thinking about justice' and that 'avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and 
our nearest friends' might well be 'insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of 
society', Hume also believed that there could develop a '"moderation and abstinence" based on a 
reasoned understanding of the mutual dependence of people on each other' combined with the 
ongoing 'progress of human sentiments':  
 
  [Hume] points out, for example, that people 'pull the oars of a boat by common  
  convention for common interest, without any promise or contract,' and that their 
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  sense of justice is developed by thinking in 'company and conversation'. The  
  connection between reasoned ethics and the “progress of human sentiments” may 
  help to explain the emergence of the so-called 'anti-globalization' movement as a 
  search—despite its misleading name—for a new global ethics with rapidly  
  expanding economic globalization. […] The search for more justice in the global 
  world can also benefit from the Humean admonition about the need for empirical 
  knowledge, particularly—in this case—about what works and what does not work (a 
  subject that is central to contemporary development economics). This applies not 
  only, say, to different forms of aid and assistance, but also to the role of education 
  and health care in advancing development, including economic progress. Empirical 
  understanding is also relevant for assessing how the market economy works, what it 
  achieves and what it does not. If the economic crisis of 2008 is at least partly a  
  reflection of being misled by the pure theory of infallible markets, it brings out  
  sharply the practical importance of real knowledge about how markets can be  
  expected actually to work.
375
 
Like Hume, Mahfouz remained optimistic concerning the 'natural progress of human sentiments' 
towards universal humanistic sympathy in the light of developments in communications technology 
and trade in goods and ideas. Declarations of Human Rights enshrine this optimism and represent a 
high point of human civilisational development rather than, as Gray suggests, dangerous utopian 
wishfulness. But as for Hume, Mahfouz saw nothing inevitable or inexorable about the advance or 
even the survival of universal rights; not only do the humanities have a role to play in enlarging and 
maintaining the sympathies which make talk of universal rights possible, but, as we will explore 
further in the next chapter, it is only with the hard work of reason – including scientific reason - that 
this sympathy finds meaningful expression in the world, thereby ensuring the survival and spread of 
Human Rights themselves.   
 
 
2.6 Warrior for Science 
  
   It is a world full of harm, and rarely do we find news to cheer us. Perhaps 
   our happiest children are almost all in one environment - the scientific  
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   environment. For in this total darkness, lights shine in centres of research, 
   promising always to add to knowledge and to discover new truths and to  
   challenge diseases and other plagues.
376
 
           Naguib Mahfouz 
 
After five chapters in which the importance of science to Mahfouz's vision of civilisation has been 
repeatedly stressed, a sixth chapter devoted exclusively to science may seem almost superfluous. It 
would not be possible, however, to overestimate the status accorded by Mahfouz to the scientific 
enterprise. In a sense, science is synonymous with civilisation itself: 'Western civilisation is not a 
foreign civilisation. It was indeed born in foreign circumstances and among foreign tribes, but in 
both historical and tangible terms, it is a humanistic civilisation above all else - humanistic in its 
origin and humanistic in its goal,' Mahfouz tells his local Egyptian and Arab readers, before offering 
what he regards as the most prominent example of this humanism: 'I do not deny that there are local 
characteristics in any civilisation which tie it to its environment and which may be abhorred and 
rejected by the rest of Humanity, but beyond these it is humanistic in its goal, a project aimed at the 
hearts and minds of all. The most important example of this is science and its applications.'
377
 As 
Mahfouz's article 'The Great Nation' (1991) further makes clear, the spirit of science is 
international: science is leading us to 'spectacular horizons of knowledge and accomplishment in the 
direction of horizons of progress, enlightenment and power between the Earth and outer space, 
affecting humans, animals, plants and even inanimate objects'.
378
 Although we face common 
dangers such as 'pollution, drought, disease, drugs and terrorism', and although 'each nation has its 
share of progress and exposure to risk in accordance with its degree of civilisation and is called to 
address its problems by all means availiable within the limits of its energies and talents', we are 
nevertheless living through a period which 'distinguishes itself in that it is tending towards 
convergence and union; the good and the bad are being shared around and are flowing through 
everyone, without regard for borders'.
379
 In an age in which secrets 'rarely stay secret for long', we 
have an unprecedented opportunity to share the good as well as the bad, and science is a key part of 
this exchange: 'We are in the era of open-source knowledge, of international trade and the global 
economy, and of dialogue between nations leading to convergence in values enshrined in the idea of 
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Human Rights. We are meeting more than ever in international institutions and conferences.'
380
 
'Knowedge without borders', indeed, is a core principle of Mahfouzian civilisation; in the end, 
knowledge is not dangerous, and what matters is to face the dangers and challenges that surround 
us, and to use the knowledge we acquire through open exchange of ideas across borders – however 
unsettling such knowledge may be – to further other civilisational values. Consider Mahfouz on 
cloning:  
  In fact I am against those who oppose cloning, not only in Egypt but in developed 
  countries themselves. Science should never be treated in this way; we should never 
  fear negative consequences of any scientific discovery. On the contrary, our duty is to 
  leave scientists completely free to do their jobs, to make discoveries, and there is 
  nothing at all to be afraid of in this. If such experiments were successful on crops and 
  plants which God created, why should they not succeed on animals too, or on  
  humans? Perhaps the result will be that we end up cloning not just creatures that have 
  the same characteristics as another creature but are also free from this creature's  
  congenital defects. This is scientific progress which we should not be trying to  
  quarantine. There is nothing in it which goes against religion at all. [...] Whoever 
  engages in cloning is herself one of God's creatures. God Almighty knows that  
  humans are capable of cloning humans, and created them on that basis. Human  
  cloning is not, therefore, contrary to the Divine Will or a challenge to it.
381
      
For Mahfouz, no scientific idea, however apparently heretical or inimical to received wisdom, is a 
threat to faith or civilisation; what matters is to deal honestly and nobly with the reality we discover 
around us, in accordance with the Moral Law. Even the study of the Moral Law itself can, and 
indeed should, as Sam Harris and Jonathan Haidt have suggested, be informed by empirical inquiry: 
despite the fact that - as the likes of Thomas Nagel and (as we will see) Ronald Dworkin among our 
Western warriors argue - its source ultimately remains beyond rational and empirical scrutiny, for 
Mahfouz one important 'side' of the scientific project is concerned with 'thought, art, politics and 
social relations'
382
. Contrary to appearances, Darwinism and its social scientific derivatives - most 
notably evolutionary psychology - pose no threat to Mahfouzian civilisation; already in the Cairo 
Trilogy, Mahfouz showed that he was entirely comfortable with the theme of evolution and its 
possible moral consequences; after arousing his father's anger by publishing an article on Darwin in 
the Balagh Weekly magazine, Kamal, whose intellectual trajectory was modelled on Mahfouz's 
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own
383
, eventually sees the light: 
   Why had he written his article after all? He had hesitated for a long time before  
  sending it to the magazine. But it was as if he wanted to announce publicly the death 
  of his old form of faith. For the last few years it had resisted the storms of doubt  
  unleashed by contact with al-Maarri and al-Khayyam, until science with its iron fist 
  assailed him. This blow had been decisive! But he kept saying to himself: 'I'm not an 
  unbeliever, I still believe in God! […] Enough suffering and temptation! I will never 
  again be the prisoner of illusions! […] Give me light at all costs! Our father Adam? I 
  have no father! Let my father be a monkey if the truth demands it.
384
  [...] Now, if he 
  wanted to write, he would have to fall back on the weekly political review that would 
  escape the curiosity of his wafdist father. As for his mother, he could already quietly 
  promise her that he would be devoting his life to spreading the light of God. For after 
  all, wasn't that actually the case? Without doubt! Distancing himself from religious 
  dogma, he would be closer to God than if he were enslaved to it! For as a key to the 
  mysteries and grandeur of the universe, there is no true religion but science! If the 
  prophets returned today, they would choose science to convey their message! Thus 
  he awoke from the slumber of myth to face the bare bones of reality, ending the  
  storm during which he had tried to crush ignorance on his way to his goal, breaking 
  from a past of darkness to embrace a future of light. The paths of Science, Goodness 
  and Beauty opened the Way to God; it was through them that he would say goodbye 
  to a past of unsubstantiated dreams, false hopes and infinite suffering.
385
     
The Moral Law commands attention to empirical detail; such contact with reality leads to constant 
revision even in the realms of cosmology and ethics themselves. It is hard to see Mahfouz 
disagreeing, for example, with the premise of James Rachels' classic Created from Animals: The 
Moral Implications of Darwinism (or with Tu Weiming's similarly post-anthropocentric, 
'anthropocosmic' vision to be discussed in Chapter 4). Rachels argues that 'Darwin's theory does not 
entail that the idea of human dignity is false', but rather that 'Darwinism undermines both the idea 
that man is made in the image of God and the idea that man is a uniquely rational being'.
386
 Since 
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human life after the advent of Darwinism is freed from the 'moral effluvium' of a 'discredited', 
anthropomorphic metaphysics and is 'no longer regarded with the kind of superstitious awe which it 
is accorded in traditional thought', Rachels believes that 'the value granted to nonhuman life will be 
increased' and that 'reconstructing morality without the assumption of man's specialness leaves 
morality stronger and more rational. It leaves us with a better ethic concerning the treatment of both 
human and nonhuman animals.'
387
 It is equally hard, given Mahfouz's already cited views on 
science and progress, to imagine him dissenting from Michael Gazzaniga's views on free will: 
'neuroscientific experiments indicate that human decisions for action are made before the individual 
is consciously aware of them. Instead of this finding answering the age-old question of whether the 
brain decides before the mind decides, it makes us wonder if that is even the way to think about 
how the brain works.'
388
 This is just one of Gazzaniga's examples; 'the list of issues where 
neuroscience will weigh in is endless,' he argues, not least because 'human knowledge can’t help 
itself in the long run. Things slowly, gradually become more clear. As humans continue on their 
journey they will come to believe certain things about the nature of things and those abstractions 
will then be reflected in the rules that are set up to allow people to live together.'
389
  
 Beyond the infinite adaptability of the Mahfouzian vision of civilisation to new empirical 
evidence, however, the question of the plausibility of the vision itself - the utopian question - 
remains. While Mahfouz's idea of civilisation is a normative vision of what could be and not a 
descriptive vision of what is or necessarily will be, it must nevertheless be psychologically and 
sociologically possible if it is to be of value to us. In true Popperian spirit, the most we can say is 
that it has not been proven to be impossible; indeed, a good deal of contemporary research would 
tend to support the broad thesis of the possibility of progress towards a vision of respect for human 
rights, socialist internationalism, and conscience. Steven Pinker's The Better Angels of Our Nature 
is one prominent recent source of evidence for the non-utopian quality of the Mahfouzian vision, as 
Carl Zimmer argues in his review of Pinker's book, citing 'civilisation's effect' on human nature: 
'Steven Pinker’s great achievement is to weave these trends into a much larger pattern of reduced 
violence, greater empathy and, indeed, a comprehensive civilising process,' Zimmer says, quoting 
Nils Petter Gleditsch of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway.
390
 'As the rise of civilisation 
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gradually changed the ground rules of society,', Zimmer says of Pinker's argument, 'violence began 
to ebb. The earliest states were brutal and despotic, but they did manage to take away opportunities 
for runaway vendettas.'
391
 A quantum leap in this civilisational process was made possible by the 
invention of movable type: 'when people used their powers of language to generate new ideas, those 
ideas could spread. "If you give people literacy, bad ideas can be attacked and experiments tried, 
and lessons will accumulate," Dr. Pinker said. "That pulls you away from what human nature would 
consign you to on its own."'
392
 One easily imagines Mahfouz as a fan of Pinker's work, as much for 
the empirical method as for the humanistic impulses and conclusions.     
 In the end, however, Mahfouz was a humanist defender of science rather than a scientist 
himself, in many ways the Matthew Arnold of the 20
th
 century Arab world. In Arnold's famous 
words, 'the more that the results of science are frankly accepted, the more that poetry and eloquence 
come to be received and studied as what in truth they really are,—the criticism of life by gifted 
men, alive and active with extraordinary power'.
393
 Both Mahfouz and Arnold looked to culture to 
provide a way of relating, in Arnold’s words, the 'results of modern science' to 'our need for 
conduct, our need for beauty'; as Roger Kimball puts it, 'This is the crux: that culture is in some 
deep sense inseparable from conduct—from that unscientific but ineluctable question, "How should 
I live my life?"'
394
 Mahfouz, however, goes a step further, resembling no one in contemporary 
debates about the the relationship between science and morality more than Sam Harris. As Harris 
points out, the question 'How should I live my life?' may not itself be a scientific question, but we 
desperately need up-to-date scientific information and a healthy does of the empirical spirit to help 
us answer it. When we open ourselves to this information, what we find is the urgency of the need 
to create a viable global civilisation. It will not be idle to rehearse Harris's arguments from Chapter 
1, according to which 'we can look at the world, witnessing all of the diverse behaviors, rules, 
cultural artifacts, and morally salient emotions like empathy and disgust, and we can study how 
these things play out in human communities, both in our time and throughout history', examining 
these phenomena 'in as nonjudgmental a way as possible and seeking to understand them. We can 
understand them in evolutionary terms, and we can understand them in psychological and 
neurobiological terms, as they arise in the present. And we can call the resulting data and the entire 
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effort a "science of morality"'.
395
 Although for many scientists this purely descriptive project would 
'seem to exhaust all the legitimate points of contact between science and morality — that is, 
between science and judgments of good and evil and right and wrong' – Harris argues that there is 
another, even more important project to which science can find a way to contribute: 'it has long 
been obvious that we need to converge, as a global civilization, in our beliefs about how we should 
treat one another. It subsumes everything else we could care about — from arresting climate 
change, to stopping nuclear proliferation, to curing cancer, to saving the whales.'
396
 Beyond mere 
neutral description of the world and accumulation of knowledge for its own sake, 'any effort that 
requires that we collectively get our priorities straight and marshal massive commitments of time 
and resources would fall within the scope of this project. To build a viable global civilisation we 
must begin to converge on the same economic, political, and environmental goals.'
397
 What matters 
to both Harris and Mahfouz, as it mattered to Arnold, is not merely the essential task of describing 
the world, including ourselves and our moral impulses, as faithfully as we can, but the even greater 
task of maximising human flourishing in a world full of challenges old and new. For all his love of 
science and his robust defence of its civilisational value, Mahfouz chose literature rather than 
science as his calling. We will recount the adolescent background to Mahfouz's career choice, and 
the battles he waged on behalf of literature throughout his adult life, in the next section.  
 
2.7 Warrior for Literature 
   How did the man coming from the Third World find the peace of mind to write 
   stories? Fortunately, art is generous and sympathetic. In the same way that it 
   dwells with the happy ones it does not desert the wretched. It offers both alike 
   the convenient means for expressing what swells up in their bosom. In this 
   decisive moment in the history of civilisation it is inconceivable and  
   unacceptable that the moans of Mankind should die out in the void. The  
   human mind now assumes the task of eliminating all causes of destruction 
   and annihilation. And just as scientists exert themselves to cleanse the  
   environment of industrial pollution, intellectuals ought to exert themselves to 
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   cleanse humanity of moral pollution.
398
 
         Naguib Mahfouz, Nobel Lecture 
 
Literature for Mahfouz is the realm of 'feeling', and is distinct from philosophy or journalism 
because it constructs feelings rather than (merely) logical arguments; civilisation without 
conscience - without a certain type of feeling - is impossible. It goes without saying that such 
feelings have a social dimension, and must be conjured through education and culture; they do not 
arrive from the sky without civilisational effort. Literature is the 'cunning art' which, if it does not 
makes conscience and civilisation possible, at least sustains them over time, returning us to the 
wellspring of the Divine Essence through contact with the feelings of others, feelings in which we 
recognise ourselves and our common connection to the Divine Essence and Moral Law. Literature 
is, par excellence, the province of those who are 'sure' of themselves, 'seekers of the Highest 
Example'; this example ultimately communicates itself through feeling allied with reason, not 
reason alone. Journalism is 'a rational form of writing which tackles society and its problems from 
all angles, essentially through reason rather than conscience and lived experience or artistic 
innovation'; although both literature and journalism both 'depend on words', in journalism 'these 
words are used in the service of reason', while 'in literature they are an end in themselves to the 
extent that they bring feeling with them.'
399
          
 Mahfouz's journey to literature, and to the novel in particular, is worth briefly recounting 
here, and is well told by Mohammed Fatḥī in 'How Was the Novelist in Naguib Mahfouz Born?' 
(2006). Fatḥī asks us to imagine a young Naguib inspired by his mother's passion for ancient Egypt 
encountering Salama Moussa's celebration of ancient Egypt as the cradle of human civilisation and 
of the enduring link between ancient and modern Egypt. According to Moussa, the history of 
Ancient Egypt was 'not the history of Egypt alone but of the world's first civilisation, and when we 
study it, what we are studying are the first human moves towards the existence of a culture of 
farming, the birth of religions, governments, laws and morals.'
400
 It was no surprise when a young 
Naguib chose to translate James Baikie's book Ancient Egypt, or that Moussa helped him publish it 
(curiously, Baikie also seems to preempt Mahfouz's eventual career choice when he says that 'it is 
good for one to choose a career for oneself such as writing, and to live happy in one's native 
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land').
401
 Fatḥī then goes on to talk about why the adolescent Mahfouz chose to study philosophy at 
university: 
  Naguib was moved to read the respected authors of the period - Taha Hussein, Al-
  Aqqad, Salama Moussa etc... and he found that the reason for their acclaim could be 
  traced back to their thought rather than their narratives (even though they all wrote 
  stories). Their writings stirred intellectual and philosophical questioning in Naguib, 
  and led him to imagine that the study of Philosophy at university would enable him 
  to respond to the questions which were then tormenting him. 'I imagined I would find 
  out the secret of existence and the destiny of humanity', Mahfouz explained.  
  'Whenever someone advised me to enter the Faculty of Law or Medicine so that I 
  could become a judge or doctor, I would say to myself, "Why would I care about 
  becoming a judge or doctor? I'm after the secret of existence here.'
402
  
 
Fatḥī also mentions how Mahfouz's generation was the first to be exposed to Western philosophy 
and literature at university, and about how Moussa published both his philosophical essays and 
short stories while he was still a university student, before moving on to address the break with 
philosophy and the embrace of literature, and specifically novel-writing, as a career in 1936.
403
 
Among other factors, Fathi cites Mahfouz's position as the youngest (and only) son in his family, 
which made him especially good at observing and listening to others and avoiding conflict with 
power, as well as his experience of the public controversy surrounding the publication of Taha 
Hussein's Pre-Islamic Poetry, which pushed him away from the adversarial world of public 
intellectualhood and into the oasis of literature (where, conceivably, he could hide his own ideas in 
his characters).
404
 Once he had finally made the choice of literature over philosophy, Mahfouz said 
that he was overcome 'by a deep and unparalleled calm'.
405
 But the real reason was that literature - 
the 'universal point of view' as Fatḥī calls it - which allowed him to 'play the whole piano' of human 
possibility, was the logical end of his philosophy studies, and not just because, as Fatḥī suggests, 
philosophers agree that the circle/sphere is the only shape without sides, or that he simply didn't like 
taking sides or challenging authority at all (he would, of course, go on to write hundreds of articles 
and opinion pieces as well as fiction), but because the moral and social dimension of philosophy 
eventually came to trump the metaphysical dimension.
406
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 Indeed, in 1936, after 'a terrible spiritual struggle', Mahfouz the philosophy graduate decided 
on a life in literature (and ultimately prose fiction) rather than philosophy, attributing his choice to 
the lack of a novelistic tradition in Arabic and his sense of responsibility to the 'Umma' or Islamic 
nation to help build one, but also to the simple fact that 'the novel was the artistic form I found 
myself in'
407
. Fresh with enthusiasm for ancient Egypt and Egyptian nationalism, Mahfouz 
famously set out to write the entire history of ancient Egypt in novel form, but 'when my readings, 
especially in modern literature, began to broaden and deepen, my enthusiasm for historical novel-
writing waned'.
408
 This exposure to modern literature led to a realisation that 'the business of novel-
writing was more urgent and profound, and that the novel can have an influential role in treating 
social issues and considering people's concerns and problems. From here I headed into the realist 
novel.'
409
 Eventually, however, further reading in Western literature highlighted the limits of 
realism: 'Literature by its very nature is symbolic; even realism must be characterised by a degree of 
symbolism and uncertainty, provided that it does not reach the level of vagueness and ambiguity 
and mental fatigue for the reader.'
410
 Indeed, 'black-and-white, straightforward literature in which 
the reader is given everything in a simple and straightforward way leaves the reader's imagination 
idle, and does not give him the opportunity for reflection and analysis.'
411
     
 Ironically, however, the highest form of literature for Mahfouz was not novelistic prose at 
all, but poetry ('in my view, poetry is the soul of literature'); he considered the novel a form of 
history, history as a branch of art, art as a unified whole which could only be studied as such, and 
poetry as the highest form of art.
412
 Still, Mahfouz says, 'every art form has its distinguishing 
characteristics. I consider myself a reader, fan and connoisseur of poetry. I tried writing some 
myself, and if I'd had the Muse I would have continued with the experiment.'
413
 The words 'poetry' 
and 'feeling' come from the same root in Arabic; the poet is the 'one who feels', and by extension, 
the one who transmits feelings to others. This is not to say, however, that the novel (or the short 
story or the play - Mahfouz says there was no particular reason why he ended up writing more 
novels and short stories than plays
414
) is without value as a vehicle for putting us into the shoes of 
others and thereby leading us into the deepest, most intimate parts of ourselves. Like Manzoni, 
however, Mahfouz's choice of prose was partially dictated by a sense of sociolinguistic 
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responsibility: Arab civilisation needed a unified language fit for dialogue with other civilisations, a 
base from which to build bridges to the modern world. This act of synthetic linguistic creation 
would not have been possible without (alongside long hours walking in Cairo's streets and sitting in 
Cairo's cafés) a long journey into the canonical past of Arabic literature. Mahfouz tells the story of 
his relationship with 'The Heritage' in a 1996 article of the same name: it was his contact with the 
Arab literary tradition which led him 
  to an initial level of understanding which allowed me to grasp the meaning of  
  culture at a very early age. Arab Islamic literature was the first component in my 
  cultural makeup. I read the Qur'an, the Sunna, and literary classics like the Book of 
  Songs. I remember I had a book called 'The Best of the Literature of the Arabs', a 
  collection of excerpts from earliest pre-Islamic times up to the modern age, including 
  al-Manflūtī and al-Barūdī. I was deeply influenced by all of this, and there is no  
  doubt that it had a fundamental inflence in helping me to find my literary voice. [...] I 
  was a defender of fuṣḥa, and I wrote the most difficult thing of all - the realist novel - 
  in it. How could a poor village boy be made to speak this classical language? Many 
  of my readers did not know whether the characters in my novels were speaking in 
  fuṣḥa or dialect. [My] fuṣḥa developed to the point that it became a language suitable 
  for the  present age, and suitable for the novel in particular. [...] My readings in the 
  Arab canon were the main factor which helped me in this. Some people may imagine 
  that it is enough for someone who chooses to write novels to study the development 
  of this literary genre in literatures where the novel had developed to a more advanced 
  stage than it had in Arabic literature, and it is true that while we have the Tales of the 
  Arabs and the Thousand and One Nights and popular epics, all this combined does 
  not match the richness of our poetry. Thus, in my adherence to the Arab canon, it was 
  as if I was embarking on writing poetry rather than novels.
415
     
Despite his modesty about his own poetic gifts, Mahfouz, we can conclude, saw himself as owing 
his primary literary debt to Arab poets. As he said in his Nobel Lecture, however, his inspiration 
then went global, or at least, as far as the West: 'it was my fate, ladies and gentlemen, to be born in 
the lap of these two [Pharaonic and Islamic] civilizations, and to absorb their milk, to feed on their 
literature and art. Then I drank the nectar of your rich and fascinating culture. From the inspiration 
of all this - as well as my own anxieties - words bedewed from me.'
416
 Of all Western influences on 
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Mahfouz, none was more profound, and certainly none more significant for our purposes, than 
Proust. Mahfouz admitted that 'Marcel Proust's great masterpiece In Search of Lost Time had a 
profound effect on me', and although 'one needs a great deal of patience and endurance to get to the 
end of its 5000 pages', it was nevertheless worthwhile to do so at least once in one's life: 'the 
amazing thing about it is that the end of the book contains a call to reread from the beginning, and 
at the very end, you find at last the key to the story. But regrettably I didn't reread it because life is 
short.'
417
           
 Mahfouz himself viewed his Arabian Nights and Days (1982), a continuation of the 
'Proustian' Thousand and One Nights, as his best piece of literary art.
418
 Like Borges, Mahfouz was 
irresistibly attracted to the infinite possibilities of narrative, the very infiniteness of narrative itself; 
the furious Mahfouzian passion for narrative was a symptom of his primal, undying thirst for the 
source, the Divine Essence itself. As in Plato, however, the source contains within itself a message 
of social responsibility, an imperative to turn one's back on the light and return to the cave. There is 
no right answer to the question of how many times one should reread Proust, of how much 
nourishment in feeling one needs on any given day to be able to fulfil one's earthly responsibilities: 
although we all need regular contact with the source, to spend one's entire life rereading Proust or 
the Thousand and One Nights would be to miss the point of literature. While we recover ourselves 
in the most intimate part of other people via sustained contact with their art, Mahfouz might have 
wished to add, 'To what end? For battle.' These and related themes will be explored further in our 
discussion of Arabian Nights and Days.        
 The vertiginous Proustian or Borgesian aspect of literature, however, is part of the broader 
'meaning of culture' which Mahfouz first sensed as a boy reading the Arab classics. An important 
part of this 'meaning of culture' is that patience and endurance have their rewards, both for the 
individual and for society; it is through sustained intimate contact with 'the heritage' that such 
values are passed down. While Mahfouz certainly took for granted that education in literature and 
art - in the compulsory, you-have-no-choice-about-this sense of the term 'education' - was part of 
any acceptable package of Human Rights, and that forcing children to learn to read and write, 
firstly, and then to learn about their civilisational 'heritage' was necessary and good, we have also 
seen that he abhorred government attempts to control the market for culture, and favoured an open 
debate between conservatives and reformers in all facets of social life. Mahfouz therefore accepted 
as inevitable that the virtues of patience and endurance required for Proust would always be in 
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relatively short supply, and that there would always be two kinds of 'world literature' - a quantitative 
world literature based on global sales figures (of which the paradigm examples given by Mahfouz 
are Agatha Christie and Harry Potter), and a qualitative world literature based on 'depth of feeling' 
or universal literary value. On the one hand, critics have a social responsibility to engage with what 
is popular, simply because it is popular: 'widely distributed works of art have an influence on a mass 
audience which exceeds the influence of art produced for élites, and therefore the neglect of such 
works by critics means that there are works that have a strong influence on large numbers of people 
but are completely ignored by those responsible for debating their merits.'
419
 While Mahfouz is 
clear that 'this must not be allowed to happen',
420
 there is nevertheless a second sense in which 
World Literature is 'concerned with value'; the title World Literature 'applies to literature which, if it 
were translated into any of the world's languages and shown to any group of intellectuals and critics 
in any country, would lead them to conclude that it contained something worthy of literary 
regard.'
421
 Popularity is irrelevant, for indeed 'publication is not the measure of value here; such 
literature may not be published and may not be known outside its country of origin because for one 
reason or another it has not been translated'.
422
 Such anonymity 'does not preclude the possibility 
that it may be World Literature in the true sense of the term because it contains all the 
characteristics of world literature in its quality and sophistication.'
423
 Dostoyevsky is one possible 
example of a 'world author'; even though he is 'a provincial author in the sense that he takes the 
reader with him through the streets of old Moscow with its characters and problems', his status as a 
world author 'is attained through the literary characteristics of the work itself, and does not depend 
on the place where the events in it unfold. "World literature" is essentially an artistic label rather 
than a geographical one.'
424
           
   It is true that Mahfouz had more pressing things to worry about in the sphere 
of culture in his native Egypt - alarming rates of illiteracy, for example - than the number of 
Egyptians reading Dostoyevsky or Thomas Mann; it is almost beside the point to ask whether a 
pragmatist like Mahfouz believed that a single canon of 'world literature' should eventually be 
taught in schools everywhere. What he did stress, however, was that there could be no global status, 
no intercivilisational podium to aspire to without a prior sense of local civilisational identity, an 
identity denied to Egyptians by colonialism and then by their own mistakes. Mahfouz relentlessly 
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encouraged Egyptians to think about cultivating their own garden before they worried about 
whether the rest of the world was watching them and paying them enough respect: 
  People are constantly asking me, 'Has art reached a level in our country qualifying it 
  for global recognition, and if not, when and how will it get there?', as if we had  
  solved our local cultural problems, as if there remained not a single shortcoming  
  worthy of reflection and debate, and as if all we have left to worry about or think 
  about is global recognition and immortality. [...] Perhaps our unique position between 
  three continents is what leads us to think in this way. [...] And perhaps our ambition 
  to excel is worthy of sympathy in itself. But we should always remember that a solid 
  building is built on sound foundations, that perfecting the inside must come before 
  dreams of the outside, and that before we train for world championships in boxing, 
  for example, we should save millions from schistosomiasis and hookworm and  
  stomach worms, that before we can play a leading role in the world we must erase 
  poverty, ignorance, tyranny and corruption, and that before we can have candidates 
  for the Nobel Prize we must free 80% of our people from illiteracy... We must learn 
  how to read, how to see, and how to hear.
425
      
Mahfouz certainly felt that Arab literature deserved more recognition on the world stage, and had 
been denied it chiefly because of a lack of quality translation; the priority, however, was to get the 
house of Islam in order. For the time being, he argued in 1994, 'the future of Arab civilisation 
should be built on the twin pillars of Islam and dialogue with other civilisations'
426
. If the reform of 
the house of Islam could be achieved, Mahfouz was ever optimistic about the outcome of this 
dialogue, and about an eventual convergence of canons: while on the one hand genuine 
international recognition 'is not attainable without a worthy degree of depth, comprehensiveness and 
humanism combined with a loyal keeping to one's own authenticity and vision of self', this 'difficult 
equation' is 'solved every day with the emergence of new world literature, and in the end this 
process is facilitated by the oneness of human nature, our common origin and destiny, and our 
common hopes, dreams and sufferings.'
427
 Mahfouz's life's work was to cultivate a local garden of 
feeling, never aiming at global recognition for global recognition's sake, but mindful always of the 
grand civilisational purpose of his labours. And why all this effort, all the long years of patience and 
endurance as a reader and writer, if not to inspire others to do likewise, to give others access to the 
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'meaning of culture', the source, the Divine Essence, and to encourage them to make their own 
original addition to the 'heritage', to the story of civilisation itself, much as he himself had done in 
Arabian Nights and Days by continuing the story of the Thousand and One Nights.  
 
2.8 Warrior for Love 
 
   Love is like death. You hear about it all the time, but you only know it when 
   it's present.
428
  
        
           Naguib Mahfouz 
 
 
We will have occasion to explore Mahfouz on love in detail in the next section, where I will argue 
that the relationship between Akhenaten and Nefertiti depicted in Akhenaten: Dweller in Truth is the 
mature Mahfouz's paradigm of the monogamous, self-sufficing bond of love on which civilisation 
ultimately rests, and which is a microcosm of civilisation and the Divine Essence itself. Mahfouz's 
journey to this mature view, however, is worth recounting from its innocent pre-pubescent 
beginnings through a testosterone-fuelled youth and on into a sea of practical mid-life obstacles. 
 Nowhere does Islam permeate the Mahfouzian worldview more than here. Before his first 
love story at the age of thirteen, the burden of conscience imposed by Islam in all matters sexual 
was already apparent: up to that point, 'my relations with girls did not go beyond tickling which 
sometimes went too far. These innocent excesses clashed with my religious sentiment, which was 
then at its most intense, to the point that I would ask for forgiveness from God on a daily basis. I 
lived in constant agony from the pangs of conscience.'
429
 Mahfouz would eventually outgrow the 
idea that the Qur'an was a literal code of sexual ethics, just as he would outgrow the idea that the 
Qur'an was a literal guide to anything; but the idea never left him that sexual energy was something 
that the Moral Law demanded we control. This did not mean that Mahfouz had any less difficulty 
than the next man when it came to controlling it; indeed, it seems impossible to imagine the author 
of the following passage from the Cairo Trilogy as anyone other than one who had experienced this 
degree of sexual frustration first-hand: 
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  When Yasine left the house, he naturally knew where he was going, because he went 
  there night after night. […] He had the habit of raising his eyes – but not his head – 
  on the lookout for action behind the windows, in search of passing forms. […] He 
  never got to the end of a street without feeling a kind of vertigo from having  
  overused his eyes, so incurable was his passion for the women who crossed his path. 
  From the front, he undressed them with his gaze, from behind he followed their  
  mobile curves with unrelenting enthusiasm. He remained in a hypercharged state, 
  like a bull foaming at the mouth, to the point where he lost control of himself and 
  was no longer able to keep his desperation from showing. […] His carnal energy 
  reigned so violently over his leisure that it left him without a single instant of repose. 
  The flames of desire constantly kindled his senses and fired the furnaces of his being, 
  like a demon taking control of him and leading him by the nose, but a demon he did 
  not want to be rid of and from whom, on the contrary, he begged ever more.
430
       
  
 
Mahfouz himself admitted that, for long periods of his youth, 'the way I looked at women was 
purely sexual, with no role for emotions or feelings, even if it was sometimes mixed with a vague 
respect'; this only began to change when, already well into adulthood, he began 'to think about 
marriage and stability'.
431
 That he was able to conceive of a monogamous future at all, however, 
was at least partly to do with his first real experience of all-consuming love. After the family moved 
from al-Gamaliyya to al-Abbasiya, a 13 year-old Mahfouz fell for a 20 year-old girl from a 
prominent local family, a girl somehow different from all the others (she wore Western clothes and 
seemed Westernised in her mannerisms); Mahfouz took advantage of regular street soccer games to 
steal glances up to her balcony. This continued for an entire year, until the girl was married off and 
forced to leave the neighbourhood. Mahfouz was to see her again, however, on the street at Saad 
Zaghloul's funeral. This chance encounter, with all the symbolism it must have had for a young, 
grieving nationalist like Mahfouz, left him dreaming like a madman for years.
432
  
 Eventually, however, the madness faded; despite the immense power of certain faces on our 
imagination, when we think and write about such superficial obsession, Mahfouz says, sooner or 
later we come to see it in its true dimensions, and the process liberates us to begin anew, and to 
continue the quest for a true human bond. Mahfouz had first known this bond with his mother: 
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  My mother had a major role in my life. In our day, the mother ran the house and was 
  not employed outside it, and her bond with her children was strong. The husband 
  went out to work, and so was more often than not at the margins of his children's 
  existence, especially in the early years, and only really made an appearance in times 
  of crisis. The mother was everything; I received love from my mother which remains 
  with me beyond my ninetieth birthday. But my mother's role was not just emotional; 
  it was also educational. She loved visiting ancient tombs and ruins; I visited the  
  Egyptian Museum with her dozens of times, and likewise the Pyramids and Sphinx, 
  and I would stand before them all in a state of amazement. In this spirit we also  
  visited all the Coptic sites together, and I have a very clear memory of the Coptic 
  Church of St. George, which we visited many times. My mother had a wandering 
  spirit and a love of knowledge. I didn't know where this love came from; she knew of 
  the renown of these places and chose them carefully, taking me with her from the 
  time I was four or five years old. […] When I came to the age of reason, I found that 
  my brothers and sisters had all grown up, married and left home. There was no one 
  left at home besides my mother and me, especially after my father died when I was 
  ten. I was over fifty when my mother died, married with children, but I still felt truly 
  orphaned.
433
       
 
Mahfouz's decision eventually to get married was not a straightforward one; having chosen to 
embark on a literary career in his twenties. Mahfouz was not sure whether his prior commitment to 
his craft required, in theory or in practice, a monastic refraining from marriage. In the end, however, 
the need - both emotional and practical - became apparent to both mother and son: 'when my 
mother's age advanced to the point that her health began to fail and she became incapable of bearing 
the large burdens I had expected of her, I began to feel lonely, and she began to realise that I needed 
to get married.'
434
 Thus began a long motherly campaign of bride-searching. Mahfouz rejected one 
candidate after another on the grounds that he was in no way willing to compromise his writing for 
the petty bourgeois keeping up of appearances that they would be expecting of him. Indeed, as he 
told an interviewer decades later, 'I would not be disclosing a secret if I said that I never thought I 
would get married. I figured that my love for literature, to which I had decided to devote all my 
time and attention, would preclude it.'
435
 Eventually, however, Mahfouz became convinced that he 
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could have his cake and eat it; although his marriage to Atiyatallah 'was a marriage of convenience, 
in the sense that I chose a wife suitable for my circumstances', and despite the fact that 'there had 
been no history of love between us prior to our wedding', Mahfouz decided that he was 'in need of a 
wife who could provide me with a relaxed atmosphere which would help me with my writing and 
would not disrupt my life', as well as someone 'who understood that I was not a social person, that I 
didn't like paying visits to people and didn't like them paying visits to me, that I would be devoting 
my entire life to literature. I found this understanding and these characteristics in Atiyatallah.'
436
  
 It is interesting that Mahfouz preferred to keep his family life largely separate from his 
literary life and intellectual friendships. He never asked either Atiyatallah or his daughters Fatima 
and Umm Kulthoum for help with his writing ('their views tended to be impressionistic rather than 
specific, which was no good to me on a literary level'
437
); they would read his books along with 
everyone else when they were published, and watch the film adaptations on TV. Mahfouz expressed 
a kind of nostalgic disillusionment that his daughters seemed more interested in Western culture 
than in the Arab heritage he had first absorbed, but by all accounts, he seems to have encouraged 
them to follow their interests rather than shoving that heritage down their throats, and to have 
provided the three women in his family with the kind of emotional, educational and practical 
support that a hardworking husband and father in a culture where a certain degree of male aloofness 
is the norm could reasonably have been expected to provide.
438
     
 If Mahfouz never achieved with Atiyatallah or his daughters the degree of intellectual or 
educational bond he achieved with his mother or literary friends (from Salama Moussa and Tawfiq 
al-Hakim early in his life through to Mohamed Salmawy and Gamal al-Gheitany at the end), there 
is nevertheless absolutely no doubt that the gratitude-infused 'feeling' that Mahfouz describes when 
recounting his years of marriage to Atiyatallah deserves the name of 'love': 'now, after all these 
years, I cannot deny the truth that my wife Atiyatallah put up with a lot from me, and helped me to 
keep up the strict discipline which I imposed on my life,' Mahfouz said towards the end of his 
days.
439
 'She provided me with an atmosphere which allowed me to devote myself full-time to my 
writing, and she tried with all her might to keep anything which might have disrupted me or 
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interrupted my thoughts at bay.'
440
 For this sacrifice, Mahfouz was convinced that 'if anyone gets 
priority treatment in where they end up, my wife is at the front of that queue. May God reward her 
with all that is good.'
441
 It may seem a bit glib for a writer who has taken advantage of a wife's good 
nature for decades to rely on God to repay his debts for him, but I think to react this way would be 
to miss one of the central points of the Mahfouzian oeuvre: pragmatism is not a sin, even, and 
perhaps especially, in love. It may be true that Mahfouz lived in a society where the savage 
exploitation of women by sons, husbands and fathers was, and continues to be, the norm, but this 
does not preclude the possibility that a married couple can find an equilibrium where one person's 
job is primarily to allow the other to do theirs, or where one plays a more hands-on role in the 
raising of the children. Mahfouz was adamant that this need have nothing to do with gender, and 
that men and women have exactly the same rights and responsibilities; although Mahfouz believed 
that 'the beauty and dignity of a woman is not complete without a certain degree of modesty'
442
  
prescribed by religious tradition, his depictions of male 'beauty and dignity', the paradigm example 
of which is his depiction of Akhenaten in Dweller in Truth, are no less conservative. 'The most 
important thing for modern woman is that she obtain an education and the right to work as she sees 
fit, and that along with her modernity she conserve her commitment to the Moral Law,' Mahfouz 
writes of women's rights and responsibilities, before arriving at a gender-neutral conclusion: 'There 
is no doubt that we are now in a stage where we are returning to [...] values that have been absent 
from our lives,' Mahfouz writes in a fit of optimism in 1985, and that 'we are now in a stage where 
we are rejecting corruption and carrying out a revolution against it by means of a return to virtue, 
and this promises good things.'
443
 This may sound chauvinistic (as well as overly optimistic 
concerning the future of Mubarak's Egypt), but the truth is that Mahfouz expected no less 'modesty' 
from men than he did from women; the culture of polygamy defended in the Qur'an may have made 
economic and social sense in the time of the prophet, but it can no longer be said to do so (Mahfouz 
addresses this theme time and time again in his oeuvre, most famously in the Cairo Trilogy itself); 
moreover, polygamy as a justification for male sexual licence has always been a non-starter in 
Islamic civilisation, for even though customs may change as the forces of conservatism and reform 
wage their eternal battle, what matters is that the Divine Essence be transmitted through meaningful 
bonds between people, whether between a mother and child, between a husband and wife, or 
indeed, between anyone. This Essence, as Mahfouz's own successful marriage shows, is transmitted 
over time through reciprocal acts of generosity and associated feelings of gratitude.   
 We will see in the next section, through the example of Akhenaten and Nefertiti, how 
                                                 
440  NM, in Naqqāš, Naguib Mahfouz, p. 109.  
441  NM, in Naqqāš, Naguib Mahfouz, p. 109.  
442  NM, in S. Qāsim Ğawda, 'The Hijab Phenomenon' ('Ẓāhirat al Hiğāb'), 'Āḫir Sā'a, 26/6/1985. 
443  NM, 'The Hijab Phenomenon'. 
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Mahfouz argued for an enduring monogamous bond as the microcosm of civilisation. As Mahfouz's 
own rigid commitment to his art shows, however, it is possible to maintain other priorities within 
the confines of a marriage, in the Obamaesque manner of his Akhenaten: Akhenaten's love for 
Nefertiti was complete, but he still found the time to try to change the way the Empire was run. 
Nefertiti, meanwhile, came to adopt the same social goals as her husband, not out of some servile 
obedience to Akhenaten's will, but because she herself sensed the transcendent importance of those 
goals.     
    This does not mean that homosexuality, divorce, or sex before marriage, for example, have 
no place in Mahfouzian civilisation; indeed, there are very good modern arguments why all these 
make sense (moreover, Mahfouz's portrayal of Akhenaten as overtly androgynous suggests that he 
was not interested in reinforcing traditional gender stereotypes
444
). But the eternal goal is to ensure 
the transmission of the Divine Essence; sexual desire wedded to this purpose becomes something 
far stronger than mere wandering lust. Any society should debate the sexual arrangements that best 
suit its circumstances in a climate of freedom, in which individuals are nevertheless free to make 
the sexual arrangements they see fit; but the point of this freedom is that it allows us to know the 
Divine Essence through meaningful reciprocal bonds with other people, in which both sacrifice and 
gratitude will eventually play a role. In this sense, Mahfouz's first love was not a mature love 
because it did not entail such feelings, and was based solely on the fancies of imagination.          
 To put all this into contemporary perspective and to remind us of Mahfouz's close affinity 
with the Western warriors presented in Chapter One (and here, most notably, with Andrew 
Sullivan), it will be useful to consider a 2011 essay on gay marriage, 'Working Arrangement', by 
Justin E.H. Smith. First and foremost, Smith reminds us that Mahfouz's views on the need for love 
within marriage are, like the rest of Mahfouz's post-tribal, post-imperial, internationalist thought, 
radically modern, for as Smith points out, 'until the past two hundred years or so, there simply was 
no presumption that marriage should be motivated or sustained by love'.
445
 Rather, marriage was 
viewed as a primarily demographic project (much as it remains in contemporary, homophobic 
Russia), and as such 'the gender of the units of exchange was a nonnegligible factor in the 
determination of who should be exchanged with whom. A family simply could not afford to give its 
                                                 
444  Critics will be quick to point out, and have been with me, that Akhenaten is still clearly male, and that 
androgynous gods and demigods purportedly combining the best of both genders are nevertheless almost universally 
depicted as male. Whatever one's position in this wider archeological and gender-political debate, however, 
Mahfouz's humble goal, as we will see in the next section, is to contrast Akhenaten's universal 'moral beauty' with 
the swarthy but blindly imperialistic masculine power of the likes of Horemheb and to come down firmly on 
Akhenaten's side, while at the same time championing Nefertiti's universal 'moral beauty' over other more 
stereotypically seductive female forms (Tadoukhepa, Mout Nedjemet etc.).     
445  Justin E.H. Smith, 'Working Arrangement', http://www.laphamsquarterly.org/essays/working-
arrangement.php?page=all, 21/12/11 (accessed 24/12/11). 
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son to a fruitless union with another family’s son.'446 Smith argues, however, that in modern liberal 
democracies this tribal demographic imperative is replaced by the view of marriage as a form of 
freely chosen contract employment; indeed, 'when marriage comes to be seen as a line of work, by 
contrast, and when individuals are seen as free to choose their own vocation, then it 
correspondingly transforms into a gender-neutral institution', one in which 'the genders of its 
members cease to matter.'
447
 At one point, Smith even goes so far as to speak of 'the economic 
contract that is heterosexual marriage', and sees no reason why such contracts should not be 
extended to homosexuals as well.
448
 Mahfouz, in stark contrast, defends the possibility that modern, 
'civilised' marriage is about more than economics. Indeed, to insist on viewing married couples as 
'employees' is to miss the entire point of marriage as a socially meaningful: it is precisely because, 
out of sheer human generosity and goodwill, one commits to fulfilling certain responsibilities to 
another person, whether this turns out to be in one's future economic interests or not, that marriage 
can have any meaning at all in a post-tribal age. Like a young Mahfouz, Smith seems unable to 
conceive of any 'feelings' or 'emotions' in a marriage beyond the merely sexual; all else is wage 
enslavement and drudgery. 'In a world in which marriage is a sort of work, and in which work is 
conceived as something that we variously succeed or fail at depending on the strength of our 
characters and the rectitude of our choices—in such a world it is no wonder we find so many people 
who believe they have, themselves, failed to attain happiness.'
449
 To many unhappily married 
'workers', Smith argues, homosexuality provided a model for an alternative mode of existence: 'it 
was precisely same-sex desire’s position outside of the marital work-unit—in a word, gay 
freedom—that made the label “gay” seem so fitting in the first place.'450 But as Andrew Sullivan 
showed us in the first chapter, homosexuals may crave the intimacy of marriage as much as 
heterosexuals do (or even moreso, because it has always been denied to them), an intimacy which 
Smith all but dismisses as peripheral to the real economic nature of marriage. There is no doubt that 
sustaining a marriage is 'hard work', and economic costs are a part of this equation; but the real 
'hard work' in a marriage is the moral work of keeping oneself strong and healthy not just for 
oneself but also on behalf of someone else. One may not receive economic benefits for this 'work' 
but, to paraphrase Plato on justice, it is its own reward. Nowhere is it written in Mahfouz that one 
must devote 100% of one's labours to a single other, but a life of alternate giving and receiving, in 
accordance with the principle 'from each according to ability, to each according to need' which 
Mahfouz so enthusiastically endorsed, is both the only path to civilisation and the only path to 
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447  Smith, 'Working Arrangement'.  
448  Smith, 'Working Arrangement'.  
449  Smith, 'Working Arrangement'.  
450  Smith, 'Working Arrangement'. 
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individual happiness and salvation. It is right that Mahfouz insisted that his wife respect his prior 
commitment to his literary labours, but Atiyatallah was repaid not only by the myriad small 
generosities and sacrifices which she herself attributed to her husband
451
, but also by the love and 
heart-felt gratitude he came to bear her over the years. If one is blind to the unique possibilities for 
intimacy that this type of long-term union provides, then frankly, one is blind to idea of love itself.
   Mahfouz eventually gets to the moral root of Yasine's 'incurable disease' in 
the Trilogy when he depicts him trying to rape Umm Hanafi. The problem with sexual desire 
unbridled by heartfelt concern for others is not only that it leads you to impinge on their rights; it is 
that it cuts you off from the Divine Essence itself. In Kantian terminlology, the other becomes a 
means, not an end in herself, a mere function of one's own ego. Mahfouz's point about love seems to 
be that it – and, indeed, civilisation, of which intimate love is a microcosm - only begins where this 
instrumentalisation of the other ends; it is right that the other respond to our desires as best she can 
given her physical limitations and other social responsibilities, but we must be ready to do the same 
with her; when we do, we discover something beyond ourselves. The libido is, or has the potential 
to be, a base from which to explore the other and reconnect with this Divine Essence, but it can also 
trap us inside ourselves. The Abrahamic religions all depict Hell as the place of utmost solitude, a 
place where love is not possible, and where the libido finds no satisfaction. Dante's Lucifer, frozen 
in the ice at the bottom of Hell, is the personification of this nightmarish state. Part of the 
Abrahamic religions' condemnation of homosexuality, as well as sex outside marriage, derived from 
the idea that it was selfish and anti-social, and oriented towards one's private pleasure alone. The 
Mahfouzian attitude to sex undoubtedly owes much to this traditional Abrahamic picture but also 
reflects his Enlightenment pragmatism and respect for open debate between conservatives and 
reformers: in principle, anything goes sexually, as long as conscience and the feelings of others - all 
the others implicated in a sexual act (children, other sexual partners, friends etc.) - are as much a 
part of the equation as one's own desires. Mahfouz had very little to say about homosexuality – he 
spent his entire life in a society in which it was not openly discussed - but would doubtless have 
been forced to accept the modern evidence that homosexuality is innate and is not the socially 
corrosive and corrupting force it has traditionally been thought to be. It goes without saying, 
however, that the same moral constraints that apply to heterosexual sex also apply to homosexual 
sex: the other's feelings and desires are of equal importance to one's own. Self-serving promiscuity 
and 'immodesty' are as dangerous and corrupting of homosexuals as they are of heterosexuals and 
                                                 
451  As the world eagerly awaits the publication of Stock's biography for more detailed evidence of Mahfouz's 
qualities as a husband, we can nevertheless cite an interview with Atiyatallah herself featured in a documentary on 
Mahfouz by the American University in Cairo in honour of what would have been Mahfouz's 100
th
 birthday: 'We 
love each other. Actually, he is an ideal husband and father; he respects our opinions and fulfils our needs' (see 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHpFIk2KN3I, 24/10/11).      
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society at large. Despite spending his whole life in a society where homosexuality was strictly 
taboo, Mahfouz would have understood the most persuasive contemporary calls for gay marriage in 
the West and around the world more readily than Smith ever could; whereas Smith speaks of 'the 
utility of the domestication of gayness, at a historical moment when marriage, if reserved for the 
straight alone, seems on its way to extinction', and 'at a moment when the consumerist status quo is 
growing rapidly more sophisticated in its strategies for co-opting any social force—whether 
political, musical, artistic, sexual—that had hitherto lain outside it'452, Mahfouz affirms, along with 
Andrew Sullivan, that marriage - the public swearing of long-term responsibilities to another person 
- is indeed a human right; it is the very emblem of the social responsibility and emotional 
reciprocity through which we all access the Divine Essence, and is nothing short of a microcosm of 
civilisation itself. How we choose to distribute this responsibility and reciprocity - whether to invest 
most of our effort in marriage and children or spread it over a wider social cause - is up to us, and 
will depend at least partly on the circumstances in which we find ourselves. In practice, we are 
limited in the number of people we can love. But love we must.     
  
  
2.9 Mahfouz's Warriors 
 
2.9.1 The Warrior Prototype: Akhenaten 
 
   'He has left this lower world to reign in the heart of eternity, and I will join 
   him one day. He will know that I am innocent and will grant his forgiveness, 
   seating me to his right on the throne of Truth.' 
    The sweet voice died out, exhausted by the effort of speaking, and my 
   host remained silent, sad but majestic in defiance of her circumstances. I said 
   goodbye with an infinite respect and went away in spite of a physical desire 
   to stay on, my heart overflowing with painful thoughts tinged with the  
   irresistible fragrance of Beauty.  
    When I returned to Saïs, my father welcomed me keenly and  
   bombarded me with questions about my odyssey. Our conversation went on 
   for days and days, each question leading to another. I told him everything, 
   except two facts which I kept to myself: my growing love of the sacred  
   songs and my profound admiration for the beautiful recluse.
453
  
                                                 
452  Smith, 'Working Arrangement'.  
453  NM, Akhenaten: Dweller in Truth (Al 'Ā'iš fī ql Ḥaqīqa), (Cairo: Dār al Šurūq, 2009 (1985)), p. 157.  
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       Meri Moun, narrator of Dweller in Truth 
 
 
Mahfouz made clear in his Nobel Lecture that Akhenaten was, for him, the father of human 
civilisation, the father of us all:  
 
  As for Pharaonic civilization I will not talk of the conquests and the building of  
  empires. This has become a worn out pride the mention of which modern conscience, 
  thank God, feels uneasy about. Nor will I talk about how it was guided for the first 
  time to the existence of God and its ushering in the dawn of human conscience. This 
  is a long history and there is not one of you who is not acquainted with the prophet-
  king Akhenaton.
454
 
Akhenaten, however, was himself the culmination of centuries of civilisational effort; Mahfouz's 
1983 novel Before the Throne, a prelude to Akhenaten: Dweller in Truth (1985), traces this history, 
and then goes beyond it to evaluate the legacies of Egypt's subsequent leaders right down to Sadat. 
To understand the Akhenaten of Dweller in Truth (the Arabic title makes no mention of Akhenaten), 
it will be necessary to examine Mahfouz's prior characterisation and evaluation of Akhenaten in 
Before the Throne. This terrain has already been expertly traversed by David Pinault in 'Pharaoh 
Akhenaten as Messenger of God' (1995); we will follow Pinault through Before the Throne before 
embarking on our own reading of Akhenaten: Dweller in Truth.      
 Thus did Akhenaten appear before the throne for judgement: 
  There entered a man in whose face were blended both feminine and masculine  
  qualities. With him there entered a beautiful woman...    
   Thoth, scribe of the gods, read aloud:     
   'The two of them inherited the realm and its power... He brought about a  
  religious revolution and called people to the worship of a new god, a single god. 
   'He abolished the old religion and its gods, proclaiming love, peace, and  
  equality among all humankind. From within, the realm became exposed to  
  disintegration, weakness and  corruption. Likewise Egypt's foreign empire became 
  exposed to loss and destruction.        
   'The realm was brought to the verge of civil war. The king fell; and a counter-
                                                 
454  NM, Nobel Lecture. 
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  revolution did  away with his revolution. Chroniclers and kings effaced his era from 
  history and considered it an era of evil that had torn apart Egypt's civilisation and all 
  but annihilated it.'
455
 
Pinault offers some important historical background to this description; in describing Akhenaten as 
'a pacifist and monotheist who proclaimed 'love, peace, and equality', Mahfouz reflects the 
idealising appraisals of Akhenaten offered by an earlier generation of scholars such as Breasted 
(1905) and Weigall (1923)', while seemingly ignoring 'more recent criticisms by revisionists like 
Redford (1984), who emphasises the violence, the intolerant cruelty, and the totalitarian tendencies 
of the Amarna Age, in which Akhenaten had proclaimed himself sole mediator between the 
Egyptians and the divine sun-disk'.
456
 The depiction of Akhenaten as a man in whose face were 
blended both 'feminine and masculine qualities' also illustrates 'Mahfouz's awareness of the 
enigmatically androgynous quality of the relief-carvings and statuary surviving from the Amarna 
Age that depict the heretic-king', and of the two broad scholarly camps on this androgyny: on the 
one hand a mere 'depiction of a pituitary gland malfunction, as the result of a "congenital ailment", 
in Bedford's terms, "which made him hideous to behold", with an "effeminate appearance"'; or on 
the other a deliberate 'iconographic program' in which Akhenaten 'was shown as both male and 
female and as part of what Aldred called 'a deliberate attempt to create a hermaphrodite - the mother 
and father of mankind'.
457
 Whatever Mahfouz's take on the historical evidence, however, it is clear 
from the language he puts in Akhenaten's mouth that he wants to draw an implicit link between 
Akhenaten's Aten-cult and his own embrace of Islam: 'Since childhood I had been diligent in study, 
filling my soul with knowledge and divine wisdom. Then there descended upon my heart 
inspiration from the heavens, together with the light of the one god and the call to worship him. I 
consecrated my life to that; and when I came to the throne I consecrated my realm to the same 
goal.'
458
 As a result of opposition from avaricious clergymen who 'thirsted for rank and for the 
enslavement of both Egypt's peasants and the subject-peoples of the Empire's realms', there began 'a 
savage struggle between my message of fight, on the one side, and on the other side the darkness of 
ignorance and of old traditions'.
459
 Nevertheless, Akhenaten's 'spiritual jihad' was 'never touched by 
weakness. I did not consent to the use of violence or coercion.'
460
 Nefertiti, likewise, uses the same 
vocabulary: 'My lord, what he says is true. We waged the jihad of heroes, until the forces of evil 
                                                 
455  NM, Before the Throne (Amāma al 'Arš), (Cairo: Maktaba Misr, 1983), in David Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten 
as Messenger of God: The Use of Islamic Theological Vocabulary in some Recent Novels by Naguib Mahfouz', 
Edebiyat: The Journal of Middle Eastern Literatures, 6.1 (1995), p. 24. 
456  Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten as Messenger of God', p. 24. 
457  Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten as Messenger of God', pp. 24-25. 
458  See Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten as Messenger of God', p. 25. 
459  See Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten as Messenger of God', p. 25. 
460  See Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten as Messenger of God', p. 25. 
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destroyed us.'
461
 As Pinault concludes, 'the wording of Akhenaten's speech [as well as Nefertiti's] 
('ğihād, da'wa, waḥī al samā', nūr al 'ilāh al wāḥid') is drawn from the religious vocabulary of 
Islam'.
462
 Extrapolating, for novelistic effect, from 'the monotheistic tendencies perceptible in Aten-
worship', Mahfouz describes Akhenaten 'as if the pharaoh were a hanif, a Muslim avant la lettre 
who, like the Quranic Abraham, lived before the time of Muhammad but nevertheless fought 
polytheistic idolatry and preached to his people the worship of the one god.'
463
    
 Pinault points out that Mahfouz was 'not alone among contemporary Egyptian authors in 
describing Akhenaten in terms of Islamic monotheism'. In particular, he cites the work of Antun 
Zakarayya and his use of the terms tawḩiid ('making one', the Arabic word for Islamic theology or 
'the art of making the world, or God, into one', or as Pinault puts it, 'the assertion of God's oneness') 
and širk ('associationism', or 'the sin of ascribing divine partners to God') in relation to the Aten-
cult.
464
  In the end, however, Pinault argues, 'Naguib Mahfouz's portrait of Akhenaten's life in 
Before the Throne, for all that he associates the pharaoh with Islamic prophethood and the call to 
tawḩiid, is not entirely uncritical. Once the monotheist has finished describing his mission and his 
life to those assembled in the Hall of Justice, his words receive a sharp reply.'
465
 Indeed, the 
judgments of Imhotep, Tuthmosis and Menes - 'all of whom, in this novel, are rewarded for their 
earthly careers with thrones among the Immortals' – paint us an Akhenaten who was 'a failed leader, 
an inflexible dreamer unskilled in balancing the ideals of universal love with the necessary use of 
brute force in achieving these ideals'.
466
 While on the one hand 'Mahfouz respects this idealism, as 
he demonstrates by having Akhenaten and queen Nefertiti awarded seats with the other Immortals 
once their testimony is concluded', on the other, 'our author has also informed us, partly through his 
biographical sketches of Cheops, Djoser, and Menes, what he considers to be the best attributes to 
be hoped for in a political leader': namely, on Pinault's account, strength wedded to pragmatism.
467
 
'For all Akhenaten's good intentions, Mahfouz implies, the visionary, in his preoccupation with 
controversial religious reforms, had allowed Egypt to fall into chaos, its borders threatened, its 
                                                 
461  See Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten as Messenger of God', p. 25.  
462  Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten as Messenger of God', p. 25. 
463  Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten as Messenger of God', p. 25. 
464  See Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten as Messenger of God', pp. 25-26. Pinault also cites as examples of 
contemporary Egyptian interest in the figure of Akhenaten the 1981 play Akhanatun by Ahmad Suwaylim which 
'implicitly compares the pharaoh's mission to the Egyptians with Muhammad's preaching to the Jahiliyya Arabs of 
Mecca ("I shall tell you an old tale, set on the banks of the Nile... a tale of tawḩiid, of the assertion of God's oneness, 
which took place before any prophets had made their way here."') and Egyptian government plans for a 'Museum of 
Monotheism', 'to be built as a joint German-Egyptian venture and to be located near Minya, not far from Amarna, 
where the capital of the Aten-cult had once been situated. According to this announcement, this project would "result 
in a pyramid-shaped building exhibiting 1500 artifacts related to the development of monotheistic thought" and 
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465  Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten as Messenger of God', p. 27. 
466  Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten as Messenger of God', p. 27. 
467  Pinault, 'Pharaoh Akhenaten as Messenger of God', pp. 27-28. 
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administration weakened by corrupt opportunists, its people hungry and on the verge of civil war.'
468
 
 Pinault contrasts Akhenaten's idealism and passivity with Horemheb's pragmatism and 
willingness to use force: 'disaster was only averted when power was taken by Horemheb, a military 
general who had formerly been counted among Akhenaten's followers. Once installed as pharaoh, 
Horemheb abolished Atenist monotheism and restored the worship of Amun and the Egyptian 
pantheon.'
469
 Horemheb claims that in 'liquidating definitively the rule of Akhenaten', he was 
'putting the public good above my personal feelings'; although he had been a trusted member of 
Akhenaten's court and had loved him 'more than any man I had ever known', he was unable to stand 
idle as Akhenaten 'refused to take my advice concerning the necessity of punishing the corrupt 
within the country and dispatching military expeditions to tame the rebels in the far reaches of the 
Empire'.
470
 In the end, for all his personal attachment to Akhenaten, Horemheb 'loved Egypt more'. 
Pinault concludes that the comparison between Akhenaten and Horemheb in Before the Throne is 
unflattering to Akhenaten and throws into relief Mahfouz's view that 'love and religious vision are 
not sufficient qualities in a leader; in a world prone to corruption and violence, a ruler must be 
willing to use force (as were Djoser and Menes) to ensure order. Tawḩiid alone will not do as a 
political program.'
471
 Pinault then argues that the same contrasting portraits of the two leaders are 
reproduced two years later by Mahfouz in Dweller in Truth; as in Before the Throne, Akhenaten is 
'portrayed as a visionary preacher whose speeches are laced with Koranic vocabulary', and as an 
'inflexible idealist, given to dogmatic assertions such as 'there's belief and unbelief, and there's no 
middle ground between the two!', while the military officer is depicted as a blunt pragmatist who 
loved Akhenaten while detesting his policies for their intolerance and impracticality.'
472
 Pinault's 
conclusion is worth reproducing in full for our purposes: 
  Of the two rulers, Mahfouz makes it clear whom he prefers: Akhenaten's rigid  
  idealism brought Egypt almost to ruin, while Horemheb's tough-minded realism  
  restored the land to prosperity and order. Mahfouz's preoccupation with the attributes 
  of the ideal leader offers a key, I would argue, to understanding the themes at work in 
  other novels he has authored. The world depicted in many of his stories - Zuqaq al-
  Midaqq, Miramar, Layal Alf Layla - is one in which the average person is well- 
  meaning but weak and continually beset by temptations of appetite: the desire for 
  food, for sexual gratification, for control over others. Those who usually come to 
  power in such a world are precisely those people who are most unscrupulous in  
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  gratifying these appetites. Given these tendencies of human nature, what sort of  
  leader should rule over us? Mahfouz gives his clearest answer in Awlad Haratna  
  (Children of Gebelawi), where he offers an allegorical comparison of the Jewish, 
  Christian and Islamic traditions. Moses was scrupulously just and was forceful  
  enough to defeat the tyrants oppressing his people; yet he proved too harsh and  
  unforgiving in administering the Jews. Jesus, on the other hand, offered love and 
  forgiveness for all; but his pacifist approach lacked sufficient muscle to triumph over 
  the brute powers ranged against him. Therefore his mission ended in failure (and one 
  should note, his dreamy idealism finds its physical correlative in Mahfouz's portrait 
  of Jesus' gently innocent facial features and asexual manner of conduct, depicted 
  unflatteringly as lacking manly qualities. This recalls for the reader Mahfouz's  
  references to the hermaphrodite appearance of that other idealist Akhenaten). In  
  Children of Gebelawi only one leader combines both strength and mercy in perfectly 
  balanced proportions: the character allegorically representing the prophet  
  Muhammad. Hence, in Mahfouz's view, the superiority of the Islamic over the  
  Christian and Jewish message.
473
 
This is, in my view, a dangerous conclusion, and one which ignores completely the fact that, after 
Muhammad, a scientist-prophet leads the community in Children of Gebelawi to unprecedented 
heights. Moreover, to view Akhenaten as a proto-Jesus, and Horemheb as a superior proto-
Muhammad, is to miss the deeper point of Akhenaten: Dweller in Truth and the message of 
civilisation contained in the whole Mahfouzian œuvre as I have endeavoured to present it so far: 
Mahfouz is not primarily concerned with the 'attributes of the ideal leader'; his deeper concern, well 
enshrined in Nefertiti's description in Dweller in Truth of Akhenaten's dream 'that the people as a 
whole should live in truth'
474
, is the survival and prosperity of civilisation itself, which requires a 
marriage of monotheistic faith and pragmatism in all people and which, despite appearances, was 
first consummated in Akhenaten, not Horemheb. While the first 'dweller in truth' necessarily lacked 
practical experience in civilisation-building - as the very first pioneer of 'civilisation' in the true, 
post-imperial sense of the word, he had no 'heritage' to draw on by definition (as Akhenaten himself 
admits in Dweller in Truth, 'I am a child taking my first steps in the realm of the One'
475
) - he 
nevertheless manages to transmit the purity of his faith and the goodness of his intentions to 
posterity; just as the 'one god' 'appeared to my spirit enveloping it with its tenderness and filling it 
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with light and song'
476
, so too did Nefertiti transmit this same unmistakable beauty and truth to Meri 
Moun. By extension, Meri Moun - Mahfouz - transmits this spirit: the flame of civilisation. If 
Arabian Nights and Days is the novelist's novel, the one dearest to Mahfouz's own heart as an artist, 
Akhenaten: Dweller in Truth, I will argue, equally enshrines Mahfouz's determination to pass on the 
flame of civilisation as it was passed down to him.         
 Rasheed El Enany is another of the handful of critics, and arguably the most influential, to 
have addressed the figure of Akhenaten and the largely neglected Dweller in Truth, although he too 
takes the side of Horemheb over Akhenaten. In Naguib Mahfouz: Reading Between the Lines 
(1995), Enany situates Mahfouz's return to ancient Egyptian subject matter by recalling Mahfouz's 
1977 claim to be a 'novelist of the present' ('there is a distinction to be made among writers between 
writers of the past, writers of the present, and writers of the future. When I thought about myself, I 
found that I was a writer of the present. I don't like writing about the past, and I don't enjoy making 
prophecies about the future'), and by informing us of Mahfouz's stated view that 'my experiments 
with historical novels failed from a historical point of view because I kept turning the past into the 
present', thereby reminding us that the author of Akhenaten: Dweller in Truth was in search of 
timeless wisdom valid for the present rather than historical accuracy per se.
477
 That said, however, 
the novel's narrator, Meri Moun, is rightly described by Enany as a model historian, a 'seeker of 
truth' examining all points of view before making a judgement (in the end, however, as we will see, 
it is the 'feeling' of Nefertiti's beauty which convinces him, and us, his readers, of Akhenaten's 
legacy). Enany, however, ultimately falls into the same trap as Pinault, arguing that Akhenaten 
lacked the pragmatism necessary to win Mahfouz's unconditional endorsement as the father of 
civilisation: 
  There is no doubt that Mahfouz paints an idealised picture of Akhenaten [...] as a 
  prophet calling Humanity to a religion based on love and peace and the spurning of 
  hatred and rivalry and hostility. But he also depicts him as a ruler who neglects the 
  business of government and indulges in metaphysical speculation, sowing discord 
  among the sons of his land through his fanaticism for a religion which does not leave 
  space for other religions, and dragging his nation to destruction at home and abroad 
  despite the goodness of his intentions. [...] When Akhenaten's commanders confront 
  him about the deteriorating situation in the country, he asks them for their  
  suggestions, and Horemheb, the Leader of the Guard, replies: 'There is no solution 
  save the announcement of freedom of religion...' But Akhenaten is deaf to this  
                                                 
476  NM, Dweller in Truth, p. 21. 
477  NM, I'm Talking to You ('Ataḥaddaṯ 'ilaykum), (Beirut, Dār al 'Awda, 1977), p. 96. 
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  secular liberal call and continues with his policy of insisting on a single creed and the 
  arbitration of the unseen in Earthly affairs... This, in our opinion; is the essence of 
  Mahfouz's message to the reader. […] 'Dweller in Truth' is an ironic title; Akhenaten 
  is a mere 'dweller in illusion' or 'absence' or 'fantasy' or whichever synonym the  
  reader prefers. In other words, Mahfouz wants to say that the truths of religion are 
  one thing and the truths of the everyday world another, and that nation-states are not 
  built on religious fanaticism but on freedom of religion and equal rights and  
  responsibilities. [...] This novel is a message from Mahfouz to extremist religious 
  groups, and is his response to growing calls for the application of Islamic law in the 
  face of all other considerations, as well as his warning from the pages of history  
  against heading in the direction of a destiny which is known.
478
    
I will argue, however, through a close reading of the novel, that Mahfouz's title is far from ironic, 
and that although Akhenaten is doubtless guilty of mistakes, the spirit of his civilising enterprise 
lives on, and it is this spirit which must above all, for Mahfouz, inform our present. If Enany misses 
this larger point, however, Ahmed Mohammad Atiya reminds us of Mahfouz's overarching esteem 
for the figure of Akhenaten in his 1985 review of the novel, tracing Mahfouz's interest in Akhenaten 
back to Breasted and The Dawn of Conscience, and also mentioning other possible influences. 
Breasted, indeed, described Akhenaten as the 'first internationalist revolutionary' and 'the first 
seeker of the Highest Example'; Fouad Shabal, meanwhile, in his book Akhenaten: Pioneer of a 
Revolution in Culture describes Akhenaten as 'the first child of the human race to realise the unicity 
of God', and as 'the leader of the first revolution in history which extended to all aspects of culture 
and spiritual life', while Immanuel Velikovsky, in his book Oedipus and Akhenaten (1950) described 
Akhenaten 'the first monotheist'.
479
 This pioneering image is, as Mahfouz's 1988 Nobel Lecture 
intimates and as we will now see in more detail, the one our author and warrior really had in mind.  
 
2.9.2 Akhenaten: Dweller in Truth  
   Essential truth, istina, is one of the few words in Russian that doesn't rhyme 
   with anything. It doesn't carry any verbal associations, standing alone and 
                                                 
478  Rasheed El Enany, Naguib Mahfouz: Reading Between the Lines (Nağīb Maḥfūẓ... Al Qirā'a mā bayn al 
Suṭūr), (Beirut: Dār al Ṭil'iyya, 1995), pp. 20-21.   
479  Aḥmad Muḥammad 'Aṭiyya, 'Naguib Mahfouz: Searching for the Truth in His New Novel About Akhenaten' 
('Nağīb Maḥfūẓ... Bāḥiṯ 'an al Ḥaqīqa fi Rīwāyatihi al Ğadīda 'an Iḫnātūn'), Al Qāhira, no. 2, 1985, pp. 28-29.    
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   distant with only a vague insinuation of the root of the verb 'to be' in the dark 
   recesses of its immemoriality. The majority of Russian writers have expressed 
   a tremendous interest in trying to discover the exact whereabouts and basic 
   properties of this truth. […] Tolstoy aimed straight for it. […] Social codes 
   are temporal; Tolstoy was interested in the eternal demands of morality. The 
   true moral principle that he establishes is this: love cannot be exclusively 
   carnal because then it is selfish, and being selfish, destroys instead of  
   creating. That is why such love is sinful. To throw his thesis into the starkest 
   possible relief, Tolstoy, with an extraordinary burst of imagination, depicts 
   and places side by side two loves: the carnal love of Vronsky-Anna (in thrall 
   to their emotions, deeply sensual but ill-fated and spiritually sterile), and the 
   authentic love – Christian, as Tolstoy calls it – between Levin and Kitty,  
   which maintains all the wealth proper to any sensuality, but which remains 
   balanced and harmonious within an atmosphere of responsibility, caring, 
   truth and domestic happiness.
480
  
         Vladimir Nabokov   
 
Chapter 1: 'The Root of the Story' (Aṣl al Ḥikāya)481 
It is worth repeating at the beginning that the Arabic title of Mahfouz's original omits all mention of 
the name Akhenaten – the novel is entitled simply Dweller in Truth (Al 'Ā'iš fī al Ḥaqīqa). As we 
have seen, this was an epithet attributed to the historical Akhenaten; as he is also the novel's main 
protagonist, it is logical to assume that the title refers to him (Mahfouz's translators have certainly 
thought so, with no apparent objection from Mahfouz himself). Nevertheless, from the first chapter, 
the narrator Meri Moun imagines himself as a 'dweller in truth'; animated by a 'sacred desire, 
reminiscent of the north wind' - namely 'to know everything about that city and its master, the 
tragedy which tore our nation apart and destroyed our empire' – Meri Moun sets out to follow in his 
father's footsteps, and takes his father's advice to 'be like History, which lends an ear to all voices, 
                                                 
480  Vladimir Nabokov, Course of Russian Literature (Curso de Literatura Rusa), trad. Maria Luisa Balseiro 
(Barcelona: Zeta, 2009 (1981)), pp. 268, 279.  
481  As my discussions of Dweller in Truth and Arabian Nights and Days follow a chapter-by-chapter path, and as 
these chapters are, with a couple of exceptions, relatively brief, I have chosen to cite only longer or vital quotes here 
in the footnotes in the interest of maintaining the flow of the text. Given the brevity of most of the chapters, all 
unreferenced citations should nevertheless be accessible in the original text without undue difficulty. All quotes 
drawn from outside the chapters under discussion are nevertheless referenced.      
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without taking sides with anyone, and then delivers the truth clearly as a gift to those who reflect on 
the evidence': 'I was delighted to be freed from inertia and to be heading into the stream of history, 
for which we know no beginning and which will not come to an end, and to whose course every 
person of substance adds a wave derived from the love of the eternal truth.'
482
 Even if Akhenaten 
remains the 'dweller in truth' to which the title refers, Mahfouz asks us to consider, from the very 
beginning, the way such 'truth' is transmitted from one generation to the next. Meri Moun is the 
indispensable link between Akhenaten and us, the one who, through his honest labours as a 
historian committed to the empirical evidence, will save the flame of civilisation from oblivion.     
 
Chapter 2: The High Priest of Amon 
 
The first of Meri Moun's witnesses, the High Priest of Amon, enshrines the best and worst of the 
'imperial' tradition which, in Mahfouz's words, 'modern conscience, thank God, feels uneasy about'.   
Everything in Thebes - bastion of Amon, god of the empire - 'breathed glory and stability' upon 
Meri Moun's arrival, and in particular the temple of Amon itself, with its verdant gardens and giant 
pillars. The High Priest rejoices that the 'protector of Egypt', Amon, has regained his rightful place 
as 'master of the gods' and that the priests of Amon have recovered their 'full sovereignty' after 
Akhenaten's 'disastrous' reign. Amon is the god who 'liberated our valley through the fist of King 
Ahmosis, extended our northern and southern borders, as well as our eastern and western borders 
through the fist of Touthmosis III. He is the god who leads those who believe in him to triumph and 
humiliates those who betray him'.
483
 The High Priest's unequivocal loathing for Akhenaten is 
immediately apparent; replying to Akhenaten's claim that the Egyptian people might respond to 
something other than brute force and subjection to Amon and welcome into their hearts the sun-god 
Aton, who 'rises everywhere' and whom 'every human being can adore without shame', the High 
Priest is certain from the beginning that this is a 'woman's vision, which could have disastrous 
consequences': 
 
  He invented a god after his own image, weak and androgynous, which he imagined 
  as Mother and Father at the same time and to which he gave a single function: love. 
  [...] He drowned himself in a swamp of madness, and neglected his royal duties  
  while those loyal to the empire and our staunchest allies fell under enemy blows. 
  They begged him for help, but he never came to their aid, and this led to the downfall 
                                                 
482  NM, DIT, p. 7. 
483  NM, DIT, p. 9. 
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  of the empire and the ruin of Egypt.
484
 
 
The High Priest goes on to describe how Akhenaten's faith went beyond sun-worship to arrive at a 
worship of the universe's 'unique and indivisible' 'sole creative force'. After a subsequent encounter 
in which the High Priest warned Akhenaten of Amon's powers of vengeance, Akhenaten replied: 'I 
am a child crawling in the realm of the One, a bud coming to blossom in his garden. […] Beyond 
that, I will not worry about anything.'
485
     
 The High Priest attempts to paint Akhenaten as a self-absorbed dreamer who avoids his 
moral responsibilities, but the very ambiguity and cautious self-awareness of Akhenaten's reply here 
contrast sharply with the High Priest's arrogant conclusion that he has delivered the truth to Meri 
Moun 'without decoration and without distortion'
486
. We will soon see that there are multiple other 
versions of this story from which we, the readers of posterity, will have to deduce the 'truth'. 
 
 
Chapter 3: Aÿ 
 
Nefertiti's father Aÿ, entrusted with the young Akhenaten's education, stresses from the beginning of 
his testimony the importance of the early death of Akhenaten's older brother Touthmosis in the 
development of young Akhenaten's character and faith: 
 
  The more beautiful of the two boys died early, while the other one, the strange one, 
  survived. This death shook the child profoundly. He cried for a long time, and each 
  time that the memory of his brother came back to haunt him, he cried again.  
   'But he was faithful to the temple of Amon!' the child complained to me. He 
  followed all the incantations and exorcisms, and he died anyway. Why don't you, the 
  learned one, the sage, bring him back to life?'
487
  
 
This early contact with the arbitrary realities of life (Fry's 'plate tectonics destroying children') led 
to an early interest in adult matters: 'his intellect was prodigious from an early age, as if he had been 
born with the brain of an adult priest,' Aÿ recounts. 'Such was his miraculous perspicacity that I 
found myself debating with him as an equal while he was still only ten years old. His enthusiasm 
poured out of his mouth like a hot spring. From his fragile shell of a body exploded an iron will.' 
                                                 
484  NM, DIT, p. 13. 
485  NM, DIT, p. 21. 
486  NM, DIT, p. 25. 
487  NM, DIT, p. 27. 
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This will expressed itself in one direction in particular: 'he pursued his religious studies with a 
passion exceeding all expectation, to the point that they got in the way of his accession to the 
throne. He never accepted an argument without serious discussion, and did not hide his scepticism 
regarding many received truths and teachings.'
488
 This scepticism descended to outright cynicism 
regarding Thebes, city of Amon and of empire: 'Thebes! You say it is sacred, when it is nothing but 
a refuge for greedy merchants, a den of vice and immodesty. Who are these great priests, Master? It 
is they who exploit the weak through superstition, oblige the poor to donate part of their meagre 
incomes, and seduce virgins in the name of mercy!'
489
        
 When Aÿ tried to convince Akhenaten that these priests were reliable sources of support for 
the throne, Akhenaten replied that 'there is no dignity in a throne built on lies and immorality'
490
. 
Then, when Aÿ reminds Akhenaten that it was Amon who led his grandfather to one military victory 
after another, Akhenaten claims not to understand how 'a god can command the slaughter of his own 
creatures'. Amon is the 'god of the priesthood', while Aton is the 'god of the sky and the earth'. Life 
is more than a battlefield; a 'sacred joy' is 'buried in the heart of our lives'.  
 Then Aÿ recounts Akhenaten's mystic experience as Akhenaten recounted it to him: 
 
  'Master, the truth has appeared! […] I was alone just before sunrise. […] A living 
  being took over the darkness and beckoned in salute. A good, calming light began to 
  shine inside me, and I saw all beings known to existence in congress before my eyes, 
  whispering congratulations to one another, shaken by the joy of the moment, and 
  ready to accept the truth before them. And I said to myself: Finally I have triumphed 
  over death and suffering.'
491
  
 
Despite what could only be described as a religious experience, Akhenaten's father accuses him of 
atheism (kafr) just as religious extremists in Mahfouz's Egypt accused Mahfouz, a fellow believer in 
a single Divine Essence, of being an unbeliever (kāfir) for the simple reason that he did not share 
their orthodox brand of faith. This dangerous exuberance when it comes to calling people 
unbelievers, rife in contemporary Egypt and contrary to Islam as interpreted by Mahfouz and 
younger liberal Egyptian authors like Alaa al Aswany, is Mahfouz's main target here, not, as 
Rasheed El Enany maintains, the exuberance of Akhenaten; there is something naggingly true, and 
decidedly un-solopsistic, about Akhenaten's creed, Mahfouz seems to want to suggest, despite its 
potentially painful short-term consequences for the society to which he introduced it. Although 
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Akhenaten made the step of 'enforcing' his new religion above all others, we will see that there is no 
actual evidence in the novel that he resorted to violence or intimidation to do so. The evidence, 
indeed, points the other way; Akhenaten's creed is a far cry from religious intolerance in Mahfouz's 
Egypt, and if anything represents the primitive beginnings of an antidote to it.      
 Of his daughter Nefertiti, Aÿ tells Meri Moun that she, like Akhenaten (and, lest we forget, 
like a young Mahfouz as well), had a prodigious intellect and a particular passion for theology 
(tawḥīd, or 'making one'), and was the first to declare belief in Akhenaten's god, who delivered her 
from her 'painful perplexity'. Akhenaten, his heart 'seduced' and liberated by the muwahhida  
Nefertiti to the point that he sought no further sexual intrigues and became, as Nefertiti herself 
quotes him, 'a muwahhid in love as well as religion'
492
, soon had a liberating effect on the Egyptian 
people as well: 
 
  He sought out his subjects in town squares and in the fields and, to their amazement, 
  showered affection on them when they were doubtless expecting to be forced to  
  kneel before a powerful god who would look down on them or refuse to look at them 
  at all. He invited men of religion to talk with him wherever he went, and was quick 
  to denounce their creeds and to condemn rituals which involved the offering of  
  human sacrifices. He spoke openly of his one god, the force pulsing at the heart of all 
  existence, the creator of all things alike, who did not discriminate between foreign 
  shepherds and Egyptian nobles. He also called for love, peace and joy, affirming that 
  love was the law of life, peace the goal, and joy the gratitude of the created towards 
  their creator. He provoked amazement and wild emotions everywhere.
493
 
 
Akhenaten applied the 'law of love' to his private affairs as well, according his protection to the 
harem he inherited from his father but refusing to take pharaonic advantage of it. In public, he 
became, in Aÿ's judgement, the most popular pharaoh of all time, until the empire began to crumble: 
'I certainly cannot minimise the losses that were inflicted on our nation because of him. She lost her 
empire, and was beset by infighting. [...] But I admit to you that I cannot rid my heart of love and 
admiration for him.'
494
     
 Aÿ and the High Priest of Amon represent the positive and negative poles of opinion to 
which all subsequent testimony will to a greater or lesser degree belong. As we will see, however, 
with each iteration, the positive, idealist pole – Aÿ's pole – will gain in strength and credibility 
                                                 
492  See Nefertiti's testimony, NM, DIT, p. 145. 
493  NM, DIT, p. 36. 
494  NM, DIT, p. 45. 
 157 
 
relative to the negative, realist pole, culminating in Nefertiti's testimony in the final chapter and 
Meri Moun's endorsement. 
 
 
Chapter 4: Horemheb 
 
Meri Moun's initial description of Horemheb mirrors his description of Thebes in Chapter 2, 
aligning him from the beginning with the realist pole at its best ('Of average height and a robust 
constitution, Horemheb exuded force and honest determination.'). As Akhenaten's childhood 
companion, Horemheb tried his best to respect the prince's status as heir to the throne, but found 
himself secretly disdaining Akhenaten's 'weakness' and the 'striking femininity of his face and 
body'. One episode from Horemheb's days of conquest in the service of Akhenaten's father tells us 
most of what we need to know about him: 
 
  When the prince greeted me, pleased to see me returned safe and sound [from the 
  campaign], I invited him to inspect the prisoners, who were lined up, basically naked, 
  and weighed down by their chains. He spent a long time looking at them, and they 
  were begging him for compassion with their eyes as if they had guessed the  
  weakness in the depths of his gaze.   
   […] 'You are a criminal, Horemheb!' 
   Such was the prince, first in line to the throne. Nevertheless, he offered me 
  his friendship, even his love. He tried to convert me to his ideas but I was never  
  influenced by them; they rather seemed to me to be voices from another world.
495
   
 
To accuse Akhenaten of a lack of pragmatism in applying his idealism is one thing; not even to be 
able to entertain such idealism, however, is entirely another, and a more serious failure of moral 
imagination than any pie-in-the-sky pacifism. When Horemheb claims to be interested in religion 
only 'insofar as it is a tradition in our country', Akhenaten, Hitchens-like, accuses him of narcissism 
and solipsism: 'You worship only yourself, Horemheb. […] Have you never wanted to penetrate the 
secret of existence?!'. 'I know how to repress such desires,' Horemheb bitterly replied.
496
 After more 
misogynistic abuse of Akhenaten, Horemheb is nevertheless forced to marvel at the 'secret force' 
and 'unbreakable will' of his 'friend', which, 'like a tongue of flame borrowed from a secret source, 
allowed him to fight his most powerful adversary, the clergy, and to break the most entrenched 
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traditions like sorcery and exorcism'.  
 The clash of ideologies between Akhenaten and Horemheb boils down neatly to Bergson's 
distinction between open and closed societies. Like a Japanese samurai, Horemheb speaks of his 
'faith in duty' and 'loyalty to his country', and then, like a Hitler ranting against cosmopolitan Jews, 
accuses Akhenaten of internationalist impulses that 'reflect a blind anarchy bubbling in the brain of 
a man born padded in extravagance'. For all his bravery and 'determination', Horemheb transplanted 
to a contemporary Egyptian context is made to look more like a semi-literate anti-Semitic Egyptian 
nationalist than the pragmatic moderniser of the House of Islam that Enany and Pinault makes him 
out to be.   
 Mahfouz ends this chapter, as he ends most of the 'realist' chapters in the novel, with a claim 
that acts retrospectively to discredit the testimony of the witness: Horemheb is 'sure' that Nefertiti 
abandoned Akhenaten to save her own skin. We will see, and above all feel, in Nefertiti's testimony 
that this is the opposite of the truth.   
 
 
Chapter 5: Bek 
 
The sculptor Bek, fellow childhood companion of Akhenaten, recalls the 'friendly familiarity' with 
which the prince always treated him. Meanwhile, however, 'the truth was what he lived for, and he 
died on the path towards it. Intimations of the unseen spread through his spirit from an early age.' 
Akhenaten himself lovingly urged Bek to 'pursue your studies to mastery so that you can be my 
man in the field of artistic creation'
497
, although Bek goes on to stress Akhenaten's own passion and 
aptitude for sculpture in particular and his patronage of the arts in general as a 'vehicle for truth' and 
social reform. Bek's engagé Akhenaten is both a political opponent of the sclerotic - a 'swimmer in 
the sea of the uncharted' -  and an artist in his own right, an 'indulger in truth's ecstasy'.  
 Bek's praise at times assumes a tone of undue bias towards a friend, but the chapter ends 
with three pieces of evidence that underscore the overall reliability of his testimony: first and 
foremost, his judgement of Nefertiti, to be retrospectively corroborated in the final chapter ('my 
queen was not the opportunitist her enemies made her out to be') and his insistence on the 'noble 
love' she shared with Akhenaten ('their union [was] the living symbol of a god at once father and 
mother'); second, Bek's Akhenaten echoes Mahfouz himself. Here is Mahfouz in the Nobel Lecture: 
'it may even be that Evil is weaker than we imagine. In front of us is an indelible proof: were it not 
for the fact that victory is always on the side of Good, hordes of wandering humans would not have 
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been able […] to grow and multiply. […] The truth of the matter is that Evil is a loud and boisterous 
debaucherer.' Now here is Akhenaten to Bek in a novel written by Mahfouz just a couple of years 
earlier: 'Good is never defeated, and evil never wins an outright victory, but we only see a fleeting 
moment of total time. Old age and death throw up a screen between us and the truth.'
498
 There is 
even more circumstantial evidence for a direct affinity between Mahfouz and Akhenaten to come in 
Bek's testimony. Although Bek is overly categorical and obviously partial in his appraisal of 
Akhenaten's difficult last days ('just as he never betrayed his faith, he never trampled on his noble 
law of love') – indeed, gouging out the eye of Nefertiti's statue when she inexplicably abandoned 
him hardly seems a gesture of noble love (though as a sign of his ongoing faith in the eternity of 
their union, Bek tells us, he leaves the other eye intact) – we are nevertheless reminded that 
Akhenaten gives up all the material advantages of an inherited empire in favour of a higher moral 
law, 'dedicating himself entirely to the truth and to defying the forces of evil, selfishness and greed'. 
This brand of self-sacrificing anti-imperialism is precisely what Mahfouz so urgently advocated in 
his Nobel Lecture and elsewhere.      
 The third and final piece of evidence which lends credibility to Bek's testimony concerns 
Nefertiti's jealous half-sister Mout Nedjemet (a delightful specimen that Meri Moun will meet in a 
later chapter). Following Mout Nedjemet's rejection of Bek's marriage proposal, Akhenaten's 
enigmatic one-line consolation for Bek is as follows: 'Like a predator, she is waiting for the moment 
to strike, on the lookout for her prey'. This follows just a couple of lines after Akhenaten explains to 
Bek why he refused to use force to defend his empire of peace and love: 'criminals do not hesitate to 
find a thousand pretexts to satisfy their blameworthy desire for power and blood'. The juxtaposition 
of these two images associates Mout Nedjemet with the imperial lust that Akhenaten and Mahfouz 
spent their lives combating. We will have occasion to verify Mout Nedjemet's sad criminal desires 
when Meri Moun pays her a visit in a later chapter. 
 
 
Chapter 6: Tadoukhepa 
 
We meet Tadoukhepa, the child-bride of Akhenaten's father and veritable soul sister of Mout 
Nedjemet, 'surrounded by 300 slaves'. Herself an obvious victim - uneducated, forced to marry an 
old man and to depend entirely on her physical charm – she lashes out against the man who 
inherited his father's harem only to reject her in favour of Nefertiti: 
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  'Would you like to give me a son?', Akhenaten murmured. 
   'It is my duty, master,' I replied, fighting my revulsion. 
   A look of grief flashed over his face. 
   'My first and only duty is to find love,' he said. 
   'Do you want love from me, Master?', I asked bravely.  
   He rubbed the back of my hand affectionately. 
   'I don't want to impose love on you.' 
   He kissed my forehead and left the room as he had entered it. […] The  
  women [of the harem] thought that Nefertiti had already taken over most of the  
  pharaoh's heart.
499
  
 
While one might have expected Tadoukhepa to be grateful to find herself freed from her sexual 
responsibilities to a man she found physically repulsive, her victimhood is such that she is capable 
only of angry, cynical projection: 'in truth he was a strange creature, neither man nor woman, 
ravaged by a feeling of inferiority and humiliation'. Moreover, Tadoukhepa concludes, 'by preaching 
love, he stirred hatred and corruption in people's hearts, and ended up destroying the nation and 
wrecking the empire. Nefertiti, his able wife, encouraged him in his madness so as to get hold of 
power and to satisfy her libertine impulses in the arms of her lovers.'
500
 Tadoukhepa then goes even 
further, accusing Akhenaten of impotence and incest, and Nefertiti of further scheming, though her 
only authority for these claims are the other chattering women of the harem. She even finds time at 
the end of her interview with Meri Moun for one last insult: 'If she hadn't known how to please him, 
she would have added to the miserable ranks of the Theban prostitutes.'  
 Tadoukhepa's obvious jealousy of Nefertiti colours her testimony to such an extent that one 
comes almost to doubt it in its entirety. Mahfouz shows himself to be an astute psychologist of 
victimhood here; just as Amina in the Cairo Trilogy is the one who reacts the most angrily to the 
flouting of tradition by her daughter-in-law (the very tradition which made Amina a prisoner in her 
own home), Tadoukhepa heaps her scorn not on the system which forced her into sexual slavery in 
the first place, but on those who would seek to lighten her burden. The tragic inability of victimised 
people (and peoples) to understand the message of universal love and 'gratitude to the creator' 
preached by Akhenaten and Mahfouz is a central theme of the novel: the only hope is an open 
society which reverses the cycle of victimhood and allows the flame of civilisation to be transmitted 
through love. Mahfouz also suggests, however, that there is no way of forcing someone like 
Tadoukhepa to feel gratitude; hers is a disease, an emotional blindness that may only be curable 
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with generations of civilisational effort. Just like Horemheb, she is unable even to hear Akhenaten's 
message. 
 
 
Chapter 7: Toutou 
 
Mahfouz follows up Tadoukhepa's negative assessment of Akhenaten with another critical 
testimony. Toutou, right-hand man for the High Priest of Amon, exudes the same quiet arrogance of 
power we have seen in the other imperial realists so far, delivering his version of events to Meri 
Moun 'without the slightest hesitation'.  
 Toutou first shows us that the priests of Amon tolerated apparent freedom of religion under 
Akhenaten's father Amenophis III not because such tolerance was part of their creed, but because it 
was in their material self-interest to do so: 
 
  [Amenophis's] powerful ancestors had established a new policy with us, the clergy of 
  Amon. They recognised his power, his virtue and his superiority over the other gods, 
  but they also accorded their protection to priests of other divinities so as to guarantee 
  their loyalty and to establish among all the priests of the empire an equilibrium  
  which affirmed the power and independence of the throne. We didn't like this policy 
  but we didn't speak out or rebel against it, because it did not affect our prestigious 
  position.
501
    
 
Just as Tadoukhepa is quick – too quick – to accuse Akhenaten of a lifelong inferiority complex, so 
too does Toutou leap to nasty conclusions about the 'cockroach who believed himself to be a lion': 
'he did not equal his predecessors in either strength or wisdom. He was conscious of his weakness 
and of the repulsive nature of his androgyny, and no one is more daring or malicious than a being 
humiliated by low origins and consumed by hatred.' In the end, 'he decided to do away with all 
divinities so that only his own image remained.'
502
 Once again here, Mahfouz shows us that those 
who are first to point the finger and accuse others of jealousy, ambition and an inability to love are 
precisely those least capable of love and gratitude themselves. Akhenaten's creed is an absolute non-
starter for Toutou: 
 
  He imagined himself capable of remaking the world according to his own fancy. He 
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  lived in a world of his own creation, and he built it in such a way that it had no  
  relationship whatsoever with reality, with its own laws and traditions and people, and 
  he appointed himself as its god. […] That was why it all came crashing down at the 
  first proper clash with reality. [… As for Nefertiti,] it is true that she was a woman of 
  strong character, superior intelligence and immense beauty, but she was, like him, 
  riddled with ambition, and pretended to adopt his religion while in reality she was 
  just as twisted and nasty as he was. I am convinced that she did not love him – that 
  would have been impossible for her – but rather aspired to absolute power and  
  despotism.
503
  
 
Toutou is yet another conservative unwilling or unable even to entertain Akhenaten's worldview. 
Desperate to rid the empire of the 'heretic', he prays to his god Amon (who allegedly 'comes to the 
cries of the poor') for Akhenaten to come to a bloody end. When the High Priest of Amon refuses to 
help with his regicidal plans, Toutou finds his chest 'boiling with hatred', 'convinced that an 
unpunished crime will sanctify the offence in people's unconscious, shake their faith in divine 
justice, and favour a recrudescence of evil'.  
 This is not far from Mahfouz's view that faith in justice, and faith in the Divine Essence in 
general, is best promoted by just social outcomes. The social processes which lead to these 
outcomes, however, must also be just; all alleged 'heretics' and despots must be allowed the right to 
defend themselves before judgement can be passed (as happens in Before the Throne, and as did not 
happen with the Iranian fatwa against Salman Rushdie). Reflex vigilante punishments of the kind 
Toutou advocates here are a sign of a reactionary unwillingness to engage in the 'holy battle' with 
reform that Mahfouz associates with civilisation: rather than playing his proper civilisational role as 
a noble defender of 'tradition', Toutou suggests that all opposition to conservative orthodoxy must 
simply be squashed by whatever means available. This, Mahfouz suggests, is the truly self-centred 
worldview.      
 
 
Chapter 8: Tiï 
 
After two chapters of vitriolic aggression towards Akhenaten and Nefertiti, Meri Moun opens the 
next chapter with a strong piece of evidence that the psychological problems attributed to Nefertiti 
which would be explicable in terms of a lack of decent mothering are unlikely to be true. If, as 
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Orwell and others since have put it, everyone beyond middle age has the face he deserves, then Tiï, 
mother to Mout Nedjemet and stepmother to Nefertiti, whose 'delicate traits radiated health despite 
her sixty years', looks like a decent person before we even start. Indeed, as Meri Moun says, 'when 
Nefertiti became queen, she chose Tiï as the first lady of her entourage. If she had not loved her, she 
would not have done so. This showed that Tiï had showered Nefertiti with care and affection, and 
had never been a "stepmother" to her in the common sense of the term.'
504
 What Tiï's affection for 
Nefertiti does explain is the wild jealousy that will be on show when Meri Moun meets Mout 
Nedjemet in the next chapter: 'between [Nefertiti] and Mout Nedjemet there arose the usual quarrels 
and conflicts between two young sisters, but Nefertiti always had the higher ground – I can't ever 
remember her being in the wrong – and she would always make up with her younger sister the way 
an adult does with a child'. Moreover, 'when it came to their education, Nefertiti was so far ahead 
that I began to fear irreparable consequences for my daughter.'
505
 Whatever responsibility Tiï may 
have for letting her daughter fall into a pit of jealousy and hatred, she at least shows the innocence 
of her intentions. While she admits 'perhaps to sharing the silent jealousy of Mout Nedjemet' when 
all eyes fell on Nefertiti's beauty and grace, she consoled herself 'by thinking that if Nefertiti were 
to marry, that would leave the way open for her half-sister, and allow her to shine in all her 
splendour'.  
 Contrast, moreover, Tiï's measured tone with the proud certainty of the realists we have met. 
Concerning Nefertiti's abandonment of Akhenaten and the circumstances of Akhenaten's death, she 
tells Meri Moun: 'You will hear contradictory accounts, and everyone will assure you of the truth of 
his version when it is merely his own fancy.' The version Tiï herself provides, however, will be 
corroborated by Nefertiti's own testimony. Of Akhenaten, she draws the conclusion Mahfouz wants 
his reader to draw: 'We lived beside an exceptional man.'     
 
 
Chapter 9: Mout Nedjemet 
 
Thin, beautiful and intelligent, Mout Nedjemet appeared 'distant' to Meri Moun from the first 
instant; he was somehow certain that there existed 'an unbridgeable distance' between them, as if - 
we may speculate - she inhabited some infernal circle and were condemned to remain cut off from 
civilisation. Here she is, jealously and self-pityingly lashing out before Meri Moun has even got 
himself properly seated, accusing Nefertiti of atheism (kafr) and much more besides:  
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  We were foreordained to share the tragedy of Akhenaten the renegade. […] I had 
  misgivings about him from the beginning, and my feelings and judgement were  
  borne out by events. Nefertiti had a different view, which surprised the family, but 
  not me: she always loved making head-turning pseudo-challenges to tradition and 
  having storms of debate swirling around her. There was no doubting her intelligence, 
  but she was neither honest nor loyal, and this was what lured her to the cult of Aton 
  and led her to prefer Aton over Amon, and ultimately to abjure her faith in all the 
  gods [kafr li ğamī'at al Āliha] and declare faith in a god we had never heard of.506 
 
Compare Akhenaten's elliptical, blink-and-you-miss-it one-line denunciation of Mout Nedjemet 
('like a predator, she is waiting for the moment to strike, on the lookout for her prey', he says to 
Bek) to the barrage of abuse launched here by Mout Nedjemet in front of a perfect stranger before 
he has even properly sat down. There is much more to come: 
 
  I had occasion to see the heretic for the first time at the celebration of the 30
th
  
  anniversary of [his father's] reign, and I was stunned by the uncanny congruence of 
  his perverse ideas and his totally out-of-proportion, thin and ugly physical form.  
  Don't take seriously any talk you hear of the noble love that united the hearts of  
  Akhenaten and the great royal wife Nefertiti, because I know her through and  
  through, and I know the ideal she dreamed of with all her heart, and it bears no  
  relation whatsoever to the ugly hermaphrodite weakling she married. They claimed 
  to be dwelling in truth, but he was living in his own mad world, and she was living a 
  life of lies and deception, and loved only power and the throne.
507
    
 
Then she rehearses the rumours she heard in the harem (and believed) about Akhenaten's impotence 
and his incestuous relationship with his mother (on the contrary, as we will see, it seems that 
Akhenaten had a very healthy relationship with his mother) and Nefertiti's unrelenting lust for the 
likes of Horemheb. The image of the world's unlikeliest couple - the gay nerd and the voluptuous 
slut - is wheeled out again by the very sort of person least likely to understand the generous nature 
of their love. Mout Nedjemet inadvertently shows that Tiï did her best to hide the truth of Nefertiti's 
effortless physical, intellectual and moral superiority, kindly exaggerating her daughter's virtues and 
minimising her obvious failings. But such truths cannot ultimately be hidden despite the best 
intentions. Mout Nedjemet then goes on to play the world's smallest violin, 'sacrificing herself' and 
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her interests – though still managing to live in an entire wing of her father's palace – for the sake of 
the nation, conspiring with Toutou and Horemheb to defend Egypt from the two 'nutjobs'. As for 
how to dispose of these two obstacles, any means would do: 'Everything is permitted to save the 
empire!' she cries to Horemheb, in a concise summary of her nasty politics.   
 The 'great mystery' concerning Mout Nedjemet, Meri Moun tells us at the beginning of the 
chapter, is that she never married. One feels as though one knows why by the end of Meri Moun's 
meeting with her, but to go into judgemental detail about Mout Nedjemet's inferiority complex 
would be to miss the entire point of Mahfouzian civilisation. Such imprisoning jealousy is, for 
Mahfouz, a cancer at the heart of civilisation: the person stuck brooding on her value relative to 
others, quick to denounce others and draw attention to herself, is not free to think of how best to 
help other people or contribute to the collective; indeed, she is not thinking about 'civilisation' at all. 
It is no coincidence that the internationalist revolutionaries in this story are those with the strongest 
emotional links to individual people (Bek and Akhenaten, Tiï and Nefertiti etc.). From the 
beginning, Meri Moun senses that Mout Nedjemet is 'distant', incapable of such affection.  
 
 
Chapter 10: Merire 
 
'It's nice to see at least one person worrying about [the truth]', Merire tells Meri Moun by way of a 
greeting. 'The divine voice has fallen silent and the temple has been destroyed, but Time has not yet 
said the last word.' Mahfouz is virtually begging the modern reader to capture his civilisational 
message here (recall Mahfouz's claim to be a 'novelist of the present'). It is we, the modern reader, 
who give the whole story its raison d'être, we who provide the hope that the flame of civilisation 
kindled by Akhenaten can survive by capturing the message hidden in this story; 'time has not yet 
said the last word' on Akhenaten precisely because we are still hearing his story. 
 'His love penetrated my heart in a way that nothing had done before. […] His youthful voice 
still resonates in my chest,' the former High Priest of Aton tells Meri Moun of Akhenaten. The key 
event in the development of Akhenaten's hypertrophied conscience is also identified by Merire as 
the premature death of Touthmosis: 'his elder brother's death inflicted a deep wound in his 
conscience that he perhaps did not recover from until he suffered an even greater wound with the 
death of his beloved daughter Miketaton'. After complaining to Merire that Touthmosis 'will never 
return again to this existence', Akhenaten 'declared an eternal war on weakness, nastiness and 
sadness' in honour of his lost brother.
508
 There is no hint of jealousy here, only sadness. Akhenaten 
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was self-aware enough to look in the mirror and see, as Merire quotes him as saying, 'neither force 
nor beauty' in his own reflection, but instead of dwelling on the cards he had been dealt and on his 
own apparent inferiority to the 'beautiful' Touthmosis, he sought out an existence on a higher plane, 
a plane which would allow him to do justice to his brother.           
 Merire also shows us that Akhenaten's policy on freedom of religion was more benign than 
his opponents made out, less an opposition to a plurality of religious song in the cultural 
marketplace than an opposition to the state-sanctioned venality and corruption of the established 
clergy: 'he announced his faith to his entourage, but did not voice his opposition to the other gods 
until later on, and this he did gradually', in contrast to genuine religious extremists, 'announcing his 
disbelief in false gods first, then abolishing them [as pillars of the state], and subsequently 
distributing their assets to the poor'.
509
 Concerned that his duties as pharaoh would interfere with his 
devotion to his god, Akhenaten is assured by Merire that, on the contrary, he will be able to serve 
his god all the better. 'You speak the truth, Merire,' Akhenaten concludes. 'Just as [my predecessors] 
made human sacrifices of the poor, I will sacrifice to my god the forces of evil, breaking the chains 
that they have kept on the wrists of the powerless'.
510
  
 Speculating, as all his supporters at some point do, that Akhenaten may have been 
assassinated, Merire nevertheless consoles himself, and returns the contemporary reader to the 
centre of the action, by saying that 'he is not dead, he cannot die, he is the eternal truth, hope 
renewed, and he will triumph sooner or later'. Then, in a final gesture of goodwill and generosity to 
Meri Moun, he offers him the book of sacred chants that will, by the end of the novel, be exerting a 
'growing' charm on our narrator: 'Read them, young man, may they nourish your truth-loving heart. 
For you have not undertaken this particular journey for no reason.'  
 
 
Chapter 11: May 
 
May's loathing for the 'woman trapped in a man's body' is hardly surprising for a proud general 
charged with defending the confines of the empire. His short, hate-filled testimony adds little to the 
picture already painted by other 'realists' so far - Akhenaten was a 'heretic' and a 'bastard' who 
'humiliated' the real men of the empire with his pacifism, while Nefertiti was an opportunist 'born to 
be a prostitute' – except for his observation concerning Akhenaten's relationship with his mother: 
'many wondered what the secret root of this tragedy was. I tell you now that the root of it all was the 
heretic's physical and mental feebleness,' May quickly concludes, adding that 'his mother spoilt him 
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rotten, and this caused a pathological vulnerability, only exacerbated by comparison with his 
superior playmates like Horemheb, Nakht and Bek. He hid his feelings of shame behind a thin veil 
of feminine modesty and camp frivolity.'
511
  
 We do not see much in the novel of Akhenaten's relationship with his mother Tīī. Note the 
similarity, however, between the names Tīī and Tiï, Nefertiti's stepmother, who we do meet; it is 
almost as if Mahfouz wants to suggest that the 'truth' discovered by Akhenaten and Nefertiti 
emanates, or rather evolves, out of the same generous ancestral source. The glimpses we do get of 
Tīī herself are courtesy of the High Priest of Amon and Aÿ (and, soon, from Nefertiti). When the 
High Priest of Amon confronts Tīī about her young son's dangerous intellectual trajectory, she 
defends him: 'he is aspiring to all forms of wisdom, in complete innocence.' Aÿ goes into more 
detail: 
 
  Tīī was from a respectable [plebeian] Nubian family, and she showed herself to be a 
  woman of greater force and wisdom than Hatshepsout herself. As her husband was 
  unfaithful to her, and because of the death of her elder son Touthmosis, she poured 
  all of her affection onto her frail prodigy, and perhaps went beyond the conventional 
  role of mother to become for her son a dear friend (ḥabība) and a teacher as well. 
  […] In reality, she wanted her son to be instructed in all the religions of the nation.512  
  
The parallel with Mahfouz's own mother and her special relationship with her son, explored earlier, 
is striking. Aÿ then goes on to colour this picture slightly, adding that Akhenaten and his mother 
came to disagree about the role of religion in politics (Tīī dreamed of 'putting religion in the service 
of politics, for the good of Egypt', while Akhenaten 'refused to put religion in the service of 
anything whatsoever'). Aÿ, the most ambiguous of Akhenaten's defenders (not even Meri Moun can 
make his mind up about him at the end of their interview), argues that Tīī was corrupted by power 
and 'came to love the throne more than love itself'. He fails to prove this point. What he does help to 
establish, however, is the quality of Tīī's relationship with her son in his early, formative years, the 
very intimacy of which provided fuel for the rumour mill for Akhenaten's enemies (though such 
rumours of incest remain utterly unsubstantiated). Mahfouz shows us in this novel through the 
example of Nefertiti and Tiï that the decisive bond in a child's life need not be with its biological 
mother, but he does suggest, as elsewhere in his œuvre, that the intimate intergenerational bond 
established in early childhood is a sine qua non of civilisation. For May, however - a diehard fan of 
closed-society, duty-based relationships along the lines of the imperial military model he 
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represented - such intimacy is merely synonymous with femininity, weakness and corruption. 
 
 
Chapter 12: Mahou 
 
Mahou was chosen by Akhenaten to be his chief of police: 'may your weapon from now on be a 
mere accessory. Civilise the people with love, as I have taught you. Those whom love does not 
civilise will be civilised with more love.'
513
  Note that Akhenaten does not tell Mahou to throw his 
weapon away; it is to remain on him as a symbol of the 'muscle' required to build civilisation. This 
weapon therefore remains a last resort in theory; it is just that, in practice, Akhenaten does not 
believe that recourse to arms has ever really worked in human affairs. He tells Mahou so: 
'sometimes only the sword can defeat evil!' Mahou argues, but Akhenaten replies that 'they have 
been repeating that since the beginning of time, and have they done away with evil?' […] When will 
humanity see East and West under one light?!'
514
 Mahou, however, shows us that Akhenaten was 
not advocating a utopian, lawless society; what he defended instead was a system of punishments 
that was both just and therapeutic (Mahfouz had no interest in debates concerning the relative 
merits of rehabilitation and 'punishment for punishment's sake'; in the end, they amounted to one 
and the same thing): 'when we arrested thieves, we returned all stolen goods to their owners, gave 
the thieves work to do in the fields, and transmitted our message of love and peace'. As far as 
murderers were concerned, 'we sent them to work in the mines, where they could earn a living while 
meditating on their lot, and in their free time we taught them the new religion.
515
 True to his creed, 
Mahou tells us, Akhenaten mixed with common people unguarded, showing the same faith in the 
goodness and judgement of ordinary people that Mahfouz himself preached in his defence of 
democracy. Mahou himself was the son of peasants, humble in his demeanour, and chosen by 
Akhenaten on that basis: 
 
  He looked at me for a long time, until I felt his gaze in my blood and respiration. 
  Then he asked me: 
   'What's your name?' 
   'Mahou.' 
   'Where are you from?' 
   'From the village of Fina.' 
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   'What is your family's trade?' 
   'We are peasants.' 
   'Why did Horemheb choose you for the royal guard?'  
   'I don't know.' 
   'He only chooses the bravest.' 
   My heart pulsed with joy but I didn't say anything. 
   'You are a sincere young man, Mahou. […] Would you accept my   
   friendship?'
516
 
   
The truth knows no class boundaries, Mahfouz suggests here. Any duty based on social hierarchy 
can only legitimately arise from mutual acknowledgement of a higher power; the 'immense honour' 
Mahou feels when he is offered Akhenaten's friendship is not the feigned honour of the duty-bound 
soldier, but the true honour one feels in the presence of 'the source of joy' and 'the very essence of 
goodness and purity', as Mahou describes his experience. Nefertiti too was for Mahou 'beauty and 
majesty in female form', and according to his testimony modestly resisted the vulgar advances of 
Horemheb, May and the man we will now meet: Nakht.  
 
 
Chapter 13: Nakht 
 
In the alternating but ultimately divine-comedic structure of the novel, Nakht represents Satan's last 
and strongest stand. Displaying the appearances of an open mind and the inklings of a self-critical 
spirit, Nakht asks himself, after Akhenaten's passing, 'what kind of man my master, the one they call 
the heretic, really was'. Ultimately, however, he condemns himself, not only by betraying 
Akhenaten, but also by condemning Nefertiti (who, we have just learnt, refused to have sex with 
him) as an 'insatiable opportunist', and generally by failing to take either of them seriously.  
 Nakht starts his testimony by offering a claim which, if true, would be damning for 
Akhenaten: 
 
  I was, like Horemheb and Bek, one of his childhood companions, and whatever one 
  might have said about his feebleness, his femininity and his strange physical  
  presence generally, he won our affection and compelled our admiration with the  
  power of his intelligence and his precocious maturity. But there was a flaw in his 
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  character that I discovered before the others, and that was that the affairs of the real 
  world had no importance for him, and aroused nothing but boredom and unease in 
  his heart.
517
   
 
Note Nakht's pride at discovering Akhenaten's 'tragic flaw' 'before the others'. It soon becomes clear, 
however, that the dissatisfaction with 'the real world' that he attributes to Akhenaten is less a 
dandyish ennui than a noble frustration with the pointless following of obsolete customs common to 
adolescents of every generation: 'he cast mocking aspersions on his father's everyday life, the solid 
core of which revolved around the sacred traditions of the throne, such as waking up at a preset 
time, bathing rituals, breakfast, prayer, meeting with his ministers, visiting temples... 'What slavery!' 
he would mutter.'
518
  
 Akhenaten appears here as a kind of anti-Confucius; where Confucius advocated a return to 
neglected ancestral traditions and rituals in the name of moral renewal, Akhenaten sought to break 
away from the traditions and rituals of the past. These are, however, two sides of the same 
civilisational coin: Akhenaten was not opposed to rituals and temples per se (he went on to establish 
his own); he simply wanted to ensure that such rituals and temples served a higher purpose than 
lining the pockets of a corrupt élite. It is the purpose (or lack thereof) of such rituals, not the rituals 
themselves, which determines their value. It is precisely because Akhenaten is committed to 
achieving good 'in this world' (like Mahfouz in his Nobel Lecture) that he devotes all his energy to 
his new religion, which, as we have seen, he views as an antidote not only to death, but to earthly 
evil as well. Nakht, however, would have none of this: 'on the one hand he mocked our traditions, 
like a spoilt child who takes pleasure in rebellion and breaking precious objects, and on the other he 
aspired to discover the secret of the universe and to triumph over death.' In the end, however, the 
'spoilt child' was kidding himself: 'he had a fertile imagination, so fertile that he ended up an 
unknowing prisoner to it. […] I had no doubts about his sincerity, just as I had no doubts about his 
delusion. He was sincere because that was his nature, but the voice he heard was not the voice of his 
god; it was the beating of his own heart.'
519
  
 We are less than two pages into Nakht's testimony here. While Akhenaten's other realist 
critics leap into their verdicts immediately, Nakht hides his behind a thin veil of pseudo-objectivity, 
condescending sympathy and faint praise in the finest traditions of Satanic rhetoric. Here he is, 
lying shamelessly to his childhood companion in order to save the empire: ''There is no doubt that 
your god is the god of truth,' I said to him, 'and if you build a temple to him in every province, he 
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will triumph in the end, but leave the people with their gods, and save the nation the ills of a 
sectarian war! […] Self-defence is a right which is not incompatible with love or peace.'520 This last 
claim is not prima facie implausible (using a nuclear weapon to stop a meteorite from destroying 
the earth, for example); Akhenaten himself asks Mahou 'not to sacrifice his precious existence' in 
his policing duties and to keep his weapon on him as an absolute last resort. But Nakht is too eager 
to take up arms: when Akhenaten refuses to resort to violence to save the empire, Nakht tries to 
mount a campaign of his own against him, only to face decisive opposition from May and the High 
Priest of Amon, who had schemes of their own, and whom he qualifies as calculating opportunists. 
Nakht takes their opposition to his plan very badly, and ends up 'convinced that they were only 
thinking of their own interests, that Egypt was lost, hostage to a bunch of criminals, and that the 
responsibility for her ruin lay with all of us, allies and enemies of Akhenaton alike, although least of 
all with Akhenaten himself, 'who of all the actors involved had perhaps the clearest conscience and 
the purest intentions'.
521
 
  Nakht's betrayal is the most serious of all because he shows that he has the makings of a 
'living conscience'; like the other realists in this story, however, he tragically lacks moral 
imagination: he is unable to take Akhenaten's universalist, post-imperial creed seriously even for a 
moment. 'This is a tale of deceit, innocence and eternal sadness,' he concludes, as if the scheming 
realists were on one side, the innocent 'spoilt child' Akhenaten on the other, and a helpless Nakht 
stuck in the middle watching the ruin of Egypt. Yet it is precisely Nakht's inability, and the inability 
of others like him, to realise his own moral blindness, to open his heart to Akhenaten's creed at least 
in theory before joining him in practice, that makes the realisation of Akhenaten's dream for the 'real 
world' for the time being unrealisable.         
 
 
Chapter 14: Bantou 
 
Mahfouz ties up the loose ends of the secondary plot concerning Akhenaten's death by having Meri 
Moun meet Akhenaten's doctor Bantou. Having been allowed to see Akhenaten one last time, and 
having been assured by him that he was in perfect health, Bantou leaves 'convinced that the doctor 
chosen to replace me would assassinate him'. Sad to be leaving his master alone in the hands of 
murderers, Bantou is kindly reminded by Akhenaten that he is not alone, and that his enemies are 
wrong to 'imagine that my god and I are defeated'. Akhenaten, then, doesn't care about being 
murdered himself, and that is why the novel is not ultimately a murder mystery: he probably was 
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murdered, but Mahfouz is not primarily concerned about that. What matters is that the truth survive, 
that the legacy of faith in a single Moral Law be passed down to the next generation via the 
historian Meri Moun. Just as a parent would willingly sacrifice himself for his child because the 
child's survival is more important than his own, Akhenaten comes to love the future of civilisation 
more than his own life: 'The one true god will triumph and beam joy into the world, and we humans 
will bear the yoke of our petty miseries,' he tells Bantou.  
 Bantou also dispels the rumours that Akhenaten was a hermaphrodite ('he was definitely a 
man, capable of having sex and of reproducing') and that he had an incestuous relationship with his 
mother ('mere slander'). The underlying reason for this hatred, Bantou plausibly concludes, was not 
Akhenaten's physical or moral inferiority, but rather the contrary: 'the problem was that he was 
nobler than the average human being. […] He made people acutely aware of their own mediocrity, 
and challenged them in an unprecedented way. That is why they attacked him with such deplorable 
rage and bestial hatred.'
522
   
 
 
Chapter 15: Nefertiti 
 
Nefertiti is not Beatrice: she is not the cause of Akhenaten's faith or salvation (his faith, as we have 
just seen, survives her abandoning him), but rather one of its pleasant effects. Nor was Akhenaten 
Nefertiti's saviour; as she recounts (after praising Meri Moun's father), she did not need one: 
 
  I was born and raised in a climate of love for the truth and for the world thanks to the 
  wisdom of my father Aÿ. I did not suffer from the absence of my mother, who died 
  before I was a year old, because I found in Tiï a spirit overflowing with tenderness; 
  and she became for me a second mother rather than a stepmother, and gratified me 
  with a happy childhood. Her wisdom was such that the birth of my half-sister Mout 
  Nedjemet did not change her disposition towards me. She raised us as two loved and 
  loving sisters; and if my subsequent successes produced their share of jealousy and 
  animosity between us, it was only much later on. Tiï remained equal in her affections 
  for us, at least outwardly, and I thanked her for that when I had the chance by making 
  her the first lady of my entourage.
523
     
 
The legend of the child prodigy Akhenaten which filtered down to a young Nefertiti through her 
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parents 'came to exercise an irresistible attraction' on her. 'Born to be a priestess' with her 'love of 
motherhood and earthly glory', Nefertiti found herself 'attracted to the supreme being like a butterfly 
to the light' when she overheard her father singing one of Akhenaten's chants, the very same chant 
that Akhenaten was still singing when Bantou visited him for the last time. Faith took possession of 
Nefertiti's 'entire being'; she was the first person to take Akhenaten's new creed seriously: 
 
  'What do you think of the voice he has heard?' I asked [my father]. 
   'Nothing at all,' he coldly replied.  
   'Could he be lying?'  
   […] 'He never lies,' my father conceded after a short pause.  
   'The voice is real then!' 
   'Perhaps he was dreaming,' my father hesitantly suggested.
524
 
 
Nefertiti then recounts how, on the night she met Akhenaten, Mout Nedjemet objected to her staring 
at him. Nefertiti 'could not forget' what her sister, in a 'fit of jealousy', said to her: 'You've fixed your 
target! Now you've reached it!' This was not because Mout Nedjemet was in love with the actual 
Akhenaten, but because she coveted the throne ('My worst fears are confirmed! He is sickly and 
mad!' Mout Nedjemet says to Nefertiti the day after meeting him). Contrast Mout Nedjemet's claim 
that Nefertiti tried to 'throw herself' at Horemheb with Nefertiti's own testimony of that evening: 
 
  There was only one person I wanted to see, the one who had guided me to the light of 
  the truth. In the great hall I saw several men with whom I could have traversed, for 
  better or worse, the ocean of life: Horemheb, Nakht, Bek, May and several others, 
  but in reality my heart beat only for my love. I admit that I was unexpectedly  
  shocked by his physical appearance – I had imagined him as a statue of light, but I 
  found him skinny, fragile, far from the man of my dreams. I soon got over my  
  deception though, overcoming his pitiable form and focusing on the spirit contained 
  in it, the one which God had chosen for His love and message, and secretly swore to 
  it my eternal loyalty.
525
     
 
When called before Tīī (Akhenaten's mother) to discuss the subject of marriage – it is telling that  
Tīī's 'intuition' leads her to choose Nefertiti for her son – Nefertiti is 'paralysed by gratitude'. Like 
Tiï, Tīī is not perfect, but as we have seen, she made the miracle of Akhenaten possible through her 
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love. By depicting Akhenaten and Nefertiti in a better light than their basically good-hearted but all-
too-human mothers (Tīī is depicted as conservative and controlling, Tiï as prone to the odd bout of 
jealousy), Mahfouz is displaying his characteristic optimism that the flame of civilisation grows in 
strength when transmitted from one generation to the next. Tīī eventually gives the heretic couple 
her blessing: 'You deserve to be punished, but you also compel my admiration! So live out your 
destiny, both of you, as you see fit, and may the will of the gods be realised!'    
 Faced with the prospect of a wedding night with a man she found physically repulsive, 
Nefertiti frankly admitted her disgust to Meri Moun, and at first didn't know what to do: 'there was 
nothing he hated more than lying.' Luckily, Akhenaten did not force her either to lie or to reveal the 
uncomfortable truth, but waited patiently for her to arrive at desire, which she did during his 
absence in the provinces: 'I missed him wherever I went, and at all times of the day and night. I had 
never imagined that he would come to occupy such a place in my life […] not only as a spiritual 
master, but as a husband and lover as well.
526
 Nor was this secret inner transformation lost on 
Akhenaten: 'At last, you love me as a husband!' he beamed on his return, leaving Nefertiti amazed 
at his sensitivity. This sensitivity extended to all questions of conscience, and even to his 
relationship with his father. 'I didn't love him as I should have,' he confides to Nefertiti upon his 
father's death, as if apologising for the adolescent sarcasm Nakht refused to forgive, and reconciling 
himself to the value of tradition without giving up his determination to fight evil in the present.  
Akhenaten's sensitivity and patience with Nefertiti – his faith in the power of love to win in the end 
– was mirrored in his patience with his entourage. 'I don't doubt that a few of them were as sincere 
as I was,' Nefertiti says, 'but History will show that most of them were lying [in their professions of 
faith], or that their faith was not strong enough to warrant sacrifice'; throughout all this, Akhenaten's 
'lucidity did not desert him, and he saw what was hidden in their hearts, but he remained convinced 
that only love could bring them to his side, and that in time they would trade their shallow faith for 
a more complete faith, in the image of our conjugal experience.'
527
   
 When Akhenaten embarked on his campaign to close the old temples and seize the assets of 
the clergy, Nefertiti asked him: 'Won't that lead you to resort to violence, you who preach peace and 
love?' Akhenaten replied that he would not be resorting to violence and would merely be 
redistributing the clergy's assets to the poor, without punishing anyone. Having done so, the new 
pharaoh and his spouse began walking unguarded in the streets of the new capital, 'breaking down 
the imaginary barriers between the people and the crown': 'we got to know almost all our subjects, 
some by sight, others by trade or even by name; love overcame the old fears, and the sweetest of the 
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sacred chants resounded.'
528
 Aÿ, worried that such a mingling of sacred and profane would discredit 
the crown, is told by Nefertiti: 'we are dwelling in truth, father.' Or again, when she tells Meri Moun 
about Akhenaten's plans for the provinces: 'when their spirits are purified, their ears will finally 
open themselves to the divine voice, and everyone will dwell in truth!' she quotes him as saying, 
before concluding: 'such was his dream, that people everywhere dwell in truth.'
529
  
 Nefertiti then recounts the end of Akhenaten's reign, her attempt to save his life by 
abandoning him, her subsequent attempts to see him again, Mout Nedjemet's scheming for the 
throne, and her refusal to leave the ruined capital, 'my husband and my god'. In the end, denied 
access to the outside world and to her husband, she recovers her faith in her god and her faith in 
civilisation to bring this god to triumph after her time: 'I resigned myself to my solitary existence, 
sad and without hope. I lost all sense of time, and absorbed myself in painful reflections and 
incessant prayer until my faith in my god returned intact despite everything – nay, I was now sure 
that the final victory would be his even if only after a long wait.'
530
 And she felt sure that 
Akhenaten, whom she knew 'better than anyone', had died alone with the same thoughts in his head, 
'happy before his god'. 
 
 
2.9.3 The Warriors of Arabian Nights and Days 
   
   Russia will not find its salvation in mysticism or asceticism, but rather in  
   advances in Civilisation, Enlightenment and Humanism. Far from empty  
   sermonising, Russia needs […] an awakening of its people to a sense of  
   human dignity, […] to rights and laws which conform to common sense and 
   justice.
531
  
 
        Belinski, 'Letter to Gogol' (1847) 
    
 
Here we will follow in reverse order the procedure employed for Dweller in Truth, plunging first 
into a chapter-by-chapter reading of the novel before offering, in our final section on Mahfouz, 
some brief concluding remarks on 'the significance of Shahriyar's journey'.  
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Chapter 1: Shahriyar 
 
Actually it is not Shahriyar but Sheherazade's father Dandan who first occupies centre stage in the 
novel: Dandan's 'fatherly heart' is petrified that Shahriyar will murder his storytelling daughter. 
Luckily for Dandan, Shahriyar is already a changed man: '"justice," said the sultan, as if 
remembering his victims, "may be achieved through various means, including both the sword and 
forgiveness. God has his wisdom."' Sheherazade made this access to the Moral Law possible for 
Shahriyar: 'her stories are a divinely sanctioned magic,' he says. 'They reveal worlds which call for 
introspection.' Rather than murder, it is marriage which is on Shahriyar's mind.  
 
 
Chapter 2: Sheherezade 
 
Sheherezade, however, can smell only blood on Shahriyar's hands: 'Arrogance and love cannot live 
in the same heart.' Dandan is portrayed as a 'hypocritical' servant of the sultan's power, and he is 
clearly thinking less of the future of civilisation than of his own daughter's safety when he flatters 
Shahriyar in Chapter One and, here in Chapter Two, urges his daughter to accept Shahriyar's 
marriage proposal by saying that 'love can also work miracles'. In Dandan, nevertheless, the flicker 
of civilisation is present, and he wishes to pass it on to his daughter in amplified form; it is he who 
sends his daughter to be educated with Sheikh al-Balji (whom we are about to meet), and he who 
concludes, when his daughter agrees to be 'patient' after the sheikh's example: 'what a good teacher 
and what a good student!'     
 
 
Chapter 3: The Sheikh 
 
As always, the details hidden at the beginning and end of Mahfouz's chapters are not accidents. 
Chapter Three begins as follows: 'Sheikh Abdullah Al Balji lived in a modest house in the old part 
of town. His visionary gaze remained profoundly engraved in the hearts of his disciples.' 
Immediately we have a portrait of a socially engaged man of religion whose humble door was 
always open to seekers of the truth, not a self-absorbed whirling dervish or cave-dwelling ascetic. 
Nevertheless, there is something vaguely unsettling, almost jarring, about the sheikh's 
unflappability ('no piece of news could perturb the sheikh's state of calm; the happiness in his heart 
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neither increased nor decreased'); contrast this with Mahfouz's own anguished statements about 
world poverty and global conflicts in his Nobel Lecture ('Our great poet Abul-'Alaa' Al-Ma'ari was 
right when he said: "A grief at the hour of death/ Is more than a hundred-fold/ Joy at the hour of 
birth."') and elsewhere. In this chapter, the sheikh is visited by his 'friend' Abdul Qadir Al Mahini, a 
medical doctor who is interested in 'what is good for the world', and who cannot bear to see his 
beloved city in the hands of thieves and murderers. 'With what force we attach ourselves to material 
things!' is the sheikh's enigmatic response, as if theft and murder, in the grand scheme of things, do 
not really matter. The sheikh thanks God that happiness and sadness do not 'touch him' in this 
material way, and laments the fact that he has failed to lead the doctor, who continues to respond 
viscerally and personally to the injustices of the world, further along the 'path' towards the supposed 
horizon of spiritual perfection. The doctor claims to be a 'believer' too, but insists on 'following 
premises and conclusions' even though, the sheikh argues, the intellect should arrive at a 
thoroughgoing awareness of its own insufficiency; we have seen, however, that Mahfouz insisted 
that feeling, and not reason, ultimately lead us to a sense of reason's limits. Here we are in the thick 
of the 'philosophy versus literature' debate that characterised Mahfouz's own intellectual 
development; about all that is certain at the end of this labyrinthine chapter is that, as the doctor 
says to the sheikh, 'if Sheherezade had not been your disciple, she would not have found stories to 
distract the sultan and ultimately to dry up the flow of blood.' The sheikh's stoic faith in a higher 
Moral Law is a necessary source of inspiration for generations of disciples who have not been 
exposed to religious tradition or who have got lost in the minutiae of everyday struggles, but it is 
not sufficient for civilisation: the doctor's passionate, engaged concern for the health of his city, and 
his almost journalistic determination to monitor injustice and to find solutions to it, are just as 
important. Ultimately, however, it is the storyteller Sheherezade, and neither the sheikh 
(philosopher/priest) nor the doctor (journalist/scientist), who holds the magical key. Thus Mahfouz 
himself embarks on a series of tales inspired by Sheherezade's own, and which, when woven 
together into the fabric of this novel, will form the work of art of which Mahfouz was most proud.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Princes' Café 
 
In this short chapter, we meet the cast of characters who will feature in the adventures to come. All 
social classes are represented – the café serves to bring them all into friendly contact without 
dissolving the status differences between them - and all are united in their gratitude to Sheherezade, 
who has saved their virgin daughters from the sultan's murderous clutches. Attention then turns to 
Simbad, who has decided to travel: 'I'm sick of these alleys and this neighbourhood, and I'm also 
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sick of shifting furniture without any hope of seeing anything new. There is another life out there; 
the river joins the sea, the sea extends into the Unknown, and the Unknown gives way to islands 
and mountains, living beings, angels and demons. It is a magic call that I cannot resist.'
532
 Nur Al 
Din crosses class boundaries to wish Simbad well ('we sat side by side in the prayer room to receive 
instruction from our master Abdullah Al Balji'), and Dr. Abdul Qadir Al Mahini gives Simbad the 
community's blessing, although he reminds him not to commit the sin of Dante's Ulysses, who 
dreamed of a 'world without people' and of private, socially useless knowledge beyond the ocean. 
The Doctor urges Simbad instead to come back, like Plato's philosopher to the cave, and share his 
knowledge with future human beings: 'Go with God, but keep your senses sharp, and record all the 
amazing things you encounter, as God himself commands.'
533
 Still, Ragab the doorman will miss 
him: 'How sad it is to be separated from you, Simbad!' 
 
 
Chapter 5: Sanan Al Gamali 
 
Here we embark on the first tale, the tale of Sanan Al Gamali. The first character we meet, however, 
is the genie Qumqam, who identifies himself as 'a genie from the city', a first clue that he is one of 
the good guys, a genie on the side of civilisation (the association between the 'city' and 'civilisation', 
which we saw with the description of the sheikh Abdullah Al Balji and his humble abode, will 
continue right up to the very last line of the novel). Qumqam insinuates himself into Sanan's 
conscience ('If it hadn't been more than a dream, why did it worry him more than reality itself?'), 
encouraging him to kill the neighbourhood's corrupt governor. Sanan loses interest in the affairs of 
the community, and resolves to fulfil Qumqam's apparent wishes as if he has no choice about it. But 
on the way, Sanan inexplicably rapes and kills a young girl, unleashing a witch-hunt in which 
further innocent people are harmed. When Sanan tries to blame Qumqam for the atrocity ('If you 
hadn't burst into my life, I would not have found myself involved in crime'), Qumqam reminds 
Sanan that he is lying: 'Only you are responsible for your crime.' Desperate to escape his 
predicament, Sanan does everything except what he should do, namely refuse Qumqam's request to 
kill the governor and begin a process of 'reflection and repentance' that Qumqam argues is still 
possible for him. When Qumqam promises Sanan salvation if only he will kill the governor, an 
exhausted Sanan accepts instead of resisting. Having fulfilled the deed, Sanan complains to 
Qumqam that he did not expose his thoughts clearly enough to him. 'I exposed them clearly enough 
for a thinking person,' Qumqam replies. 'On the contrary, I gave you a chance for salvation which is 
                                                 
532  NM, Arabian Nights and Days (Layālī Alf Layla), ((Cairo: Maktab Miṣr, 1982), p. 11. 
533  NM, AN&D, p. 12. 
 179 
 
rarely given to a living being' (c.f. the discussion in Ch. 3.6 of the officer's sacrifice with the 
grenade in Tarkovsky's The Mirror). Qumqam challenged Sanan because he saw his capacity for 
goodness; Sanan, however, let Qumqam down; he felt that Qumqam had played an 'unworthy trick' 
on him, and could not understand why he had been chosen to take responsibility for the state of the 
neighbourhood. But Qumqam says there is no running away from such social responsibility: 'It is a 
public covenant which an honest person must not ignore. Indeed, it depends first and foremost on 
people like you, who are not empty of good intentions.'
534
      
 Sanan had a conscience and was not a sociopath, but he failed to be the moral 'hero' that 
Qumqam called him to be by refusing the order to kill the governor. Sanan, indeed, crumbles under 
the pressure and commits a hideous crime. Even if the governor deserved some form of punishment, 
the energies unleashed in Sanan by Qumqam's apparent 'licence to kill' prove uncontrollable; 
Sanan's thirst for 'blood justice' is as dangerous as his blind obedience to Qumqam's authority. He 
may agree that the governor is unjust, but his passion for violence goes beyond justice; the licence 
to kill the governor is used as a pretext for other crimes. Sanan remains tragically blind to his own 
moral responsibility, insisting on his victimhood until the very end, and failing to respond to the call 
of civilisation, the call of the 'genie from the city'.  
 
 
Chapter 6: Gamasa Al Bulti 
 
Like Sanan Al Gamali, Gamasa Al Bulti, the chief of police, is another morally mixed character, 
capable of both conscience and barbarism: 'In his heart, there was space for emotions but also for 
cruelty and greed,' the narrator tells us. While he dreams of a city with a just governor, one in which 
honest people do not have to 'go hungry', he is selfishly relieved that at least his superiors are worse 
than him: 'How light his scales were compared to those of the great sultans!' Singam, Qumqam's 
genie associate, visits Gamasa and offers him essentially the same deal as the one offered to Sanan 
by Qumqam, but is more explicit in his condemnation: 'If they call you to do good, you say that you 
are unable, and if they call you to do evil, you rush to do it in the name of duty.' When the 
'oppressive presence' of the genie leaves him, instead of receiving the visit as a wake-up call from 
his conscience, Gamasa feels only a burning desire to 'escape' from conscience and civilisation. 
Worried for his social position, he decides to bury the secret of the genie's visit, and to continue on 
his merry way, 'not devoid of good feelings and echoes of religious sentiment, but neither worried 
about practising corruption in a corrupt world'. Gamasa Al Bulti tries to convince Singam that his 
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mind is exercised 'entirely in the service of his duty', but Singam replies that this is an 'excuse 
which takes the humanity out of the human being'. Again, Gamasa justifies his corruption by saying 
that his criminal earnings are mere 'crumbs fallen from the table of the powerful', but for Singam, 
this is 'an ugly excuse'. Gamasa then goes on the offensive, accusing Singam of trying to deceive 
him: 'You want to deceive me to realise your secret dreams of power and authority!'  
 Eventually, Singam's message penetrates him, but only partially: 'Singam had convinced him 
that he was a contemptible human being. His only consolation had been that he was the strong arm 
of the state. But his sword was blunt, and security had crumbled.' Gamasa soon reaches rock 
bottom: 'what authority did he have left?! He was a thief, a murderer, a defender of criminals and a 
torturer of the honest. He had forgotten God until a genie had reminded him of His existence.'
535
      
Desperate for a solution to his predicament, and desperate to share the secret of the genie's visit, 
Gamasa goes to see Sheikh Abdullah Al Balji, who refuses to listen to Gamasa's story, insisting that 
whatever difficult decision Gamasa has to make, he must make it himself, and 'only for the love of 
God'. In a wave of 'fervent and mysterious emotion which made him feel his own solitude', Gamasa 
opts for the path of murder, listening not to the voice of God but to his own pride: 'he had faced the 
most dangerous situations in his life with extraordinary valour and a daring which had not faltered 
in the face of anything.' With the deed done, he enjoys a feeling of 'calm and serenity' for a time, but 
will end up paying for his sin.  
 
 
Chapter 7: The Doorman 
 
Gamasa somehow survives his own execution, but finds himself transformed into a bearded 
Abyssinian that no one recognises, while his old severed head is displayed in public for all to see. 
He gets a job as a doorman (Ragab remembers that his 'first friend' Simbad is in foreign lands, and 
decides to help this stranger out; 'God is generous and merciful'), and tries to help his struggling 
family out even though they do not recognise him. This state of affairs naturally causes Gamasa a 
great deal of pain and frustration, but in the end, pride and victimism are transformed into gratitude:  
 
  Without forgetting that he had miraculously escaped death, he decided to follow the 
  path of devotion to the end. He found his joy in his creed and, in his solitude, gave 
  thanks to God. He would address his old head on display and say: 'May you remain 
  as a symbol of the death of the evil which toyed with my spirit for a long time.' [… ] 
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  The man who had died had to stay dead, out of respect for those he loved. He had to 
  get used to his death and concentrate on his new life as Abdullah the doorman and 
  not Gamasa Al Bulti, and to find gratification in work and devotion.
536
      
 
The Gamasa/Abdullah character is the central character in the novel, and goes a step further than 
the sheikh on his spiritual journey: he lets the state of the world penetrate him, and channels his 
frustration with injustice into social action: 
 
  His work often led him into the houses of his former acquaintances, and into the  
  mansio ns of the élite and ruling class – a world of apparent piety and secret  
  corruption. This led him to reflect on his own state and on the state of the people, 
  disturbing the purity of his spiritual peace. The sense of discomfort stayed with him 
  as if invading his limbs and disrupting their  functions. He said to himself that just as 
  the planets move in harmonious alignment, so too should the affairs of humanity. He 
  wondered anxiously: 
   'Have I remained miraculously alive to work as a doorman?!
537
 
 
Concerned to make the best of himself, Abdullah visits the sheikh, who reminds him that 
'everything is in proportion to one's aspiration', and that very few people 'continue the journey to the 
state of love'. When Abdullah suggests that humans need to receive love and tenderness as well as 
give it, the sheikh only repeats his claim that 'everything is in proportion to one's aspiration'.  
Abdullah does not get what he is looking for from the sheikh; he goes away and discusses the 
sheikh's cryptic claim with Fadil Sanan, also one of the sheikh's former students, and concludes that 
'prudence', or concern for the state of the world, is 'part of the highest aspiration'. Resolving to fight, 
through targeted assassination, the corruption he has witnessed in the houses of the rich and 
powerful, Abdullah 'set out like a dart on his lofty struggle, as he imagined it, calling on his old 
strength but this time harnessing it in the service of an unyielding, pure will'. But something is still 
not right, and Singam visits him to remind him of this, and to suggest that he is still a prisoner to his 
old feelings of pride. Abdullah 'cannot sleep' after this visit: 'he had not stopped trying to weigh up 
the death of Ibrahim Al Attar, how much it was motivated by genuinely lofty motives, and how 
much by resentment and a desire for revenge.' In the end, however, 'God's path was clear, and there 
was no place for resentment or pride anywhere along it; indeed, such feelings would destroy the 
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path from its very source'.
538
       
 
 
Chapter 8: Nur Al Din and Dunyazada 
 
In this chapter, the 'bad genies' Sajrabut and Zarmabaha – according to Qumqam, 'nihilism and evil' 
incarnate - burst into the story, kindling in the hearts of the humble Nur Al Din and the royal 
Dunyazada (Sheherezade's sister) a mutual and seemingly impossible love. Just as Akhenaten works 
his way into the very sinews of Mahou's respiration, so too does Nur Al Din wake from his dream 
with Dunyazada's whispers 'repeating themselves at the rhythm of his breath'; 'nihilism and evil', 
alas, are capable of such illusory transports. Nur Al Din was also a student of the sheikh, who had 
told him that he was one of the few fit for 'the path of divine love'. Nur Al Din recalls these words, 
but decides not to tell the sheikh about his dream, fearing that the sheikh would not understand: 
'How lost one feels without a guide!' Nur Al Din laments. Dunyazada, for her part, is lost in a self-
absorbed, evil-inspired passion: 
 
  'Where are you, my love? How did you come to me? What is your secret? What  
  keeps you apart from me? Is it that my beauty did not captivate you as yours  
  captivated me? Does the fire which burns in my soul not touch you? Do you feel no 
  compassion for my torment? Don't you find it hard to live without my love and my 
  passion for you?
539
     
 
Nur Al Din, meanwhile, begins to sense that, despite his helpless yearning for Dunyazada, salvation 
may be at hand: 'the strange experience that he had lived seemed to exclude all room for hope, but 
at times he thought he could hear the whisper of an extraordinary truth that would be revealed to 
him when God saw fit.'
540
 Mahfouz then introduces the millionnaire Karam Al Asil into the mix. 
Karam had an 'ample mansion, a wife, and dozens of female slaves', but 'he did not have their 
hearts'. With his money, he could 'change destinies, but he could not alter the forms of the world'. 
Karam's eye falls on Dunyazada, and he 'suffers at the thought' that he 'may not be able to buy her'.  
 Sujrabat and Zarmabaha move to organise Karam's wedding with Dunyazada, but 
Zarmabaha worries that 'good may sneak into the story where we least expect it'. Qumqam and 
Singam, meanwhile, look on helpless, following the thwarted lovers' monologues 'with profound 
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sadness': 'look at the havoc wreaked by space and time!', Singam says to his friend, to which 
Qumqam replies: 'the sighs of mankind have been caught since ancient times in the river of sorrows 
between the planets.'
541
 Moved to action, they send Sahlul, the angel of death, to 'carry out a 
mission' in the service of good. Sahlul frees Abdullah the doorman from the lunatic asylum where 
his hitherto murderous creed had temporarily led him. In search of a new direction after his 
miraculous escape, Abdullah remembers a dream of 'a being without identity, whose purpose is 
beyond all universes, but who thinks and reflects. Liberation has not come to you without reason'.
542
         
 Nur Al Din and Abdullah soon meet, and Nur Al Din tells Abdullah the story of his hopeless 
love. While Abdullah suggests that 'the love of God makes all the others superfluous', Nur Al Din 
replies that he is 'a believer and sincere in his devotion', but still 'has love for God's creatures'. 
Indeed, after this meeting with Abdullah, Nur Al Din concludes: 'it was clear that he was an ascetic'; 
Nur Al Din, on the other hand, 'had not been created for asceticism, but rather for the love of God 
exercised in the world, and that was why he had distanced himself from the sheikh Abdullah Al 
Balji.'
543
 Shahriyar, keen to know more about the lives of his subjects, then crosses Nur Al Din's 
path disguised as a foreign traveller. 'Moved by the generosity' of Shahriyar and his travelling 
companions, Nur Al Din invites them to his 'humble home', where the company 'gets to know each 
other via the heart, which is the way with generous people', and Nur Al Din shares his story. 'With 
patience and engagement you will reach what you desire,' the Sultan and his companions assure 
him, wishing him comfort from God.  
 Upon his return to the palace, Shahriyar was consumed by the urgency of Nur Al Din's 
predicament; Sheherezade had 'never seen the sultan so excited', but could still not bring herself to 
trust him with Dunyazada's secret. In the end, it is Abdullah who reveals Nur Al Din's identity to 
Dunyazada, and even suggests a plan for them to escape together, thus revealing himself to be more 
than the remote ascetic Nur Al Din had believed him to be and thwarting the best-laid plans of 
Sajrabut and Zarmabaha. But the evil genies' work is not done; Abdullah returns to his murdering 
ways by killing Karam Al Asil, and although 'peace and happiness' temporarily reign in the 
community with the marriage of Nur Al Din and Dunyazada, this mirage of justice and stability has 
been forged on the foundations of Abdullah's 'ostentatious and proud' crime. 
 
 
Chapter 9: The Adventures of Ugr the Barber 
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Ugr is one of many lustful, nosy, poor simpletons to populate Mahfouz's world for whom the reader 
nevertheless comes to feel real human warmth and sympathy. Mahfouz's message, here as 
elsewhere, is that with a little help and patience from human civilisation, there is hope for such 
people. Although Abdullah initially tries to stop him ('your mind is corrupt; that's why you won't 
listen to me. […] You're a know-nothing descended from know-nothings'), Ugr is led by his own 
dreams of 'women, wealth, food and drink' into an illicit relationship, full of food and carnal fun, 
with two sisters. All goes well until he finds one of the sisters murdered in bed beside him. Ugr is 
unsure whether he might somehow be responsible; for a time, the cadaver hovers over his 
conscience and disrupts his carnal appetites. But this sobering effect does not last long; he is soon 
trying to turn the situation to his advantage, ignobly blackmailing his way to money and women and 
kidnapping a hunchback along the way. In the end, however, he realises he will have to let the 
hunchback go ('He had no alternative left but to take possession of his promised spouse and escape 
with her on the first boat to begin a new life in a faraway land, a life of riches, love, and 
repentance.'). Despite these inklings of conscience, Ugr is not yet able to overcome his own sense of 
entitlement and to take responsibility for what he has done: 'he told himself that he was not a bad 
man, and that he had been forced into scheming by his deprived and weakened state. God had given 
him a poor man's lot and a rich man's tastes. How was he to blame for any of that?'
544
          
 His ruses uncovered, Ugr finds that 'feelings of security had vanished from his world and the 
lamp of hope had gone out. Although he was Qamar's husband, she was further away than the stars. 
He was rich but threatened with death.' Abdullah saves Ugr from decapitation at the hands of the 
local authorities, and at long last intervenes not through murder but by supplying information to the 
Sultan. Shahriyar punishes the real offenders firmly but fairly and confiscates all of Ugr's ill-gotten 
assets, but otherwise leaves him free. 'The Sultan has changed,' Dandan now feels safe to affirm. 
'He has turned into another person, full of religious sentiment and a sense of justice'. Sheherezade, 
however, remains unconvinced: 'Part of him still cannot be trusted, and his hands are still stained by 
the blood of the innocent.' As for Ugr, he has at last made the transition to gratitude and civilisation: 
'the joy of salvation made him forget his material losses. He immediately rescinded his marriage 
with Qamar and headed towards [Abdullah …], expressing his gratitude thus: 'I am indebted to you 
for life, my kind guardian.'' Above all, Abdullah has learnt that murder is an absolute last resort, and 
that there are more civilised and fruitful ways to fulfil his mission to 'cleanse humanity of moral 
pollution'.  
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Chapter 10: Anis Al Galis 
 
The next chapter begins with Dandan and Shahriyar debating the ways of justice: 
 
  'Violence,' Shahriyar said, 'must remain as one of the means at the disposition of the 
  Sultan.' 
   Dandan thought about this for a while and then carefully replied: 
   'Wisdom, not violence, is what Your Majesty intends.'   
   The Sultan let out a laugh which pierced the silence of the night. 
   'You are nothing but a hypocrite, Dandan. What did [Abdullah] say? That if 
  the head is sound, the whole body remains healthy, since both integrity and  
  corruption come from the top.'
545
  
 
Zarmabaha watches this debate about justice 'pursued by a sense of boredom'. Singam joins 
Qumqam in letting Zarmabaha know the score: 'the earth shines with the light of its Lord. […] 
Gamasa Al Bulti [Abdullah] and Nur Al Din, the man in love, live in this light night and day. Even 
Ugr has stayed in his shop and repented for his transgressions. As for the murderer Shahriyar, an 
impulse to follow the path of righteousness is invading him...'
546
 Sajrabut, however, sends a 
beautiful woman, Anis Al Galis, to try to disrupt proceedings. Ugr is one of the first casualties ('my 
desire for repentance has been smashed, and the arrow of eternal torment has penetrated me'). As 
one man after another (with the notable exceptions of Abdullah and Nur Al Din) ruins himself in the 
quest for Anis's love, Qumqam and Singam look on helpless, lamenting the fact that they are 'not 
allowed to help the weak'. But Sahlul, the angel of death, reminds them: 'God has given them 
something better than anything you can give them: reason and a soul.' Such temptations as Anis Al 
Galis, however strong, bend but do not force the will. The point of life, Mahfouz wants to show, is 
to deal well with such obstacles to pleasure and flourishing when they arise, not to try to avoid such 
obstacles completely. Struggle (ğihād) is the only path to God and happiness; there may only be one 
law in the universe, but it is not always easy to follow. This is just one reason why the Mahfouzian 
vision of 'one law' is not as 'boring' as Zarmabaha lamented: there is nothing boring about trying to 
resist Anis Al Galis, and plenty of satisfaction to be gained from doing so in the name of something 
higher.  
 One after another, the men sacrifice themselves on the altar of passion, giving up their 
fortunes, their responsibilities, their families, their honour, and even their clothes to the insatiable 
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man-eater Anis, until the apparently 'mad' Abdullah shows up at her house unannounced, trying to 
solve the mystery of all the missing men:     
 
  Could she lure him into her trap? She moved languidly. For the first time, her face 
  did not have its usual irresistible effect. It seemed that she was a temptation only for 
  the sane, not the mad. […] 'Don't you like all this beauty?'  
   'I see only walls within which the age-old plague breathes.'  
   It was time for her to undress, as she had done with the others. But she  
  surrendered, powerless, before his invading madness. All her tricks and strategies 
  were in vain. […] Her slim figure decayed and her grace and elegance left her. With 
  amazing speed, she disintegrated, turned to smoke, and disappeared without a  
  trace.
547
    
 
Abdullah shows further evidence of moral transformation from eager murderer to just 
neighbourhood watchman when dealing with the men he has rescued: 'I will not save you from 
punishment, but I have chosen one which will be useful for you and will not harm those who follow 
God.'  
 
 
Chapter 11: Qut Al Qulub 
 
This chapter begins with Abdullah meeting his double, who asks him why he has started pardoning 
sinners instead of murdering them: 'I saw them with their hearts full of shame, after having 
experienced human weakness. […] Woe to the people who live under a governor who knows no 
sense of shame!' In other words, while it is impossible and unjust to forgive those who are not sorry 
for their crimes, one should ideally forgive those who genuinely repent and feel 'shame' for their 
sins, those who realise that they have let down something more important than themselves; this 
spark of conscience will be cultivated, not crushed, by wise leaders, who have themselves known 
the full force of 'shame' and experienced gratitude for being forgiven and will therefore distinguish 
between true and fake repentance.  
 Qumqam, Singam and Abdullah are then forced to watch 'the fall of those who had repented' 
as corruption once again spreads rapidly through the community. The chief of police Al Muin ibn 
Sawi, one of those caught in the trap laid by Anis Al Galis and brought to shame, rapes and almost 
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kills Qut al Qulub, the favourite slave of the governor Suleiman Al Zaini, whose jealous wife is also 
behind the plot. When Shahriyar finds out, he exclaims: 'Al Muin and Gamila, the wife of Al Zaini, 
should be executed!', showing that the old bloodlust that Sheherezade so fears and loathes still runs 
through his veins. But 'the anger suddenly vanished. Perhaps the image of Al Muin's naked flight' 
from Anis's house, 'pursued by feelings of sin, flashed through his mind. Perhaps he felt that Al 
Zaini and Al Muin were good men despite everything, although he removed them both from their 
posts and confiscated their assets, sentenced Gamila and Al Muin to be whipped, and gave Qut Al 
Qulub ten thousand dinars in compensation.'
548
 When Shahriyar asks Qut al Qulub if there is 
anything else he can do for her, she asks him to pardon Al Zaini. Shahriyar accepts her petition.  
 
 
Chapter 12: Aladdin 
 
We begin this chapter with Abdullah and Shahriyar, the two central characters in the novel, in the 
foreground. We first find Abdullah begging for forgiveness and justice; Singam tells him that he and 
Qumqam want 'the same'. Zarmabaha laughs in the background, while Shahriyar tells Dandan that 
'incessant whispers' fill his head and leave him perplexed.  
 Next we meet Aladdin, son of Ugr and Fatuha. Ugr tells us that Aladdin has 'the beauty of 
Nur Al Din'. 'The lord will protect you from evil,' Fatuha tells her son. The amulet she has given 
him will ensure that he 'will not follow in his father's footsteps'. Ugr casts his wife a scornful look 
but says nothing because he knows he deserves no better; both his mother's love and his father's 
repentance make Aladdin possible. Once again, Mahfouz shows his optimism for the future of 
civilisation: if the parents have the divine spark in them, it will take flame in the children.  
 Aladdin inspires all those who cross his path to exclaim: 'May the Great Creator bless you.' 
His friend Fadil Al Sanan invites him regularly to his house, but like a young Mahfouz, Aladdin 
makes up excuses to avoid contact with the women of the house ('his teenage blood boiled with lust, 
fighting against his creed and the religious education he had received at the Quranic school'). Fadil 
calls him 'worthy of the words of God which are hidden in your heart', and asks him: 'What do you 
feel when you see all these people wallowing in sin?' 'Sadness and regret,' Aladdin replies, but for 
Fadil, this is not enough; Aladdin should feel 'anger' too. This debate plays itself out over the course 
of the chapter.  
 Aladdin then meets the sheikh Al Balji. The sheikh extends, as if to a starcrossed lover, a 
'secret invitation' to Aladdin; Aladdin wordlessly receives it and comes to join him. The sheikh 
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shares the following hadith with Aladdin: 'The corruption of learned men is caused by foolishness; 
the corruption of princes, by injustice; and the corruption of the poor, by hypocrisy.' The sheikh 
implores Aladdin not to become 'an accomplice of demons'; such accomplices are 'leaders without 
education, learned men without virtue, and poor men without trust in God'. Aladdin strives to 
understand these cryptic words, but the sheikh tells him to be patient, and, in a burst of proto-
anthropocosmic enthusiasm (c.f. Tu Weiming's 'anthropocosmic' vision of civilisation introduced in 
Chapter 4), assures him that they are 'only the beginning of a mutual acquaintance with a view to 
the stars' ('mā hiya illā bidāyat ta'āruf 'ala mašhad min al-nuğūm'). The sheikh partially, though alas 
only momentarily, redeems himself here, showing himself to be a social being rather than an 
emotionally aloof ascetic devoid of a social role. He reminds Aladdin that his 'door is always open'.  
While Ugr ungenerously suggests that Aladdin is 'only a barber with religious impulses' and should 
not go beyond his station, Fatuha is pleased with Aladdin's new acquaintance.  
 Fadil once again expresses to Aladdin his anger at the behaviour of the ruling élites, 
suggesting that people like Aladdin and him are 'instruments of God' who can do good and eradicate 
evil. Aladdin finds himself caught between his loyalty to Fadil, a vengeful soldier in the army of 
God who calls Aladdin to take action against corruption, and the sheikh, who calls him to prayer 
and meditation (without, however, telling him to quit his day job: the sheikh only accepted students 
who worked). Slowly, Aladdin finds himself pulled into the sheikh's orbit ('he who satisfies himself 
with the ephemeral will be overcome by sadness when what pleases him comes to its end. All is 
vanity except the One.'). But Aladdin is still very attached to Fadil; he feels much better when the 
sheikh assures him that Fadil is a good young man whose righteously angry creed 'corresponds to 
his aspiration'. In the end, however, for the sheikh 'the sword is one creed, love is another', and 
'blessed is he who manages to turn his heart from things to the lord of all things'. Although he 
recognises Aladdin's goodness and marries him to his daughter Zubaida, when Aladdin is murdered 
by the jealous new chief of police, the sheikh shows no emotion whatsoever, and can only remind 
Zubaida to be 'patient', telling the ridiculous story of a man who was trapped in a hole and, instead 
of calling out to passers-by to be rescued, prayed only to God, who 'saved him from death with 
death'. This is not the Mahfouzian creed; while Fadil does not go far enough in his quest for truth 
and fails sufficiently to question his own motives for violent action, the sheikh goes too far, 
forgetting that only 'feeling', a visceral love for the flesh and blood of civilisation, can give us 
access to certain aspects of the Divine Essence. Although Mahfouz argues that people like the 
sheikh are very useful guides for the young and uninitiated in civilisation and can therefore play an 
important social role, in the end the best men respectfully take their distance from such teachers, as 
Dante does from Virgil, and get on with the business of civilisation-building (by force if necessary) 
in the tradition of Don Quijote, whose sword, Cervantes explicitly argues, is at least symbolically 
 189 
 
necessary for the defence of any republic of letters (c.f. Mahou's symbolic sword in Dweller in 
Truth). Mahfouz is interested in cultivating the middle path between Fadil's bloodlust and the 
Sheikh's aloofness, a path represented elsewhere in the novel by Nur Al Din (the 'man in love') and 
Abdullah, and here by Aladdin. Shahriyar, meanwhile, is battling to find this path, and attention will 
now turn back to him.  
 
 
Chapter 13: The Sultan 
   
In one of his undercover nocturnal forays into the life of his people, Shahriyar discovers a lavish 
banquet with singing slaves ('inside me the tongue of passion says that I love you') in which a mock 
court serves as the after-dinner entertainment. Ibrahim, the former water-boy and now the husband 
of Gamasa Al Bulti's widow, spends his new fortune entertaining the marginalised and dispensing 
imaginary justice, a justice which is 'impossible in the real world'; it is he who plays the role of 
Shahriyar in the mock trial as the real Shahriyar looks on in astonishment: 'I give thanks to God that 
he has helped me to repent after I had immersed myself in spilling the blood of the innocent and 
pillaging the assets of Muslims. He is truly generous with his pity and forgiveness.'
549
 Shahriyar 
accuses Ibrahim of having 'lost his mind to hashish' for having decided to 'create an imaginary 
kingdom where we could all be equal'; Ibrahim himself agrees that this must be the case. 
Nevertheless, the island created by Ibrahim is not an egalitarian paradise (remember the singing 
slaves); it resembles more the dream of the 'hypocritical poor' against which the sheikh rightly 
warned. Instead of using his new-found treasure for investment in real social development, Ibrahim 
and the marginalised poor who flock to his parties waste money enjoying themselves, eating and 
drinking too much, and taking refuge in cheap, imaginary justice (c.f. Mahfouz's Adrift on the Nile). 
While they may have 'bought' themselves 'an incalculable happiness', they have failed to convert 
themselves into truly decent men, and seem unaware of the hypocrisy of asking for justice while 
themselves failing to behave justly.  
 Shahriyar, however, moved by sympathy for Aladdin and the thirst for justice he finds 
among the crowd in attendance, decides to reopen the investigation into Aladdin's death.   
 
 
Chapter 14: The Cape of Invisibility 
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In this chapter, the bad genies set their sights on Fadil Sanan. An unknown foreigner offers Fadil a 
cape which will make him invisible when he wants, and which he can use 'for anything except what 
your conscience dictates'. Fadil follows the stranger's nihilistic reasoning that 'there are many things 
which are neither good nor bad', and eventually accepts the gift on the grounds that he has nothing 
to lose and 'nothing to fear' from it. 
 Fadil thus finds himself in the dangerous and antisocial situation where he can 'see faces he 
knew without them being able to see him'. He continues to ask himself what the point of having the 
cape is if he can do no good with it, until he decides to break the pact and use the cape to murder a 
man he believes deserves it. Unfortunately, the man he murders turns out to be the upstanding twin 
brother of the target. Fadil plunges into a spiral of guilt and violent self-loathing, begins drinking 
and committing horrific crimes. Abdullah, who had always greeted him with a friendly handshake, 
now ignores him, seemingly perceiving that 'the devil was hiding under his skin'. Eventually, Fadil 
realises that he has 'turned into a dead man': 'From that day on, there was no life for him except the 
life of the cape. He was like a spirit condemned to wander in darkness, unable to visit anywhere 
except the provinces of frivolity and evil, and deprived of the power to repent and the chance to do 
good.'
550
 Fadil loathes his 'state of non-existence', but seems unable to do anything about it. When 
the sheikh is asked to explain the crime wave rocking the community, he says simply that 'we lack 
faith', the 'true faith' which is 'rarer than a unicorn'; the community, Mahfouz wants to suggest – the 
sheikh included - is somehow responsible for failing sufficiently to cultivate this spark in people 
like Fadil.  
 Luckily, Fadil has received just enough of a spark to begin the process of saving himself. A 
'ray of light' eventually appears ('for the first time, Fadil reacted against his desperation, surprising 
himself, and he wondered if there was still any room left for reflection and repentance'), upon which 
the owner of the cape appears and asks him: 'Have you still not cured yourself of your old 
infirmity?' A battle of wills ensues, until finally Fadil tells the owner of the cape ('they will tear you 
to shreds!') to 'leave him in peace' ('I know what awaits me better than you do'), thereby exposing 
himself to humiliation and judgement at the hands of the community. He accepts his execution with 
'a firm step, a calm face, and humble resignation', begging Sahlul, the angel of death, only 'for 
justice'.  
 
 
Chapter 15: Maruf the Shoemaker 
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Maruf finds himself in poverty and married to Firdaus Al Urra, 'a greedy glutton with a bad 
character, a strong and violent woman': 'between his day job and his marriage, [Maruf's] life was 
hell. Not a single day went by without him receiving blows or insults, while he was left to tremble 
before her in fear and humiliation'.
551
 While he dreamt of escape, Maruf felt like a 'prisoner, just as 
Fadil Sanan had been a prisoner of the devil'. One night, he takes some drugs and heads to the 
Princes' Café, where he tells his friends 'the truth' (a lie) that he has found Solomon's ring. Called by 
his mocking friends to produce a miracle, Maruf unexpectedly finds himself levitating above them. 
Reminded by his friends not to forget them and by Al Zaini not to forget God, Maruf heads home to 
find his wife waiting for him, 'smiling at him for the first time in years'. Emboldened by his 
newfound power, Maruf tells his wife to 'go to hell', and smiles himself 'for the first time in a long 
time' when he finds that he has his humble abode to himself. Although he may have been justified in 
throwing his wife out, the vengeful pleasure with which he does so is, we know by now, a bad 
omen. As Maruf tries to understand why he has been given this strange power, he finds that 
everyone is treating him with newfound respect and extending invitations to him, causing him to 
'smile proudly as a man in control of his situation'. Shahriyar soon summons him, and Maruf 
repeats, to his own great surprise, his diabolically inspired feats of levitation. Only then does the bill 
arrive: Maruf is told that he must kill the sheikh Al Balji and Abdullah if he wants to keep his 
powers. This deal left Maruf in 'hell' (ĝaḥīm) once more ('Would he kill [Al Balji and Abdullah]? He 
coveted wealth, but he was also a decent and weak man, and a believer in God.'), and his thoughts 
turn to 'escape' with his new wife and his money. There is to be no getting away, however; Maruf 
and his wife are arrested trying to escape. Nevertheless, Shahriyar recognises the relative nobility of 
Maruf's struggle to avoid collaboration with the devil, and, in a radical experiment, appoints Maruf 
Governor of the neighbourhood.      
 
 
Chapter 16: Simbad 
 
Maruf asks to have Nur Al Din as his personal secretary and Abdullah ('Abdullah the Just') as his 
chief of police. To Dandan's surprise, Shahriyar accepts Maruf's petition ('we are venturing into a 
new experience'). The Princes' Café is then greeted with Simbad's return; the patrons are 
overwhelmed by emotion and by a desire to hear of Simbad's adventures abroad. The sheikh Al 
Balji, Simbad's former teacher, shows himself to be the exception to this rule; although Simbad 
longs to share his stories with him ('you will find things to like in them'), the sheikh is 'only worried 
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about one thing' ('he who has known God is indifferent to everythng which is not Him') – a final 
proof, if one were needed, that the sheikh is emphatically not Naguib Mahfouz. Shahriyar, on the 
other hand, wants to hear what Simbad has 'learnt while travelling, what knowledge you have 
obtained, and how you have used that knowledge'. The most important thing Simbad has learned is 
that 'people are deceived by illusion; they think it is the truth, but there is no salvation for us until 
we set foot on firm ground': indeed, he says, 'we must use the senses and the intelligence God has 
given us. […] I have also learned that one should not sleep when one needs to be awake, and that 
where there is life there is hope.'
552
 Simbad goes on to tell the sultan that food and sex are 'a fuel 
when consumed in moderation but a danger when consumed excessively', and that 'it is dangerous 
to carry on outmoded traditions' such as those involving human sacrifices. Nevertheless, Simbad 
shows himself capable of abandoning a pregnant wife and killing a nasty old man, and of 
employing too-easy excuses to justify his self-serving behaviour. Shahriyar 'sighs' and exclaims: 
'How much enslaves us in this world!' Still, Shahriyar concludes: 'you have seen wonders of the 
world that no other human being has contemplated, and you have learnt numerous lessons. Enjoy, 
therefore, the wealth and wisdom that God has apportioned to you.'
553
   
 Simbad's tales stir Shahriyar to reflect further on the vanity of earthly power and glory, and 
to 'curse' everything from 'emitters of pernicious legal decrees' to 'gold pillaged and wasted on 
wine', 'fancy turbans and furniture', 'empty hearts', and 'the sarcastic laughs of the universe'. While 
Sheherezade reminds him that Simbad's stories come from 'the same source' as her own, Shahriyar 
can take no more stories: 
 
  Wisdom […] does not get passed down like a crown. […] Do you know why I have 
  kept you close to me? Because I found in your loathing for me the lasting torment 
  that I deserved. What saddens me now is that I think I deserve an even greater  
  punishment. […] Cry, Sheherezade, for it is better than lying. […] The palace  
  belongs to you and your son, who will govern the city one day soon. It is I who must 
  leave, and assume the burden of my bloody past. […] For ten years, I have lived torn 
  between temptation and duty. I remember even if I pretend to forget. I try to think of 
  myself as sophisticated while I lead a libertine existence. I act and then I repent. I 
  take one step forward and then another step back. And I am tormented all the time. 
  The time has come for me to listen to the call of salvation, the call of wisdom.
554
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While Sheherezade laments that Shahriyar is abandoning her 'just as her heart is opening to him', 
Shahriyar insists that 'he will never return to seek out human hearts again'. Although this seems a 
sheikh-like waste, Shahriyar feels that, for the time being, he has no choice. To his credit, however, 
his last thought is not for himself at all: 'Go and fulfil your obligation, Sheherezade. You have 
educated the father; now you must prepare the son for a better future.'
555
 
 Simbad, meanwhile, gets itchy feet once more. While the sheikh counsels Simbad to embark 
instead on a spiritual course whose goal is 'to arrive at a single preoccupation' and 'to prepare for 
death', Simbad tells the sheikh that he is 'not that kind of believer' and that the calls of conscience 
'come from a thousand and one wonderful places', while Dr. Abdul Qadir Al Mahni, a voice of 
reason, decency and social engagement throughout the novel, tells the sheikh that Simbad is 
obviously a 'born traveller' and that the sheikh should wish him well. 'Go in peace, and come back 
loaded with diamonds and wisdom, but don't repeat your mistakes,' the doctor tells him.  
 
 
Chapter 17: Those Who Weep 
 
The final chapter recounts Shahriyar's adventures after leaving the palace. He finds himself 
absorbed in a dream-state which promises him youth, wealth, the queen of his dreams and 'a forty-
day wedding' ('I am nothing more than a slave of your majesty,' Shahriyar tells the woman, who 
replies: 'No, you are my companion in love and my companion on the throne.'). In this tempting but 
ultimately sadistic and diabolical nightmare-kingdom ('imperatives do not exist here except in 
love'), the queen assures Shahriyar that he 'will only know true happiness when he completely 
forgets the past'. This is, we have learnt, the opposite of the truth in Mahfouz's world. In a reversal 
of the Eden-myth, Shahriyar escapes the garden of temptation by opening the only door that was 
sadistically forbidden to him, only to find himself cast back to the wilderness of Earth, and greeted 
by 'Abdullah the Just', who reveals to him the message of the entire Mahfouzian oeuvre: that truth, 
while seemingly 'necessary', cannot be found by escaping from a felt engagement with the human 
community. The novel ends with Abdullah the Just 'heading for the city' to fulfil his role as chief of 
police. 
 
 
2.10 The Significance of Shahriyar's Journey 
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   We must always bear in mind that art is a divinely sanctioned game.  
   Literature, true literature, is not to be ingested as a concoction which might 
   be good for the heart or the head, the mere stomach of the soul. Literature 
   has to be taken and broken into pieces, undone, ground down; only then will 
   you smell its divine fragrance in your hand, chew it and turn it on your  
   tongue with relish, and only then will you appreciate it in its just measure, 
   with its broken down and crushed constituents reassembled in the soul to  
   reveal the beauty of a unity to which the reader has contributed some of her 
   blood.
556
 
 
         Vladimir Nabokov 
 
 
Just as Rasheed El Enany misses the civilisational point of Akhenaten: Dweller in Truth, so too does 
he completely ignore the character of Abdullah in his 1995 review of Arabian Nights and Days, 
focusing instead on Shahriyar, and even there, failing to understand the significance of Shahriyar's 
journey: 
 
  Mahfouz draws the portrait of Shahriyar with great care, showing in a gradual and 
  convincing way his transformation from bloodthirsty tyrant into just leader, and  
  finally into a disoriented man who gives up power and embarks on a long quest for 
  the meaning of existence – an evolution which seems to reflect the evolution of  
  humanity from primitive times right up to the complexity of conscience in the 20
th
 
  century. The moment of truth in Shahriyar's life comes when he hears Sinbad  
  recounting his extraordinary travels: he realises the horror of his former life. The art 
  of the storyteller has exercised its cathartic effect. Shahriyar deems himself unsuited 
  to government. He abdicates and sets out in search of his own salvation, leaving  
  behind him – oh the irony – a Sheherazade who is beginning to love him and does 
  not want him to leave. At the end of his quest, Shahriyar enters Paradise, but soon 
  breaks a heavenly law and finds himself back on Earth. Thus the cycle of sin  
  (motivated by the desire to know) and punishment is completed. Note here an  
  important omission from the biblical account: there is no serpent, no evil, no woman. 
  Shahriyar's fall is his own fault; Mahfouz wants to convince us that the responsibility 
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  for human choices rests on nothing other than the will power of each individual.  
  Shahriyar returns to Earth, but his soul remains tied to Heaven, to the ideal world he 
  has seen with the eyes of his spirit.
557
  
 
Beyond 'reflecting the evolution of humanity from primitive times to the complexity of conscience 
in the 20
th
 century', Shahriyar's journey serves only to throw Abdullah's even greater journey into 
starker relief. The 'paradise' which Enany describes Shahriyar entering is in fact an 'illusion' of 
precisely the kind against which Simbad warns, and for which all the stories leading up to the final 
chapter prepare us. It is to Shahriyar's credit that, like Maruf, he recognises in some vague sense 
that there is something not right about this offer of bliss and tries to escape through the only 
available door. At the end of the novel, moreover, we have no idea whether, as Enany claims, 
Shahriyar's heart remains 'tied to the sky' or whether, as seems much more likely, he will follow 
Abdullah back to the city and return, like a Platonic philosopher returning to the human cave, to the 
task of civilisation-building, or at the very least remain in self-imposed purgatory in the city's 
deserted environs until he is ready to do so.     
 Assaad Cherif Omar gets much closer to the essence of Mahfouz when he compares the 
treatment of the Thousand and One Nights in 'Fantasy and Tradition in Two Texts by Jorge Luis 
Borges and Naguib Mahfouz'.
558
 Omar quotes Borges as sharing the same views as Mahfouz on the 
purpose of literary creation ('my stories, like those of the Thousand and One Nights, aim to move 
[conmover] and not to persuade'), before suggesting that 'it is as if Mahfouz had made his own the 
following lines from Antonio Machado: "After living and dreaming/ Comes that which matters 
most:/ Waking."'
559
 In the thirst for narrative inspired by the Thousand and One Nights and common 
to Borges and Mahfouz, Omar finds proof that 'the confluence of tastes and mutual influences 
continues, and will keep continuing, because it is a law of life; the meeting of three worlds: Europe, 
America, and the Orient.'
560
 In the remaining two chapters, as our attention shifts from Mahfouz to 
Andrei Tarkovsky and Tu Weiming respectively, Mahfouz will continue to echo through these 
distant worlds; indeed, all three warriors along with their Western counterparts exercise a 'mutual 
influence' on each other in accordance with the 'law of life' which Omar so eloquently describes.    
 
                                                 
557  Rasheed El Enany, 'Mahfouz and the Thousand and One Nights' ('Mahfouz et les Mille et Une Nuits'), 
1/6/1995, http://www.lexpress.fr/culture/livre/mahfouz-et-les-mille-et-une-nuits_798797.html (accessed 20/3/12). 
558  Assaad Cherif Omar, 'Fantasy and Tradition in Two Texts by Jorge Luis Borges and Naguib Mahfouz' 
('Fantasía y Tradición en Dos Textos de Jorge Luis Borges y Naguib Mahfuz'), Revista del Instituto Egipcio de 
Estudios Islámicos de Madrid, no. 26, 1994, pp. 179-185. 
559  Omar, 'Fantasy and Tradition in Two Texts by Jorge Luis Borges and Naguib Mahfouz', p. 184. 
560  Omar, 'Fantasy and Tradition in Two Texts by Jorge Luis Borges and Naguib Mahfouz', p. 184. 
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3. Andrei Tarkovsky 
 
   The present is what we suffer, the future what we hope for, and the past what 
   we cherish, both bitter and sweet.
561
 
         
         Naguib Mahfouz 
    
 
3.1 The Pillars of Tarkovskian Civilisation 
 
Andrei Tarkovsky (1932-1986) is a generation younger than Naguib Mahfouz (1911-2006), but 
achieved the full extent of his global fame in the 1970s and 1980s, around the time that Mahfouz's 
patient labours were beginning to be recognised outside the Arab world (culminating in the 1988 
Nobel Prize). Tarkovsky, whose father Arseny was arguably the finest Russian poet of his 
generation and a translator of Oriental literatures, decided to pursue the new medium of film after 
18 months of undergraduate Arabic study. Despite his struggles with Soviet censors, which limited 
his output to a mere seven films and eventually forced him to emigrate to Europe, and despite his 
eager embrace of the best of global high culture from Shakespeare
562
 to Daoist music and beyond, 
Tarkovsky remained a dedicated Russian and even a dedicated Soviet, though one unwilling and 
unable to shake his roots in pre-revolutionary Russian Orthodox religion and spirituality and the 
rich 19th-century Russian literary and philosophical tradition embracing such names as Pushkin, 
Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and Ilyin.  
 The continuity of Orthodox civilisation, and its specific role in defending 'civilisation' as a 
whole from barbarism, is dramatised by Tarkovsky in the central scene in his autobiographical film 
Zerkalo (The Mirror), the fourth of his seven films, where Ignat, the son of the protagonist, is asked 
                                                 
561  NM, in Francka Mouloudi, Naguib Mahfouz: Passages de Siècle, (Harmattan, 1999) (film).  
562  For a taste of Tarkovsky's particular obsession with Shakespeare's Hamlet, a play which he staged in 1977 
with Anatoly Solonitsyn in the main role, see Viktor Filimonov, Andrei Tarkovsky, (Moscow: Molodaya Gvardia, 
2011),  pp. 296-300. For an even more concise summary of the Hamlet theme in Tarkovsky, see Lyudmilla 
Boyadzhieva, Andrei Tarkovsky: Life on a Cross (Andrei Tarkovsky: Zhizn' na Kreste), (Moscow: ANF, 2012), p. 
233: for Tarkovsky, Hamlet's greatness resides in his reluctance 'to accept the laws of this world, to give up his 
moral aspirations and become a common killer'. In other words, like Mahfouz's Akhenaten and Wolin's Moses, 
Hamlet feels the pull of the world as it should be – a world in which violence is only ever a last resort - over the 
world as it currently is, where revenge is used, just as it is by several characters in Mahfouz's Arabian Nights and 
Days, as a pretext for bloodthirsty and immoral slaughter. The unique twist which Tarkovsky adds to Shakespeare's 
play by having Hamlet rise from the dead frees him, in the words of A. Obraztsova (see Filimonov, p. 299), 'from the 
burden of awareness of his unwitting participation in a world of vice and lawlessness, unavoidable in the historical 
situation in which he found himself. Striving for the moral improvement of society, he above all wanted to raise the 
spiritual value of each individual and continues even now to nurture this dream, which becomes a reality. […] The 
end of the play attempts to convey the idea of a collective burst towards moral perfection' inspired by Hamlet's 
pioneering leadership.     
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to read aloud from Pushkin's 1831 letter to Chaadaev by a 'timeless' teacher: 
 
  There is no doubt that the Schism separated us from the rest of Europe, and that we 
  did not take part in any of the great events that shook the European continent, but we 
  nevertheless had our own world-historical role. Russia: its vast lands absorbed the 
  Mongol invasion. The Tatars too retreated to their deserts, and Christian civilization 
  was saved. […] Although I am personally very attached to the Emperor, I do not  
  admire all that I see around me [...] but upon my honor, I would not for anything in 
  the world want to change our country or have a different history than the history of 
  our ancestors, such as God gave it to us.
563
 
 
Even at the heart of his most autobiographical film, Tarkovsky, via recourse to Pushkin, defines 
Russia's greatness in terms of its world-historical role: it is the world as a whole and the survival of 
civilisation which matter. All seven of Tarkovsky's films, the last of which, Sacrifice, was released 
in the same year as Mahfouz's Dweller in Truth (1985), are a desperate attempt to remind the world 
of the existence of moral and spiritual values, indeed of a single Moral Law, in an era of rampant 
individualism, relativism and materialism. The central theme of Igor Evlampiev's brilliant and 
untranslated 2001 study The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, from which we will have the 
privilege of drawing liberally in this chapter, is precisely Tarkovsky's inheritance of the 19th-
century Russian philosophical and spiritual tradition which stressed the ideas of 'deep truth' (istina) 
and 'the oneness of everything' (vseedinstvo). This distinctly un-Soviet commitment to 
prerevolutionary Russian ideas heavily indebted to Orthodox Christianity left Tarkovsky 
intellectually marginalised inside the Soviet Union; though unappreciated in the Soviet Russia he 
finally emigrated from, Tarkovsky nevertheless became, like Mahfouz, a standard-bearer in the 
West for a brand of thinking recognisably committed to values of truth and unity which Western 
intellectuals themselves largely abandoned during the final decades of the Cold War. 
 There is no evidence that Mahfouz and Tarkovsky knew, or even knew of, each other. 
Tarkovsky did enrol to study Arabic at university, but gave up after a year or so when he realised 
how difficult it was going to be. Mahfouz, as we have seen, repeatedly praised the bravery of Soviet 
citizens and their sacrifices for the socialist experiment in which he, like Tarkovsky, in principle 
believed even as he criticised its horrific failures and democratic shortcomings. And of course 
Mahfouz was heavily influenced, as Tarkovsky was, by contact with the work of Tolstoy and 
Dostoyevsky. But the central starting point for comparison between Mahfouz and Tarkovsky, the 
                                                 
563  See Andrei Tarkovsky, The Mirror (Zerkalo), Mosfilm, 1974. 
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details of which we will be exploring in this chapter, is that, just as the West began to embrace the 
relativist ideas of poststructuralism and postmodernism in the 1970s and 1980s, arguably the best-
known and best-loved representatives of Arab and Russian high culture in the West - Mahfouz and 
Tarkovsky respectively - were simultaneously preaching grand narratives of civilisational unity and 
progress in the face of apocalyptic Cold War threats to the survival of the planet and humanity as a 
whole.  
 Whether it means importing the best from elsewhere or taking pride in one's own 
civilisational heritage, what matters more than anything to both Mahfouz and Tarkovsky is 
civilisation itself, and its survival 'on their watch', to use a military metaphor worthy of our 
warriors, into the next century. All seven of Tarkovsky's films dramatise precisely this readiness for 
sacrifice in the name of civilisation: Ivan gives up his life to resist Nazism in Ivanogo Detstvo; 
Andrei and Boris fight medieval ignorance and barbarism to spread the word of God in Andrei 
Rublev; Kris redeems humanity by engaging in civilised dialogue with the Ocean in Solaris, even 
risking his own mental health to do so; the Stalker risks death in order to bring the necessary magic 
of the Zone to jaded modern meaning-seekers; Domenico burns himself alive in the name of 
humanity at the end of Nostalgia; and Alexander burns his own house down in order to protect his 
son and the rest of humanity from a nuclear apocalypse in Sacrifice. And perhaps the most 
important example of all comes, as we have seen, from the structurally central scene in Zerkalo in 
which Ignat quotes Pushkin's letter to Chaadaev on Russia's indispensable role in the history of 
civilisation and the sacrifices it has made in its name.  
 All this sacrifice, however, is only made possible by love, or transcendence of the self. To be 
willing to die for a cause is to love that cause more than one's own life; it is diametrically opposed 
to the homo economicus view of man as a rational egoist. For Tarkovsky, the goal of moral 
education and the high-point of civilisational development is an overcoming of material and self-
prolonging appetites in the name of love, a willingness to lay down all that one has so that the group 
as a whole or certain individuals within it can survive. Tarkovsky's critics have pointed out that he 
struggled to live up to this lofty ideal in his own life, repeatedly preferring to indulge expensive 
appetites and abandoning his own family in his quest for artistic recognition and fulfilment. As we 
will see, however, Tarkovsky's diaries reveal a man with a hypertrophied conscience, painfully 
aware of his own shortcomings, generous to the point of weakness in his dealings with those closest 
to him but susceptible to the wiles of his self-centred second wife Larisa and constantly struggling 
to balance the demands of work and family. Before we explore Tarkovsky's elaborations of the 
civilisation theme in each of his seven films, it behooves us to explore in greater detail the man, his 
life, and his capacity for the love and sacrifice and faith in 'the unity of all things' which are the 
pillars of his concept of civilisation. 
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3.2. Life on the Cross?  
 
Lyudmilla Boyadzhieva's 2012 biography of Tarkovsky, Andrei Tarkovsky: Life on a Cross, comes 
close to outright character assassination. From the beginning, Boyadzhieva is only willing 
sarcastically to acknowledge the apocalyptic urgency of the Tarkovskian œuvre: 'He knew 
unreservedly: the world, in order to survive, needs a new homo sapiens, formed under the spell of 
Great Art, High Culture and inviolable spiritual values, [individuals] guided only by moral laws and 
oblivious to all kinds of material blessing sought by the lowly body.'
564
 Boyadzhieva's insistence on 
Tarkovsky's mind-body dualism, however, confuses his championing of spiritual sensitivity 
(dukhovnost') over vulgar end-in-itself materialism with contempt for the physical dimension of 
spiritual striving: on the contrary, Tarkovsky's attention to the physical hues of his characters' moral 
development is arguably unmatched in the history of cinema. From the sinuous purity of Ivan and 
Boris in Tarkovsky's early films to the otherworldly beauty of Hari in Solaris, the stoic sensuality of 
the young Maria Ivanovna in Zerkalo, the portrayal of the Stalker's lithe traversing of the Zone, 
Gorchakov's brooding honesty in Nostalgia and Maria's rustic charms in Sacrifice, the body is – for 
where else could such transformations take place? - the site of discipline and improvement, and 
only 'low' insofar as it is also, by definition, the site of excess and depravity, perhaps most 
memorably embodied by the raving Adelaide in Sacrifice. Evlampiev's insistence on istina and 
vseedinstvo in Tarkovsky comes much closer to the mark than Boyadzhieva's positing of a hyper-
Platonic distinction between lowly body and lofty soul, and Boyadzhieva's criticisms of Tarkovsky, 
cast as they are in the light of this distinction, suffer for it even as they warrant being taken 
seriously by any would-be hagiographers. 
 Boyadzhieva's central charge is that Tarkovsky, in pursuit of 'higher' truths, neglected the 
physical and social realities of his own existence: 'he created new worlds made up of often 
rationally inexplicable elements, exploring phenomena and feelings all but alien to himself – 
sacrifice, compassion, love.'
565
 The charge of dualism soon rears its head again in Boyadzhieva's 
analysis: 'the paradox of Tarkovsky's cryptically complex personality consisted in the fact the he 
existed simultaneously as if in two different realms, thereby acquiring a kind of 'dual citizenship': in 
the material and spiritual worlds'.
566
 This distinction allows her to pursue her personal charges 
against a man whom she nevertheless regards as a talented artist: 'in the loftier spheres one finds the 
                                                 
564  Lyudmilla Boyadzhieva, Andrei Tarkovsky: Life on a Cross (Andrei Tarkovsky: Zhizn' na Kreste), (Moscow: 
ANF, 2012), p. 9.  
565  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 11. 
566  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 11. 
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sources of a unique gift, at the same time as the real-life, fleshly plane determines the special 
characteristics of a nature which does not befit the gift and which often works against it.'
567
 Yet if 
one views Tarkovsky's struggle as one not of overcoming the material in favour of the spiritual but 
rather one of uniting the material and spiritual planes in a single unity – whence the odd 
juxtapositions of political and personal events in, for example, Zerkalo – Tarkovsky's life and 
sacrifices for his art, which eventually included the painful process of emigrating and abandoning 
his children, begin to make more sense and to have more dignity than Boyadzhieva can give them. 
Tarkovsky, indeed, revered his country, in spite of all the negative trappings of the brand of 
socialism which had developed there - 'the idiocy, the cruelty, the deceit and general climate of 
hostility' – and wanted to be '" understood by his native land" and to be looked after and honoured 
by it'; he nevertheless 'came to be seen as extraneous and undesirable' by Soviet authorities 'with 
their keen nose for all that was "foreign"' and was forced to seek asylum in order to pursue his 
Arnoldian mission, described by Boyadzhieva as 'the task of perfecting humanity'.
568
 In this 
description, however, Boyadzhieva betrays her total lack of sympathy for Tarkovsky's Arnoldian 
project, arguing that in 'giving over all his spiritual and creative forces' to this task, he merely 
indulged in megalomaniac fantasies and 'considered himself a Messiah'.
569
 Boyadzhieva also 
harshly criticises Tarkovsky's 'messianic' unwillingness to compromise on his artistic goals for the 
benefit of the 'broad Soviet public', which 'did not have the cultural resources to feel at home in the 
world of Tarkovsky's films, lacking both the intellectual capital and aesthetic discernment necessary 
to appreciate such difficult material': in Boyadzhieva's harsh assessment, Tarkovsky 'did not set out 
to entertain people, or even to interest them. He was afraid of even the tiniest drops of 
sentimentality or humour leaking into his films', and as such, was adamant that 'watching one of his 
films would be a painful operation, almost as painful as the process of making it. Only afterwards 
could a person, having been led to the depths of self-knowledge by her teacher, change something 
in herself, and in turn change a world mired in lowly materiality.'
570
 Boyadzhieva's cynical dualistic 
analysis, however, threatens to obscure the apparent fact that Tarkovsky, who as we will see calls in 
his diary for the coming of a new moral Messiah with persuasive powers beyond any he attributed 
to himself, only considered himself a 'Messiah' to the extent that anyone with moral beliefs feels a 
duty to act on those beliefs and argue for them in public; that he failed fully to live up to them, as he 
himself freely and repeatedly admitted, only puts him in the illustrious company of any serious 
person. The total unwillingness to compromise artistically, to condescend to the tastes of the market, 
represents a commitment to a qualitatively different kind of activity from market-driven 
                                                 
567  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 11.  
568  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, pp. 11-12. 
569  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 12. 
570  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 12. 
 201 
 
entertainment; one may question the tactics, and many have, but the commitment to high culture – 
to a 'best that has been thought and said in the world' irrespective of prevailing tastes - as a unifier 
and improver of humanity is unquestionable.    
 Boyadzhieva's main charge is that Tarkovsky's obsession with civilisation in the highest, 
'best-that-has-been-thought-and-said' sense not only blinded him to the profound effects of his 
behaviour on concrete individuals, but actually blinded him to the existence of these individuals 
altogether: 'In his real life the secret of love was unknown to him. In the sense of sacrifice or self-
sacrifice, he didn't love anyone – neither his friends, nor his colleagues, nor his children, nor the 
women in his life.'
571
 With reference to women in particular, Boyadzhieva also quotes, though 
without referencing it, one of Tarkovsky's many tragic and self-injuringly misogynistic claims 
regarding female spiritual autonomy: 'a woman does not have her own inner life and nor should she 
have one. Her inner world should be entirely absorbed in her man's inner world.'
572
 From this 
shocking premise, Boyadzhieva deduces an unpleasant conclusion: 'not knowing how to love, he 
was unable to distinguish the true from the obviously false in the romantic domain.'
573
 Although 'he 
declared the importance of loyalty and extreme honesty in relationships between men and women', 
he was nevertheless himself 'an unreliable, cheating partner', and it was 'his destiny to deceive and 
be deceived'.
574
 Boyadzhieva not unreasonably points us to the central problem with Tarkovsky's 
chauvinistic worldview and its tragic consequences for his life: 'a woman, ready to give up her life 
for her persecuted martyr, could never become a necessary pillar of his life or a Muse, and would 
never have her feelings reciprocated'.
575
 Instead of ending up with an intellectual and spiritual 
equal, Tarkovsky in his married life 'ended up in the role of the victim, a puppet in the hands of a 
stronger, self-serving partner. As a result – a marriage with a woman who destroyed him.  Arguably 
the worst of all the traps which Destiny prepared for Tarkovsky was the meeting, and subsequent 
long years, with Larisa Kizilova, later Madame Tarkovsky.'
576
 We will have occasion to explore the 
details of Andrei's relationship with Larisa in the course of this chapter, but suffice it to say at 
present that Tarkovsky's view, repeatedly expressed and utterly unjustified, on the female inability 
to lead independent intellectual and spiritual lives, significantly reduced his odds of finding love. 
Nevertheless, at least one woman, Natalya Bondarchuk, managed to get past this prejudice and to 
introduce Tarkovsky to the possibilities of heterosexual love between intellectual equals. The 
reasons why Tarkovsky decided to return to Larisa deserve careful consideration, both for the light 
they shed on Tarkovsky himself and because the decision represents, or so I will argue, the major 
                                                 
571  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 13.  
572  See Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 13.  
573  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 13.  
574  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 13.  
575  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 13.  
576  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 13.  
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turning-point in Tarkovsky's life.         
 Boyadzhieva's biography describes in detail Tarkovsky's marital infidelities and the flimsy 
artistic excuses provided for them, his betrayal of two of his closest friends - Anatoly Solonitsyn 
and Olga Surkova - in their hours of need, and a generally capricious temperament which made life 
close to impossible for those working with him. Yet Tarkovsky also inspired love and forgiveness 
from those who might otherwise have complained at poor treatment. Natalya Bondarchuk, the star 
of Tarkovsky's third film Solaris, undisputably finds herself at the top of this long list. Her 2013 
play at the Bulgakov Museum in Moscow, Meetings on Solaris, narrated the love story of a lifetime, 
and in doing so has done much to rescue Tarkovsky's artistic and personal legacy from the damage 
done by Boyadzhieva's overwhelmingly unflattering biography. Bondarchuk herself narrates to one 
side as photographs of Andrei and a younger version of herself flash across the background screen 
behind the actors playing Tarkovsky and Bondarchuk - Anton Afanasiev and Sofia Torosyan - 
onstage. What initially appears as a guileless exercise in self-promotion and narcissism soon reveals 
itself to be something quite other: an aging woman's attempt to recover and communicate the most 
important event in her life in the belief that something of universal significance is contained within 
it (not for nothing is Bondarchuk's book on her affair with Tarkovsky, on which Meetings on Solaris 
is based, titled The Only Days). At the centre of the play is the figure of Hari, Bondarchuk's 
character in Solaris; in the film, Kris Kelvin's dead wife Hari is resurrected in neutrino form by the 
alien Ocean in a bid to penetrate Kelvin's conscience and establish contact with humanity. Initially, 
the neutrino Hari is seen by Kris as a mere copy of his wife, but as he comes to realise her utter 
dependence on him, he finds himself declaring that the neutrino Hari is now 'the real Hari', and that 
he is ready to sacrifice everything for her. This transition is not portrayed as a betrayal, but rather as 
a continuation of the one true love in Kris's life. Through this love, the neutrino Hari is able to 
realise herself as a human being and eventually to overcome her dependence on it.  
 Tarkovsky, Bondarchuk argues in her narration, played the role of Kris Kelvin in her own life, 
quite literally creating her as an adult human being. After periods when it was physically unbearable 
to be separated from him and a 'sinful' suicide attempt when she realised he would not be leaving  
Larisa to be with her, Bondarchuk finally 'learnt to live without' Tarkovsky, and went on to find love 
with the star of Tarkovsky's first two films, Nikolai Burlyayev, to whom she remains married. Yet 
just as Kris Kelvin's love for the neutrino Hari constitutes a continuation of his love for his dead 
wife and not a betrayal, so too does Bondarchuk portray her love for Burlyayev as a continuation of 
the flame for Tarkovsky, seeing not malice but rather destiny in Tarkovsky's final decision, and 40 
years on, choosing to celebrate the brief moments of true happiness they shared together rather than 
burning them as fakes.  
 If the story ends with a happy marriage for Bondarchuk, it is less clear that it did for 
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Tarkovsky. The scenes of torment Bondarchuk choreographs onstage when Andrei meets her in later 
years reflect a desperately unhappy and trapped soul wondering if it hasn't made an unforgivable 
error. For if Tarkovsky's central role in Bondarchuk's life is made plain by Bondarchuk herself, all 
the evidence presented in Bondarchuk's play suggests that she was also the closest thing in his life 
to true love, and that he let her go out of fear: fear of abandoning another wife and child. The figure 
of Larisa, indeed, haunts the play as it haunts the second half of Tarkovsky's life; this hands-on, 
pragmatic and at times frankly demonic woman was to all appearances the opposite of everything 
Tarkovsky valued in his art and philosophy. Betrayal, manipulation and hysteria seem to have been 
the only constants with Larisa; though not altogether obvious in Bondarchuk's play, a picture 
emerges from sources to be cited below of a venal woman who used her practical skills to take 
advantage of an impractical man prone to attribute guilt to himself. Tarkovsky was clearly afraid to 
hurt someone so emotionally fragile - his diary entries repeatedly refer to 'poor Larisa' - and he 
frankly needed her practical support, but this was not love as he had known it with Bondarchuk, or 
even with his first wife Irma, whom he later regretted leaving.
577
 Still, I wanted confirmation of this 
suspicion from Bondarchuk herself, and she was kind enough to give me half an hour of her time 
after the final night of Meetings on Solaris on June 26. I didn't record the interview as I was hoping 
for some off-the-record insight. I was not to be disappointed. 
 One particularly memorable moment from the play was the scene in which Larisa tells 
Natalya to forget about the affair with Andrei, that in the grand scheme of things it was 
'unimportant'. This heartless pragmatism helped drive Bondarchuk into her suicidal rage in the first 
place: how could anyone, let alone Andrei's wife, dare to suggest that the most important event in 
her whole life was 'unimportant'?! Yet 40 years on, even Bondarchuk conceded to me that Andrei 
and Larisa deserved each other, and that 'everyone in the end gets the partner they deserve'. She 
stressed the practical aspect of Larisa's appeal to Andrei: he was virtually incapable of doing 
anything for himself. The neurotic side of Andrei, well portrayed in the play by Anton Afanasiev, 
was also brought home to me by Bondarchuk, and was well summarised by Tarkovsky himself in a 
diary entry from the days of Solaris: 'I am not a saint or an angel, but an egoist who fears more than 
anything in the world the suffering of those whom he loves'.
578
 A man like that is going to have a 
very hard time indeed leaving a woman like Larisa, although if the portrayal of the hysterical and 
utterly selfish figure of Adelaide in his final film Sacrifice, a character which Bondarchuk herself 
confirmed was modelled on Larisa, is anything to go by, Tarkovsky had indeed realised the score by 
the end, even if he was too sick and too stuck to admit it openly to himself or to do anything about 
                                                 
577  See Paola Volkova, Andrei Tarkovsky: Nostalgia, (Moscow: Zebra E., 2008), p. 343. 
578  Andrei Tarkovsky, Martyrolog: Diaries (Martyrolog: Dnevniki), (Istituto Internazionale Andrej Tarkovskij, 
2008), p. 40. 
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it.  
 More than unpublished gossipy detail, Bondarchuk provided me with the proof I needed as a  
would-be presenter Tarkovsky's civilisational vision: a sense of the man's fundamental goodness. 
The sacrifices for art were never made lightly, and many of the betrayals in Andrei's life were 
attributable to Larisa's malign influence or the dishonesty of the betrayed parties themselves. But 
Bondarchuk made no excuses for Andrei's weaknesses either; what matters to her 40 years on is that 
they shared brief moments of true happiness together in between the other peripheral nonsense, 
moments that are, to paraphrase Philip Larkin, 'what will survive of us'. True love like this does not 
guard itself jealously but shares itself as widely as it can, for it belongs somehow to all of us even as 
it belongs to the lovers alone; this is what Tarkovsky, the great believer in the spiritual unity of 
human civilisation, taught Bondarchuk, and what she herself now wants, quite openly, to pass on to 
younger generations (her affection for Sofia Torosyan, who played her younger self, and the other 
young cast members of Meetings on Solaris was evident both onstage and off). Where I had 
expected caution and evasion, I found frank, open warmth: 'Tell me what you need to know', 
Bondarchuk began our interview by saying, and she did not hold back. When I asked why she never 
worked with Tarkovsky again after Solaris, she replied matter-of-factly: 'Larisa would never have 
allowed it.' The contrast between the two women, and the tragic consequences of Tarkovsky's 
choice of Larisa, had never been more apparent to me.      
 Although Boyadzhieva fails to do justice to Andrei's soft side in his dealings with Larisa, to 
her credit she does not exonerate Larisa either, and indeed provides excruciatingly detailed evidence 
of her selfishness; even Andrei's falling out with close friend and associate Olga Surkova is 
ultimately made to look like Larisa's doing. Surkova herself confirms this, though not without a 
bitter recrimination of a man whom, by all accounts, she loved unrequitedly: 
 
  Indeed, I idolised the great and persecuted artist with a childlike enthusiasm for  
  many long years. Oh how typical this is in Russia!: unselfishly and recklessly given 
  aid to the pure and absolute Truth. Tarkovsky was surrounded by people like this, 
  people who almost deified him and who were ready to serve not only the man  
  himself, but even his family, all in the name of St. Art. They were ready to help not 
  only on the filmset, but even at home, with domestic business, organising orders of 
  scarce groceries, coming up with cheap materials for the construction of his country 
  house, paying for furniture in instalments, and generally running all kinds of trifling 
  errands. This gave meaning and nobility to the lives of each of us, the chosen  
  members of his inner circle. And then when I was chosen by the Master from among 
  all these people for the most honoourable task of creative collaboration – well, it  
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  wasn't fit to dream of greater happiness than that! 
   But for the most part, and gradually, I grew out of this brand of   
  sophomorically enthusiastic admiration for the 'Great Artist', whom I had met while I 
  was still a film student. This 'growing up' proceeded as the glaring contradictions 
  between the lofty and 'selfless' spiritual values espoused by the director and their 
  'everyday practice' became apparent to me. I then decided to separate these two  
  spheres of the artist's existence: I decided to concentrate on his work and ignore the 
  domestic side of his life.  
   His films, snapshots of time, bear traces of a wearying and often unsuccessful 
  battle with himself, an inability to contain the rust which gradually corroded his soul 
  and which foully parades itself on the screen. His films, indeed, are uniquely  
  interesting as objective evidence of this struggle. 
   For a long time I didn't notice, or couldn't, didn't want to see the traces of this 
  erosion, which is so visible on the screen and which explains to me today  
  Tarkovsky's unique artistic and human destiny. We were friends – or rather,  
  Tarkovsky bestowed his friendship upon me – and I so wanted just to believe in and 
  love the ideal, even if it meant shutting my eyes to everything. 'Oh, it's not hard to 
  deceive me; I happily deceive myself all on my own...'
579
  
 
No portrait of Tarkovsky can afford to ignore such intimate testimony; people who aim for public 
impact rarely fail to incur private costs for their ambition, costs which Tarkovsky may indeed have 
transferred to Surkova. But even Surkova, by the end of her book, finds it in her heart to forgive 
him: 'The best twenty years of my life were linked with this family and this man, Andrei Tarkovsky. 
Did he more than unfairly take advantage of me? So what if he did? None of this matters anymore; 
he was what he was, and all those of us who were close to him loved him for it.'
580
 Even Surkova 
herself suggests that the cancer which fully and finally killed their relationship was Larisa, not 
Andrei or his cancer; the extraordinary story of a visit to Italy to see Larisa, at Larisa's own 
insistence, while Andrei was filming Sacrifice reveals a scheme to sabotage Surkova's marriage and 
generally to undermine her self-confidence.
581
 Surkova, who never again saw Andrei or Larisa, has 
'never been able' to understand the meaning of Larisa's invitation and subsequent behaviour, 
although she provides evidence that Larisa was involved, more or less directly, in Andrei's decision 
to publish the book Printed Time, substantially edited and even rewritten by Surkova, without citing 
                                                 
579  Olga Surkova, Tarkovsky and I: A Pioneer's Diary, (Moscow, Zebra E. 2005, (2002)), pp. 12-13. 
580  Surkova, Tarkovsky and I, pp. 30-31. 
581  See Surkova, Tarkovsky and I, pp. 433-445. 
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Surkova as co-author.
582
 Did Larisa plan to humiliate and immiserate Surkova, a woman she must 
have suspected of romantic involvement with her husband, by whispering in her husband's ear? To 
absolve Andrei of all responsibility is to deny the man the very moral agency he spent his life 
defending; yet perhaps, just perhaps, his fear of offending Larisa was rooted in knowledge of her 
extreme fragility and insecurity, and his loyalty to her may have been, in part, a recognition of her 
need, if not for him, then for something urgent which no one could ultimately provide. To view 
Andrei's favouring of Larisa and her expensive appetites over the chaster, loftier calls of 
Bondarchuk and Surkova as a mere acknowledgment of his need for the practical help in which 
Larisa excelled, from the kitchen to the film set to the studio boardroom, would be to deny Andrei 
the sensitivity to emotional detail in which his films are bathed and which friends and children less 
betrayed than Surkova, and even Surkova herself, knew and loved. The likeliest explanation of 
Andrei's failure to leave Larisa and his insistence on taking her side despite repeated infidelities, 
hysterics and general emotional dishonesty is simply an inability to inflict suffering on someone so 
apparently vulnerable. That Tarkovsky could not see through Larisa's act, or saw through the act all 
too late with his portrayal of Adelaide in Sacrifice, is the great tragedy of his life, but it reflects a 
person far from incapable of attachment to concrete individuals; paradoxically, he was unable to 
believe enough in his own civilisational ideals to do the only thing they demanded: give up his 
ludicrous ideas regarding female spiritual autonomy, divorce Larisa and start again with someone 
capable of actually loving him and worthy of his own love. The traumatic experience of a first 
marriage breakup, and the effect of a further rupture on his sons, must also have been an important, 
if not decisive, factor.       
 Tarkovsky's other great betrayal, documented by Boyadzhieva and mentioned by Surkova, 
concerns Anatoly Solonitsyn, the actor who starred in four of Tarkovsky's seven films and with 
whom Tarkovsky maintained, if not a friendship, at the very least an intense professional and 
personal relationship bordering on a master-disciple dialectic. Tarkovsky failed to visit Solonitsyn 
as he was dying of cancer in Moscow, and, when it became apparent that Solonitsyn's condition was 
terminal, went ahead to cast Oleg Yankovsky in Nostalgia after having promised Solonitsyn the role 
just as soon as he was better. Both Boyadzhieva and Surkova remind us that Tarkovsky, for all his 
admiration of Solonitsyn's talent, felt that he had failed to nurture it and was at least partially 
responsible for his premature ill health. 'Solonitsyn built his life with no respect for his own talent. 
In his life he played the role of a kind of idiot, and led an irresponsible lifestyle. Artists should not 
live like that! They have a mission to fulfil,' Boyadzhieva quotes Tarkovsky as saying.
583
  
 Did Andrei fear the sight of his dying friend, unwilling to believe what he knew to be true 
                                                 
582  See Surkova, Tarkovsky and I, pp. 478. 
583  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 254.  
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about the severity of his conditon? Had he lost patience with a man he had spent a decade and a half 
trying to help? Did he really believe, as he was overheard saying, that those who get cancer deserve 
it? Or was he simply too busy to call in? Solonitsyn, if Boyadzhieva is to be believed – she provides 
no footnotes - certainly took the snub very personally indeed: 
 
  Leaving long-term for sunny Italy, Tarkovsky did not deem it necessary to visit  
  Solonitsyn or to comfort his terminally ill friend even with false assurances that he 
  would be better in time for shooting. 
   Comforting a dying man is a tedious task, particularly for someone like  
  Tarkovsky, who distinguished himself neither for his spiritual warmth nor for the 
  generosity of his feelings.  
   In one of his many interviews, the director said in passing: 'Freedom does not 
  exist as a choice; freedom is a spiritual state.' This may be a wonderful position when 
  defending artistic principles, but if it extends to liberation from personal obligations 
  of charity and sacrifice, it is flawed, and indeed borders on an anarchic disregard for 
  moral norms. He headed abroad, without saying goodbye to his favourite actor, his 
  'talisman', in full knowledge that he would probably never see him again. 
   When Solonitsyn was told that Tarkovsky was already filming in Italy with 
  Yankovsky, his legs were already paralysed. He asked his nurse to take down a photo 
  of Tarkovsky from the wall and never got off the couch again. 'He drank all my  
  blood,' he mumbled. Solonitsyn died short of his 47
th
 birthday.
584
  
 
It would be the task of a biographer – and a new biography is indeed called for - to improve on 
Boyadzhieva's broad thesis concerning her subject. I have suggested that there are reasons to take 
her less flattering conclusions seriously, as well as those of Surkova, without necessarily regarding 
them as definitive, and apportioning at least some of the blame, where blame is indeed to be 
apportioned, to Larisa and to aspects of Andrei's character which reflect an excess of sensitivity and 
sympathy, and at worst misogynistic prejudices typical of his time and place, rather than the 
borderline sociopathy that Boyadzhieva depicts.
585
 Nevertheless, the purpose of this section has 
                                                 
584  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 255.  
585  As George Scialabba says of Saul Bellow:  
   
  Some people were saying, “Really, how can anyone think Herzog or Augie March is a great novel when  the 
women characters are just there for the man to feel betrayed by, or impressed with his flair?” Well, yes, 
 that’s an aspect of the book, and I’m glad that feminism has made me notice that kind of thing. But that 
 doesn’t mean that in Augie March Saul Bellow didn’t practically invent a whole new prose style for 
 American fiction. So yes, they have flaws, but I’m still capable of enjoying the books despite those flaws. 
 (Lindsey Gilbert, ‘What Are Radicals Good For? An Interview with George Scialabba’, 
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been to introduce a man less likeable, and less liked, than either Naguib Mahfouz or Tu Weiming 
who nevertheless, through a felt engagement with the world through art, arrives at similar 
conclusions concerning the importance of civilisation and the urgency of the need to defend it – 
along with the high culture that transmits it from one generation to the next - in an age of 
apocalyptic weaponry and widespread moral decline caused by a loss of faith in 'deep truth' and 'the 
unity of all things'. After tales of sordid betrayal which could not, alas, not be told, Tarkovsky's 
straightforward love for his children, his love for his native Russia, and indeed his deep 
unselfishness and love for 'all things' will shine through the films he sacrificed so much to make, 
and also through the diary he kept in the last 15 years of his life, which we will address in turn.  
 
 
3.3 Ivan's Childhood (1962)
586
 
 
Tarkovsky's first feature film, Ivanogo Detstvo (Ivan's Childhood), is at once the least Tarkovskian 
of Tarkovsky's seven feature films – he inherited the project from another director - and the first 
iteration of the civilisation theme which runs through his subsequent œuvre; Tarkovsky's three 
student productions, in particular The Steamroller and the Violin (1961), are recognisably the work 
of the same man, but will not warrant our attention here.
587
 Ivan, whose childhood and family are 
destroyed by the Nazi invasion of Russia, refuses to be kept out of battle despite his age, and 
eventually lays down his life in defence against an aggressor which, as 12-year-old Ivan himself 
argues in the film, has completely lost touch with its high cultural tradition. Tarkovsky took to the 
project not least because he was Ivan's contemporary: 'Ivan is my brother! I was the same age when 
the war started. I am living out HIS life. [His story] recounts what could have happened to me.'
588
  
 That Ivan is the victim of evil, and a sufferer of what our century refers to as post-traumatic 
stress disorder, is beyond question; yet Ivan's heroism consists precisely in the fact that he 
circumvents Auden's famous law: he does not allow the evil done to him to make him do evil in 
return. Like the Confucian sage we will meet in Chapter 4, he meets malice with neither malice nor 
kindness but rather with justice and uprightness (as Tu's Confucius himself asks, 'If you meet malice 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 http://bostonreview.net/us/scialabba-interview-intellectuals-radicals, 20/11/13). 
 
 
586  Just as for Chapter 2.9 (dedicated to Mahfouz's Dweller in Truth and Arabian Nights and Days), citations from 
dialogue in the films under discussion in each of the next seven sections are not routinely footnoted (in order to 
avoid unnecessary clogging of the text). Please see the Bibliography for reference information for each film.  
587  For more discussion of the place of Ivan's Childhood in Tarkovsky's œuvre and the genesis of the project, see 
Igor Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky (Xudozhestvennaya Filosofiya Andreya Tarkovskogo), 
(St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2001), p. 11. 
588  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 110.  
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with kindness, what will you meet kindness with?'). No lesser Western critic than Jean-Paul Sartre, 
however, saw in Ivan an inability to love: 'Ivan is a prisoner of cruelty. This cruelty gets inside him. 
The Nazis killed him when they killed his mother and shot the inhabitants of his village. He 
remained physically alive of course, but at the same time, in this irreparable moment, he saw his 
whole future blotted out.'
589
 Sartre goes so far as to insist that Ivan 'proves unable to break out of the 
war-death nexus; in order to live, he must now live in this cruel world. When he engages in military 
activity, he frees himself from all fear, but then a new anguish takes hold of him.'
590
 Describing him 
further as the 'little victim', Sartre argues that Ivan 'knows what is required of him: war, blood, 
revenge', and that 'love is a permanently closed road for him.'
591
 Yet Sartre seems entirely to miss 
the point of Ivan's sacrifice: the desire to avenge the deaths of his loved ones has not an ounce of 
gratuity about it. Rather, Ivan's love, in particular for his mother, drives his quest for justice, 
relegating everything else, including 'the whole evil of the world' - which was, in the view of A. de 
Baecque as well as Sartre, 'enclosed in his being'
592
 - to the background. Simonetta Salvestroni, who 
saves her treatment of Ivanogo Detstvo for last in her 2007 book The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and 
Russian Spiritual Culture, takes precisely this view of motherly love as Ivan's north star in spite of 
the tremendous evil which befalls him. Commenting on the motif of the well in the film, Salvestroni 
argues that Ivan's 'mother's words about the star have a real effect on the dreaming boy. A light 
shines even in the depths of the well – in other words, in the black world of the war – because past, 
present and future are all embedded in the deep core of any human being.'
593
 The light at the bottom 
of the well, moreover, 'is the light seen by a person who has understood the essential: the oneness of 
past, present and future. This light is fuelled by the love of others and by a spirit of self-sacrifice 
and selfless dedication.'
594
 Although Ivan 'does not share his dearest memories with anyone', he 
nevertheless 'finds ways to express these feelings in his dreams, in games, and also in his choice of 
profession, a choice which he defends with all his might by refusing to be sent off to a military 
academy away from the front.'
595
 Despite his suffering, Ivan 'interacts meaningfully and vigorously 
with the adults around him', and is moroever 'governed by a sensitivity only aggravated by the 
traumas he has experienced.'
596
 Ivan, of course, is not actually alone; his mother, though dead, 
remains with him through his trauma; her example and her love even alert Ivan to the suffering of 
others. While the other soldiers ignore the written plea of the eight children butchered at the hands 
                                                 
589  See Simonetta Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture (Filmy Andreya 
Tarkovskogo i Russkaya Dukhovnaya Kultura), (Moscow: St. Andrew's Biblical Theological Institute, 2007), p. 113.  
590  See Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 113. 
591  See Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 113. 
592  A. de Baecque, Andrei Tarkovskij, (Paris: Editions de l'Etoile, 'Cahiers du cinema', 1989), p. 54.  
593  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 214.  
594  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 214.  
595  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 214.  
596  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 214.  
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of the Nazis, Ivan incorporates their suffering into his own thirst for justice: 
 
  Not one [of the other soldiers] pays any attention to the writing on the wall which so 
  struck the boy. He meaningfully illuminates the message several times with his light 
  when he is on his own thinking about the war: 'There were eight of us. Not one of us 
  was older than nineteen. Avenge our deaths.'  
   At precisely this point something important happens inside [Ivan]. The  
  experience of suffering caused by the loss of all that was dearest to him does not  
  allow him to remain indifferent and immobile before the suffering of others. When 
  Galtsev returns to check on him during a bombing raid, he finds the boy calm and 
  determined. With the moment of crisis averted, Ivan gets to his feet and replies to 
  Galtsev in a mature and confident voice: 'I am not afraid.' 
   [Ivan] is the first of Tarkovsky's heroes who is able to bring himself to the 
  point of sacrifice in the hope that future generations will be able to live in a better 
  world, one without the kinds of grief and loss which were visited on him. This  
  outlook is close to that of the artist Andrei Rublev, who after a long period of silence 
  realises that his calling is to 'bring happiness to people'; close to that of the  
  protagonist of The Mirror on the threshold of death, close to that of the Stalker, who 
  risks his life for the sake of his mission; close to Gorchakov, struggling with his  
  candle to cross the swimming pool; and close, too, to Alexander in Sacrifice.
597
  
  
Tarkovsky's recourse to documentary footage at the end of the film serves to situate Ivan's personal 
suffering in the broader economy of Russian and human suffering during the Second World War, 
but ultimately the story of Ivan is one of a triumph of love and civilisation over malice and 
barbarism: fhe function of the documentary footage is 'to go beyond the individual experience of the 
protagonists and to situate it in the wider context of the sufferings of this whole generation. This 
technique will be used again later in The Mirror.'
598
 Concluding on a wholly positive note, 
Salvestroni argues that 'Ivan, like Gorchakov and Alexey in The Mirror, recovers in the moment of 
death what he had lost. The music of Ovchinnikov leads us back to a bright and happy world. We 
return to the state of affairs at the beginning of the film, as if the war had never happened.'
599
  
 Ivanogo Detstvo testifies to the power of motherly love to transmit universal moral values and 
faith in the unity of all things in spite of the obstacles presented by war; even Ivan grudgingly 
                                                 
597  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, pp. 214-215.  
598  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 216. 
599  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 216. 
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admits that a German writer 'from 400 years ago' might have something to offer the world despite 
the fact that the current generation of Germans is busy burning books and disgracing itself. Much as 
Mahfouz's Awlad Haratna (Children of Gebelawi) dramatises the transgenerational struggle of 
civilisation to keep the hounds of war and evil at bay, Ivanogo Detstvo shows that even an enemy as 
thoroughly evil as Nazism can be resisted if those resisting it have a heritage of love and morality to 
call on.  
 
 
3.4 Andrei Rublev (1966) 
 
Although Igor Evlampiev sees signs of the influence of the 19
th
 century Russian philosophical and 
spiritual tradition in Ivanogo Detstvo, an essentially Soviet-commissioned film, he takes Andrei 
Rublev as the start of the Tarkovskian œuvre proper, and the 'key' to all that comes after it. For 
Evlampiev, it is the idea of vseedinstvo which is central to the tradition which Tarkovsky inherited, 
and central to Tarkovsky's 'artistic philosophy'. Although Tarkovsky did not, Evlampiev argues, 
conduct a formal study of this tradition – from Solovev's idea of bogochelovechestvo, the perfect 
union of man and God, to Karsavin's idea of zhertvovanie, the need to sacrifice oneself 'to the world 
and all people' as Jesus did, and beyond - its central thrust formed the 'bedrock' of his own 
philosophical outlook.
600
 Evlampiev traces the history of this tradition from its beginnings down to 
its misappropriation by the Soviets, starting with the 'the principle which is present in essentially all 
Russian philosophers from P. Chaadaev to S. Frank and L. Karsavin: the idea of vseedinstvo.'
601
 
With its long history in European philosophy, 'originating in the philosophy of Plato', reaching its 
'first clear expression in neo-Platonism', then becoming 'a fixture of Christian mysticism' and finally 
'a feature of the grandiose systems of German idealism – the systems of Schelling and Hegel' -  
Russian philosophy, 'beginning its rapid development in the 1830s, took onboard the ideas of all 
these  movements, fusing them with a native and extremely old Russian cultural constant: namely, 
the pagan notion of the magical oneness of the world, the relationship of everything with everything 
else.'
602
 Evlampiev then explains how the essence of vseedinstvo in Russian philosophy is the drive 
towards 'a state in which the fragmentation [of the world], the alienation of its various elements 
from each other, is overcome. If this state of 'all-unitedness' could be realised, the world would form 
a harmonious whole, each tiny element of which would be imbued with a unique meaning and a 
                                                 
600  See Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 11. 
601  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 11. 
602  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 11.  
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unique beauty.'
603
 The Soviets got this idea of sacrifice for unity backwards; indeed, 'Meyer's 
reasoning about the need for acts of sacrifice (both voluntary and compelled by fate) in the life of 
every individual can be seen as an attempt to reflect on and offer a kind of justification for the order 
which emerged in Soviet Russia between the 1920s and 1940s and consigned millions of people to a 
painful death or a slavelike subsistence.'
604
  
 While no lesser Russian writer than Vladimir Nabokov railed against vseedinstvo as yet 
another meaningless 'big idea', preferring instead Tolstoy's novelistic attention to moral detail and 
the precise contours of the moral unity to which Tolstoy, as a de facto part of this tradition, 
subscribed
605
, even Nabokov inherited, as Tarkovsky did, the 19
th
 century Russian intelligentsia's 
disdain for the related concept of poshlost'. Ivan Ilyin defined as poshloe 'any existence wholly 
subordinated to superficial material well-being, deprived of a sense of the mystery of life' 
(Evlampiev also asks us to 'recall that precisely this word is employed by the travelling doctor at the 
beginning of [The Mirror] to describe the wrongness of our contemporary lives').
606
 In his later 
writings Ilyin 'insisted on emphasising that poshlost' by its very nature means the absence of deep 
religious feeling, the feeling through which the intact existence of God and His "candle-glow" in 
every earthly object reveal themselves to us.'
607
 Evlampiev then quotes Ilyin directly on poshlost', 
detecting therein a distinctly Arnoldian disdain for its philistine qualities:   
 
   'True religiosity,' writes Ilyin, 'is a feeling that a human being fits in with all the  
   things and events and relationships in her life, thereby remaining in God's light […] 
   and finding in everything a corresponding godly light. This godly light is the main 
   thing in everything, the most important, the most valuable, the most prominent, and 
   everything is made meaningful, profound and sacred by it; without it everything is 
   empty, miserable, trifling, unmeaningful and void. For this emptiness and baseness, 
   for this meaninglessness and weakness, the Russian language found a name over a 
   hundred years ago, and created a special concept for it: poshlost'. […] Poshlost' takes 
   the business of life and the things of the world as if no sacred existential mystery 
   lived in them. It regards things not in their main essence or from their main essence; 
                                                 
603  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 11.  
604  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 15. This perversion of the Orthodox ideal of 
sacrifice is directly comparable to the perversion of Confucianism by Mao according to Tu Weiming: one's 
willingness to sacrifice even one's nearest and dearest for the cause of revolution, of being able to 'bear' even their 
suffering. The true Confucian ideal elaborated by Mencius, meanwhile, involves an extension of the inability to bear 
suffering outwards from self and family to embrace, eventually, the entire cosmos. It is in precisely this sense that, 
as we will see in more detail in Chapter 4, the Confucian Way is described as 'a heavy burden indeed'.    
605  See in particular Nabokov's Lectures on Russian Literature, (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2002), for a 
discussion of moral unity in Tolstoy's Anna Karenina.  
606  See Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 174. 
607  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 174. 
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   it takes the inessential in them, quite as if there were nothing essential at all in  
   them.'
608
 
 
While Ilyin clearly 'has in mind the canonical Orthodox tradition and a canonical understanding of 
the relationships between man and God', and Evlampiev reminds us that 'the religiosity which is 
undoubtedly present in Tarkovsky's worldview is a long way from dogmatic Church Christianity'
609
,  
Tarkovsky's critique of materialism, both the dialectical materialism of Marxism-Leninism and 
Western consumerist materialism, is launched in precisely these 'anti-poshloe' terms, beginning in 
earnest with Andrei Rublev. The 'way' to truth and unity is to follow the example of Jesus the man, 
independent of revelation, and to pass the flame of sacrifice on to others, as Boriska does through 
his sacrifices to rebuild the town bell destroyed by barbarian invasion, thereby physically reigniting 
in Rublev, by the sheer power of his moral example, the desire to serve and sacrifice for human 
civilisation by fulfilling his talent for icon painting and spreading the light of God in the medieval 
Russian darkness surrounding him. Indeed, 'the transformation brought into the world by Boriska's 
work is not full and final – it needs to be continued', not just by Andrei Rublev but by us, and 
ultimately by everyone committed to the Arnoldian idea of human perfectibility: 'Boriska's sacrifice 
needs to be taken up by people who, committing themselves in turn to their own voluntary acts of 
sacrifice, following the path of the cross on their own, dying and coming back to life in their own 
versions of the Calvary, take sacrifice even further and make the world even better.'
610
 Evlampiev 
then describes in detail how Tarkovsky achieves this Arnoldian goal in the final frames of the film, 
where we see 'how Andrei Rublev symbolically takes up Boriska's sacrifice in order to continue the 
work of Jesus and all those who followed him'.
611
 Not for the only time in the Tarkovskian œuvre, 
there is an important difference between the screenplay and the finished cinematic product: 'in the 
script, Andrei finds Boriska on a muddy road; in the film, Tarkovsky adds some characteristic 
touches to this scene: Boriska walks through an area full of instruments of torture, and falls on a 
stake which is likely designed for torture and execution.'
612
 Evlampiev interprets this episode as 
'Boriska's last steps on his path to the Cross; when Andrei bends down next to the crying boy and 
lifts him up, we have before us an image created by Tarkovsky which corresponds exactly to the 
iconographic tradition of depicting the mourning of Christ.'
613
 The film does not end here, however; 
the colour snapshots of Rublev's immortal icons, including 'The Transfiguration', 'The Resurrection 
of Lazarus', and 'The Trinity', create 'an image of the enlightened and harmonious world which 
                                                 
608  See Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, pp. 174-175. 
609  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 175.  
610  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 118. 
611  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 118. 
612  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 118. 
613  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 118. 
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appeared to Andrei at the end of his path to the Cross and his Calvary and up to the end of his life 
itself, and which culminated in true resurrection and immortality.'
614
 Nevertheless, the final image 
in the film is Jesus himself, 'the image of sacrifice'; for Evlampiev, Tarkovsky's civilisational 
message here is unambiguous: 'If people renounce their foreordained purpose and renounce Jesus, 
the images of a perfect world will remain only images, only the dreams of an artist lifted 
temporarily above the tragic prose of life.'
615
 The film thus ends with a clear call to arms: 'the fate of 
Jesus – the man, not the god – is a reflection of the deepest essence of Being. The rain running over 
the icon of the Saviour and the final shots of an earthly harmony emphasise the unseverable unity of 
personal destiny and the destiny of the world, and show that the way of Jesus is the only path to 
transforming the world.'
616
  
 Responding to criticism that the film was 'cruel and dark', Tarkovsky was adamant: 'I don't 
find that. If anything it was faithful [to the period], or at least tried to express our connection with 
Rublev's era.'
617
 The burst of colour at the end of the film, Rublev's legacy to posterity, is a triumph 
over cruelty and darkness, a triumph which Tarkovsky wants to show is made possible by Boriska's 
sacrifice and the spontaneous feelings of love which Boriska's efforts on behalf of civilisation ignite 
inside Rublev. This, the path of civilisation still recognisable to us centuries on, is what unites 
Rublev's epoch with our own and with what Evlampiev repeatedly describes as the 'world of 
eternity' beyond, or rather inside, the 'world of time'. 
 Natalya Bondarchuk, for her part, describes the effect of the film in general, and the 'bell 
episode' in particular, on her own destiny: 
 
  I doubt that any work of art had such a painful and beautiful effect on me as Rublev. 
   In the 'bell' episode I was struck by the image of the boy-creator, almost a 
  child, feeling the truth. For me this became a symbol of Tarkovsky's entire œuvre and 
  his faith in beauty and perfection. Squeezing effort from the large collective of  
  people who worked with him, Tarkovsky led them forward, working towards his bell. 
  The thin, brooding face of the actor Nikolai Burlyaev enshrines in itself all the power 
  and vulnerability of the creating artist. The image of the young man, the bell master, 
  remained forever in my soul, and we can say that the work of Tarkovsky determined 
  my future fate, joining me as it did to my future husband.
618
     
                                                 
614  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 118. 
615  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 118. 
616  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 118. 
617  See Volkova, Andrei Tarkovsky: Nostalgia p. 207.  
618  Natalya Bondarchuk, 'Meeting on Solaris', in M.A. Tarkovskaya (ed.), On Tarkovsky (O Tarkovskom), 
(Moscow: Progress, 1989), p. 152. In an analogous spirit to Bondarchuk, Marina Tarkovskaya, Tarkovsky's sister 
and editor of this volume, stresses on p. 10: 'I embarked on collecting this volume of reminiscences out of a feeling 
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Andrei Rublev, indeed, for all Tarkovsky's painstaking attempts to recreate physically the dreadful 
poverty and ignorance of the time, is neither a 'historical' nor a ''biographical' film
619
; much as 
Mahfouz creates an idealised Akhenaten for openly moralising and contemporary nation-building 
purposes, so too does Tarkovsky seek to create a figure recognisable as the soul of modern Russia, 
the soul which saved conscience-based civilisation from the plundering Mongols and Tatars in 
medieval times and which, as depicted in Ivanogo Detstvo, ultimately defeated Nazism. 
 To critics accusing him of historical inaccuracy, Tarkovsky replied that he had 'added a 
lacquer to reality, in order to preserve hope'.
620
 The goal was 'a return to national memory, to the 
beginnings, the sources, the wellspring'.
621
 But just as Mahfouz's goal with his explorations of the 
glorious Egyptian past and his calls for 'independence' were primarily to secure universal rights and 
values in the present, so too Tarkovsky's 'system of values lived in him independent of the themes of 
Old Rus or national memory'
622
. Jesus, Boriska and Rublev are important examples, but that is all 
they are; the past matters because of its connection with the present and especially the future, not 
for its own sake. This is the very meaning of these men's sacrifice; it is only because they believe in 
the 'world of eternity' and the ultimate unity of all things – past, present and future - that their 
sacrifices for the future of civilisation make sense.
623
  
 Some, including the head cameraman on Andrei Rublev, Vadim Yusov, who described the 
years spent working on the film as 'the best years of our lives, the best days and hours'
624
, regarded 
Tarkovsky's decision to tell his own story, or rather the story of his mother's sacrifice for him, in 
Zerkalo (The Mirror) as 'an incomprehensible and unpleasant attempt to draw undue attention to 
himself'
625
 rather than as an unselfish attempt to make his own contribution to 'the best that has been 
thought and said', to leave behind his own 'corner of the truth' for the future. Tarkovsky himself 
explains his self-sacrificing impulses, from Andrei Rublev to Zerkalo and beyond, in 'The Artist in 
Old Rus and Modern Russia', with reference to the opening scene in Andrei Rublev: 'the episode 
with the flying man was a symbol of bravery,' he says, 'in the sense that creation demands complete 
self-sacrifice of a person. Whether a person wants to fly before it is possible, or to erect a bell 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of love for my brother and a duty to preserve his memory.' 
619  See Lev Anninsky, 'Andrei's Apocalypse', in Y.A. Yaropolov (ed.), Unknown Tarkovsky: The Stalker of World 
Cinema (Neizvestnyy Tarkovsky: Stalker Mirovogo Kino), (Moscow, Eksmo, 2012), p. 124. 
620  Anninsky, 'Andrei's Apocalypse', p. 128.  
621  Anninsky, 'Andrei's Apocalypse', p. 139.  
622  Anninsky, 'Andrei's Apocalypse' p. 142. 
623  Mahfouz, for all his insistence on being a 'novelist of the present', also shared this view of the radical unity of 
past, present and future, as the quote chosen to introduce this chapter suggests: 'The present is what we suffer, the 
future what we hope for, and the past what we cherish, both bitter and sweet,' he says in his interview for the 1999 
French documentary Passage du siècle (http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x34wrl_naguib-mahfouz-passage-du-
siecle_creation).  
624  Vadim Yusov, 'The Best Years of Our Lives', in Yaropolov (ed.), Unknown Tarkovsky, p. 44.  
625  Yusov, 'The Best Years of Our Lives', p. 44. 
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without knowing how to do it, or to create an icon, they all require that the person die for her 
creation, disappear in her work, give all of herself.'
626
 Indeed, the slipperiness of identities in 
Zerkalo, with fathers becoming sons and wives mothers, and the attempts to insert, again via 
documentary footage, the sufferings of the Spanish Civil War, the dramas of the Communist 
revolution in China, and not least the Second World War further suggests that Tarkovsky's goal was 
not to 'draw undue attention to himself', but rather to insert this humble family story into the 
immense wider unity in which it was lived, to the point where the protagonists all but 'disappear' 
inside it but for the sparks of inspiration and civilisation they, like Boriska and Rublev, leave 
behind.  
 Tarkovsky embarked on Andrei Rublev precisely because these Jesus-inspired sparks of 
civilisation were being not only forgotten but actively suppressed in Soviet Russia. Although the 
likes of Alexander Meyer took advantage of the 19th-century Russian philosophical tradition's 
emphasis on self-sacrifice to justify sacrifices under communism, Tarkovsky's film was, to put it 
mildly, not entirely palatable to Soviet authorities hungry for easily digestible realist patriotism; 
Andrei Rublev marked the beginning of Tarkovsky's long battle with Soviet film bosses which 
limited his output to a mere seven films and, after Stalker, finally culminated in emigration. 
Tarkovsky's interest in recovering the glories of Russia's pre-revolutionary past, and in stressing the 
parallels between the contemporary Soviet Union, pounded by Nazism, and the humbled, ravaged 
Russia of Rublev's time simply did not fit the Communist progress narrative at all; as Salvestroni 
points out, Tarkovsky preparing for Rublev found himself in an analogous situation to Boriska, 
trying to recover a tradition dying all around him: 'like Boriska, who did not receive from his dying 
father the secret of bell-making and was therefore forced to go blind in his quest to "bring people 
happiness", so too Tarkovsky lived in a world which had all but buried its artistic and cultural 
traditions and banned, at least officially, access to its spiritual sources.'
627
 Salvestroni also highlights 
the fact that 'when Andrei Rublev was made and distributed, religious literature was hard to get, and 
there were practically no fora for discussing such themes'; although 'the sale of the Gospels was 
banned under Soviet law, as well as the writings of the Church fathers and the religious literature 
which had abounded in the personal libraries of Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoyevsky and other writers', 
Tarkovsky nevertheless found a way to familiarise himself with the Bible, repeatedly citing it in this 
film and others.
628
 Salvestroni nevertheless stresses just how much civilisational wisdom Tarkovsky 
could not possibly have been able to access: 'he had a strong thirst for Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, 
                                                 
626  See Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 12 (taken from Andrei 
Tarkovsky, 'The Artist in Old Rus and Modern Russia' ('L'artista nella antica Russia e nella Russia moderna'), Il 
Dramma, 1/1/1970).   
627  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 13. 
628  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 13. 
 217 
 
a trinity about which Church fathers and theologians had written so much but whose writings would 
scarcely have been known to a director in the 1960s.'
629
   
 Salvestroni's fine treatment of Andrei Rublev goes on to trace Rublev's own spiritual 
development, possible only 'after years of seclusion and training within the safe walls of the 
monastery' and then a first-hand experience of suffering and guilt in the 'real world', leading 'to a 
deep understanding of reality which later lights up his masterpieces'.
630
 Nothing under the sun 
comes from nothing; like Rublev in his monastery, Tarkovsky did have a direct adolescent 
connection to Russia's deep Orthodox roots, and that connection was primarily literary rather than 
philosophical or theological: Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Pushkin. Salvestroni argues that Rublev's words 
to Theophanes the Greek about the Russian people are 'close to the words of Pushkin in his letter to 
Chaadaev which are read aloud in The Mirror. They link the figure of Christ, accompanied by a few 
frightened and confused disciples, with the figure of the artist and his role.'
631
  Tarkovsky himself 
tells us what this role is: 
 
  The aim of art is to dig up and loosen [one's] soul, to make it capable of turning to 
  Good. When coming into contact with a great work of art, a person starts to hear the 
  same call which prompted the artist to make it in the first place. When there is a real 
  link between the work of art and the spectator, she experiences a deep and cleansing 
  spiritual shock.
632
 […] All my films in one way or another are about how people are 
  not alone and are not abandoned in an empty universe, but are rather linked by  
  countless threads to the past and the future, and that the fate of each person is linked 
  with the world and the path of humanity as a whole.
633
  
 
For Salvestroni, 'we see precisely this process in action in the final episode of the film – "The Bell". 
Here Rublev witnesses the exhausting labour of a boy who, going by intuition, devotes himself to 
the task of continuing a lost tradition and making a bell.'
634
 Kirill, Rublev's once-jealous rival, also 
drives the unequivocal message of Boriska's sacrifice home: 
 
  Indeed, it is none other than Kirill who is on his knees begging Rublev to start  
  painting icons again. 
                                                 
629  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 13. 
630  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 19.  
631  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 26.  
632  Andrei Tarkovsky, Printed Time (Zapechatlennoe Vremya/Scolpire nel Tempo), (Milano: Ubulibri, 1988), p. 
141. 
633  Tarkovsky, Printed Time, p. 326.  
634  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 33.  
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   'I am a worm. You have got your talent from God. Don't commit the sin of 
  wasting it.'  
   In this episode Kirill, Boriska and Rublev influence each other's fate and help 
  each other to complete their various missions. The mission of two of these three is to 
  'bring people happiness'. Kirill's bitterness over his lack of talent gives way, after a 
  long ordeal, to humility and quiet unselfishness, allowing him to complete his  
  modest, but necessary, task: to stir up his once-hated brother and force him to rethink 
  his sin of not making full use of God's gift. […] Rublev comes to see [the truth of 
  this] when contemplating Boriska's struggle.
635
  
 
Rublev has learnt, with a combination of prior education, adult suffering and Boriska's inspiration, 
to overcome his self-centred and reclusive dwelling on the past and to embrace the 'world of 
eternity' and the civilisation of which he is a part: 'You've seen yourself that everything's fine, so 
what's the matter with you? Come on, let's get out of here, you and me. You can make bells, and I'll 
paint icons. […] Just think what a holiday this is for people! You've brought them so much 
happiness; what are you crying for?'  
 
 
3.5 Solaris (1972) 
 
In his bid to Goskino for the Solaris project, Tarkovsky wrote: 'the storyline of Solaris is powerful, 
intense, full of unexpected twists and arresting collisions. We are certain, above all, that the film 
will enjoy commercial success.' Nevertheless, the sci-fi thrills and spills of the film would in no 
way replace the moral message of Ivanogo Detstvo and Andrei Rublev: 'these people from the future 
represent the ideal of moral purity to which our descendants should aspire in order to achieve 
victory on the path of perfecting reason, honour and moral character [nravstvennost'].
636
 Perhaps 
only in Chekhov's Three Sisters do we find, in the Russian literary canon, such open concern for the 
moral and material fate of the species, for what the world will look like 'in a thousand years'. For all 
Tarkovsky's interest in cosmic processes and civilisational themes, however, it all starts, as the film 
does, at home, on Earth, around the hearth. In the words of Boyadzhieva, 'the Earth is the starting-
point for all that happens in the film. It is the homeland, the source of human passions, our highs 
and lows.'
637
 Nevertheless, 'in the film the symbol of modern earthly civilisation is the long journey 
                                                 
635  Salvestroni, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Russian Spiritual Culture, p. 34.  
636  See Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 178.  
637  Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross, p. 182.  
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through the labyrinth of motorways which was shot in Japan. In contrast to this industrial world 
there is the world of living nature, of peaceful human existence.'
638
 For all his modern scientific and 
extraterrestrial adventures, Kris Kelvin and his conscience ultimately return to reconnect with his 
father's house and surrounding garden, where he began the film. His affair with the neutrino Hari, 
itself a continuation of the one true Earthly love in his life, far from distancing him from his family, 
actually leads him back to it, to a realisation that all is connected in conscience: 'the beloved 
woman, who had died on Earth, returns to Kris, in order to give him the chance to understand that 
the basis of all cosmic law is the observance of moral standards. He follows his conscience; having 
gone through Hari's death and resurrection, he no longer wants to destroy [the new Hari] even 
though he knows that she is made up of neutrinos.'
639
 This discovery of truth and unity in 
conscience frees Kris to overcome his fear of death and personal annihilation. Evlampiev describes 
this overcoming of death as 'one of the most important thematic lines in the film': 'in the prologue to 
Solaris Kris's father's house appears as the unshakable foundation  of the local earthly world, a form 
of order which maintains itself only thanks to the efforts of its owner. Not by chance is the house 
itself rooted in history, in the past', for as Kris's father himself says: 'this house is similar to my 
grandfather's house; I liked it a lot, and your mother and I decided to build one like it.'
640
 Kris's 
father and his sister Anna are 'the true keepers of the house, and take responsibility for the whole 
miniature world associated with it.'
641
 On the one hand, this effort to maintain a house over time 
seems futile: 'the incompleteness of the earthly world is most clearly shown by the fact that the 
house, built by human beings as the basis of their existence and a stronghold of their efforts to 
transform the surrounding world, is exposed to the forces of time; sooner or later it will die.'
642
 On 
the other, however, 'human beings have the strength to fight against time and the destruction that it 
brings; they are able to rebuild their houses and in so doing to conquer death, if only indirectly.'
643
 
Although Kris's father's house is only 'simulating a continuation of life' and is 'not identical to its 
grandfatherly prototype', there is nevertheless 'a chance for human beings – of which they are not 
yet fully conscious - to overcome death in its very essence and to abolish its absolute metaphysical 
significance. Precisely this overcoming is one of the main themes of Solaris.'
644
 The way to achieve 
this absolute overcoming of death is through an absolute identification, via conscience, with 
everything in one's life-path through a simultaneous felt attachment to past, present and future. 
While this process starts with attachment to the family home, it ends with 'feeling responsible for 
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everything that happens in the world'; after initially trying to dispose of the inconvenient and 
unsettling neutrino Hari, Kris eventually 'starts to treat her like his own resurrected wife'.
645
 This is 
precisely what Snawt and Sartorius, 'who still look upon these "guests" as merely part of a hostile 
and foreign world and do not recognise them as part of themselves, as a "continuation" of their own 
selves in the infinite realm of being, are incapable of doing.' Hari herself tells them so in the 
Library: 'I think Kris Kelvin has been more consistent than either of you. In inhuman conditions he 
has behaved humanely, while you act as if none of this concerns you, treating your "guests" – as it 
seems you like to call them – as something foreign, when in fact they are related to your very 
selves.' Evlampiev concludes that Kris 'gradually changes his entire system of ideas about himself 
and his place in the world', and comes 'to reject his earlier conviction that human beings and the 
surrounding world are in absolute opposition to each other and his feeling that humans are 
somehow "superior" to nature, and becomes aware of his responsibility for all that happens in the 
world and his guilt before it'.
646
 Solaris charts Kris's path from narrow-minded scientist, committed 
to investigating a world external to himself and gaining control over that world, to morally engaged 
cosmic citizen. At the beginning of the film, 'the feeling of responsibility for the small world around 
his father's house does not exercise a decisive pull on Kris's soul. He sees this feeling as merely a 
part of his relationship with his father and considers it meaningful only in the narrow context of 
family politics.'
647
 Kris's real energies flow in another direction entirely: 'a single conviction, indeed 
a single faith, reigns in his heart: faith in scientific reason, aimed at a final understanding and 
conquest of the world. Convinced of the greatness and power of human reason, he gives his total 
service to its ideals and challenges, chief among which (whether he consciously realises it or not) is 
the achievement of domination over the infinite expanse surrounding us.'
648
 Tarkovsky, however, 
will explore in Solaris (and later in Stalker) the possibility that observational instruments and 
narrowly empirical methods, for all their amazing discoveries and all their success at improving our 
material lot, may not be enough to penetrate the deepest mysteries of the cosmos; conscience may 
have a role to play. In Solaris, this position is represented by Burton, who tries to persuade Kris not 
to act immorally in his dealings with the Ocean and argues that 'knowledge is only true knowledge 
when it is based in moral feeling [nravstvennost']'. At the beginning of the film, Kris 
misunderstands the role of nravstvennost' in science, regarding it as a 'sub-region of the truth, as 
second-order knowledge about the desirability or otherwise of the application of new scientific 
discoveries'; on this view, an immoral application of science is 'tantamount to an "incorrect" or 
"inexpedient" application, a result of incorrect or incomplete reasoning about moral truth. The 
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possibility of such immoral applications of scientific knowledge ought not to stop the scientist on 
her path towards exact knowledge.'
649
 On the surface, this view of the relationship between science 
and morality looks Arnoldian enough: the union of the purely scientific and the moral forms of truth 
'gives the absolute truth, in the context of which error is no longer possible'; but the goal is a 
philistine, imperial one rather than a properly civilised one: namely, in Evlampiev's words, the 
achievement of 'dominion over all that surrounds [us]'.
650
 For Burton, by contrast, 'nravstvennost' is 
not a "sub-discipline" of reason, but a sphere of the soul utterly distinct from reason which defines 
all that is most important in human beings and at the same time connected to a certain vital 
dimension of reality as a whole which reason cannot penetrate.'
651
 The truly Arnoldian marriage of 
morality and science represented by Burton's position means, in contrast to the prevailing philistine 
view, 'subordinating reason and all its methods and forms of domination over nature to a deeper 
capability: a direct, individual, and responsible approach to existence, with all its strange, 
unrationalisable calls and voices.'
652
 Burton's discovery of this 'vital dimension of reality' ends up 
'overturning all of his established beliefs'; 'in the service of scientific reason and scientific truth, 
which relegates all that is purely personal and 'all-too-human' to a subordinate status, Burton comes 
up against the need to regard precisely the personal as the key to understanding the laws under 
which non-human cosmic forms exist.'
653
       
 Kris only starts to realise the wisdom of Burton's advice once he gets to Solaris; there, he 
finds Sartorius feverishly conducting a range of hideous experiments, tragically oblivious to the 
Ocean's responsiveness to human emotion: 'Now we should only be thinking about our duty,' 
Sartorius says in a sermonising tone. 'Duty to whom?' Kris asks. 'To the truth.' 'That means, to 
people.' 'That's not where you search for truth.' After these words, 'Sartorius looks away from Kris, 
looks straight ahead, at us, and, nodding in the direction of the station windows behind which 
Solaris rises and brilliantly shines, adds in the tone of a man who has found what he is looking for: 
'That's where you search for truth!'
654
 Even Kris's close friend and colleague Gibarian, although he 
recognises that the Ocean's effect on him is not to provoke madness but rather to activate 
'something connected with conscience', takes Sartorius's view that the only bearable solution to the 
mystery of the Ocean is to bombard it with radiation. For Evlampiev, Gibarian's inability to take up 
the moral challenge posed by the Ocean is a result of physical and emotional isolation on Solaris 
and of distance from the warmth of civilisation. Gibarian did not have anyone to prepare or 
accompany him on his arduous journey, and ended up committing suicide; his role in the film is 
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precisely to provide Kris with the support he himself never had: along with other 'eternal' figures in 
the Tarkovskian œuvre, like Asafiev and the two mysterious women in Zerkalo, Gibarian is for 
Evlampiev 'eternal in the context of being as a whole and continues to exist in "other worlds"'; 
moreover, 'even after death Gibarian is tied to the world in which Kris exists, and is capable of 
influencing it. Tarkovsky stresses the equal moral status of Kris and Gibarian and the 
interwovenness of past and present with a series of subtle brushstrokes', including the life-size video 
recording of Gibarian's final message to Kris with its 'sharp sound and the voice of Sartorius, calling 
on Gibarian to open the door. Kris turns quickly towards the door of his own room, as if these 
sounds from the past had been transferred into his present.'
655
 Evlampiev then points out that   
'exactly the same device is used to underline the interwovenness of past and present during the 
earthly prologue, when Kris watches the tape with the recording of Burton's meeting with the 
commission. Kris and his aunt ask questions as they watch, to which the participants in the meeting 
taking place on screen in turn respond.'
656
 Just as the recording of Burton's meeting is in black and 
white, Gibarian's message is also deprived of colour 'ostensibly for the same reason', namely that, 
like Burton, 'he finds himself in a situation of absolute despair and hopelessness.'
657
 Alone on 
Solaris, unable to confide in either Snawt or Sartorius, 'an experience of unbearable moral suffering 
as a result of some secret buried deep in his soul - visible only to him and suddenly presented to 
him in all its shameless nudity - causes [Gibarian] to lose touch with the natural "fabric" of life, and 
with other people.'
658
 His desperate suggestion to bombard the Ocean with radiation acts as a 
reductio ad absurdum of Sartorius's argument, allowing Kris to see a truth that Gibarian could not 
see for himself: 
 
  Now, sitting in his room in front of the empty screen on which Gibarian has just  
  pronounced his last words, Kris fully and finally realises the untruth of Sartorius's 
  position, or in other words the wrongness of his own position until he arrived at the 
  station. The light of the unearthly day out of the station windows becomes for him a 
  faded, meaningless grey with nothing to say about the true nature of the powerful 
  'being' in whose captivity they find themselves on this planet. […] The fear and  
  confusion felt by Kris upon witnessing the 'resurrection' of his dead wife already 
  themselves bear witness to just how unbelievable and beyond the bounds of all he 
  thought conceiveable or plausible his situation has become. The main problem with 
  our clear-headed, rational consciouness is its extreme sureness of itself and its  
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  inability to understand that there is always room in existence for the absolutely new, 
  the absolutely foreign in comparison with all that is familiar and expected; all feeling 
  of the mystery of existence is absent from it. Returning to an earlier concept, we  
  could call this type of consciousness poshloe, sliding over the surface of things and 
  incapable of recognising the inexhaustible depth hidden in them.
659
   
 
The ability to overcome poshlost' and to 'wish for the impossible' is a vital antidote to bland 
scientism, and may be rewarded in this life as well as the next; Kris's deepest 'impossible wish' – to 
see his dead wife again – is in fact granted by the Ocean as a reward for his faith in possibility: 
'the whole story of Kris and Hari's relationship in the station shows the battle between two sides of 
his personality and the eventual victory of the deeper, more sensitive incarnation, capable of 
wishing for the impossible, over the "lighter", more superficial character, who considers his main 
achievement a slavish obedience to the laws of necessity.'
660
 Without this faith in possibility, faith in 
the possibility that the world is more than a 'hostile environment' to be conquered and is rather some 
kind of organic, enduring unity, there can be no self-sacrifice (for Tarkovsky, lest we forget, the 
highest of human gestures), as Evlampiev once again peerlessly explains: 
 
  Life is a mystery, and everything that happens in it happens for the first time and 
  demands responsible decision-making in the here-and-now and not on the basis of 
  pre-formed stereotypes. There is only one rule or principle: human beings are  
  responsible for all that happens to them and around them, and should act as if no one 
  besides themselves is capable of solving the problem before them: to save everything 
  that needs saving, to bring harmony to all that requires harmony, to give a shot at life 
  to all that is dying around them. And they should do all of this without thinking of 
  themselves or their own future; the only justifiable position in this world is one of 
  self-sacrifice. We are called not to rule over existence, but to submit voluntarily to it 
  and to sacrifice ourselves. Only by so doing, even if it involves suffering and death, 
  will we be able to achieve a relative harmony with the world, and thereby with  
  ourselves, since the world is the only basis of true human nature, and does not form a 
  hostile outside to that nature.
661
  
 
The Russian tradition, and never more famously than in Dostoyevsky, often tends to portray the 
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need for self-sacrifice in terms of guilt rather than faith or love, or in other words, in seemingly 
negative rather than positive terms. As an heir to this rather unsmiling Orthodox Christian tradition, 
Tarkovsky makes much of guilt in his films and certainly suffered from it acutely in his own life, 
and in Solaris too the link between self-sacrifice and guilt is made clear as Kris faces up to Hari's 
suicide and his unexpected chance to make amends: 'not only does Hari become a new person by 
interacting with Kris, or rather becomes human in the first place, but Kris also is changed by his 
experience. A feeling of guilt is now at the heart of his new relationship with the world.'
662
 
Gradually, as if in a Dostoyevsky novel, 'the rational arguments showing the uselessness of this 
feeling and its inability to influence the laws of necessity lose their power for him'; moreover, 'the 
awareness of his guilt towards Hari, and in a wider context, towards all people and all of existence, 
becomes the main constituent of his character, complementing his feelings of love for his 
resurrected wife.'
663
 Since 'only an act of self-sacrifice can match the act at the root of one's guilt 
and bridge the "gap" introduced into existence by the guilty party', Kris decides to sacrifice himself, 
'giving up his whole past life for the "ghost", the "guest" that Snawt and Sartorius are ready to 
destroy with highly sophisticated equipment'.
664
 While Sartorius is disgusted by Kris's ritual gesture 
in the Library, 'it is precisely this decisive step by Kris which saves the human occupants of the 
station; by offering his past and his memory in "sacrifice" to the Ocean, Kris strives to ensure that a 
thin thread of understanding extends between human beings and this eerie embodiment of the 
Unknown.'
665
      
 Far from a useless distraction from present reality, guilt is the necessary corollary of love, a 
force which binds us to the past, present and future of the cosmos and provides evidence for the 
existence of a Moral Law. It is through guilt that the neutrino Hari shows herself to be human, as 
she comes to understand that Kris's life 'in this new world, with her around, infinitely loving him, 
infinitely dependent on him and immortal, will be too much for him.'
666
 By asking Sartorius to 
destroy her with the help of his machines, Hari's 'act of self-sacrifice' tells us that 'she already has 
her own internal dimension, her own "I", which is independent of Kris's "I" and indeed is a 
continuation, and not simply a copy, of the earthly Hari's "I"' ('am I similar to her?', Hari asks of her 
earthly counterpart, to which Kris replies: 'No, you were similar, but now you, not she, is the real 
Hari.').
667
    
 For Evlampiev, the ultimate Tarkovskian 'sacrifice' is to 'being' itself, although he goes on to 
explain what he means by this: 'for Tarkovsky, man's "rootedness", his belonging not only to time 
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but also to eternity, was always beyond doubt'.
668
 Nevertheless, Tarkovsky shows us in Solaris and 
in his later films that the centuries-long strivings of human civilisation, as enshrined in the central 
library scene in Solaris and in our stores of high culture, are the main source of connectedness to 
the sphere of eternity in which 'being' resides. Solaris reminds us of the possibility that we may one 
day be able to connect to this 'sphere of eternity' via contact and moral engagement with 
extraterrestrials; the role of plants and animals, in particular dogs, in Zerkalo, Stalker and Nostalgia 
will remind us of the possibilities of extending the eternal sphere of moral connectedness to other 
Earthly creatures and even to the Earth itself. Nevertheless, it is the islands, quite literally, of 
civilisation which sprout up in the Ocean at the end of the film as a direct result of Kris's self-
sacrifice which make Kris's self-sacrifice tangible to us and justify his long absences from home. 
Kris returns home to his father, full of guilt, to beg forgiveness, but we are made to understand that 
Kris's odyssey has been no mistake, that all is well and as it ought to be, and that he has made a 
'giant leap for mankind' into the sphere of eternity through his sacrifice to the Ocean and the 
neutrino Hari.    
 
 
3.6 The Mirror (1974) 
 
Zerkalo (The Mirror) will again juxtapose the personal and the cosmic in an effort to generate the 
energy necessary to catapult the viewer into the 'sphere of eternity', this time via a combination of 
Tarkovsky's own autobiographical journey and the world-historical events, including space 
exploration, which accompanied it. Although significantly shorter than the two preceding three-hour 
Tarkovskian marathons Andrei Rublev and Solaris, Zerkalo is arguably the most experimental and 
least accessible for the lay viewer of his seven films, as images of a Russian dacha give way to 
documentary footage of the Spanish Civil War and the rise of Chairman Mao as well as dream-like 
sequences featuring timeless ghosts and a repeated conviction that nature sees all, hears all and feels 
all. Although Tarkovsky places mirrors all the way through the film to dissuade us from any too-
easy conclusions about what the title may refer to, it is clear that we have an attempt in Zerkalo to 
draw a portrait of the artist as a young man, to show that the artistic temperament emerges through 
contact with the world and other people, and that the journey of the self begins when one looks, 
really looks, as Alyosha does towards the end of the film, at oneself in the mirror. This kind of 
responsible introspection is made possible by the discovery of other people and their capacity for 
love and sacrifice; it is no coincidence that this culminating 'mirror' scene in Zerkalo, set to 
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dramatic classical music, takes place while Alyosha waits for his mother to pawn her jewellery so 
that she can feed him and just before she is forced, by way of payment for what is more an act of 
charity than commerce on the part of the doctor's wife, to kill a chicken against her will so as to 
spare Alyosha the responsibility. This late afternoon visit to the doctor's wife sticks in Alyosha's 
memory because it coincides with his first realisation of debt, and with that realisation come his 
first feelings of moral responsibility as an autonomous human being and member of a wider 
community. Though these feelings start with his mother, they by no means end there; they 
eventually extend to mother Russia, distant war victims, animals, and even nature as a whole. The 
film is a confused and confusing but nevertheless powerful attempt to show that all these levels of 
life or modes of being are connected in a higher unity, and that we as individuals owe an allegiance 
to this unity in all its forms. It is by showing this depth and breadth of sympathetic resonance that 
Tarkovsky aimed to thank his parents for all they had given him; at the public première of Zerkalo, 
Andrei's father Arseny wept in surprise and awe before his son's simultaneous filial gratitude and 
artistic generosity.
669
    
 At the centre of this expansive vision of sympathy and identity, however, as Evlampiev 
rightly points out, is the question of time and the individual's view of herself as a temporal and 
temporary member of something trans-temporal and trans-generational. The dual role of Marina 
Terekhova, who plays both wife and young mother in the film, as well as the repeated appearance of 
Tarkovsky's own mother Maria Ivanovna and confusing similarities between father and son, not to 
mention visits from seemingly undead 'guests', create an atmosphere in which who is who is both 
unclear and, in the grand scheme of things, irrelevant. Evlampiev, whom we will be quoting 
extensively on Zerkalo both to introduce his important contribution to scholarship on the film to an 
English-speaking audience for the first time and to bring to life an otherwise frankly impenetrable 
film, ties all this back to the prerevolutionary Russian philosophical tradition and the idea of 
vseedinstvo. Arguing that 'the central problem in the film is the problem of time, its essence and its 
meaning for human beings', Evlampiev recovers 'elements of continuity' with the pre-revolutionary 
Russian philosophical tradition and with Chaadaev and Karsavin in particular: 'in a world where all 
is united [vseedinyy], however, there is no space and time, since space and time, according to 
Chaadaev, separate the elements of existence from each other, and are signs of a deviation of reality 
from its state of vseedinstvo.'
670
 For Karsavin, meanwhile, 'the soul is not only temporal, but also 
"omnitemporal", covering all possible time and including all that exists, has existed or will exist. In 
this sense, the concept of "omnitemporality" is different from the concept of eternity; the former is 
richer than the latter, since the latter excludes all that is temporal from itself and opposes itself to 
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time.'
671
 Karsavin and Tarkovsky 'share a single view of the role of human beings in existence', one 
which will accord perfectly with the Confucian view of human beings as 'centres of relationships' to 
be introduced in the next chapter; namely, they regard 'human beings act as a centre for the 
"crystallisation" of vseedinstvo, points from which relationships develop, transforming an imperfect 
unity into a perfect one'.
672
 The Arnoldian commitment to perfectibility through praxis is also, 
Evlampiev argues, present in both Karsavin and Tarkovsky: 'love, as well as contemplation aimed at 
gathering the world and its meanings up within the life and mind of the individual, and ultimately 
the individual's self-sacrifice to the world therefore all have a special role to play in transforming 
the imperfect world.'
673
 Indeed, for Evlampiev's Tarkovsky, the desire to perform good works 
common to all morally healthy individuals must, just as Arnold stresses in Culture and Anarchy, be 
informed by 'right understanding': 
   
  It is important to stress that in order to act 'effectively' and to have a positive  
  impact on the state of the world, an individual must have the right understanding of 
  herself and her place in the order of things. Only if she can achieve this can love  
  become a truly metaphysical act of overcoming the divisions of existence rather than 
  simply a momentary flash of desire: an act of worshipful co-contemplation – an  
  objective joining with the secret meanings of existence - and not a subjective  
  distraction for the imagination; an act of sacrifice – transformation via resurrection – 
  rather than an irresponsible act leaving no trace in the memory of future generations. 
  Above all a person should understand herself and 'cultivate' herself in her own  
  internal spiritual world. Andrei Rublev is engaged in precisely such 'self-cultivation' 
  in Tarkovsky's film on him, although we can only guess at what is going on inside 
  him; in Andrei Rublev our attention is turned to the external forms of the relationship 
  between the individual and the world, the active result of a long period of  
  introspection and self-questioning.
674
  
 
In Zerkalo, however, we have, quite literally, a turning of attention back on the autobiographical 
subject itself. For Tarkovsky, this process of artistic self-discovery also meant the complex task of 
distinguishing himself as an artist from his father while incorporating his father's poetry into his art; 
in the end, Tarkovsky's very awareness of his father's uncontestable greatness as a poet helped, 
rather than hindered, the forging of his own identity. The content itself of Arseny's poetry, featured 
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in Zerkalo, certainly helped Andrei overcome this 'anxiety of influence':    
 
  I'm not running, there is no death on Earth. 
   Everyone is immortal. Everything is immortal. We don't need 
   To fear death at seventeen  
   Or seventy. 
   […] 
   The great-grandfather and the grandson share a single table. 
   […] 
   I'm happy with my own immortality, 
   That my blood will flow from century to century. 
 
Evlampiev's analysis of the poem helps us to understand how Andrei, far from being crushed by the 
weight of his father's artistic gifts, finds liberation and identity in them: 'in the form of the poem we 
find expressed the same conviction concerning the "multi-dimensionality" of human existence 
which we find repeatedly expressed among the leading exponents of Russian philosophy from 
Dostoyevsky to Karsavin.'
675
 In this tradition, 'the true essence of a human being is not limited to 
what is revealed to her and in her during the limited period of her own stay on Earth. Each 
individual, in the fullness of her being, binds and encompasses within herself all planes of existence 
and all layers of history.'
676
 Among other things, this conception entails that 'the process of 
"gathering" and "cultivating" oneself should include reviewing not only one's own past, but history 
itself and the whole temporal dynamic of life, both that which is near to us and that which is 
unimaginably far away. For the apparent limitations of being human prove illusory, and each of us 
is as infinite and eternal as the world around us.'
677
  
 Zerkalo, then, charts Andrei's own journey to world-historical awareness – in other words, 
self-awareness - from his mother's love and sacrifice, his father's poetry, his discovery of the place 
of Russia in the world, and the 'eternal' nature of the civilisational struggle of which Russia has 
been a part. Evlampiev's treatment of this process is worth reproducing in full for an English-
speaking audience: 
 
  The most significant and obvious thematic sphere in the film is the autobiographical 
  story of the 'author-protagonist', interconnected as it is with the fates of his closest 
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  relatives: his mother and father, his ex-wife, his son. A second sphere, however, also 
  widely explored in the film, concerns the world history through which the  
  protagonist lived, depicted with the help of a variety of documentary footage. Finally, 
  a third sphere extends to History as such, the entire history of humanity, a sense of 
  belonging to which is also necessary for the full self-realisation of any individual. 
  This sphere is explored in the film through elements of the cultural heritage of  
  humanity amongst which the protagonists live and which permeate their way of life.  
    According to the initial script the film was to include a scene entitled 'Dawn 
   on the Kulikovo Battlefield', which Tarkovsky had also intended to incorporate into 
   Andrei Rublev. As we can see from the screenplay for Zerkalo, the scene was  
   supposed to go right in the middle of the film and form its thematic core, bringing 
   together all three of the aforementioned spheres, linking the autobiographical story 
   with the history of the [Russian] people and the history of humanity as a whole. It 
   seems that Tarkovsky finally realised, however, that even if it would have made his 
   philosophical conception clearer, the insertion of a purely historical episode would 
   somehow have ruined the artistic integrity of the film, and he thus decided against it. 
   In order to express the oneness [edinstvo] of the individual and History, he used a 
   less straightforward and more refined technique: this oneness was depicted via  
   recourse to works of World Culture, which appear in the film in their original forms 
   (painting and music from the great masters of the past), and reflected in the very  
   appearance of  the protagonists (the similarity of Maria Ivanovna to Maria  
   Lebyadkina, the heroine of [Dostoyevsky's] novel Demons, as well as her similarity 
   to the young woman in the portrait by Leonardo da Vinci; the parallel between Ignat, 
   burning branches outside his house, and Moses, to whom the Angel appears in the 
   form of a burning bush; the similarity of the landscape in the scene at the firing range 
   with landscapes from Bruegel etc.).  
    Instead of the scene depicting the Battle of Kulikovo, Tarkovsky opted in the 
   end for another alternative (missing from the script), which becomes the culminating 
   centre of the whole film: the 'appearance' of a mysterious woman to the young Ignat, 
   who asks him to read a passage from Pushkin's famous letter to Chaadaev, in which 
   he talks about the world-historical destiny of Russia. Without breaking out of the 
   visual or thematic lines of the film, this scene contains within itself a highly complex 
   meaning and adds significant philosophical weight to the film as a whole beyond 
   what we find in the screenplay. The original scene would only have conveyed the 
   individual's belonging to History, the oneness of the individual and human history as 
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   a whole, while the scene which made it into the film gives us more: it shows us that 
   the destiny of an individual person, the wider contemporary history through which 
   she lives, and the history of bygone days all have equal status in the context of the 
   'world of eternity' and that any one of them can make an appearance in any of the 
   others,  showing a person what her destiny is, helping her to understand the meaning 
   of life and to carry out her mission in it. In its content, this scene is very similar to 
   the scene in Andrei Rublev when Theophanes appears to Andrei. Here too, Tarkovsky 
   depicts the irruption of the 'world of eternity' into the 'world of time', the   
   convergence and union of all levels of being made possible by the action of  
   individuals.  
    The scene begins with Ignat on his own in his father's new apartment.  
   However, even before his mother's sudden exit, the 'dissolution' of the present into 
   eternity already begins. Natalya (played by M. Terekhova, who also plays the young 
   mother of the main protagonist) drops her bag, and when they both bend down to 
   collect what has fallen out of it, Ignat gets an electric shock from one of the coins, 
   and has the strange feeling that what is happening has already somehow happened to 
   him before. 'It's as if I've already picked up money like this. And yet this is the first 
   time...,' he says. The dropping of the bag, caused by his mother's rushed inattention, 
   carries a clear symbolic meaning related to the leitmotif of tripping which is repeated 
   in all Tarkovsky's films and which represents the difficulty of trying constantly to 
   improve oneself, the difficulty of moving to a new form of life or a new sphere of 
   existence. […] In this case the 'vectors' of the two protagonists' movements are  
   heading in opposite directions: Natalya is trying to 'catch up' with passing time, to be 
   in step  with the present, and she interprets the delay as an unfortunate mistake; while 
   for Ignat, the event becomes a gateway to the sphere of eternity.
678
  
 
The corollary of this 'sphere of eternity' is what Evlampiev calls 'the deep unity of people': the 
possibility of moral transmission, a passing on of the civilisational flame from one generation to the 
next: 'a child becomes an adult by finding himself in debt to what the people around him do 
(consciously or unconsciously) for him, to the fact that those around him find themselves 'reflected' 
in him and the fact that their 'reflection' stays in him as a part of his own self.'
679
 In the first part of 
the film, Evlampiev argues that the main protagonist is engaged in the 'attempt to establish in 
himself the form of his young mother and to understand this form as the living basis of his own 
                                                 
678  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, pp. 131-133.  
679  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 138.  
 231 
 
individuality', and concludes that 'the influence of his mother on him was so comprehensive and 
profound that all the events in her life (especially those that determined her, and his, fate), even 
without his willing it or participating in it, find themselves reflected in his personality, and became a 
part of his life.'
680
 This influence was only heightened by the fact of his father's leaving, which 
'forced Alexey's mother to face the fact that she was alone, and led her to the decision to sacrifice 
herself for her children.'
681
 As Alexey came gradually to realise the extent of his mother's loss and 
sacrifice, the event of his father's leaving became 'the basis of his whole relationship with the world 
and the leitmotif of all his memories of his own past, for it was precisely this event which allowed 
him to understand the importance of his mother's role in his own development.'
682
  
 Tarkovsky also opens up the possibility of the cosmos's sympathetic resonance with all this 
human suffering and responsibility through the leitmotif of wind, beginning with Maria's encounter 
with the travelling doctor in the film's first scene. The unity of each individual's moral strivings in a 
'sphere of eternity' is also illustrated through wind, which 'can be seen as a symbolic designation of 
the "border" between the "world of time" and the "world of eternity"'.
683
 The repetition of the wind 
motif towards the end of the film contributes to an overall effect of 'movement printed in eternity, 
not the natural movement of earthly nature, but the reaction of nature to human effort, to internal 
movements of the human spirit', as was the case with the doctor in the opening scene as he 
contemplated a future with the 'interesting' woman he had just met.
684
 Evlampiev also suggests a 
possible connection with the film's enigmatic title: 'the image of the mysterious gust of wind is a 
symbol of the two forms of specular reflection, a reflection in the world of nature of human 
emotional impulses and a reflection of earthly existence as a whole (both the individual and the 
world) in eternal being or the "world of eternity"
685
 ; in summary, these gusts of wind are 'a 
translation into nature and the surrounding world of a momentary burst of feeling in a person's 
soul.'
686
 Likewise, Evlampiev argues, 'the sudden eruption of fire – fire in the rain! - is a reflection, 
breaking its way into the world, of the spiritual upheaval' through which Maria Nikolaevna was 
then living.
687
 Tarkovsky throws this suffering into stark relief with the use of 'an alarming red-
yellow colour which seems to come out of herself, a fire burning in her own soul which has a 
sinister effect on the verdant and humid harmony around her'.
688
 Nevertheless, after overcoming the 
radical disharmony and disunity of the fire episode – which occurred in the same year (1935) as her 
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husband's leaving (as we are told by Maria herself) – Maria Nikolaevna restores this harmony by 
assuming the responsibility of sacrifice for her children, a move made possible for Evlampiev's 
Tarkovsky because 'a person's choice of the path of sacrifice in life frees her from the shackles of 
ordinary existence and brings her out into the wide ocean of being to a point where the "world of 
time" and the "world of eternity" unite'.
689
 Moreover, 'whoever the person is, she stands on a level 
footing with the inhabitants of the "world of eternity"'; this is precisely why we see the same 
'mysterious woman-angel' with Maria Nikolaevna as later appears to Ignat, 'determining his fate', 
and who 'will also be with Alexey at the moment of death. Taking Alyosha's sister by the hand, she 
effectively helps his mother to take her first steps on the path of the cross, just as the peasants 
helped Jesus in the "Russian Calvary" scene in Andrei Rublev.'
690
  
 If this 'sphere of eternity' is a heavenly harmony, Tarkovsky also shows us what the absence 
of this harmony looks like through scenes of war and, closer to home, his mother's experience 
working as an editor for Stalin's state publishing giant. The publishing house scene, in which Maria 
rushes to correct a spelling mistake which could have 'terrible' consequences, ends with her 
colleague Liza telling her that she is a selfish drama queen who is sure to make her children's lives a 
misery. Liza ends her tirade by quoting the opening lines from Dante's Inferno, as if to reinforce the 
message made clear enough by the underground, mechanised setting and long corridors that there is 
something hellish, 'recalling a prison, concentration camp or torture chamber', both for Maria 
Ivanovna personally and for Russian society as a whole, under Stalin: 'in this oppressive atmosphere 
each human step, each movement requires an enormous effort; with barely noticeable movement of 
the camera, Tarkovsky creates a distinct sense of physical weight, which slows the characters 
down'.
691
 The deeper problem, however, is that 'harmonious interaction is impossible here; people 
don't understand each other, fail to say what they mean, make mistakes, argue, cry, and try to get 
away from each other.'
692
 In the end, 'not even the basic requirements of life can be satisfied here; 
that which is normally useful to people becomes a weapon for new forms of torture. When Maria 
Nikolaevna goes into the shower and starts washing herself, the water runs out, and all she can do is 
to laugh in despair and then cry.'
693
 While an ordinary existence is consumed by the search for the 
'Divine Word' or Moral Law insofar as it 'holds the key to perfection and harmony among all 
things', here in the publishing house scene 'a hellish word holds sway, bringing punishment, 
suffering and death. There is never any getting away from this word; it has no absolute meaning in 
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either the "world of time" or the "world of eternity", and the Divine Word gets lost here.'
694
     
 Tarkovsky also takes the Spanish Civil War as a paradigm of cosmic disharmony, showing 
scenes of children wrenched from their parents and then depicting the deracinating effects of forced 
separation from one's home on Spanish exiles in Russia. Evlampiev cleverly draws the parallel 
between these unfortunate Spaniards and Alexey himself: 
 
  The central space in the Spaniards' memory is occupied by the tragic events of their 
  childhood: their separation from their homeland. Just as Alexey's father's abandoning 
  of the family and the disaster this causes in his mother's life becomes the vantage 
  point from which he assesses his own life and reflects on his own personal fate, so 
  too does the Spaniards' childhood tragedy become a reference point for defining  
  themselves and their place in the world. It is not just a thing of the past, and is more 
  than a mere memory; it has entered their flesh and blood, poisoned their souls,  
  causing a need endlessly to resolve the problem of the foundation of their  
  existence.
695
  
    
Likewise, 'the tragedy of Alexey's mother, reflected in his soul and entering into his personality, 
made him an obnoxious person, constantly entering into conflict with those around him, even those 
closest to him – his mother, his wife, his son.'696 In precisely the same way, 'the childhood tragedy 
of the Russified Spaniards, the tragedy of irrevocable separation from their homeland and their 
loved ones, made them strange people, incapable of normal, conflict-free relationships with each 
other and with the world.'
697
 The Spaniards, indeed, are an example of failed globalisation: 'they 
dream of Spain, talk and think constantly about it, but they have already lost their understanding of 
its spiritual essence', as shown by the episode with the unnamed Spaniard impersonating a 
matador.
698
  As the older Luisa bitterly concludes: 'The windbag – he was in Spain and he didn't 
understand anything.' The same Spaniard slaps his daughter in the face merely because she manages 
successfully to complete a Spanish dance move: 'They taught you and taught you and nothing 
worked, and now it turns out that you can do it!' At the end of the scene, Luisa 'gets up and leaves, 
unable to listen anymore to these conversations about Spain and the past which lives in them but 
which cannot co-exist harmoniously with their present circumstances.'
699
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 Yet Tarkovsky, following Dante, believes in the transforming power of human spiritual effort, 
of an honest facing up to one's own 'demons' and the demons ruling the society around one, and in 
the possibility of acts of nobility and sacrifice in even the most desperate situations. In fact, such 
situations as those faced by Luisa and the other Spaniards may provide the best possible 
opportunities for meaningful sacrifice; even though she has lost touch with her homeland, Luisa 
decides to stay in Russia because her 'husband is Russian and children are Russian'. Another 
opportunity for sacrifice in the film is provided by the cruel trick of the war orphan Asafiev, who 
launches a practice grenade at the officer charged with training child soldiers during Russia's battle 
with Nazism. Far from a meaningless act of defiance or mere tasteless prank, Asafiev's fake grenade 
in fact provides the officer with a unique opportunity to do something very meaningful indeed: he 
spontaneously throws himself on the grenade in an effort to save the children nearby. Evlampiev 
connects 'the hesitation and nervousness evident in the instructor's speech' with 'the motif of 
stuttering in the prologue, where we see a teenager who, with the help of a hypno-therapist, tries to 
overcome his condition, to speak – to take possession of the Word which opens the door to 
existence as a whole and the unity of meaning in things.'
700
 Just as the teenager in the prologue 
succeeds, with the help of a hypnotherapist, in the brave and difficult task of speaking, the army 
instructor is given a chance to recover his true human voice by Asafiev, described by Evlampiev as 
'another messenger from the "world of eternity"', whose 'orphan status serves as a kind of evidence 
of his "timeless" origin'.
701
 While 'the test to which Asafiev puts the instructor seems cruel and 
meaningless', it nevertheless 'gives him a chance to fulfil the true goals and values of human life. 
Given a tough choice by Asafiev – to watch in horror as the children around him die or to sacrifice 
himself for them - the instructor unhesitatingly chooses self-sacrifice.'
702
  
 Just as Maria Ivanovna is moved by the death of Liza, who had been so cruel to her, so too is 
Alexey's fate tied to that of the the war orphan Asafiev – much as Tarkovsky himself had identified 
with Ivan in Ivanogo Detstvo – as both are left clutching what appears to be the same bird. While 
Evlampiev argues that it is useful to view Asafiev as another guest from the 'sphere of eternity', 
another being forming one body with Alexey and the officer, the deeper point is that all human 
beings have one foot, so to speak, in eternity, and are all, even the most victimised and cruel, linked 
there. In this way, a fully realised human being feels at home in any company, any century, even in 
the depths of the Russian war effort, as Tarkovsky shows by playing his father's poem over the top 
of muddy, miserable footage from the war:      
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  There is no death in the world. 
  All are immortal. Everything is immortal. 
  You live in a house – and the house does not collapse. 
  I take any century, 
  I will go into it and build a home in it. 
  That's why your children are with me  
  And your wives are at one table. 
  The great-grandfather and the grandson share a table too. 
  The future shines now, 
  And if I raise my hand, 
  All five beams will remain with you.  
 
Evlampiev associates this transtemporal spirit with Jesus: 
 
  The image of a single Path common to all humanity is shown in the scene depicting 
  Soviet soldiers crossing the Sivash during the Second World War. This documentary 
  scene is the longest of all those shown in the film, and caused surprise among the 
  first spectators to see the film for its strange – unheroic and somehow timeless –  
  depiction of war. But this is precisely the effect that Tarkovsky sought. For him, war 
  is only one manifestation, however cruel, of a central law of existence, according to 
  which the destructive forces which prevail in the world can be tamed and the  
  imperfection of the world to some extent 'corrected' through a human act of sacrifice, 
  a voluntary following of the destiny of Jesus Christ. The slow-motion, drawn-out 
  scene takes place somehow outside of historical time and outside the earthly sphere, 
  in eternity, as the movement of the soldiers carrying ammunition, weapons and some 
  rustic wooden structures allows for only one ready comparison – the path of Jesus to 
  the cross, now the common and shared lot of all people.
703
   
 
Tarkovsky also tries to make essentially the same point in a different, more personal way with his 
twin deployment of a bird in the film: 
 
  The image of the bird clutched in a human hand is repeated twice in the film, and it is 
  clear that there must be a deep inner correspondence between the two scenes. At the 
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  end of the film, a dying Alexey takes the apparently injured bird into his hand, and 
  lifts it up, as if trying to get it to fly. The most banal (and therefore least likely)  
  explanation is to suppose that the bird which Alexey tries to 'let go' is his soul, which 
  separates from his body at the moment of death. But this explanation leaves entirely 
  to one side that which is clearly emphasised by the director: namely, that the bird on 
  the bed next to Alexey is in as much pain as Alexey himself. We see what difficulty it 
  has breathing, how it trembles with discomfort.  
   […] The bird also serves as a symbol of the thirst for connection when it flies 
  onto [Asafiev's] head in the very place where all the meanings of existence and of 
  human life converge. In this place, time joins eternity, the Earth forms one with the 
  sky, and human beings achieve the heights of angels; here, the deep sources of all 
  ages and all human events can be found, and here, human beings take full  
  responsibility for all that happens in the world.
704
 
  
Returning to compare the instructor's sacrifice with that of Alexey's mother, Evlampiev concludes 
that 'both these tragic events, showing the level of people's interconnectedness and the degree of 
their responsibility for each other, are reflected in Alexey's soul and exercise a decisive influence 
over his destiny. The former laid the foundations of his personality, while the latter helped him to 
understand his purpose in life.'
705
 That this message of responsibility and sacrifice assumes 
prophetic dimensions is emphasised by Tarkovsky's choice of Pushkin's poem The Prophet to open 
the screenplay: the artist receives a message from other people, from earlier 'prophets' – including, 
in Tarkovsky's case, his own mother and father - and then transmits this message to future 'prophets' 
in a magical and necessary process; just as the subject of 'The Prophet' is 'precisely the kind of 
higher intervention in our lives that makes prophets of us, mediators between Heaven and Earth', so 
too is this intervention 'the main theme of The Mirror, since we find at the heart of the film two 
episodes which depict the arrival of messengers from the "world of eternity" to Alexey and his 
son.'
706
 Evlampiev then links this theme to Tarkovsky's views on the role of artists, who 'become 
intermediaries uniting the temporal and eternal in their lives and their work', and without whom 
'humanity would lose its understanding of its higher purpose and its path to achieving that 
purpose'.
707
  Just as for Mahfouz, however, the content of this 'prophecy' is at bottom a 
straightforward call to self-cultivation and self-responsibility, as Alexey discovers in the earring-
pawning scene, when 'a fierce determination is born within him in response to the sudden 
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realisation of his mother's obvious helplessness.'
708
 While on the one hand Alexey's staring into the 
mirror while his mother tries to sell her earrings represents the moment of his realisation of his own 
independence, on the other he 'comes to understand the complexity and tragic contradicitions of the 
world – so beautiful and good in some of its aspects and so unpleasant and wicked in others.'709 The 
doctor's wife, not uncoincidentally played to perfection by Larisa after Tarkovsky wisely refused to 
give her the role of Maria, may have created a 'wonderful homely environment' for her family, but 
admiration 'gives way to an acute sense of injustice in Alyosha's heart for the fact that destiny can 
bestow such comfort and calm on the undeserving doctor's wife while at the same time leaving his 
own mother deprived of even the merest crumbs of happiness and spiritual harmony'.
710
 Moreover, 
Evlampiev concludes, 'in this very moment of insight into the contrast between the possible 
harmony and completeness of the world and its current state of deep imperfection, Alyosha realises 
his calling as an artist'.
711
  
 This moral struggle to spread the sphere of harmony in a world of potential darkness gives 
meaning to the details of each individual's personal story, as the very end of the film, in Evlampiev's 
view, underlines: 'here, not just symbolically but really (in the sense of a reality not confined to a 
single sphere but encompassing existence in its entirety), the beginning and end of the protagonist's 
life merge into one, time merges into eternity, and all the events [in Alexey's life] find their absolute 
meaning and fuse into an inseparable whole.'
712
 At a time when humanity, locked in a nuclear-
framed Cold War, appeared to have lost its faith in this potential wholeness and to be careering 
towards apocalypse, Tarkovsky felt an urgent need to paint his own self-portrait, not in order to save 
himself or the details of his life from oblivion, but precisely in order to show that he was a product, 
one among centuries of products, of an infinitely more important civilisation which made his 
personality possible and which makes all morally self-conscious personalities, all members of the 
'club of eternity', possible. Without dodging the aspects of his personality which made him selfish, 
difficult and insecure – Alexey's wife gives full voice to these in the film - but rather, incorporating 
these apparent flaws openly into his narrative, Tarkovsky gives us a truly modest autobiography, 
one which shows its subject striving to realise the best of himself but ultimately indebted to a 
network of other selves who made his own prophetic and public form of self-cultivation possible as 
well as defining the contours of that struggle. Just as Maria Ivanovna overcomes abuse and 
misfortune, surviving the hell of abandonment by her husband and the scorn of the society around 
her (embodied in the publishing house scene) and sacrificing herself for her children, so too does 
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her son face his own personal demons, learning from her example and other examples of sacrifice 
and seeking the broadest, worthiest sacrifice he can through art, an art which creates not for its own 
sake or to celebrate its own maker, but to convey an eternal, or at least trans-generational and trans-
millennial, message for which one is merely a flawed and short-lived receptacle.   
 
 
3.7 Stalker (1979) 
 
It is no surprise that Frederic Jameson, the godfather of postmodern criticism, heaped scorn on 
Tarkovsky in general, and on Stalker in particular: Tarkovsky's message of civilisational unity and 
moral truth was laughable to him. Although Jameson claims that his objection to Tarkovsky is 'not 
so much to the religious content' as to Tarkovsky's 'artistic pretentiousness', he nevertheless 
dismisses Tarkovsky's 'grandiose mysticism' and describes Stalker as a 'lugubrious religious 
fable'.
713
 Jameson concludes that 'the deepest contradiction in Tarkovsky is then that offered by a 
valorization of nature without human technology achieved by the highest technology of the 
photographic apparatus itself. No reflexivity acknowledges this second hidden presence, thus 
threatening to transform Tarkovskian nature-mysticism into the sheerest ideology.'
714
 Tarkovsky's 
alleged 'nature-mysticism', however, is not nature-mysticism at all, but rather, as we have seen and 
will see further in Stalker, a dynamic faith in the power of human civilisation to complement nature 
and to bring Heaven and Earth together in a higher moral unity. The Stalker's mission is to improve 
his charges by bringing them into contact with the Zone, a place which will force them to confront 
themselves and to behave in a self-critical, morally responsible way if they are to survive.  
 This moral imperative applies just as acutely to the Stalker himself, who by the film's end 
has realised that the promised 'room' in the Zone is a mirage, and that the real work of life is, as for 
Plato's philosopher, to turn back from the light of a Promised Land and to spread the light, briefly 
glimpsed, to those stuck with their backs turned in the darkness of the human cave. Tarkovsky's use 
of colour in the film also points us in this direction: not only is the final scene in the Zone a shot of 
the three men in a cave looking out over the Promised Room and the light formed by the reflection 
of the rain on the surface of the water in it, the black-and-white scene of domestic misery from 
which the Stalker is desperate to escape at the beginning of the film also gives way, by the film's 
end, to colour images of the Stalker as a family man struggling to raise a deformed daughter in an 
almost post-apocalyptic environment. With this eternal moral light - brought back from the Zone in 
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the form of a good-natured dog - the genius of the Stalker's daughter, whom the Stalker had 
previously perceived as a nightmarish obstacle to his own self-realisation inside the Zone, reveals 
itself as she makes an extraordinary technological breakthrough: telekinesis. Progress in meaningful 
human knowledge, Tarkovsky argues again in Stalker, is only possible when we embrace our moral 
responsibilities and pass on the best of ourselves to those around us.        
 The Zone is also a reminder, however, of the universe's limitless capacity to surprise us. 
Although there is absolutely nothing new in this – if the Greeks didn't say it first, David Hume 
reminded us in the 18
th
 century that we cannot be sure a priori that the sun will come up tomorrow, 
and epistemologists closer to our time, like Karl Popper, remind us that our empirical knowledge 
can always be falsified by new data – Tarkovsky lived through a period of remarkable confidence in 
the power of technology, nowhere moreso than in Soviet Russia. The Zone calls into question all we 
thought we knew about knowledge in the second half of the 20
th
 century, and constitutes a space 
where progress is only ever aligned with moral behaviour. In this lies the 'hope' of the Zone, its 
necessity for human beings in the age of nuclear weapons: the hope of justice. While Evlampiev 
argues that in Stalker, 'faith in the possibility of preserving harmony in the earthly world disappears 
(and indeed the whole idea of harmony disappears from Tarkovsky's worldview)'
715
, I would sooner 
argue that Stalker is a logical extension of the concerns raised in Tarkovsky's first four films: 
sacrifice, intergenerational solidarity, love and justice, all enshrined in the idea of civilisation and 
the need to protect it. If the world of Stalker is a fiercer, darker world, this only heightens the 
imperative: seek the Moral Way.   
 All three heroes in the Zone reject the opportunity to enter the room where their wishes will 
be fulfilled. Vera Shitova argues that this is 'because these desires are almost certainly pathetic, 
selfish and base', and goes on to argue that they 'return from the Zone just the same as they were 
when they arrived in it'.
716
 Yet the Stalker at least (lest we forget, the film's central protagonist) has 
by the end realised – or we, the spectators, realise this through him even if he himself stops short of 
a full realisation himself - that his heartfelt desire to be useful, to give people what they need, can 
be fulfilled by engaging with his family, who love him, as well as by bringing people to the Zone. 
The Writer and Professor allow the Stalker to see what he had not yet seen, and which is the only 
'message' of the Zone: any room which could fulfil one's desires, even if it really existed, could 
bring, like Nozick's Experience Machine, only temporary pleasure and not lasting happiness, for 
lasting happiness requires constant moral engagement, both self-cultivation and real-world effort.     
 Boyadzhieva also argues that the protagonists do not enter the room because they realise that 
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their souls are not clean enough ardently to desire a better world.
717
 While the Stalker does indeed 
complain to his wife after leaving the Zone that, for the Writer and Professor, 'every movement of 
their souls is billed' and that 'they only think about how to get more for it', he himself has seen 
beyond such egocentric calculations to a world in which other considerations matter. Whereas the 
Writer asks himself what the point of writing is if no one will read him in 100 years, and whereas 
the Professor is cynically bent on destroying the Zone to ensure that nobody's deepest desires are 
fulfilled and his own skin and 'calm' are thereby protected, the Stalker is committed to a higher code 
of honour: a code of service, in which the desire for direct personal salvation via God is dismissed 
as selfish, and the desire to save civilisation via sacrifice remains.         
 Evlampiev, for all the knots he ties himself in by trying to argue that Tarkovsky had lost 
faith in God by the time he came to Stalker, nevertheless concludes that 'in the world of Tarkovsky's 
films God is "born" only via human beings. He is "constructed" through their spiritual strivings, 
which bring together the surrounding universe.'
718
 These strivings, however, go well beyond 
introspective navel-gazing or a renunciation of community: 'spiritual cultivation which presupposes 
the self-sufficiency of the individual shows itself to be no longer possible, since, by getting caught 
up in herself the individual loses herself and her contact with existence.'
719
 While Tarkovsky in no 
way rejects the primacy of self-cultivation, he promotes 'an essentially different idea of it' from 
what we might expect: namely, that 'a person should not cut herself off from the world, but rather 
follow its rhythms and currents, even when they seem absurd or dangerous; a person should 
therefore try to change these rhythms and currents so that they take on a more meaningful form and 
become positive and creative rather than destructive and lethal.
720
  
 The Writer, on the other hand, even if he pretends briefly to share Tarkovsky's vision of art 
as 'unselfish', is in the end, in contrast to both Tarkovsky and his Stalker, interested only in 'finding 
himself', and at any price: 
 
  Not by chance after passing successfully through the 'dry tunnel', the Stalker and the 
  Writer achieve a deeper understanding of themselves; we then have the central scene 
  in the film, where they both formulate (first inarticulately, then articulately) the true 
  reasons for their coming to the Zone. 
   During an unannounced stop decided on by the Stalker, all three protagonists 
  lie on the ground amidst a series of puddles, and the Writer returns to discussing the 
  meaning of his journey. 'I don't care about humanity,' he says, continuing his endless 
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  argument with the Professor. 'Of all the people in the world I am only interested in 
  one person: me. Am I worth something, or am I a piece of shit, as so many others 
  are? Suppose I go into the Room and return to our godforsaken city a genius. But a 
  person writes because he tortures himself, doubts himself; the whole time he needs to 
  prove to himself that he is worth something. And if I find out for sure that I'm a  
  genius, why would I write then, what the hell for? ... In any case all this technology 
  of yours, all these bombs, wheels and other boring artifacts, designed so that we can 
  work less and eat more, all these are crutches and prostheses; while humanity exists 
  to create works of art. This at least is unselfish, as opposed to all other human  
  activity... great illusions, visions of absolute truth!' 
    The Writer's true goal in coming to the Zone consists in trying to find  
   himself.
721
  
 
Nevertheless, there is the suggestion that by the end of their arduous journey through the Zone, both 
the Writer and Professor have made some limited measure of moral and spiritual progress, even if it 
is not nearly enough to satisfy the Stalker: the pair's very survival in an environment which has 
proven so lethal for the immoral is the strongest evidence of all for this hypothesis. While the Writer 
may have begun to understand the selfish and ultimately empty nature of at least some of his 
longings, achieving a vague intimation of 'the horizon of spiritual perfection' by the end of his time 
in the Zone, the Professor with his bomb, which is apparently designed to save human civilisation 
from the threat of 'all these unrealised emperors, great inquisitors, führers of all kinds, and other 
such benefactors of the human race' who might have their wishes fulfilled by the Zone, realises that 
his weapon is rendered powerless by the Zone itself; the Professor arguably stays out of the Room 
and refuses to detonate his bomb because he realises that 'against the true causes of evil and chaos 
no bomb, no matter how many kilotons, can be effective.'
722
 The moral of the film, for Evlampiev, 
resides in the fact that 'the saving of existence, and of the whole of humanity, depends on how 
quickly people can come to this new understanding of the world, give up their false ideals and false 
relationship with reality.'
723
 Tarkovsky is clear that only the moral leadership of the Stalker, his 
courage and faith and honest desire to be useful, can pull the simultaneously self-absorbed and 
reason-drugged masses of our modern world, represented in the film by the Writer and Professor 
respectively, out of their dangerous moral and spiritual emptiness. The challenge inherent in this 
new understanding of the world is that since it 'sets itself in opposition to reason's claims to 
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definitive superhuman knowledge, it can only become accessible to people through their own 
individual earthly efforts, and cannot be impressed on the brain in the same way as generally 
accepted scientific truths.'
724
 The three men's journey to the Zone is an allegory of this urgent 
process: the Stalker can offer advice on how to behave, but in the end it is the Zone who reads the 
hearts and minds of those who enter her and judges them accordingly, and it is this judgment which 
matters.  
 Towards the end of the 1970s, Tarkovsky began to worry more and more that this moral and 
political progress, realisable only 'in the brains of millions' to paraphrase Thomas Nagel, was taking 
too long; in Stalker, he develops the specifically apocalyptic Cold War theme we had seen in 
incipient form in Solaris and Zerkalo: we must cultivate ourselves now, en masse, if there is to be 
any future for us as a species at all. Evlampiev sees this as a thematic shift from a man for whom 
God had died rather than as a a logical extension of the idea of a divinely inspired Moral Law (or 
simply as its application to present-day circumstances), arguing that 'in Stalker, Tarkovsky talks less 
about the possibility of making the world more perfect and harmonious (in comparison with its 
present less than perfect state) than he does about saving the world from a definitive disintegration, 
of saving it from total death even if in a less than perfect state.'
725
 While 'the apocalyptic theme - the 
idea of a universal catastrophe leading to a full and final destruction of all that is meaningful and 
whole in existence and the definitive reign of chaos and absurdity - first appears in full force in 
Stalker', Evlampiev argues that in Tarkovsky's final two films 'it will become the main theme.'
726
 I 
see no reason, however, why this 'apocalyptic turn' in Tarkovsky should constitute an either/or; it is 
surely perfectly consistent with the views on moral cultivation and potential harmony expressed by 
Tarkovsky in his earlier films and even in Stalker itself. Evlampiev himself actually shares this 
view, even if he confuses himself and his readers by at times pretending he doesn't and by insisting 
that 'God is dead' in Stalker. On the contrary, God is, while deprived of the authority of revelation, 
still as alive as ever: 
 
   Despite the many things that distinguish it from his earlier films, Stalker in its own 
   unexpected way rehearses the main themes of Andrei Rublev in a new light. The only 
   path to the saving of the world and human beings was shown by Jesus Christ, the 
   Teacher. The Jesus theme, his biography as an example of self-sacrifice and of the 
   master-student relationship, appears with a new force in Stalker, although in a less 
   obvious and direct form than in Andrei Rublev. We have already stressed that  
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   Tarkovsky was a long way from traditional Christianity, and his interpretation of the 
   story of Jesus clearly illustrates this. For Tarkovsky Jesus is a man and only a man; 
   the meaning of his story is not that he brought people a promise from God, but that 
   as a man he proved capable of an earthly feat which showed all people the path to 
   salvation.
727
   
 
Evlampiev introduces into his discussion, unhelpfully and unnecessarily in my view, the 
Heideggerian concept of 'Being' as the object of post-Christian service where I would prefer 
'Civilisation', or at least some version of Tu Weiming's 'anthropocosmic vision' for that civilisation 
as we will discuss it in the next chapter. Terminological debates aside, however, Evlampiev's 
evaluation of Stalker is understandable enough to the lay reader unsteeped in Heideggerian arcana: 
'in the story of Jesus the most important part is not the final moments of his life, since in trying to 
imitate them there is a big risk of self-deification, but rather the patience and methodical discipline 
of the teacher's vocation.'
728
 Moreover, 'the work of Jesus is alive and evolving, as long as there are 
students of his work, and as long as it is passed on through inconspicuous earthly service and a 
smooth transition from teachers to students.'
729
 This process of transmission 'is not affected by 
whether Jesus was a perfect human being; indeed, some of his closest disciples were a long way 
from being perfect (we need think no further than Peter).'
730
 While the goal may be individual 
perfection, the most important thing is 'the adoption of a respectful willingness to take up one's 
section of the Path', an intergenerational awareness which 'already involves a person in a higher 
calling'; even if she 'retains the imprint of her ineradicable imperfection, she can still in turn pass on 
what she has achieved to her students, so that they can make their own contribution to that common 
task which Jesus began and which is capable of saving everything and everyone.'
731
 Evlampiev 
concludes that 'this, in particular, is what Tarkovsky's film is about'.
732
  
 This common civilisational project may indeed require precisely the sacrifice of the 'self' to 
which the Writer was so attached; rather than striving to 'find oneself' or 'be happy', for Evlampiev's 
Tarkovsky 'the realm of "religion", of true faith, involves coming down to Earth as it is and trying to 
correct its imperfection'.
733
 In this sense, 'a violation of ethical laws is not a failing to to live up to 
some "sublime" set of divine commandments, but rather an inability to recognise that the most 
important thing for a human being is not his own "subjective" existence or his own individual ends, 
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but existence itself, existence as such.'
734
 This may require compromise and even outright sacrifice: 
'if in order to keep this existence from falling into a state of chaos and absurdity one is asked to 
sacrifice one's ethical self-righteousness, one is obliged to do so.'
735
 The Zone, with its mirage of a 
'Wish Fulflilment Room', offers a necessary reminder to people, in a world short on reminders, of 
this higher Moral Law: 
 
   'There's nothing else left for people on Earth,' the Stalker cries to the Professor, who 
   has brought his bomb into the Zone so as to blow up the 'Room of Desires'. 'This is 
   the only place where people can go if they have nothing else left to hope for.'  
   Although when she gets there a person does not get her wishes fulfilled, the hope 
   which remains alive in her does not die, and actually gets stronger insofar as she gets 
   more than simple wish fulfilment: she understands that all her previous desires were 
   mirages and only cut her off from herself and the true meaning of her life. Here [in 
   the Zone] one learns to desire from scratch, and the new desires will not be at all 
   similar to the old ones.
736
  
 
Whereas the Writer is stuck asking plaintively why he can't personally live forever, the Stalker has 
grasped the intergenerational meaning of life and civilisation, accepting the lessons of his 'Teacher' 
in the stalking trade, such as they were, and going further, in the end desperately hoping that 
someone, somewhere, somehow, will take up the mantle in a world sliding, or already slid, into a 
'chaos' of self-centred materialism and unbelief: the idea of the Room of Desires is that 'a person, 
upon reaching it, should realise the emptiness of her former life and renounce all that she formerly 
put under the heading of "desires"'.
737
 In contrast, 'if she does not understand the need to transform 
her own essence and her own existence and enters the Room anyway, she will truly get her wishes 
fulfilled – the genuine deep-rooted wishes of a soul which is wrongly oriented in the world – 
leading to a collapse of all she knows and ultimately to death.'
738
  
  The Stalker himself can, by the end of the film at least, be seen as a teacher desperately in 
search of students in a decaying social edifice well represented by the station bar where the 
travellers' journey begins and ends. Following their return from the Zone, in a conversation with his 
wife, the Stalker utters some 'very harsh words about his two fellow travellers', which Evlampiev 
argues 'do not refer to them (not least because they contradict other not less honest statements by 
                                                 
734  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 261. 
735  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 261.  
736  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, pp. 262-263.  
737  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 267. 
738  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 267.  
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him) but to people in general, to the whole surrounding human zoo, built on a foundation of 
technological reason and physical power.'
739
 While we have already argued that the Writer and 
Professor do indeed represent, with their respective faiths in self and reason, the contemporary 
'human zoo' at large, and that the moral progress they achieve in the Zone is limited, Evlampiev 
goes so far as to argue that the Stalker, in his final journey into the Zone, 'in fact fulfilled his life's 
work – he finally found a student that could go further than his own teacher.'740 Evlampiev argues 
that this exemplary 'student' is in fact the Writer, who has 'become another person while navigating 
the Zone, similar to the Stalker - in fact, he has himself become a Stalker.'
741
 While there is some 
limited evidence for this, including the Stalker's wife's positive reaction to the Writer in the bar 
when they return from the Zone (she praises the apparent humanity and warmth he shows towards 
dogs), it is ultimately unclear whether the Writer stays out of the Room more for the admirable 
reasons Evlampiev suggests or primarily because of the self-centred fear he expresses throughout; a 
more measured conclusion would be to say that the Writer and Professor show, by successfully 
navigating the Zone under the Stalker's guidance, that there is a modicum of hope for the 'human 
zoo' at large, but that the painfully slow nature of their moral progress leaves the Stalker 
exasperated and Tarkovsky nervous about the future of humanity in the post-nuclear age, where 
moral leadership of the kind supplied by the Stalker is in such dangerously short supply. 
 Although Boyadzhieva exaggerates when she says that the Stalker's wife is the only character 
in the film 'capable of love'
742
, this love is the Stalker's final unequivocal hope. Although he refuses 
to take his wife into the Zone for fear that she, too, will fail fully to understand, we see at the end of 
the film, whether Tarkovsky's Stalker can or not, that she already understands him and his mission, 
even if he is unwilling to share this mission with her in the way that Akhenaten and Nefertiti shared 
theirs (and here we come very close to the tragic flaw in Tarkovsky's conception of conjugal 
relations which prevented him from conceiving of a truly shared mission and equal relationship). 
The Stalker's wife loves her husband and believes thoroughly in him, sacrificing herself to him and 
regretting none of the bitterness and solitude that he has caused her with his dangerous forays into 
the Zone; it is no coincidence that it is the daughter of this couple who shows the will necessary for 
true human discovery, a will not forged by dreams of self-sufficiency and personal immortality but 
by the 'fire' of collective inspiration and action, as we see in the poem which inspires her to 
telekinesis: 
 
   I love your eyes, my friend, 
                                                 
739  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 267. 
740  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 267.  
741  Evlampiev, The Artistic Philosophy of Andrei Tarkovsky, p. 267.  
742  See Boyadzhieva, Life on a Cross p. 242.  
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   With their flaming playfulness, miraculous, 
   When you raise them suddenly 
   And as if in a heavenly prayer 
   Draw a brief circle. 
   But there is a stronger charm; 
   The eyes cast down, 
   In minutes of passionate kisses, 
   And through the lowered lashes,  
   The sombre, faint glow of determined ardour.  
 
The triumphal music from a bygone century which accompanies the breakthrough to telekinesis 
provides a backdrop of ancestral cheering and a reminder of the deep intergenerational effort and 
civilisational energy which has gone into producing this precious new prodigy.  
 
 
3.8 Nostalgia (1983) 
 
With Nostalgia, Tarkovsky, now an emigrant in Western Europe, turned his attention to a 
specifically Western form of spiritual crisis, addressing his own alienation from Western culture's 
preoccupation with the individual self. Russia, with its long tradition of viewing itself as a 'bridge 
between East and West' and only reluctantly as part of Europe, is represented in Nostalgia by 
Gorchakov, a poet who feels entirely uneasy about Italy and its 'beauty' even as it comes to form 
part of him; the film's memorable closing scene, in which Gorchakov sits with his dog against a 
half-Russian, half-Italian backdrop, is explained thus by Tarkovsky: 'at the end I put a Russian 
house within the walls of an Italian cathedral in an artificial montage. This models the internal state 
of the protagonist, which has not let him live in harmony, or rather a newfound integrity marrying 
Tuscan hills and the Russian countryside.'
743
 This new 'house', half-Russian and half-European, is 
nevertheless, as Tarkovsky intimates, missing something; Daoist music makes its appearance in the 
film as Tarkovsky openly begins to seek solutions from beyond the confines of Christendom: 'while 
making my latest film Nostalgia, which I shot in Italy, I met with Daoist music from around the 6
th
 
century BC. I have it in the film. What astonishing music! I don't mean its apparent formal qualities; 
on the contrary, the whole point of it is that it disappears, dissolves.'
744
 Tarkovsky argues further that 
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744  Andrei Tarkovsky, 'The 20
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 Century and the Artist', Iskusstvo Kino, no. 4, 1989, p. 98.  
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'this is a kind of introvertedness in Eastern spirituality which is expressed in its music, a sort of 
spiritual implosion, where the individual draws the  entire surrounding world into herself, as if 
breathing in the whole world in the spiritual sense.'
745
 Tarkovsky, and by direct extension 
Gorchakov, for all their education in Russian and Western classics, are not fully at home in them, 
and seek inspiration from the East; as Tarkovsky once told an interviewer, 'for me, for example, 
countries like Thailand, Nepal, Tibet, China or Japan have always been closer to my spirituality and 
interiority than France or Germany, as strange as that may seem.'
746
 Although Tarkovsky 
'understood' Western culture and 'knew it well' and was, 'at the end of the day, a Westerner myself, 
educated not only in Russian culture but in Western culture more generally', there was nevertheless 
'a common spirit, a deep common creed' which linked him and other Russians 'even more intimately 
with the East.'
747
 When asked in 1986 'how have you resolved the problem of your 'I' in the West?', 
Tarkovsky the emigrant was even more explicit: 'I haven't managed to at all yet. For me Eastern 
civilisation is more attractive, with its focus on interiority and the desire to get beyond oneself, 
rather than the aggressive Western striving to express one's feelings as if they somehow 
mattered.'
748
 Without arriving at envy of other cultures – this is the man who quoted Pushkin 
approvingly on Russia's irreplaceable role in the history of civilisation in the central scene of his 
authobiographical film - he had nevertheless 'always felt a strong pull from the allure of Eastern 
culture, where people are ready to offer themselves, so to speak, as gifts to the whole of creation.'
749
 
In the West, by contrast, another philosophy reigns: 'namely, to assert oneself and draw attention to 
oneself. This always struck me as dreadfully irritating, naive, and animal-like. The philosophy of 
the East has always had a magical effect on me and with every passing year it grows stronger.'
750
   
 It is regrettable that Tarkovsky's main contact with 'Eastern civilisation' came in the form of 
the Daoism on display in Nostalgia and the Japanese Buddhism we will see in Sacrifice - two 
essentially marginal (though trendy in the West) brands of Eastern spirituality when compared with 
the central (but long marginalised in the West) Confucian tradition – but we will have more to say 
on this in Chapter 4 (suffice it to say here that Tarkovsky, like Mahfouz, seems to have been largely 
ignorant of Confucianism and the ways in which it would have made a nicer fit with his ethic of 
sacrifice than either Daoism or Buddhism). Tarkovsky the emigrant's central concern, however, is 
Western civilisation's inability to take the idea of 'civilisation', and sacrifice for it, seriously: 
 
  Here in the West, people are particularly concerned about their own selves. If you tell 
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747  See Boldyrev, Stalker, p. 323.  
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  them that the meaning of human existence lies in sacrifice for something higher, they 
  will probably laugh and not believe you, just as they won't believe you if you tell 
  them that people are not born to be happy and that there are much more important 
  things than personal success or individual material prosperity. No one, it seems,  
  believes that the soul is immortal!
751
 
 
Just as Matthew Arnold's England had been consumed by a passion for coal and faith in the power 
of money over culture as a route to human perfection, Tarkovsky argues that the same philistinism 
has now conquered the entire Earth: 'the East was closer to the Truth than the West, but the West has 
eaten the East with its material claims to a better life.'
752
 Western 'romanticism', Tarkovsky argues, 
is partially responsible for this: 'Compare Eastern and Western music: the West cries, "This is me! 
Look at me! Listen to how I suffer, how I love, how unhappy I am, how discerning I am! I! My! To 
me! Me!"'; the East, meanwhile, 'doesn't say a word about itself! Complete dissolution in God, 
Nature, Time. Finding oneself in everything! Hiding everything within oneself! This is what Daoist 
music and China gave us 600 years before the birth of Jesus.'
753
 Tarkovsky then asks himself the 
difficult question: 'But why, then, did this grand vision not win out? Why has it collapsed? Why has 
the civilisation founded on this base not reached us in the form of a completed historical 
process?'
754
 Tarkovsky's only response is to say weakly that 'physical resistance is sinful by the very 
essence of Eastern logic.'
755
 
 Gorchakov in Nostalgia is utterly uninterested in his beautiful Italian translator Eugenia, 
who struggles to understand why she cannot find a man to satisfy her, and is fascinated instead by 
Domenico, who ends up burning himself alive in the name of humanity. Eugenia has completely 
failed to understand that there are 'things more important' than her own happiness, whereas 
Domenico, for all his appearance as a madman – for Tarkovsky, such believers could only appear 
mad in the West in the second half of the 20
th
 century – has found something that Gorchakov, a 
Russian in Europe with a largely European education, is struggling to find within himself: the 
courage of his civilisational convictions. Gorchakov's carrying of the candle for Domenico 
represents an act, however trivial and symbolic, of sacrifice, a 'crossing over' to the house of truth – 
half-Western (Italian) and half-Eastern (Russian) - in which he can finally, with his timeless dog, 
enjoy a moment of symmetry and harmony. Indeed, for all Tarkovsky's embrace of the Far East, in 
the end it is Russia which comes to stand in for an Eastern civilisation which has, in our time, 
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largely capitulated to Western materialism. As Nikolai Boldyrev argues, 'Tarkovsky dreamed of a 
"third way" for Russia. He saw that few in the West understood, or even wanted to understand, the 
essence of Russia and Russian people. The West was too complacent in its materialistic 
interpretation of "spiritual life" to be interested in any "third way".'
756
 As late as 1985, Tarkovsky 
was telling interviewers: 'I strongly believe in Russia's spiritual resources, the great spiritual forces 
which lie hidden in our country, and I think they are capable of having an impact on the course of 
civilisation as a whole.'
757
 
 Gorchakov, then, is a kind of universal man and an idealised self-portrait of Tarkovsky 
himself, a man Western enough to appreciate the best of European art, architecture and (Christian) 
civilisation, but also a standard-bearer for the kind of cosmos-embracing values which have been 
lost in the West and which were once embraced in the East but which now risk being lost there as 
well. For Boldyrev, 'this is, in essence, the main theme and the main conflict in Nostalgia: the 
opposition between East and West in the protagonist's soul and his quiet, daydream-like edging 
towards Eastern "overcoming", fleshly material self-sacrifice (through his brotherly union with the 
"exemplary" Domenico) for the sake of the invisible city and the world.'
758
 Although there is plenty 
to like about living materially well or standing up for the rights of individual people – Tarkovsky 
himself was keen on both and does not in any way celebrate Domenico's selfish imprisonment of 
his family, for example – when such concerns with utility and rights are merely self-centred they 
cannot lead to human fulfilment. When asked Eugenia's 'How can I be happy?' question by an 
audience member at an American lecture, Tarkovsky unambiguously replied: 
 
   I find your question simply laughablе! [...] For a start, you need to ask yourself why 
   you're alive in the world. What is the meaning of your life? Why have you appeared 
   on Earth at precisely this time? What role has been set aside for you? Sort all this out. 
   Understand that human beings were not born for happiness at all. I think we were 
   born to bear the burden of hard work. Life was given to us for spiritual growth, so 
   that we could perfect ourselves morally. I don't understand at all who said we ought 
   to be happy. People can't live with only self-centred pragmatic goals, even if they 
   live in a very well organised state. If they do, they simply degenerate. Christian love 
   begins with love for oneself, but such love entails not egoism but rather a capacity to 
   sacrifice oneself for the sake of the next person. [...] Of course, it would be absurd to 
   suggest that one could or should make suffering her goal. Sacrifice as such should 
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   not feel like a conscious giving up of something; it's a matter of achieving readiness 
   for sacrifice as a natural spiritual state.
759
  
 
For Shitova, Gorchakov and his 'Teacher', Domenico, succeed in this self-overcoming and in 
identifying with a collective entity which brings them into contact with Truth: while modern Europe 
endures with 'the old stones of its culture, its comfort, the constrained tone of its ideological and 
political struggles, its people broken by unbelief and horror in the face of a nuclear apocalypse' and 
left merely with 'the exposure of nerves, tiredness of oneself, loneliness, the grinding complexity of 
relations with others', Gorchakov 'carries and carries his candle'; meanwhile, in Rome, in front of 
the statue of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius on his horse, Domenico 'shouts his words of prophetic 
warning at the indifferent crowd, a call for unity (to the sound of Beethoven's 9
th
 Symphony, with 
the powerful refrain "Unite, millions!"), and douses himself in gasoline before burning like a 
torch.'
760
   
  'Strange people, strange acts?' Shitova asks. 'Yes, but behind each of them lies an intolerable 
agony of involvement in the woes of our wide world, a desire to change even a symbolic something 
in it and in oneself by overcoming alienation from oneself.'
761
 Shitova puts in this same category of 
strange self-overcomers the hero of Tarkovsky's final film, Sacrifice. 
 
 
3.9 Sacrifice (1985)  
 
According to Shitova: 'Alexander, the hero of Sacrifice, also carries out a ritual of his own: he 
calmly, almost supernaturally prepares the destruction of his big, beautiful home, offering it as a 
sacrifice in an effort to save the world from fiery nuclear annihilation.'
762
 'Is he mad?' she asks. 'Yes 
and no, because the overcoming of the terror which had disfigured him is a move which brings him 
liberation.'
763
 Although Alexander himself will soon die, he 'leaves behind a son who overcomes his 
inability to speak by saying "in the beginning there was the Word", and who continues to water the 
parched tree which will one day be green with health.'
764
 Just as Gorchakov finds more to interest 
him in Domenico and his sacrifice than in Eugenia and her self-centredness, so too is Alexander's 
young son more attracted by his father's mixture of respect for Christian tradition ('in the beginning 
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there was the Word') and samurai warrior spirit (not least evidenced by Alexander's choice of 
costume for his act of ritual sacrifice) than his mother's hysterical egoism. In stark contrast to the 
spiritual purity – old-fashioned Christianity with some dashes of Eastern flavour – enshrined in the 
tree by the water where father and son commune and exchange the flame of civilisation, we have 
the house, its merely ornamental Western high cultural contents and the decadent, self-centred 
behaviour of its inhabitants, most notably of Alexander's wife Adelaide. In his bid to the Swedish 
Film Institute, Tarkovsky explained his central goal thus: 'the film will be about the following: if we 
do not want to live like parasites off the body of society and enjoy the fruits of democracy, if we do 
not want to become conformists and blindly consuming idiots, then we are obliged to give up a 
lot.'
765
 Without a readiness for sacrifice of the kind made by Alexander, Tarkovsky argues, a vibrant 
democratic order is impossible: 'only when you know that you are ready to sacrifice yourself can 
you have an impact on the overall process of life. The price, as a rule, is our material wealth. One 
must live as one says [one should], in order that the principles one expounds become more than idle 
chatter and demagoguery.'
766
 By the end of Tarkovsky's life the apocalyptic nature of the nuclear 
threat in particular made this readiness for sacrifice and moral self-cultivation all the more urgent: 
'we live in a crucial period in the history of our planet and should recognise that this is a pivotal era. 
A great deal depends on people themselves. Now is a decisive moment, and we must act and 
understand why this action is necessary.'
767
 Such understanding is achievable only through art, the 
main task of which is 'the resolution of the spiritual crisis reigning all over the world'; Tarkovsky 
describes art as 'the most selfless of all human activities' because it responds to 'society's need for 
something which stimulates spiritual development and develops a sense of self within the 
individual, encouraging her to strive for distinction and humaneness'.
768
  
 The self-evident proposition that co-existence on a crowded, nuclear-capable planet will only 
be possible if everyone comes to regard the survival of life or civilisation beyond themselves as 
more important than their own physical survival, and that this will only be possible if we are willing 
to sacrifice at least some of our material well-being all of the time and even all of our material well-
being some of the time, will paradoxically require a commitment to moral self-discovery and 
painful truth-finding that no one, unaided by 'the best that has been thought and said', is ready to 
undertake. Alexander confronts the material and cultural excess with which he has surrounded 
himself, and comes to see his privilege for what it is – a call to responsibility and sacrifice - whereas 
Adelaide, for all her bourgeois comfort, has never enjoyed a true humanistic education, and is 
utterly incapable of even beginning the path to self-cultivation, consumed as she is by her hysterical 
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fear of personal annihilation. If, as Natalya Bondarchuk and many others have stressed, Adelaide is 
to some degree at least based on Larisa – Layla Alexander Garrett, the actress who plays Adelaide 
in the film, said of her hysterical scenes that 'the most frightening thing is that this was not some 
fantasy concocted by the director; reality stood behind it, and he experienced it all in his own 
skin'
769
 – we must ask ourselves once again why Tarkovsky stayed with such an obviously self-
centred woman, and why he felt it necessary to make a film about it.  
 In Tarkovsky's diaries, which we will turn to in more detail in the next section, Larisa is 
almost always introduced as 'poor Larisa'. Although she was a wonderful solver of the kinds of 
practical problems for which Tarkovsky had an almost pathological incapacity, she was, as we have 
already intimated, a person in grave need of emotional support and guidance. If Tarkovsky was on 
the one side attracted by her ability to deal with the practical realities of daily life and afraid of the 
consequences of leaving her, he was also arguably drawn back, time and again, to the challenge of 
'educating' her, of saving a soul, of doing something useful for someone like the Stalker, of freeing 
her from her obvious insecurities and opening up the moral, humanistic view of life in which one's 
own material concerns lose their absolute animal significance. Tarkovsky's portrayal of Adelaide 
and her relationship with Alexander in Sacrifice are a testament to his total failure in this regard; 
even Alexander comes to see the pointlessness of engaging with Adelaide anymore and concentrates 
all his hopes and energies on his son (Tarkovsky also dedicated the film to his son, not Larisa). 
Even when Alexander has burned the family house down, Adelaide is visibly more concerned for 
the house than for the welfare of her husband, but Alexander is not surprised or worried by this; it is 
merely proof of what he already knows: his wife does not, and has never, loved him, and indeed is 
incapable of loving anyone or sacrificing for anyone. Adelaide wanted a man who would give 
everything to her and for her, but was unwilling and unable to reciprocate, and unable to understand 
that true love consists not in seeing the loved one as a unique end-in-herself, as Adelaide herself 
wishes to be seen, but rather as a microcosm of a wider goodness flowing through the universe and 
to whom one chooses, for reasons of destiny as much as anything else, to ally oneself, in principle 
for life, in a wider common cause.  
 Did Tarkovsky feel that he owed Larisa for the practical help she gave him? Did he feel sorry 
for her and wish to 'educate' her, thereby making himself feel useful and 'necessary'? Did he really 
believe that it was impossible for a man and a woman to have a relationship based in spiritual 
equality rather than a master-student dialectic, or that women could never take a fully autonomous 
role in the civilisational enterprise, living it instead through the men in their lives? Women like 
Natalya Bondarchuk and the director Larisa Shepitko, described by Bondarchuk to me as 
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Tarkovsky's 'spiritual twin' and the creator of films every bit as 'Tarkovskian' as those here covered, 
should surely have put paid to this ludicrous and outdated notion, even as Larisa (Tarkovskaya) lent 
evidence to it from day to day. Whatever the reasons, and for all the suffering it caused him ('there 
are things more important than happiness,' Tarkovsky probably said to himself), he stayed with her, 
and in his own way 'loved' her, as Bondarchuk stressed to me in no uncertain terms; but the figure 
of Adelaide forces us to ask, even if we cannot fully answer (to repeat: a thorough intimate 
biography of Tarkovsky is desperately needed), the question of how Larisa, a seemingly venal, 
vindictive and unloving woman, came to occupy such a central place in the life of a man committed 
to diametrically opposed values and who appeared, by the end at least - if the depiction of Adelaide 
is any measure - to have understood her moral and psychological condition to be untreatable.  
 At the very least, we can say that Tarkovsky understood and was deeply preoccupied by the 
direct link between the state of our intimate personal relationships and the perilous state of the 
nuclearised Cold War world; the solution to the latter could only be arrived at by hard work on the 
former, which in turn could only happen if individual moral self-cultivation, culminating in the 
recognition of the ultimate spiritual goal of readiness for sacrifice, were to become the global norm. 
'My film is called Sacrifice,' Tarkovsky says of his last work, 'and shouldn't readiness for sacrifice 
indeed be our natural spiritual state?'
770
 In the film, Tarkovsky 'raises the question of the importance 
of personal responsibility and personal faith, a faith which takes responsibility for the destiny of the 
world and opposes itself to the general irresponsibility reigning everywhere.'
771
 Something 
extraordinary is now required to oppose this 'general irresponsibility' before it is too late: 'now only 
a genius can save humanity – not a prophet, but a genius who formulates a new moral ideal', one 
which calls for self-cultivation and which could, in principle at least, convince everyone. 'Where is 
this Messiah?' Tarkovsky asks.
772
 Boyadzhieva uncharitably argues that Tarkovsky saw himself in 
the Messiah's role, when deep inside himself he must have felt that if he could not even convince 
his own wife, the only possible Messiah would somehow have to come from his son's generation 
(hence the dedication of the film 'to my son Andryusha, in faith and hope'). For Maya Turovskaya, 
meanwhile, Sacrifice marks the end of Tarkovsky's evolution 'from confession to sermonising, from 
sermonising to sacrificial action'. Although the old Tarkovskian themes – 'home, family, 
intergenerational identity' – recur, for Turovskaya there is in Sacrifice a new and open determination 
to 'influence reality and even to change it, as with the words and deeds of a Messiah', and the film 
itself is best understood as a 'magical' attempt to effect this spiritual change
773
. I would argue, 
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however, that this desire to be useful is nothing new in Tarkovsky, and was present as early as 
Andrei Rublev if not from his earliest student days.   
  Nikolai Boldyrev comes closer to the novelty of Sacrifice when he suggests that 'the house 
in which Alexander wanted to hide from the world appears as a fragile illusion'; the hero makes a 
breakthrough, 'finding a new quality in his soul', and is no longer a victim of 'the circumstances of a 
mad world', but rather a 'spiritual warrior': thus does Alexander 'save his young boy, whose destiny 
defines the tone of the film'.
774
 Even here, however, there is little which distinguishes Alexander 
from Tarkovsky's Rublev, or even his Ivan; if there is any discernible change in theme from Ivanogo 
Detstvo to Sacrifice, it is only insofar as Tarkovsky's consciousness of the apocalyptic threat facing 
humanity in the nuclear age, and of the even greater urgency of the need for spiritual transformation 
towards moral truth in which he had more or less from the beginning believed, has grown. This 
faith has nothing whatsoever to do with revelation, Christian or otherwise, but rather with action: as 
Tarkovsky himself says, 'I think that a person who is ready to sacrifice herself can be considered a 
believer.'
775
 For the others in the house, Alexander 'is a broken man, although in fact it is utterly 
clear,' Tarkovsky adds, 'that it is precisely he who will be saved. Alexander sacrifices himself, but at 
the same time drives others to sacrifice too.'
776
 
 Viktor Filimonov offers arguably the best analysis of Tarkovsky's final film, even going so far 
as to suggest that Sacrifice was the final nail in the coffin of Soviet tyranny and its creator the 'final 
communist': 'Tarkovsky's final work appears as a symbol of the end of decades of homelessness for 
Russian socialism. It raises the idea that the artist was sent into the world, on the back of our 
orphanhood, to search for a spiritual home uniting nature and human beings.'
777
 Filimonov laments 
that 'nothing similar has been possible in the post-Soviet period in such a simple and brilliantly 
frank form. Tarkovsky was the last communist, a successor to precisely those Russian geniuses, 
such as Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky', who, like Matthew Arnold in Culture and Anarchy and at around 
the same time, 'were able to feel the force of the religious idea at a time when it appeared of dubious 
relevance', battered on all sides by philistine materialism of one form or another.
778
 Filimonov, 
indeed, praises Sacrifice for the 'nakedness' of its religious feeling, 'meaningful for several 
generations of our countrymen who embraced the temptation of the idea of "happiness for all"'.
779
 In 
Sacrifice, 'all that remains is a mad act of unverified faith in a meaning which will be unavailable 
precisely to you as you contemplate your own approaching non-existence on Earth. And then, 
perhaps, we have for the first time in the history of our cinema an individual drama of universal 
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scope, as if it were the tragedy of a whole nation.'
780
 This is why, Filimonov concludes, 'beyond the 
whole "global problematic" of this film, we should see it as part of Tarkovsky's intimate diary, the 
final (earthly) pages of his spiritual autobiography'.
781
    
 Filimonov also reproduces, in full for effect, Alexander's plea to Heaven, in which he begs 
God to save his 'children, friends, wife, Victor' and 'all those who feel the coming of the end, and 
are afraid not for themselves, but for those around them' from a war after which there will be 'no 
winners and losers, no cities, no villages, no grass, no trees, no water in the springs, no birds in the 
sky': 'I will give You all that I have, only make everything as it was before, like this morning, make 
the war go away. […] Help, God, and I will do all that I have promised,' Alexander begs. Even if 
humanity contains armies of blind, self-centred Adelaides, the show simply must be allowed to go 
on! Alexander burns down his house, in all its European decadence, in a bid to avoid the looming 
tragedy of an aborted global civilisation. To do so, he calls on all the civilisational resources he 
possibly can in a bid to recapture its monotheistic essence: 'the interweaving of pagan magic and 
Christianity is born of the feeling of the redundance of [contemporary] European high culture' and a 
desire 'somehow to recover the evangelical myth' in a context where it can no longer survive on its 
own; 'for the hero of the film, as for its creator, not only prayer but also magic are needed to stave 
off the terror which is engulfing him.'
782
 The participatory knowledge of culture – Arnold's 'best 
which has been thought and said in the world' - is precisely what provides this 'magic' unattainable 
by other means: in his desperate bid to save humanity, 'Tarkovsky marshals the support of a world 
culture created over thousands of years of history and prehistory, starting from its mytho-ritualistic 
origins.'
783
   
 Filimonov is also right to weave into his analysis Andrei's acute guilt at having 'sacrificed' 
his own family to pursue his art both at home and, in the end, abroad: 'Andrei effectively abandoned 
his material earthly home; he was entirely absorbed with the "house of culture", with his own art, 
and sacrificed his relationships with his sons and blood relatives for it.'
784
 Still, without wanting to 
give up his broader mission and instead doing his absolute best to incorporate his children into the 
intergenerational civilisational struggle, Tarkovsky sought 'salvation in an act – meeting his fears 
and turning the meeting into a sacrificial act, a public declaration of repentance before his son, all 
the while affirming his choices: "in the beginning (after all) was the Word."'
785
 
 Tarkovsky is not the Messiah, but rather a man who recognises that he represents a culture 
and civilisation in crisis, who must sacrifice himself and his home to make room for a new 
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generation which, instead of closing itself off within the self-regarding walls of decaying Western 
high culture, will rediscover 'the Word' by looking outward from Europe and creating a new global 
cultural synthesis for a new century:  
 
  The century which gave rise, so to speak, to the décor [of the house] is, according to 
  the logic of the film, exhausted. It has reached a crisis point, at which death, burial 
  and rebirth in some new unforeseen form now await it. Along with [the décor]  
  Alexander, as the bearer of the high spiritual values of European culture, must also 
  die and be transformed. This is the essence of his sacrifice in the face of a global  
  catastrophe. […] And these are the very laws, recognised by the artist himself, by 
  which we ought to judge him.
786
    
 
 
3.10 Warrior or Monster? The Verdict of the Diaries 
 
    In light of the infinite laws or the laws of infinity which lie beyond our 
    reach, God cannot not exist. GOD is a word to comfort human beings, 
    who struggle to feel the essence of the beyond, the unknown,  
    the unknowable. In a moral sense, God is love. 
     In order for people to live without harming others, there needs 
    to be an ideal, an ideal in the sense of a spiritual, moral conception of 
    law. Morality is inside us.
787
 
    
         Andrei Tarkovsky, Martyrolog   
 
Tarkovsky, like Mahfouz, was a man of One Law. This law, discoverable inside oneself, requires 
spiritual and introspective effort to be discovered and applied: 
 
  It is possible to save everyone by saving oneself. In the spiritual sense of course. … 
  Instinct alone will not save us. […] Is a person's destiny really just the iteration of an 
  endless process, the meaning of which she does not have the power to understand? 
  People, despite everything – cynicism, materialism – believe in infinity, in  
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  immortality. Tell them that not one more human being were to be born on Earth, and 
  they would put a bullet in their heads. […] To recognise the mortality of our flesh 
  [and to sacrifice] in the name of the future, in the name of immortality: […] if  
  humanity is capable of that, then all is not yet lost. There is still a chance.
788
    
 
Sacrifice of self for the future of civilisation: the essence of the Tarkovskian creed. He needed 
practical help proselytising, however, and this Larisa provided ('When Larochka isn't around, I 
always have unpleasant things to deal with,' reads a typical diary entry from 1971
789
). The creed, 
though updated for the apocalyptic context of the Cold War and showing flashes of Cold War-era 
cultural globalisation with its nods to Daoism and Akira Kurosawa, owed much to the Russian 
philosophical and spiritual tradition, and arguably more to Tolstoy than to Dostoyevsky; for all 
Dostoyevsky's influence on the adolescent Tarkovsky and all Tarkovsky's desire to read 'everything 
by Dostoyevsky and everything about him'
790
, ultimately Tarkovsky seems to have shared Vladimir 
Nabokov's conclusion that Dostoyevsky was better read once than twice ('I reread The Idiot; […] I 
found it boring somehow'
791
), whereas Tolstoy was the gift that kept giving ('a selfish person cannot 
read Tolstoy and love him; he is inimical to her'
792
). Tarkovsky's choice of medium - film - was also 
an attempt to update the tradition of truth, both to reach a broader audience and to show that, while 
film was in no way 'truer' than earlier media, it was at least 'on the same level with the other arts, 
[…] equal to music, poetry, prose and so on'.793  
 There is little point defending Tarkovsky from charges of sexism - when asked to define the  
'organic nature of women' in 1974, for example, he replied 'submission, abasement in the name of 
love' while the 'organic nature of men' was  'artistic creation'
794
 – but the tragic consequences of this 
prejudice for his own life have been rehearsed here already and do not, in my view, constitute a 
decisive blow against his 'One Law' creed: in the end, both men and women have to learn that, 
when it comes to the future of civilisation, all must adopt a posture of 'submission, abasement in the 
name of love' and all must be ready to engage in 'creative' acts of sacrifice as the need for them 
arises. This process of spiritual purification may at times require an isolation which appears selfish 
and may even be selfish from the point of view of one's nearest and dearest, as thе following vitally 
important diary entry from 1977 attests: 
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  I see with ever more clarity the need to change my life, to reorganise it somehow, 
  revise it. I need to start living from scratch. What do I need for that? Above all to feel 
  free and independent. To believe, love. To give up this current world of routine – too 
  pointless – and live for the sake of the future world. But where? How? I have  
  responsibilities to my nearest and dearest – to my children, my parents, Larisa. This 
  is the first hurdle, the first obstacle.
795
  
 
The need for communion with the ideal world may appear stronger in Tarkovsky than in Mahfouz – 
who argued tirelessly for an ethic of social engagement over detached mysticism - if we forget that 
Mahfouz, as a writer, organised countless hours of solitude for himself, whereas Tarkovsky, both 
professionally and personally, was more often 'stuck' with other people. In the end, however, one 
tired diary entry does not change the fact that Tarkovsky's Moral Law, like Mahfouz's, primarily 
involved service to other people, and to family first and foremost, even as it required a modicum, 
even a fairly large modicum, of private self-cultivation. An approving 1978 diary reference to an 
unlikely source – Schopenhauer – reminds us of Tarkovsky's ultimate rejection of solitude as a 
creed: 'the equal passing of time in all our heads shows more than anything else that we are all 
immersed in the same dream, and moreover, that all those who have this dream are a single united 
being.'
796
   
 Tarkovsky quotes Tolstoy himself in a diary entry a few months later: 'Just as we have 
thousands of dreams in our lives, so too is our life one of thousands of lives into which we enter 
from that more authentic, real, true life from which we leave upon entering this life, and to which 
we return when we die. Our lives are one of the dreams of that truer life, and so on to infinity, up to 
a final true life: the life of God.'
797
 Tolstoy links this to a certain interpretation of the Buddhist idea 
of karma, which consists in the idea that 'the good and evil of our future lives will depend precisely 
on our efforts to avoid evil and do good which we have made in this life.'
798
 Commenting on the 
meaning of Tolstoy's call to action, Tarkovsky writes, employing essentially the same image as the 
image of Gorchakov crossing the swimming pool with his candle: 'The struggle between good and 
evil will exist for as long as human beings exist in their earthly existences. People need to swim to 
the opposite shore, otherwise they drown. Human beings have existed for so long and we still doubt 
the most important thing – the meaning of our own existences. That's what's so strange.'799   
Civilisation must be strengthened, Tarkovsky argues, if we are to protect this fragile flame of moral 
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truth; the strengthening process starts at home with a call to self-cultivation, and requires one to be 
hard on oneself, to demand better of oneself, as Tarkovsky repeatedly does in his diary, as in this 
episode of self-flagellation from 1979: 'All the time I am convinced that I am not living right. And 
that everything I do is false. Even when I act well, it seems that I do it to seem better.'
800
 This spirit 
of critical self-flagellation must then be extended to one's tribe and nation and the heroes of its 
pantheon, together with a willingness to see one's own nation as part of a broader civilisational 
struggle, as Pushkin could and Dostoyevsky couldn't: 'Dostoyevsky didn't believe in God, although 
he wanted to. He had nothing to believe with, but he wrote about faith. Pushkin is above all others 
because he did not attribute to Russia an absolute meaning.'
801
  
 Tarkovsky repeatedly affirmed that he 'did not believe in death', although he meant primarily 
by this that the person guided by the Moral Law sacrifices herself to posterity without regard for the 
possibility of what Nabokov calls 'The Impossible Human Surprise' of a life after death. Although 
he quotes Nabokov's The Gift ('I am convinced that unlikely surprises await us. It's a shame that we 
can't imagine that to which we have nothing to compare. Genius is a negro dreaming of snow.'
802
), 
the possibility of personal 'salvation' or personal surprises is entirely beside the point, as his 
unexpected comment on the Nabokov quote illustrates:  
 
  If I am to speak about what I see as my calling, well, it is to reach the absolute by 
  striving to raise the level of my craft. […] I want to preserve a level of quality. Like 
  Atlas bearing the Earth on his shoulders. He could have simply let it fall because he 
  was tired. But he didn't let go of it, and somehow held onto it. By the way, the most 
  amazing thing about this myth is not that he held on for a long time, but that he didn't 
  give up when he was deceived.
803
 
 
The sacrifices for artistic mastery are not a Pascalian wager on a possible future payback but a kind 
of magic, Atlas-like gesture of selfless service to future audiences with no thought of possible 
recompense. The Tarkovskian genius is not a person who can imagine snow having never seen it, 
but rather a moral genius who can serve for no other reason than love of service to others. 
 This need to serve, and to improve oneself for service, ultimately explained the decision to 
emigrate, as illustrated by the following entry from 1979: 
 
  I know that I am a long way from perfection, to put it mildly, and that I wallow in sin 
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  and imperfection without knowing how to fight against my own pathetic nature. I 
  know only one thing: that living as I have lived so far, working so appallingly little, 
  experiencing endless negative emotions which do not help but rather hinder the  
  feeling of the oneness of life which is necessary for work, at least from time to time – 
  I mustn't live like this anymore. I am afraid of such a life. I don't have enough time 
  left to waste it.
804
   
 
Note again the insistence on the need for 'wholeness', stability and love in order to forget oneself in 
work and realise one's potential as an artist. Only a 'complete personality' can make the call to 
sacrifice in which all art, for Tarkovsky, consists; an incomplete or traumatised one will be 
preoccupied with its own sufferings, often out of a simple and justifiable thirst for private justice, 
instead of being preoccupied with one's own shortcomings – conscience - out of a desire better to 
serve others. Art, in the public sense, is above all the responsibility of the lucky, the privileged, the 
'whole', because such 'great' personalities are most capable of the sacrifice in which 'true' love 
consists: 'in order truly to love a person – a mother, a wife, the mother of one's children, a man – 
one must be a whole personality, in other words a Great human being. [My mother-in-law] Anna 
Semenovna is one, my mother was another, my grandmother too. [...] So were the wives of the 
Decembrists. Love is truth. Falsehood and truth cannot go together.'
805
 Tarkovsky unexpectedly 
associates this 'greatness', however, with the courage to realise that 'anything can happen', that our 
scientific knowledge is all inductive and falsifiable. Just three lines before the above quote, we read 
in his diary: 'if I were to be asked what convictions about life keep me afloat (if it is possible to be 
'kept afloat' by one's convictions), I would say: first, that the world is unknowable, and 
(consequently) second, that EVERYTHING is possible in our unlikely world. It seems to me that 
the first entails the second, or the second the first, I'm not sure which.'
806
 The meaning of life is 
therefore not to search for stability in a world in which anything is in principle possible, but rather 
to erect a personality strong enough to embrace an ethic of sacrifice in the face of this potential 
chaos. Tarkovsky was therefore committed, if not to the idea of free will, then at least to a Moral 
Law which transcends all possible brain states and which is, in an almost Cartesian sense, a source 
of ultimate, unalterable stability in which all life has its meaning. If 'matter' is the sphere of the 
empirical, in which anything can happen and in which we face Hume's unresolvable Problem of 
Induction, there nevertheless remains a sphere of 'self-knowledge' which, though dependent on 
'matter' and brain states, nevertheless transcends them to occupy the realm of istina, the realm of 
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truth and love even if the brain states which make them temporarily possible could be smashed at 
any time by outside forces beyond our control. Tarkovsky summarises this philosophy with the 
following words: 'The main thing is that self-consciousness is not material. The result of its action, 
yes, but it is not itself matter.'
807
 'Faith' is therefore the belief that this one aspect of self – the moral 
aspect, or what Tarkovsky often calls the 'spiritual' dimension of selfhood – is in fact transcendent 
even though it appears as trivially changeable as the ultimately unknowable, chaotic universe in 
which it finds itself.
808
 In other words, 'the world exists for us and is evaluated by us, by our 
consciousness. Is it possible to get outside individual consciousness for a new, non-subjective 
evaluation of reality? They say that it isn't. But for some reason I believe that it is.'
809
 
 To stress the point about the difference between the empirical and spiritual realms, 
Tarkovsky approvingly quotes a Dutch Professor of Zoology: 'that a scientist is a Christian does not 
make him a better or worse scientist. If the study of science destroys religious faith, then we must 
bravely add that it destroys false faith, or better yet, false religion.'
810
 Although Tarkovsky clearly 
does not embrace science as a moral obligation with the insistence that Mahfouz does, but rather 
spends much of his time warning against the perils and moral costs of scientism in modern society, 
this reflects the fact that Mahfouz's Egypt and Tarkovsky's Russia found themselves at radically 
different stages of scientific and civilisational development rather than any meaningful difference of 
opinion on the relationship between science and religion: both could do good, and the former was 
not, in itself, any threat to the latter, but rather a possible forum for moral sacrifice in the service of 
the latter. Modern art, for Tarkovsky, had entirely lost this sense of mission, reducing itself to a 
science or 'method of disharmony' when the whole artistic and humanistic enterprise has nothing 
whatsoever to do with 'method' or 'disharmony' or 'unwholeness': 'in a word, the meaning of art is in 
the search for God in people, the search for the Way for people. I absolutely do not admit the idea of 
modern art, or what calls itself modern art, because it is soulless. It has turned from a search for the 
Divine Essence to a demonstration of method.'
811
 The very idea of an art decoupled from 
monotheistic religion is suspect: 'Analysis, dismemberment, the subsequently happily expressed 
idea of disharmony (if that is even possible – the IDEA of disharmony) – all this contradicts the 
essence of artistic creation, the essence of the demiurge.'
812
  
 In the end, and for all that Dostoyevsky himself was incapable of the faith he himself 
prescribed and did not enjoy the requisite 'wholeness' of character, the meaning of art and life for 
Tarkovsky is to be found precisely where Dostoyevsky says, namely, in sacrifice: 'and so, human 
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beings on Earth strive for an ideal which stands in opposition to their animal nature. When a person 
fails to live up to this law of striving for the ideal, or in other words when she fails lovingly to 
sacrifice her own 'I' to people or to another being […] she suffers and calls this state of suffering 
sin.'
813
 Survivor guilt is an inevitable part of this balanced whole: 'thus, human beings should 
constantly experience this suffering as a way of compensating for the failure to fulfil the heavenly 
covenant, namely sacrifice. This is how the earthly balance is maintained. Otherwise the world 
would be meaningless.'
814
 Tarkovsky sought to unite East and West in this harmony of meaning 
achievable through the cultivation of a spirit of sacrifice: 'the East is what remains of the true 
ancient civilisations, as distinct from the West, which is the centre of a mistaken, tragic, 
technological civilisation. […] It is precisely because Russia finds itself between East and West that 
it feels an essence here which is different from the lethal and mistaken Western way.'
815
 Tarkovsky 
here comes close to dismissing the idea of importing the best of Western science and learning as 
defended by Mahfouz, but ultimately, this is a question of stress and accent: nobody could wish for 
other people to live poorly. Although Western science and learning have brought about tremendous 
improvements in living standards for millions of people, a civilisation truly based on 'I want, I 
demand, I desire, I ask, I suffer'
816
 is not a civilisation at all, and true civilisation must be defended 
from such a 'wrongheaded' idea of welfare. As pithily summarised by Alexander Herzen from a 
1982 Tarkovsky diary entry, 'aristocratism is unhappiness'.
817
         
 In the end, even to want salvation for oneself is for Tarkovsky to remain a prisoner to such 
'aristocratic' and self-centred values, as this diary entry just weeks before his death in 1986 makes 
clear one final time: 'someone wanted to SAVE HIMSELF and suddenly felt a traitor, a Great 
Sinner opposing himself to everyone else, himself to life.'
818
 We must all make room for the great 
show of civilisation to go on, and be willing to get out of the way without self-pity when the time 
comes for us to sacrifice ourselves once and for all. Tarkovsky thus ended his life much as 
Muhtashami Zayid, the octogenarian hero of Mahfouz's The Day the Leader Was Killed (1981) 
ended his: 'perhaps I have lived longer than I was due? Have I perhaps played a role without 
knowing that I was going to complicate things so much [for my grandson]? It is time for me...'
819
        
 Four passages stand out, however, from Tarkovsky's diary above all the others, and reveal a 
man tragically caught between loyalty to flawed loved ones and loyalty to the great civilisational 
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ideal he had cultivated within himself thanks to a 'feeling of personal freedom'
820
 passed on to him 
by his loving parents and which had allowed him to overcome the ordinary concerns of the modern, 
self-centred individual and to recover the best of bygone cultural traditions. The first of these 
passages covers the death of Anatoly Solonitsyn in 1982: 
 
  Tolya Solonitsyn died on Friday. They say that he was already doing much better 
  with his tumor but had heart problems. The ambulance took him away and gave him 
  an injection. Then some careless doctors were discussing his condition in a  
  neighbouring hospital room. He heard them and cried. Poor Tolya! 
   That night I had a long dream about Stalin. Young and dark-haired. I had a 
  long talk with him about the importance of upholding tradition.
821
  
 
For all Solonitsyn's human flaws, Tarkovsky did not, contrary to Boyadzhieva's deeply unflattering 
portrayal of this episode, in the end lack the heart to suffer on behalf of a friend who was not ready 
to die. Nevertheless, Tarkovsky's love for the lost Solonitsyn, who had failed in Andrei's eyes to live 
up to his artistic responsibilities and to make the most of his prodigious talents, only redoubled the 
urgency of the need for others to remain 'true to the traditions' of Russian spiritual humanism. 
Stalin, a greater failure than a thousand Solonitsyns, clearly stands in here for Tarkovsky's lost 
friend. 
 The second and third passages take us back, one final time, to the great enigma of 
Tarkovsky's life: Larisa. This entry also dates from 1982: 'I want us to live in a nice comfortable 
apartment (for Larisa's sake). I want her to relax, enjoy herself, and to the extent that it is possible, 
to get treatment. It's hard work for her to live with me. But did I really not know what she was like 
before we got married?'
822
 Although Larisa did not make it onto the list of 'Great' individuals which 
included Tarkovsky's mother as well as Larisa's own, Tarkovsky nevertheless considered her 
worthy, for many long years, of being spoilt and of deserving all the things that the truly moral 
person has learnt to live without. Natalya Bondarchuk described this to me as 'love' of a kind, but 
'love' is not the right word for it. In truth, Tarkovsky never quite managed to bring himself to 
believe fully in what, in spite of all Larisa's practical skills, was ultimately a matter of indulgence of 
someone less than fully deserving of such attention and sacrifice: 
 
  Larisa should have come back from out of town over a week ago, and she hasn't even 
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  called once. What's she doing there? Why doesn't she come to Moscow? I don't  
  know... 
   God, how terrible everything is. Cats [of jealousy] are scratching in my soul, 
  and I'm supposed to be thinking about 'my work'... 
   How burdensome, pointless and boring it is to be alive! 
   I have to change everything! I have to change my life, throw everything out, 
  except the chance to serve that which I have been called to serve. I need to gather my 
  manhood and cast off all that gets in the way of this service.
823
  
 
For all the practical help she may have provided, Larisa stood between Tarkovsky and his 
commitment to the Moral Law and to the ethic of service and sacrifice in which he believed right up 
to the very end of his life. Meddling Soviet authorities were not the only major reason for 
Tarkovsky's inability to produce more than seven films in his 25-year career.   
 That Tarkovsky was able to produce as much as he did, however, was a testament to the 
deep civilisational strength and stability, the eternal flame of morality, passed down from early 
childhood from his older relatives. After concluding an anecdote about his dead grandmother with 
the words 'that's my grandmother for you!', Tarkovsky realises in a diary entry the following day, 9 
May 1981, after rereading the previous day's entry, that 'I didn't write "was" in the last sentence. But 
then it occurred to me that this wasn't an error.'
824
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4. Tu Weiming 
 
   The unity of humankind is rich, varied and diverse. Indeed, the 'great unity' 
   (datong) is inspired by the life-force of 'harmony without uniformity'  
   (heerbutong). 
 
        Tu Weiming, 'The Confucian Way' 
 
 
4.1 Confucianism and the Moral Law: Tu's Confucian Way 
 
Tu Weiming (1940-) smashes the prejudice, so prevalent outside China, that Confucianism is a 
philosophy of obedience to authority, a recipe for a closed rather than an open society and for 
unintrospective rule-following rather than moral self-cultivation via conscience (what Tarkovsky in 
Russian calls nravstvennost'
825
). Unfortunately Confucianism, when applied in the real world, has 
often produced dully hierarchical results; indeed, it was the chronic perversion of Confucian 
doctrine which led whole generations of Chinese intellectuals to turn their backs on the Confucian 
tradition in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. Tu Weiming belongs to a second generation of 
'New Confucians' whose goal is to rejuvenate the Confucian tradition by recovering within it the 
kernel of universal moral truth on which Chinese civilisation has, at its best, been based. His essay 
'The Confucian Way' retraces the millennial history of Confucianism, presenting along the way an 
account of human flourishing which forces us to take seriously the idea of a single Heaven and a 
single Mandate of Heaven or Moral Law discoverable inside ourselves. 'Should our pluralistic 
society deliberately cultivate shared values and a common ground of human understanding?'
826
, Tu 
asks at the beginning of his essay, to which the answer will be an emphatic 'yes', both because the 
Moral Law is a reality on which we can and should converge despite our individual differences, and 
because the costs of failing to converge in the 21
st
 century could entail the extinction of our own 
and countless other species. 
 The Confucian Way is first and foremost characterised by 'lofty pragmatism': 'when 
Confucius was asked, 'Should one not return malice with kindness?' he replied, 'If you return malice 
with kindness, what will you return kindness with? Therefore, return malice with uprightness 
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China, (New Delhi, Centre for Studies in Civilisations, 2010), p. 209. All quotes drawn from this volume are from 
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(justice), but return kindness with kindness.'
827
 For Mencius, likewise, the 'great man' or 'profoundly 
moral person' 'aims only at what is right'.
828
 This law emanates from only one source: 'Heaven as a 
source for moral creativity […] and ultimate self-transformation features prominently throughout 
the Confucian tradition. In this sense, all major Confucian thinkers are profoundly religious.'
829
 It 
would be a grave mistake, however, to assume that such a law can be grasped with anything less 
than full, honest effort. Quoting from the Doctrine of the Mean, Tu argues: 'only those who are 
absolutely sincere can fully develop their nature. If they can fully develop their nature, they can 
fully develop the nature of others.'
830
 This process of self-realisation, however, does not stop at the 
edge of the human community, or even at the community of sentient life: 'If they can fully develop 
the nature of others, they can fully develop the nature of things. If they can fully develop the nature 
of things, they can assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth. If they 
can assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth, they can thus form a 
trinity with Heaven and Earth.
831
 This doctrine of the radical oneness of Heaven and Earth is 
summarised in the four characters tianrenheyi ('Uniting Heaven and Humanity Harmoniously as 
One'). Confucius himself, after a lifetime of moral self-cultivation, achieved, or at least approached, 
this ideal state: 'at fifteen I set my heart on learning: at thirty I firmly took my stand; at forty I came 
to be free from doubts; at fifty I understood the Decree of Heaven; at sixty my ear was attuned; at 
seventy I followed my heart's desire without overstepping the line.
832
 Tu is careful, however, to 
show that this state of moral 'truth-dwelling' in no way extinguishes one's critical and, in particular, 
self-critical faculties: 
 
  It would be misleading […] if the transcendent dimension of the Confucian project 
  were interpreted to mean that the course of culture, or the Way, would eventually 
  prevail on its own. Confucius made it explicit: 'It is the human that can make the  
  Way great, and not the Way that can make the human great'. At the same time, as a 
  mere human mortal, he also realised how difficult it was to live up to the demands of 
  the Way of Heaven, and he was the first to admit his own shortcomings in this  
  regard: 
 
   There are four things in the Way of the profound person, none of which I have 
   been able to do. To serve my father as I would expect my son to serve me: 
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   that I have not been able to do. To serve my ruler as I would expect my  
   ministers to serve me: that I have not been able to do. To serve my elder  
   brothers as I would expect my younger brothers to serve me: that I have not 
   been able to do. To be the first to treat friends as I would expect my friends to 
   treat me: that I have not been able to do. 
 
  The tension and conflict between his sense of mission – that he was entrusted by  
  Heaven to transmit the Way – and his sense of deficiency 'in practicing the ordinary 
  virtues and in the exercise of care in ordinary conversation' generated a dynamism in 
  Confucius' 'earnest and genuine effort' to learn fully to be human. This dynamism 
  made him an inexhaustible student and an untiring teacher: 'To remember silently 
  [what I have learned], to learn untiringly, and to teach others [what I have learned] 
  without being wearied...' What drew people to this teacher was a quiet charisma  
  embodied in his daily interactions with students. There was no prophetic claim of 
  privileged access to the divine. Nor was there any suggestion of noble birth or  
  superior native intelligence. Yet, he aroused the devotion of his followers with the 
  magic quality of his sincerity and authenticity.
833
  
 
Just as Mahfouz and Tarkovsky abandoned all claims to revelation as a source of their moral 
authority, relying instead on the sheer force of their art as a medium to allow the deeper truth of the 
Moral Law to speak through them, so too does Tu identify a 'magic' charisma as the ultimate 
justification for Confucian truth-claims. This charisma, however, originates in a process of cultural 
initiation and transmission without which no human individual can embark on the Way at all. This 
process ideally begins in the family home; although Confucius' father died when Confucius was 
only three years old, he was 'instructed first by his mother and then by a host of other teachers,  
[and] distinguished himself as an indefatigable student in his teens'.
834
 In this way, Tu argues, 
'Confucius inadvertently initiated a great tradition in East Asian education: the exemplary teaching, 
often through oral transmission, of the mother. The centrality of the mother as an educator in 
Confucian learning is widely recognised but seldom analysed.'
835
  
 The overwhelming desire of a person having received such a civilisational heritage is to 
spread the message of truth as widely as possible: 
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  Before Confucius, aristocratic families had hired tutors to educate their sons, and 
  government officials had instructed their subordinates in administrative and  
  bureaucratic matters, but he was the first person to devote his whole life to learning 
  and teaching for the purpose of transforming and improving society. All human  
  beings, he believed, could benefit from self-cultivation. He inaugurated a humanities 
  program for potential leaders, opened the doors of education to all, and defined  
  learning not merely as the acquisition of knowledge but also as character-building. 
  The spiritual value of this seemingly secular humanistic enterprise lies in its implicit 
  faith that ultimate self-transformation in ordinary human existence is not only  
  possible but practicable.
836
  
 
A corollary of this 'dwelling in truth' is a spontaneous desire to share all that one has with the world, 
not out of a narcissistic desire for attention but rather out of its opposite, to the point that Tu argues 
that 'our feelings, thoughts, and ideas are not necessarily our private properties. While they are 
intensely personal, they need not be private; they are often better thought of as shared public 
goods.'
837
 When we embrace such a view of our own mental states, in which they are no longer 
merely viewed as inalienable ends in themselves destined to die with us but as a potential part of 
something much larger, we find that 'the willingness to share empowers us to generate a dynamic 
process of interchange, first with members of our family and, then, with our neighbourhood 
community, and beyond. This broadening process is central to the Confucian project of self-
cultivation.
838
  
 The responsibility to look inward is universal; as the Great Learning tells us, 'from the Son 
of Heaven to the common people, all, without exception, must take self-cultivation as the root'.
839
 
Mencius argues that what we find when we look inside ourselves are the beginnings or 'sprouts' of a 
'heart which cannot bear the suffering of others'; the task of moral self-cultivation is to extend this 
feeling of 'unbearability' outwards from ourselves and our nearest relatives until it accedes to the 
realm of truth where 'all the ten thousand things are there in me. There is no greater joy for me to 
find that, on self-examination, I am true to myself.'
840
 Tu brilliantly characterises Maoism as the 
opposite of this move towards greater 'unbearability', arguing that the essence of the Maoist creed 
was precisely a willingness to 'bear' the suffering even of one's closest relatives in the name of the 
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revolution, an utter perversion of the Confucian civilisational heritage.
841
  
 This expansion of the sphere of moral concern is in no way, however, to be confused with 
doctrines of universal love of the kind made famous in China by Mozi: 'Mo Tzu advocated 
"universal love", but Mencius [also first educated by his mother] contended that the result of the 
Moist admonition to treat a stranger as intimately as one's own father would be to treat one's own 
father as indifferently as a stranger.'
842
 Just as malice must be met by justice rather than kindness so 
that kindness can be met with kindness, so too must the desire to identify and 'dwell in truth' with 
'all the ten thousand things' not obscure one's prior moral responsibilities to family, city, nation, 
species and so on. Although the Moists were concerned about 'pervasive injustice' and 'organised 
themselves into military units to bring about love and peace through self-sacrifice'
843
, their creed 
proved unable to win the hearts and minds of posterity because it lost touch with the intimate 
source; instead, 'the Confucians opted for a long-term solution to the collapse of the Chou Dynasty 
through commitment to education as character-building. They believed that one could attain true 
nobility through self-cultivation and inner enlightenment.'
844
  
 At no point, however, did this process entail an ascetic cutting oneself off from society, as 
the Taoists advocated. The Taoists, indeed, 'advocated a total rejection of human civilisation, which 
they believed to be the source of spiritual pollution'.
845
 The commitment to real-world action, to 
Mahfouzian socialism and Tarkovskian sacrifice, is a feature of what Tu calls 'Confucian humanism' 
as far back as the Analects itself: 
 
  While Mencian moral idealism may have prevailed over Mohist collectivism and 
  Yangist individualism, the Confucian project, despite its having a formidable  
  defender in Xunzi, was seriously challenged by the Daoists. In the Analects  
  Confucius is reported to have encountered hermits, such as the Madman from Chu, 
  who urged him to abdicate his social responsibility, sever relationships with the  
  human community, and abandon the world. Since the disintegration of the political 
  system, like a torrential flood sweeping the entire world, could not be stopped, any 
  attempt to change the inevitable process of history would be an exercise in futility. 
  What the hermits proposed was a course of action advocated by virtually all major 
  ethico-religious traditions: to cultivate a spiritual sanctuary outside the lived world 
  here and now. The Christian kingdom of God or the Buddhist 'other shore' are  
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  exemplifications of this universal transcendental breakthrough. Confucius' existential 
  choice to try to repossess the Way by working through the human community as it 
  was constituted represents an anomaly.
846
  
 
Tu goes on, however, in his usual conciliatory way, to celebrate the contributions of Taoism to the 
Confucian civilisational heritage. For centuries, indeed, while Confucianism was 'the orthodoxy 
defining the life orientation of the cultural elite', it nevertheless 'coexisted with many other currents 
of thought – Taoism, Legalism, Yin-Yang Cosmology, theories of the Five Phases, and a variety of 
folk beliefs in the Chinese philosophical and religious landscape.'
847
 Tu argues that this 
'inclusiveness' is not some sort of historical accident but is rather a 'distinctive feature' of Confucian 
humanism itself, 'symbolising a deliberate effort to accommodate seemingly incompatible systems 
of ideas in a correlative worldview'.
848
 
 How can a civilisation-renouncing Taoism ever be reconciled with a civilisation-affirming 
Confucianism? Tu explains how: 
 
  On the surface, Zhuangzi's Dao transcends humanity, rightness, ritual, and music and 
  is definitely anti-humanist and un-Confucian, but in a deeper sense what Zhuangzi 
  aspires to is true enlightenment, in which all formalistic structures are relegated to 
  the background to make room for great knowledge and profound virtue. This is  
  perhaps the main reason why Confucian scholar-officials throughout Chinese history 
  have found Zhuangzi's self-image a standard of inspiration: 
 
   Alone he associates with Heaven and Earth and spirit, without abandoning or 
   despising things of the world. He does not quarrel over right or wrong and 
   mingles with conventional society. […] Above, he roams with the Creator, 
   and below he makes friends with those who transcend life and death and  
   beginning and end. In regard to the essential, he is broad and comprehensive, 
   profound and unrestrained. In regard to the fundamental, he may be said to 
   have harmonised all things and penetrated the highest level. … 
 
  Daoism was ostensibly a critique of Confucian humanism but, since it was taken 
 absolutely seriously by the Confucians, it became gradually absorbed in the   
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 Confucian responses themselves. As a result, we witness the Daoist transformation of  
 the Confucian tradition and the emergence of a tender-minded Confucian   
 humanism.
849
  
 
Just as Mahfouz and many of his characters were in constant dialogue with Sufism, and Tarkovsky 
and his heroes, most notably Andrei Rublev, pass through an ascetic phase before arriving at the 
idea of sacrifice for community, so too has Tu's Confucian humanism 'strengthened itself for battle' 
after many centuries of contact with Taoism and, subsequently, Buddhism. After describing the six-
century-long 'introduction, domestication, growth and appropriation of a distinctly Indian form of 
spirituality' in the form of a Buddhism inherited largely 'via Taoist categories', as well as the 
profound influence of Buddhism on Taoist 'institutions and practices', Tu goes so far as to conclude 
that 'the spiritual dynamic in medieval China was characterised by Buddhist and Taoist values.'
850
 In 
order to return Confucianism to the heart of Chinese cultural life, marginalised Song neo-
Confucians were forced to formulate 'a creative response to the Buddhist and Taoist challenge and 
an imaginative reinterpretation and reappropriation of classical Confucian insights.'
851
 Taoism and 
Taoist-derived Buddhism were, like Sufism, worth taking seriously because they were in an 
important sense monotheistic rather than polytheistic, believing as they did in the ultimate 'oneness' 
of the Way or Moral Law even if they prescribed un-Confucian ascetic renunciation of community. 
Confucianism and Buddhism also shared a preoccupation with suffering, even if they essentially 
prescribed opposite solutions to the problem: an extension of self and the 'inability to bear suffering' 
to cover all the ten thousand things versus an ascetic renunciation of selfhood and attachment to the 
ten thousand things, the perceived cause of suffering. Returning to Mencius, Tu argues that 'learning 
to be human is primarily the extension of sympathy and empathy. Since commiseration is 
boundless, it can, at least in principle, fill up the distance between Heaven and earth. We can, as 
human beings, embody the myriad things in our sympathy and empathy.'
852
 This recognition of the 
Moral Law has profound implications for socialisation: 'when Mencius says that the way of learning 
is none other than the quest for the lost heart-mind, he means that the recovery of our depleted 
commiseration takes precedence over all other forms of education.'
853
  
 This policy of moral education also constituted a 'strategy for social reform' which aimed to 
'change the language of profit, self-interest, wealth, and power' - regarded as a reflection of 
immutable human nature by, for example, Legalists like Han Feizi - into 'a moral discourse with 
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emphasis on rightness, public-spiritedness, welfare, and exemplary authority'.
854
 This language was 
emphatically not, however, the language of pie-in-the-sky utopianism: 'Mencius was not arguing 
against profit. Rather […] he urged [the feudal lords] to look beyond the horizon of their palaces 
and to cultivate a common bond with their ministers, officers, clerks, and the seemingly 
undifferentiated masses.'
855
 Xunzi would take this 'public-spiritedness' a step further, to the point 
where, in an ancient echo of Norbert Elias, he says that 'a cultured person is by definition a fully 
socialised participant of the human community who has successfully sublimated his or her 
instinctual demands to further the public good'.
856
  
 Far from the vision of slavery it seems, this prioritising of politics aims to move 'beyond 
collectivism and individualism' as they had existed in China in their respective Moist and Yangist 
forms and to serve both individual and public welfare: 
 
  Mozi insisted that, for the sake of peace and love as willed by Heaven, people ought 
  to sacrifice their private interests. […] The opposite view was held by Yang Zhu, an 
  advocate of radical individualism. Yang argues that since nothing is more valuable 
  than what we are as individuals, the preservation of what we are endowed with ought 
  to be the highest guiding principle for action. Mencius finds fault with both  
  approaches. Mohist universal love thwarts the establishment of the parent-child  
  relationship and Yangist self-centredness makes the maintenance of political order 
  [as well as true self-fulfilment] impossible. The Confucian alternative is a middle 
  path in which the self as a centre of relationships can serve as a foundation for the 
  politics of community. […] A salient feature of Confucian thinking, as interpreted by 
  Xunzi, is the primacy of the political order. Politics is seen as an integral part of the 
  ritual process through which the moral community comes into being. The purpose of 
  politics is to provide a wholesome environment for human flourishing. The way of 
  the sage-kings, as contrasted with the dictatorship of the hegemon, is openness to 
  new ideas, receptivity to different voices, and hospitality to all human beings. Its 
  political style is communal, participatory, and democratic. The underlying tone,  
  vibrating with the sympathetic resonance of contented people, is poetic.
857
  
 
In order to reappropriate this powerful - if by their time aging and marginalised - Confucian 
tradition, Song Dynasty neo-Confucians did their best to insist that the core of the Confucian 
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message was timeless. One of Tu's favourite examples of the timelessness of the Confucian 
'principle' is provided by Lu Hsiang-Shan (1139-1193): 'Sages appeared tens of thousands of 
generations ago. They shared this heart-mind; they shared this principle. Sages will appear tens of 
thousands of generations to come. They will share this heart-mind; they will share this principle. 
Over the four seas sages appear. They share this mind; they share this principle.'
858
 This principle is 
not, however, on Tu's interpretation an irresponsible or merely 'animal' basking in the rays of the 
One: 'Lu's unequivocal assertion that "the affairs of the universe (yüchou) are my affairs; my own 
affairs are the affairs of the universe" may appear to be an unbridled romantic statement about 
forming one body with the universe. Implicit in this seemingly idealist faith, however, is a moral 
imperative'.
859
 Fulfilling this imperative, according to Lu, will require a courage not to be acquired 
overnight: first, we must realise that 'this principle existing throughout the universe is hidden from 
nothing and nothing can escape from it'; once we make this realisation, Lu asks, 'how can we be 
selfish and disobey principle?'
860
 Encouragement in the right direction can be found in Mencius: 
'first build up the nobler part (the "great body") of your nature then the inferior part cannot 
overcome it.'
861
 The costs of failing to engage in this lengthy process of self-cultivation are heavy 
indeed: 'it is because we fail to build up the nobler part of our nature that it is overcome by the 
inferior part. In consequence we violate principle and become different from Heaven and Earth.'
862
  
 While Lu's insistence on principle and 'nobility' is a direct echo of Mahfouz's claim that 'it is 
the nobility of the soul which allows us to understand what the universe is', and while his insistence 
on the millennial continuity of human sagehood and civiliation is a direct echo of Tarkovsky and 
earlier Russian moralists like Chekhov, whose heroes are preoccupied with human existence 'a 
thousand years from now', the insistence of Chang Tsai (1020-1077) on the need to extend one's 
sphere of moral concern 'beyond what is seen and heard' could also have come from Tarkovsky 
himself or from Russia's greatest playwright, who argued that 'people of culture […] are 
sympathetic not only to beggars and cats; their heart aches for things they don't see with the naked 
eye'.
863
 For Chang, likewise, 'the heart-minds of ordinary people are limited to the narrowness of 
what is seen and what is heard. The sages, however, […] regard everything in the world to be their 
own selves. This is why Mencius said that if we exert ourselves to the utmost, we can know nature 
and Heaven.'
864
 The scope of this exertion is no joke: 'Heaven is so vast that there is nothing outside 
of it. Therefore the heart-mind that leaves something outside is not capable of uniting itself with the 
                                                 
858  See Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 249. 
859  Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 249. 
860  See Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 249. 
861  See Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 249. 
862  See Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 249. 
863  See Gary Saul Morson, 'Chekhov's Enlightenment', http://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cfm/Chekhov-s-
enlightenment-7471, November 2012 (accessed 4/11/12). 
864  See Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 245.  
 274 
 
heart-mind of Heaven.'
865
 In practice, this means more than mere scientific observation; just as 
Arnold stresses that culture goes beyond observation to embrace our natures as moral beings, so too 
Chang argue that the Confucian Way involves constant moral reflection on what is observed:  
'Knowledge coming from seeing and hearing is knowledge obtained through contact with things. It 
is not knowledge obtained through our moral nature. Knowledge obtained through our moral nature 
does not originate through seeing and hearing.'
866
 Chang's definitive statement here of the difference 
between the sciences and the humanities, and of the former's ultimate subordination to the latter (for 
all the latter's extraordinary usefulness), was not really new to Song neo-Confucianism; Tu traces it 
right back to Confucius himself: 
 
  Confucius was deeply concerned that the culture (wen) he cherished was not being 
  transmitted and that the learning (hsüeh) he propounded was not being instructed. 
  […] The community that Confucius created through his inspiring personality was a 
  scholarly fellowship of like-minded men of different ages and backgrounds from 
  different states. They were attracted to Confucius because they shared his vision and 
  took part in varying degrees in his mission to bring moral order to an increasingly 
  fragmented polity. This mission was difficult and even dangerous. The Master  
  himself suffered from joblessness, homelessness, starvation and, occasionally, life-
  threatening violence. Yet, his faith in the survivability of the culture he cherished and 
  the workability of his approach to teaching was so steadfast that he convinced his 
  followers as well as himself that Heaven was on their side. When Confucius' life was 
  threatened in K'uang, he said: 
 
   Since the death of King Wen [founder of the Chou Dynasty], does not the 
   mission of culture (wen) rest here in me? If Heaven intends this culture to be 
   destroyed, those who come after me will not be able to have any part of it. If 
   Heaven does not intend this culture to be destroyed, then what can the men of 
   K'uang do to me?
867
 
 
Note that, as for Mahfouz's Akhenaten, it is the survival of 'culture' (wen) and civilisation – in 
modern Chinese wenming - which matters absolutely to Confucius, rather than his own survival or 
even the survival of his own name. Indeed, like Mahfouz's Meri Moun, 'by defining himself as a 
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transmitter and as a lover of antiquity, Confucius made it explicit that a sense of history was not 
only desirable but also necessary for self-knowledge.'
868
 This awareness that we are 'embedded in 
our human-relatedness' to those who came before and will come after us is vital for the 'continuous 
self-transformation of our body and mind' that allows us, 'through our sociality', to 'realise ourselves 
as witnesses of the Mandate of Heaven.'
869
 Just as Mahfouz in Before the Throne places the leaders 
of Egypt on trial for their behaviour, so too does Confucius assume 'a godlike role in evaluating 
politics by assigning ultimate “praise and blame” in history to the most powerful political actors of 
the period.'
870
 Such political engagement reflects 'an existential choice to participate in the human 
fellowship, even though the thought of detaching himself from the world was not only a real 
possibility but also a persistent temptation'.
871
  
 In the end, however, Confucius represents one of  
 
  two significantly different approaches to life. The hermits Ch'ang-chu and Chieh-ni 
  opted to abdicate their social responsibility and 'flee the world altogether'. […] They 
  perceived with an ironic detachment people like Confucius who made desperate, and 
  always abortive, attempts to right the wrongs of the world. They themselves, not  
  unlike Thomas More with his Utopian view of the mundane world, determined that 
  politics had degenerated to the point of no return. […] But for Confucius, it was  
  precisely the nature of the times – the turmoil and disorder – that called for political 
  engagement rather than detachment. […] His audacious personal assumption of the 
  moral responsibility to change the world, to 'repossess the Way', aroused much  
  excitement, and also much suspicion. […] The seemingly contradictory description 
  of Confucius' critical awareness of the impracticality of putting his Way into practice, 
  and his self-conscious resoluteness to carry it out with all his heart, perceptively  
  captures the spirit of the Confucian project. By inextricably linking his own fortune 
  with the whole world, even though he realistically understood that he could do very 
  little to prevent the world from being swept away by a torrential flood, he still chose 
  to do the best he could to show the Way of avoiding such an impending disaster. […] 
  However bleak the immediate situation may have appeared to him, he believed the 
  Way could still prevail in society, and even in politics, through education. In any  
  case, he saw the great task of 'repossessing the Way' as a Heaven-ordained moral 
                                                 
868  Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 273.  
869  Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 273.  
870  Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 273.  
871  Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 276.  
 276 
 
  imperative and a spiritual calling, not to be denied whatever the odds.
872
  
 
Tu, indeed, is adamant – like Mahfouz, who argues that 'there is only one Law in the universe, 
whether we choose to call it sacred or secular' – that 'the dichotomy of sacred and profane is quite 
alien to the Confucian tradition', and that 'it is misleading to characterise Confucian humanism as 
"secular"', because 'Confucians believe that the meaning of human existence is realised in ordinary 
daily 'practical living'', and therefore 'not only regard the secular as sacred but experience Heaven 
through the dimension of the human heart-and-mind.'
873
 Tu's view of the relationship between 
secular and sacred in Confucianism differs from that of the great Western populariser of Confucian 
ideas, Herbert Fingarette, who argues in his Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (1972) that 'it is not 
only conceivable but also imperative to understand the Confucian person as a thorough social being 
to the extent that there is a total absence of interiority (inner dimension)'.
874
 Although Fingarette's  
'notion of the "secular as sacred" is so pleasing to the Confucian ear'  because it 'appears to be a 
definitive rejection of Max Weber's characterisation of the Confucian ethic as submission to the 
status quo of the existing political order', namely as 'a kind of secular humanism diametrically 
opposed to the faith-generated Protestant ethic and thus devoid of the salvific potential for changing 
the world motivated by a transcendent vision'
875
, Tu judges Fingarette's privileging of ritual 
propriety (li) over felt humanity and empathy (ren) to be 'unconvincing': 'Confucian education – 
learning to be fully human – without reference to the psychodynamics of self-cultivation is 
unthinkable. […] Confucian humanism without ren as its core value easily degenerates into 
ritualism.'
876
  
 Nevertheless, Tu more sympathetically concludes, 'Fingarette's powerful and subtle 
argument for the idea and ideal of li is most appealing'
877
. Moreover for our purposes, in tackling 
the problem of translation of Confucian ideas into European languages, Fingarette, writing in 1972, 
argues persuasively that although 'the specifically Christian element has disappeared in recent 
translations, often the European background assumptions remain. Even where European ideas do 
not infect the translation, it is Buddhist and Taoist thought – now so much more familiar to Western 
scholars – which colours the rendering.'878 The problem with these 'infections' is that 'the Buddhist 
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ideas, however different from European ideas in so many respects, share with the latter certain 
fundamental biases: they favour the individualistic and subjectivistic view of man. It is individual 
mind, the inner life and reality of the individual, which is focal in understanding man as viewed 
throughout the main course of Buddhist and European thinking.'
879
 The translations may have 
improved in the last 40 years, but Fingarette's point about Confucian spirituality as bound up with a 
freely chosen sacrifice of self in the name of a higher social goal – ritual propriety – remains: 'the 
(spiritually) noble man is one who has laboured at the alchemy of fusing social forms (li) and raw 
personal existence […] Li is the fulfilment of human impulse, the civilised expression of it – not a 
formalistic dehumanisation.'
880
 Or as Tu unsurpassably expresses it: 'our aspiration to know Heaven 
and our longing to be united with Heaven are grounded in our obligations to our fellow human 
beings. Personal salvation, unless it involves one's family, society, country, and the whole world, is 
analogous to the situation of the hermit who has fled the world, one-sided and of limited 
significance.'
881
 Confucius himself stresses that 'all salvation is necessarily communal. [...] A man of 
humanity, wishing to establish his character, also establishes the character of others, and wishing to 
enlarge himself, also helps others to enlarge themselves.'
882
  
 We will soon have occasion to expand on what Tu calls his 'anthropocosmic' vision for 
'communal salvation' and a 21st-century global civil society founded on a common Global Ethic, 
but before we do, it behooves us to cover briefly the ground traversed by his New Confucian 
predecessors and inspirations, most notably his teacher Mou Zongsan.   
 
 
 
4.2 Mou Zongsan and the 1958 Declaration 
 
   Another feature of Mou's thought system is its promulgation of Confucianism as 
   the teaching that would facilitate the formation of a global culture or world  
   creed and enable different cultures to coexist peacefully and with respect for  
   one another. Mou and the other joint authors spelled this out clearly in the  
   concluding section of 'Wei zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan'  
   ('Declaration on Behalf of Chinese Culture Respectfully Announced to the  
   People of the World') (1958), a document retrospectively construed by many  
   scholars in Taiwan and the mainland as the 'manifesto' of the New Confucian 
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   movement. Mou and the other joint authors were of the view that the Western 
   domination of the world by force and Westerners' lack of both respect for and 
   sympathetic understanding of Chinese and other non-Western cultures did not 
   bode well for world peace. The declaration presented their basic stand  
   regarding Chinese culture and its reconstruction and expressed their hope that 
   the spiritual resources of Confucianism would contribute to the formation of a 
   spiritual world creed to facilitate world peace. In Daode de lixiangzhuyi [The 
   Idealism of Virtue] (1959), Mou portrays the Confucian concept of ren  
   (empathetic compassion) as the fountainhead of human values, the   
   springboard for a healthy vision of the future of humanity, and the cure for 
   what he perceives as the spiritual ills of the modern age. This is a bold  
   assertion, given that Confucianism has yet to reestablish a strong foothold in 
   mainland China. Du Weiming, the best known of the North American New 
   Confucians, has discussed some of the hurdles that have to be overcome and 
   the steps that have to be taken in order to transform Confucianism into a  
   teaching with global significance. In this regard, he thinks that Confucianism 
   must not remain confined to the Chinese and East Asian cultural settings and 
   that Confucians should strive first of all to engage in dialogues with  
   members of other religions and to formulate a Confucian approach to world 
   problems.
883
  
 
      N. Serina Chan, 'What is Confucian and New About 
      the Thought of Mou Zongsan?' 
 
 
Mahfouz's view that metaphysical experience is only possible through moral experience and 
ultimately through moral agency, and Tarkovsky's view that moral agency ultimately trumps 
metaphysical experience, represent uniquely fertile interpretations of the Abrahamic religions for 
our times, and of Islam and Orthodox Christianity in particular, not least because they prima facie 
correspond to the views espoused by Mou Zongsan, Tu Weiming and other New Confucians. This 
movement can be traced back to 1958, when a group of Confucian thinkers got together to resurrect 
their moribund creed for the modern age in the form of a public declaration. Like Mahfouz, these 
New Confucians presented an account of 'culture' and civilisation which 'opposed Marxist 
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materialism vehemently'
884
 without rejecting the noble egalitarian principles of socialism in general;  
just as Matthew Arnold united the Hebraistic and Hellenistic under one umbrella, the New 
Confucians in N. Serina Chan's words 'looked at both culture and history through religion', as the 
words of the declaration itself show: 'we hope that the people in the world who study Chinese culture 
do not think that the Chinese people emphasise only the external regulation of practical 
interpersonal behaviour for the maintenance of social and political order.'
885
 The Confucian Way is 
above all a path towards a deeper form of civilisation; the world 'should instead pay attention to the 
notion of the unity of heaven and human beings in Chinese culture and to the religious faith in the 
way [of heaven] shown [by the Chinese people] in their moral praxis.'
886
 To ignore this faith in 
oneness is to ignore the fact that 'this learning of the mind and human nature is precisely the core of 
Chinese learning and Chinese thought. Moreover, within this learning lies the real reason why there 
exists in Chinese thought the doctrine of unity in virtue of heaven and human beings.'887 Chan's 
Arnoldian summary of Mou's New Confucian call to arms is that 'the religious-cum-cultural spirit of a 
people drives the production of their culture'.888     
 This New Confucian view that virtue unites us with Heaven corresponds directly to the 
Mahfouzian claim that the 'nobility of the soul gives us the highest sense of what the universe is'. It is 
important to note that these are empirical rather than theological claims; what is asked for is not faith in 
a historical miracle or transcendental being, but honest introspection about what has made us happiest 
and what promises to make us happier still. There is no a priori reason why we should all agree that 
virtue rather than vice should be the tonic; the entire raison d'être of Mahfouz's fictional and non-
fictional œuvre, as well as Tarkovsky's films and the philosophical writings of generations of Confucian 
thinkers down the ages to Tu Weiming in the present, is to wage war on behalf of civilisation by 
convincing the public that virtue really is the ticket and is not the humourless bore it is so often 
portrayed to be. As Mou himself says: 'some people don't like to talk about morality. [...] The crux of the 
matter is why one should be afraid of morality. Fear of morality indicates that one has a problem'; the 
whole point of moral self-cultivation for Mou is to bring us closer to the Arnoldian goal of perfection: 
'people nowadays tend to think that morality restrains. They therefore dislike morality and dislike Song-
Ming Neo-Confucians, who had a very strong moral consciousness. The truth is that morality is not for 
restraining people. Morality is for liberating and fulfilling people.'889  
 In their eagerness to recover and export their own dying cultural tradition, the early New 
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Confucians systematically underestimated the contributions of other cultures to this universal project. 
Chan does an excellent job of explaining how the authors of the declaration, and Mou in particular, 
essentialise, and indeed dichotomise, 'Chinese' and 'Western' culture in their search for a global creed 
based on 'the unity in virtue of Heaven and humanity' (tianrenhede). As well as criticising Western 
culture's imperialist and expansionist tendencies, the authors attacked 'the "forward-going" (yi wang 
zhi qian) instrumentalist mentality of Westerners' which had 'led to an excessive stress on the 
intellect. The imbalance, they claimed, had resulted in a lack of caring about other peoples' 
suffering and a contentious, controlling and restless approach to life, which had thwarted the 
development of a world culture'.890 Just as Arnold laments the philistine British attachment to mere 
'machinery' in Culture and Anarchy, Mou worried that prospects for a genuine Global Ethic 'would 
only worsen if Western culture continued to lead humanity in an endless chase after better 
"instruments"'.891 Mou, however, Chan argues, appears to ignore or be unaware of the existence 
of Western brothers-in-arms in this struggle; the New Confucian declaration was 'administered in 
an overflowing moral condescension' and called for 'Westerners to learn from China's "learning of 
the mind and human nature"' as if such arguments had never been made in the West.892 Chan 
describes this blind spot, which extends not just to Western culture but to other non-Western cultures as 
well, as 'a conceptual vestige that Mou and many other Chinese intellectuals retained from the 
historical context of Western imperialism.'893 Only with the second generation of the New 
Confucian movement, headed by the wisdom-hungry Global Ethic founder Tu Weiming in the United 
States, did this posture shift towards taking as well as giving.   
 A quick parallel might be drawn here between Mou and Mahfouz, the reluctant traveller who 
only very late in life recognised the possibility that 'cultural China' might have something real to 
offer. Likewise, Mou was unable to explore Islam in any meaningful way in his lifetime or to 
chance upon Mahfouz's 'New Islam', which is really an updated version of pre-Renaissance 
Averroean Islam just as New Confucianism is a return to the core of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism. 
The word tragedy would not be too strong to describe the fact that Mou (1909-1995) and Mahfouz 
(1911-2006), quite literally simultaneous admirers of Western science and democracy and defenders 
of a deeper, global concept of civilisation rooted in their own experiences of Western imperialism 
and chance discoveries of their own indigenous cultural and religious heritages, could not meet in 
their lifetimes: we feel we have done a service by juxtaposing them here for the first time. The 
details of Mou's neo-Kantian, neo-Buddhist New Confucianism, however, interest us less than his 
general emphasis on ren and moral agency which inspired a generation of New Confucian scholars, 
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of whom Tu Weiming is the most prominent contemporary example. Chan's synopsis of Mou's 
thought is nevertheless worth reproducing for the many parallels with Mahfouz in particular that it 
suggests. Try substituting, in the following passage, 'Islamic' for 'Confucian', 'Sufism' for 
'Buddhism', 'Arab' for 'Chinese', and 'Mahfouz' for 'Mou': 
 
  Mou [...] opposed Marxist materialism vehemently. Additionally, he was highly  
  critical of the strong positivistic influences from the West and its accompanying  
  preoccupation with what is external and verifiable. He maintained that Chinese  
  culture has to be reconstructed scientifically and democratically, but that such  
  reconstruction has to be founded on Confucian moral values for it to be spiritually 
  rooted and enduring. Along this line, he believed that an important mission of  
  Chinese intellectuals in modern times is to elucidate clearly mainstream Chinese and 
  Western thought systems and to reconcile and harmonise the two. 
   […] Mou [...] believes that there are universal truths and values that can be 
  appreciated by the entire humanity, but that no one culture expresses all of these  
  truths and values. Rather, each culture tends to express in its particular way some of 
  these truths and values, and cultures enrich one another by offering different paths to 
  the realisation of universal truths and values. In this regard, he is of the view that 
  Chinese culture has tended to focus on life as a whole and emphasise moral values 
  that nurture and settle life, while Western culture (along the Greek tradition) has  
  tended to focus on nature and emphasise theoretical reason and knowledge about the 
  external world. The modern age, in Mou's eyes, has been marked by an excessive 
  dominance of Western values. On the one hand, he is highly positive about Western 
  values as expressed in the building of modern national states, the development of 
  science, and the realisation of democracy. He firmly upholds these as values that  
  should be adopted by China. On the other hand, he is adamant that these values have 
  been unchecked and pushed to the extreme, resulting in excesses, imbalances, and 
  calamities to humanity. He disapproves of Western imperialism and vehemently  
  condemns Marxism.
894
  
Like Tarkovsky, moreover, Mou 'laments that modern people have become spiritually ill in that they 
are oblivious to their inner source of truth, value, and moral creativity and are concerned mainly 
with what feels good and what is technically right and socially conforming rather than with what is 
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rational and moral'.
895
 While Kant, for Mou arguably the paradigmatic 'Western' thinker, 'insists 
upon the separation between God (the transcendent) and human beings' and 'maintains that only 
God possesses intellectual (transcendental, non-sensible) intuition and has knowledge of the 
noumenal world', Mou 'expounds the unity of the transcendent and the immanent using the "two-tier 
mind" paradigm'.
896
 Although, in keeping with centuries of Confucian tradition, Mou borrows 
liberally from 'major Buddhist paradigms' in building his philosophical system, 'he also draws a 
clear distinction between Confucianism and Buddhism in terms of the content of thought.'
897
 Chan 
argues that Mou regarded Confucianism at its best as 'the great, central, and orthodox "perfect 
teaching" that addresses ontological creativity squarely and positively and provides a transcendental 
basis for moral cultivation', while regarding Buddhism at its best as but a "perfect teaching" of 
deliverance (from transmigration, suffering, and so on) that fails to address morality and ontology in 
the true and proper sense.'
898
 Indeed, for all the doubts about his Confucian credentials, there is no 
doubt that Mou remains an heir to the central pillar of Confucian thought: following Mencius, Mou 
argues that 'the virtue of humane benevolence (ren) is rooted in fellow feeling', and that 'the scope 
of this humane benevolence is such that it would not be wrong to say that it represents real life 
itself'.
899
 The Confucian challenge is to embody this reality in one's daily life: 'if one is able to 
extend this fellow feeling outward in a continuous stream, it will take the essential best of 
everything it flows through, culminating finally in a meeting and becoming one with Heaven.'
900
 
For Mou, as for Mencius, the call of this Heaven is first heard when one realises that others can feel 
and suffer; this leads to the birth of conscience or 'moral consciousness' (daode yishi) and an 
accompanying sense that, like Heaven itself, one cannot rest from one's responsibilities. The virtue 
of ren thus has two key characteristics: jue (feeling) and jian (action), the very same characteristics 
as Arnoldian 'culture'. Jue, Mou explains, 'does not refer to sensory perception or sensation, but 
rather to a feeling of concerned pity, referred to in the Analects as an 'uneasy feeling' (bu'an zhigan), 
and by Mencius as a 'compassionate heart' or 'a heart that cannot bear the suffering of others'. 
Without such jue, 'we might as well call the heart a piece of indifferent wood'; indeed, 'a person may 
have good business acumen, but may still be, for all his intelligence, indifferent to the suffering of 
others. That is because true jue is a feature of the moral mind, and it is only through jue that one can 
hope to enjoy a fully developed human heart.'
901
 The other characteristic of ren, jian, which might 
be translated as 'enduring health' or 'tireless vigour', is linked by Mou to the pre-Confucian fragment 
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weitian zhiming, yumu buyi (‘The Mandate of the Only Heaven: Ever to the Rice Field'). Jue is only 
the start, a precondition for ren: the cultivation of ren begins in earnest when jue is put into practice 
with jian: a person of noble character (junzi) 'realises that she must try to join Heaven in her own 
tireless activity.'
902
 This fusion of jue and jian is, in so many words, the task of our first two 
warriors and their Western counterparts. Just as Mahfouz ultimately disagrees with Kant ('I do not 
say with Kant that Good will be victorious in the other world. Good is achieving victory every day,' 
he writes in his Nobel Lecture) and argues, like Mou, that social engagement is ultimately superior 
to detached meditation, he and Tarkovsky smash the idea that tianrenhede ('the unity in virtue of 
Heaven and humanity') is a non-Abrahamic or uniquely Confucian contribution to global 
civilisation. This is good news for global integration and bad news for Chinese nationalism; but 
despite Chan's valid point about the postcolonial Sinocentrism of the drafters of the 1958 
declaration, it is hard to see them or their foremost son, Tu Weiming, being anything other than 
happy to discover surprise allies in an essentially common struggle.   
 
4.3 Taking Up Mou's Mantle    
Tu, indeed, continues the legacy of Mou and the 1958 generation and aims to 'domesticate' 
Confucianism both in the West and around the world in a way that the first generation of New 
Confucians simply could not. An important part of this task involved establishing the link between 
the Global Ethic and domestic ethics in the Confucian tradition and rebranding the oft-maligned 
Confucian virtue of filial piety. The language Tu uses to do so, however, could have been drawn 
from our other 'warriors for civilisation': 
  Filiality so conceived is certainly more than familial obligation and personal  
  affection. To serve one's parents and make them comfortable is only to 'nourish the 
  mouth and belly' (yang k'ou-t'i). Unless one can also honour one's parents in one's 
  moral rectitude, public service, and ethical leadership, one cannot be said to have 
  'nourished their will' (yang-chih). In this sense, the maintenance of an ancestral line 
  is not merely the biological prolongation of the life of a family. Rather, it signifies 
  the continuation of a personality ideal exemplified by the forefathers of the ancestral 
  line and the transmission of cultural values created by its outstanding members.
903
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More explicitly, Tu argues that 'the Confucian position asserts [that...] morality is not only a means 
of preserving the community; it is also the very reason why the community is worth being organised 
in the first place.'
904
 Echoing Mahfouz on the 'eternal holy battle' between tradition and freedom, we 
discover in Tu that 'what [New Confucianism] envisions is not merely a moral community, 
definable in terms of harmonised social relations. Nor is it the approximation of a moral theology, 
laying claim to clear and certain knowledge of the moral law.'
905
 The Moral Law itself is more 
dynamic than this, and is best understood as 'a form of metaphysics which advocates that the 
ultimate reality is perceivable and realisable in the moral life of every person because human nature 
is potentially a genuine manifestation of that reality'.
906
 Naturally, however, 'there is no guarantee 
that, with his heavenly endowed nature, each human being can effortlessly form a complete union 
with Heaven. Moral self-cultivation is required to actualise that ideal.
907
 It is true that this moral 
self-cultivation, of the exact kind advocated by Mahfouz and Tarkovsky, implies a certain 'way of 
being religious', which Tu memorably describes 'as ultimate self-transformation as a communal act 
and as a faithful dialogical response to the transcendent'.
908
 In other words, one must strive to 
improve oneself out of a sense of responsibility to one's transgenerational community, and an 
optimism regarding the possibilities of engagement with a higher Moral Law one discovers within. 
Tu rightly describes this view as unfashionable: 'the Confucian conviction that a person's self-
cultivation is the root of social order' is 'predicated on a holistic vision of human self-transcendence 
that the compartmentalised methods of psychology, sociology, or theology which are characteristic 
of academic "disciplines" in modern universities are grossly inadequate to grasp'.
909
 Rather than 
regarding our private lives as emptily private and 'secular', as Western liberal democracies 
invariably do, the Confucian 'conviction that what we do as ordinary citizens within the confines of 
our private homes is socially and politically important and what we do as public servants 
performing our roles and functions in the mundane world is religiously significant reflects a deep 
concern for "the secular as sacred"'.
910
 Moreover, writes Tu for a Western audience, 'in the post-
Machiavellian, Hobbesian, Marxian and Freudian age, it is extremely difficult to imagine that there 
is or ever can be an organismic unity that underlies the person, the community and the 
transcendent'.
911
 Even to suggest it is to risk seeming quaint or mad: 'any insinuation that these 
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connections are still whole may give the impression of a prelapsarian worldview, a worldview that 
can still be imagined but is no longer viable as a spiritual and intellectual option for the 
sophisticated modern mind.'
912
 Yet this return to a 'prelapsarian' tianrenhede worldview, indeed its 
global export, is precisely what Tu, Tarkovsky, Mahfouz and their Western counterparts call for in 
their work.  
 The core of this worldview for Tu is, as for Mou, trust rather than contract. Although he does 
not intend for a moment to 'challenge the doctrine of individualism which has inspired generation 
after generation to search for autonomy, independence and dignity, or the concept of an all-mighty 
God which continues to be informed by sophisticated theological argumentation', Tu wants instead 
to remind his sceptical Western reader that 'the concept of organismic unity is predicated on an 
inclusive humanist vision', and that it is 'desirable to establish fruitful communication with the 
transcendent through communal participation. Only in extraordinary circumstances, such as the case 
of Ch'ü Yüan, who was the only sober person in a drunken multitude, can we appeal to Heaven 
directly'.
913
 By extension, the injured party who appeals to the justice system for redress of a breach 
of contract ought not to think of herself as 'facing Heaven alone as an isolated individual without 
reference to [her] community', for such a direct appeal has 'grave consequences for the community 
as a whole as well as for the individual. It must be undertaken with extreme care and even a sense 
of tragedy.'
914
 In short, 'the fiduciary community, as a defining characteristic of Confucian 
religiosity, is not governed by social ethics devoid of reference to the transcendent. On the contrary, 
the community based on trust rather than contract is itself a sacred confirmation that human nature 
is ordained by Heaven.'
915
 Whatever usefulness contracts may have for the preservation and smooth 
functioning of social life (and Tu repeatedly stresses the importance of the 'legal constraint'), it is 
minor beside the trust engendered by the feelings of 'organismic unity' one discovers in virtue. For 
Confucians, marriage is the microcosm of this unity
916
, since the best marriages, like that of 
Mahfouz's Akhenaten and Nefertiti, are outward-looking as well as loving and equal: 'in a 
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  In the School Sayings of Confucius (Kongzi Jiayu) the following observations on the Way of human beings 
 are attributed to the Master:  
   
   Among men, government is highest. Now, 'to govern' means 'to be noble'. In olden times the love 
  of others was the highest form of government. Among the ways of expressing this love for others, 
  rites were the highest. To fulfil these rites, veneration was of the utmost importance. Of all forms 
  of veneration, the great rite of marriage was the highest.  
 
  The logical conclusion is therefore that 'love and veneration are the roots of government'.  
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prescriptive sense, love and affection between husband and wife are taken for granted. The focus is 
then on the precautionary measures pertinent to such a relationship for the purpose of human 
flourishing. […] The danger of excessive indulgence between husband and wife is a cause for 
concern.'
917
 Despite the uses and abuses of Confucian doctrine down through the centuries to justify 
nepotistic, male-dominated, and of course heterosexual conjugal arrangements, Tu is clear that the 
doctrine itself is entirely predicated on the inward work of moral self-cultivation common to all
918
; 
a healthy conjugal relationship is the central link in a network of outwardly expanding relationships 
of which only a self-cultivating individual is truly capable: 'inward reflection involves not only the 
choice of the self over others as the primary focus for learning but also a critical sense of 
developing the true self rather than the private ego'.
919
 This privileging of self-cultivation 'does not 
lead to self-centredness (nor does it lead to individualism), for it is never meant to be an isolated 
quest for spirituality devoid of social relevance.'
920
 Returning to Mencius, Tu concludes that 'the 
purpose of the inner decision to know our true self is to 'recognise the great body' in us: the 'great 
body' (ta-t'i) is contrasted with the 'small body' (hsiao-t'i); it 'refers to the true self that can form a 
unity with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things.'
921
  The 'Great Body' (dati) inside us is the inner 
reflection of the 'Great Unity' (dahe) of civilisation outside us envisaged by Confucianism, uniter of 
kingdoms under the banner of trust. Confucius himself insisted that 'trust is the only basis on which 
the state can survive and prosper', since 'death has been with us since the beginning of time, but 
when there is no trust, people have nothing to support them' (Lunyu, 12, 7).
922
  This 'positive 
assertion of human-relatedness' is summarised by Tu as follows: 'In order to establish ourselves, we 
must help others to establish themselves; in order to enlarge ourselves, we must help others to 
enlarge themselves.'
923
 This spirit of trust 'provides the basic foundation for building an ethics that is 
applicable to cultures and religions throughout the world'
924
. Unfortunately, Tu sees on the horizon 
of the 21
st
 century a 'new world order which is diametrically opposed' to such trust-building; 
nevertheless, 'the 'Great Unity' is neither utopian nor romantic' but rather 'a reasonable, enlightened, 
humane, and practicable way of envisioning a truly functioning global community.'
925
 Tu reiterates 
this underlying New Confucian pragmatism in his appraisal of the legacy of New Confucian 
                                                 
917  Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 264.  
918  For a contemporary Islamic theological perspective which takes the same view of the primary role of self-
cultivation within marriage, see Tariq Ramadan, 'Marriage and the Family in Islam' (‘Le mariage et la famille en 
Islam’), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLok8th5w-g, 25/9/2012. 
919  Tu, Centrality and Commonality, pp. 117. 
920  Tu, Centrality and Commonality, pp. 117. 
921  Tu, Centrality and Commonality, pp. 117-118.  
922  See Yao, Confucianism, p. 350.  
923  Tu Weiming (pref.), in Martin Lu, Rosita Dellios, R. James Ferguson (eds.), Toward a Global Community: 
New Perspectives on Confucian Humanism, (Gold Coast: Bond University Centre for East West Studies, 2004), p. 
xii.  
924  Tu, Toward a Global Community, p. xii.  
925  Tu, Toward a Global Community, p. xii.  
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pioneers Qian Mu, Tang Junyi and Feng Youlan as well as Mou Zongsan: 'they were obviously 
convinced that their cherished tradition had a message for the emerging global village; they 
delivered it in the most appropriate way they knew.'
926
 The underlying spirit of the declaration, 
indeed, was pragmatic as well as 'prophetic': 'they did not wish merely to honour their ancestors but 
also to show that they cared for the well-being of future generations. As such they were not only 
retrieving the tradition, but also reappropriating it for contemporary circumstances.'
927
 While the 
first generation of New Confucians could arguably have done more to engage in dialogue with the 
outside world instead of issuing a unilateral declaration, and while they may at times have been 
guilty of 'longing for a lost world' of hopelessly romantic unity, they nevertheless 'discovered a new 
vitality and a persuasive power in the tradition' and encouraged a generation of scholars, including 
Tu himself, to reengage critically with it and to make it relevant for a contemporary global 
audience.
928
  
 One figure in the Confucian tradition that Tu singles out for repeated attention is Wang 
Yangming (1472-1529), and in particular Wang's 'Inquiry on the Great Learning': 
 
  The great man regards Heaven and Earth and the myriad things as one body. He  
  regards the world as one family and the country as one person. As to those who make 
  a cleavage between objects and distinguish between self and others, they are small 
  men. That the great man can regard Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things as one  
  body is not because he deliberately wants to do so, but because it is natural to the 
  humane nature of his mind that he do so. […] When we see a child about to fall into 
  a well, we cannot help a feeling of alarm and commiseration. This shows that our 
  humanity (ren) forms one body with the child. It may be objected that the child  
  belongs to the same species. Again, when we observe the pitiful cries and frightened 
  appearances of birds and animals about to be slaughtered, we cannot help feeling an 
  'inability to bear' their suffering. This shows that our humanity forms one body with 
  birds and animals. It may be objected that birds and animals are sentient beings as we 
  are. But when we see  plants broken and destroyed, we cannot help a feeling of pity. 
  This shows that our humanity forms one with plants. it may be said that plants are 
  living things as we are. Yet even when we see tiles and stones shattered and crushed, 
  we cannot help a feeling of regret. This shows that our humanity forms one body 
                                                 
926  Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 385 ('The Ecological Turn in New Confucian 
Humanism'). 
927  Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, pp. 385-386 ('The Ecological Turn in New Confucian 
Humanism'). 
928  Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 386 ('The Ecological Turn in New Confucian 
Humanism'). 
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  with tiles and stones.
929
 
   
Tu concludes that 'these examples clearly indicate that 'forming one body' is not a romantic idea 
about unity, but a highly differentiated sense of interconnectedness.'
930
 Wang does not deny that 
'when [our minds] are aroused by desires and obscured by selfishness, compelled by greed for gain 
and fear of harm, and stirred by anger, we will destroy things, kill members of our own species, and 
will do everything. In extreme cases, we will slaughter our own brothers, and the humanity that 
forms one body will disappear completely.
931
 However, for Tu this means that 'the more we are able 
to move beyond our self-centredness, the more we are empowered to realise ourselves.'
932
 Even 
more importantly, however, 'moving beyond selfishness into an ever-expanding network of 
relationships enables us to fully realise the full potential of our humanity, for our self-realisation is 
personal and communal rather than egoistically private.'
933
 This public responsibility to perfect 
oneself is summarised in the Confucian tradition in the expression tianming, or Mandate of Heaven: 
'as Heaven's partners, we are individually and communally entrusted with a sacred mission. To 
borrow Herbert Fingarette's felicitous phrase, our mission is to recognise "the secular as sacred" 
[and to] transform our earth, body, family, and community into the emanations of Heaven's inner 
virtue (de)'.
934
 An even more 'felicitous' summary of Tu's worldview reads as follows:  
 
  Since the community as home must extend to the 'global village' and beyond, the self 
  in fruitful interaction with community must transcend not only egoism and  
  parochialism, but also nationalism and anthropocentrism. 
   […] In shifting the centre of one's empathic concern from oneself to one's 
  family, one transcends selfishness. The move from family to community transcends 
  nepotism. The move from community to nation transcends parochialism, and the 
  move to all humanity counters chauvinistic nationalism. While 'the project of  
  becoming fully human involves transcending, sequentially, egoism, nepotism,  
  parochialism, ethnocentrism, and chauvinist nationalism', it cannot stop at 'isolating, 
  self-sufficient humanism'. If we stop at secular humanism, our arrogant self- 
  sufficiency will undermine our cosmic connectivity and constrain us in an  
                                                 
929  See Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 385 ('The Ecological Turn in New Confucian 
Humanism'). 
930  Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 385 ('The Ecological Turn in New Confucian 
Humanism'). 
931  See an alternative version of Tu's paper 'The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism', in Toward a 
Global Community, p. 17.  
932  Tu, 'The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism', in Toward a Global Community, p. 17.  
933  Tu, 'The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism', in Toward a Global Community, p. 17.  
934  Tu, 'The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism', in Toward a Global Community, p. 17.  
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  anthropocentric predicament.
935
 
 
Moving beyond anthropocentrism without losing touch with one's ancestors and descendants, 
without forgoing the prior human ties which bind us to family, nation, and then to the 
intergenerational ideas of 'civilisation' and culture which our two previous 'warriors', Mahfouz and 
Tarkovsky, so tirelessly defended, is a task which Tu assumes with equal gusto. He calls it his, or 
Confucianism's, 'anthropocosmic vision'. 
 
4.4 Tu's Anthropocosmic Vision 
In his essay 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic Vision', Tu takes on the most sophisticated 
of the postmodern liberal philosophers, Richard Rorty, and his 'ironist' insistence on a plurality of 
versions of the good life and the need for 'respect' for such plurality in a modern democratic society, 
a refraining from trying to 'impose' one's version of the good life on others. Tu rightly argues that 
such a denial of even the possibility of moral truth and unity, and the subsequent radical separation 
of the public and private spheres that such a denial entails, is antithetical to the Confucian project: 
'Richard Rorty, from his ironist postmodern perspective, argues for the incompatibility of self-
realisation and social service. If Rorty were right, the Confucian project would necessarily fail.'
936
 
The Confucian position on the so-called 'public-private distinction' in liberal political philosophy is 
clear: 'self-cultivation is profoundly personal but not inevitably private. Conceptually and 
experientially, it is a serious flaw to confuse the personal with the private. Although the personal is 
a matter of the heart, it can be publicly accountable.'
937
 It is precisely through a sharing of the 
personal that our feelings, and those of our interlocutors, 'can be properly channeled or substantially 
enriched'; the stakes of such openness extend to the very purpose of existence itself: 'although 
Confucians do not tap transcendental symbolic resources and do not practice otherworldly 
asceticism, they are deeply concerned about the ultimate meaning of life', and this concern leads to 
the conclusion, echoing Norbert Elias, that 'it is not inconceivable that while in contemporary social 
life we cannot but divide ourselves into multiple social roles, we can still cherish the vision of 
"organic unity" as a source of inspiration for our personal identity'.
938
 This embrace of a concrete 
                                                 
935  Tu, 'The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism', in Toward a Global Community, p. 19.  
936  Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 329 ('Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic 
Vision').  
937  Tu, 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic Vision', p. 329. 
938  Tu, 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic Vision', pp. 329-330. 
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vision of the good life need not lead to the authoritarian outcomes so often witnessed in 
Confucianism's actual past; indeed, 'the democratic spirit', Tu argues, 'can also be realised in a 
Confucian community with an emphasis on family ethics', and moreover, 'we can also maintain that 
the persistent effort to integrate ourselves in a holistic environment is more congenial to human 
flourishing than the uncritical acceptance of the assertion that self-realisation is relentlessly private, 
subjective, and unsocial.
939
 In other words, the postmodern abandonment of 'the persisent effort to 
integrate ourselves in a holistic environment' and the adoption of an 'ironic' stance towards morality 
in a complex world – the preference for bare minimum standards of 'respect for difference' over 
active moral education and an attempt to create 'organismic unity' across ever wider chunks of 
humanity and beyond – is a choice, and ultimately a lazy and dangerous choice; while Tu rightly 
asks 'the critical question of whether or not the vision of "organismic unity" is practicable in our 
lifeworld today' and argues that 'if we can only show that it is imaginable but "simply structurally 
impossible" as a practical idea in our ordinary daily existence, [then] it has merely historical rather 
than contemporary significance'
940
, he emphatically insists on this 'contemporary significance' by 
returning to the timeless Confucian example: 'the promise that humanity in its all-embracing 
fullness is realisable prompts a sense of mission, requiring a total commitment' of the kind 
demonstrated by Confucius himself ('the profound person cannot but be broadminded and resolute, 
for the burden is heavy and the way is long. He takes humanity as his personal vocation; how can 
we say that the burden is not heavy? He does not let go until he dies; how can we say that the road 
is not long?').
941
             
 The central question for Tu in his debates with postmodern ironists like Rorty concerns the 
concept of 'respect for difference'. Just as Mahfouz celebrated the eternal 'holy battle' between the 
forces of tradition and reform in an open society, Tu argues that in 'the ideal society […] referred to 
as the Great Unity' in Confucian thought ('an imaginary fiduciary community infused with public-
spiritedness'), the 'harmonisation of differences, far from being uniformity, is synchronisation of 
divergent agencies.'
942
 Refusing to disagree or to question other people's conceptions of the good 
life leads to insipid solitude, and is ultimately less respectful than engagement with them. Accepting 
the idea that moral truth could come from anywhere, including one's apparent enemies, is more 
respectful than denying the possibility of anyone having access to it and of adopting an ironist's 
essentially polytheistic stance to the whole question of right and wrong, better and worse. Tu 
illustrates this point with reference to the pre-Confucian figure of Ran Qiu ('what his lord declares 
acceptable, he also declares acceptable'); as the pre-Confucian fragment puts it, 'this is like trying to 
                                                 
939  Tu, 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic Vision'), pp. 330-331.  
940  Tu, 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic Vision', p. 331.  
941  Tu, 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic Vision', p. 335.  
942  Tu, 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic Vision', p. 339.  
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season water with water; who would be willing to eat it? It is like playing nothing but a single note 
on the zither; who would want to listen to it?'
943
       
 The Moral Law itself commands 'respect for difference', and Tu is surely not wrong when he 
says that 'a major challenge confronting the human community is to harmonise, and respect 
difference at all levels'
944
. Such respect paradoxically requires, however, a prior commitment to the 
idea of a Moral Law and a willingness to express one's views publicly when one believes the Moral 
Law has been contravened. Such a willingness to concern oneself with 'everything that happens in 
the world', including, for example, with what happens in other people's bedrooms, does not in any 
way represent a desire to 'impose' one's views on others – the Moral Law cannot be 'imposed' by 
definition - but rather a healthy commitment to the idea of 'organismic unity' or Great Unity which 
is central to the civilisational legacy of Confucianism as well as other Axial Age civilisations and all 
but the most literalist of the monotheisms. Tu goes to great lengths to stress that 'Confucians - 
Confucius in particular - recognised the importance of the legal constraint: the law'; but self-
interested 'contractual' thinking alone will not do, for the individual or for the collective: 'law is a 
preventive measure; law cannot itself generate a sense of shame, and without a sense of shame it is 
difficult to develop some kind of moral character. The legal constraint is a minimum requirement 
for order in any society, but it certainly falls short of a maximum realisation of human potential.'
945
 
The Great Unity of human civilisation, indeed, goes beyond secular law to symbolise 'a most 
cherished form of life in which self and community, despite the inevitable danger of alienation and 
the intractable realities of compartmentalisation, are not irreconcilable opposites.'
946
 In so doing, the 
Great Unity opens itself to the beyond of itself, to all the ten thousand things, and in this way, it 
presents an alternative to human civilisation's dealings not only with itself, but also with nature. Tu 
describes this as the 'ecological turn' in New Confucian humanism at a time when 'for the survival 
and flourishing of the human community it is vitally important to harmonise the relationship 
between the human species and nature.'
947
 This does not mean an end to technology or science - on 
the contrary, many if not most of our current ecological problems require extremely hi-tech 
scientific solutions - but it does mean a shift away from an instrumental attitude to the world around 
us.               
 It is clear, however, in his essay 'Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality', that Tu is an 
enthusiastic supporter of 90% of the legacy of the Western Enlightenment, which he describes as 
                                                 
943  Tu, 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic Vision', p. 338. 
944  Tu, 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic Vision', p. 337. 
945  See Tu Weiming, 'Dialogue with Francis Fukuyama',  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LP3RjmvyMOs&feature=youtu.be, 21/2/12. 
 
946  Tu, 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic Vision', p. 339.  
947  Tu, 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic Vision', p. 339.  
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'the most dynamic and transformative ideology in human history'
948
. Indeed, 'virtually all major 
spheres of interest characteristic of the modern age are indebted to or intertwined with this 
mentality: science and technology, industrial capitalism, market economy, democratic polity, mass 
communication, research universities, civil and military bureaucracies, and professional 
organisations.' Even in the sphere of morality itself, the Enlightenment has bequeathed to us an 
unrivalled patrimony: 'the values we cherish as definitions of modern consciousness – including 
liberty, equality, human rights, the dignity of the individual, respect for privacy, government for, by 
and of the people, and due process of law – are genetically, if not structurally, inseparable from the 
Enlightenment mentality.'
949
 Nevertheless, Tu adds, 'it seems self-evident that both capitalism and 
socialism subscribe to the aggressive anthropocentrism'
950
 of this mentality, and that 'the human 
desire to become the measure and master of all things is still the most influential moral discourse in 
the political culture of the modern age'.
951
 Against the Confucian ideal of seeking knowledge for the 
sake of moral self-improvement and the subsequent moral improvement of human civilisation in its 
dialogical relationship with Heaven, Tu contrasts the 'dark side of the modern West', the 'unbound 
Prometheus', the 'Faustian drive to explore, to know, to conquer, and to subdue', which has now 
been 'fully embraced as the unquestioned rationale for development in East Asia' and elsewhere.
952
 
Tu invites us to rethink the Enlightenment heritage in the context of Confucian and other 
civilisational calls to unity: 'we need to explore the spiritual resources that may help us to broaden 
the scope of the Enlightenment project, deepen its moral sensitivity, and, if necessary, transform its 
genetic constraints in order to realise fully its potential as a worldview for the human condition as a 
whole.'
953
 Tu proposes a supplement to the Golden Rule of global folk morality (which he prefers in 
its negative but still ultimately self-centred formulation 'Do not do unto others what you would not 
want others to do unto you'), which would consist of 'the positive principle "In order to establish 
myself, I have to help others to enlarge themselves." An inclusive sense of community, based on the 
communal critical self-consciousness of reflective minds, is an ethicoreligious goal as well as a 
philosophical ideal.'
954
 The need to overcome some of the alienating binaries of modern 'Western' 
thought and to return to older, more venerable forms of spirituality is as palpable in Tu as it is in 
both Mahfouz and Tarkovsky: 
  The exclusive dichotomy of matter/spirit, body/mind, sacred/profane, human/nature, 
                                                 
948  Tu, The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 112 ('Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality'). 
949  Tu, 'Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality', p. 112.  
950  Tu, 'Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality', p. 112. 
951  Tu, 'Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality', p. 113.  
952  Tu, 'Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality', p. 113.  
953  Tu, 'Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality', p. 114.  
954  Tu, 'Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality', p. 114.  
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  or creator/creature must be transcended to allow supreme values, such as the sanctity 
  of the earth, the continuity of being, the beneficiary interaction between the human 
  community and nature, and the mutuality between humankind and Heaven, to receive 
  the saliency they deserve in philosophy, religion and theology. The Greek emphasis 
  on rationality, the Biblical image of man having 'dominion' over the Earth, and the 
  Protestant work ethic provided necessary, if not sufficient sources for the   
  Enlightenment mentality. However, the unintended negative consequences of the rise 
  of the modern West have so undermined the sense of community implicit in the  
  Hellenistic idea of the citizen, the Judaic idea of the covenant, and the Christian idea 
  of fellowship that it is morally imperative for these great traditions, which have  
  maintained highly complex and tension-ridden relationships with the Enlightenment 
  mentality, to formulate their critique of the blatant anthropocentrism inherent in the 
  Enlightenment project.
955
  
Western philosophy, too, when not infected with the polytheistic relativism of so many of its 
continental forms, has succumbed to an analytical dryness which confuses the cool empirical 
method of the hard sciences with standards of philosophical rigour. Tu passionately argues that his 
'love' for Confucianism is a philosophical and personal strength, not a weakness, although he faced 
severe criticism early in his career from American analytic philosophers who had already fully 
internalised the idea that philosophy could no longer be about love at all and that truth was utterly 
external to love.
956
 Although Tu celebrates a 'spiritual turn' in Western philosophy in the form of 
communitarianism, a closer cousin of Confucian 'spiritual humanism' than either Marxist 
materialism or liberal 'irony' regarding forms of the good life, he nevertheless highlights the 
contemporary relevance of a 'second kind of spiritual resource […] derived from non-Western, 
axial-age civilisations, which include Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism in South and Southeast 
Asia, Confucianism and Taoism in East Asia, and Islam.'
957
 Just as Mahfouz stresses the essential 
oneness of Islam and its Western monotheisic cousins, so too does Tu argue that 'Islam should be 
considered an essential intellectual heritage of the modern West because of its contribution to the 
Renaissance.'
958
 Regrettably, 'the current practice, especially by the mass media of North America 
and Western Europe, of consigning Islam to radical otherness is historically unsound and culturally 
insensitive. It has, in fact, seriously undermined the modern West's own self-interest as well as its 
                                                 
955  Tu, 'Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality', p. 115.  
956  See in particular Tu's 'Dialogue with Charles Taylor', http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b3-ZnkCC0Jc, 
11/6/2011. 
957  Tu, 'Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality', p. 115. 
958  Tu, 'Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality', p. 115. 
 294 
 
own self-understanding.'
959
 At the same time, and without wishing to neglect the spiritual resources 
of 'primal traditions' including 'native American, Hawaiian, Maori, and numerous tribal religious 
traditions'
960
 and their 'deep experience of rootedness'
961
, Tu argues that 'as both beneficiaries and 
victims of the Enlightenment mentality, we show our fidelity to our common heritage by enriching 
it, transforming it, and restructuring it with [… the] spiritual resources still available to us for the 
sake of developing a truly ecumenical sense of global community'.
962
 He then unsurprisingly places 
Confucian spiritual resources at the heart of this struggle: 
  Human beings are metaphysical beings with the highest aspirations not simply  
  defined in terms of anthropocentric ideas but characterised by the ultimate concern to 
  be constantly inspired by and continuously responsive to the Mandate of Heaven. 
  […] Learning to be human in the Confucian spirit is to engage oneself in a ceaseless, 
  unending process of creative self-transformation, both as a communal act and as a 
  dialogical response to Heaven. This involves four inseparable dimensions – self,  
  community, nature, and the transcendent. The purpose of learning is always  
  understood as being for the sake of the self, but the self is never an isolated  
  individual (an island). […] Therefore, the profound significance of what we call  
  primordial ties – ethnicity, gender, language, land, class, and basic spiritual  
  orientation – which are intrinsic in the Confucian project, is a celebraton of cultural 
  diversity (this is not to be confused with any form of pernicious relativism). […]  
  There is a recognition that each one of us is fated to be a unique person embedded in 
  a particular condition. […] The spiritual resources which sustain [Confucians  
  include] cultivating themselves, teaching others to be good, 'looking for friends in 
  history', emulating the sages, setting up cultural norms, interpreting the Mandate of 
  Heaven, transmitting the Way, and transforming the world as a moral community.
963
  
This transformation, in our time, involves asking, and answering in the affirmative, the question 
'Should our pluralistic society deliberately cultivate shared values and a common ground for human 
understanding?'. Tu argues that 'an alternative model of sustainable development, with an emphasis 
on the ethical and spiritual dimensions of human flourishing, must be sought'.
964
 In words which 
could have been drawn directly from Mahfouz, Tu concludes that 'the time is long overdue to move 
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961  Tu, 'Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality', p. 117. 
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964  Tu, 'Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality', pp. 124-125.  
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beyond a mind-set shaped by instrumental rationality and private interests. As the politics of 
domination fades, we witness the dawning of an age of communication, networking, negotiation, 
interaction, interfacing, and collaboration.'
965
 Summarising his anthropocosmic vision, Tu takes us 
on the journey of self-cultivation which must be completed by each individual if we are collectively 
to achieve the meaning of our lives: 
  We begin with a quest for true personal identity, an open and creatively transforming 
  selfhood which, paradoxically, must be predicated on our ability to overcome  
  selfishness and egoism. We cherish family cohesiveness. In order to do that, we have 
  to go beyond nepotism. We embrace communal solidarity, but we have to transcend 
  parochialism to realise its true value. We can be enriched by social integration,  
  provided that we overcome ethnocentrism and chauvinistic culturalism. We are  
  committed to national unity, but we ought to rise above aggressive nationalism so 
  that we can be genuinely patriotic. We are inspired by human flourishing, but we 
  must endeavour not to be confined by anthropocentrism, for the full meaning of  
  humanity is anthropocosmic rather than anthropocentric.
966
  
Nor does this process stop at the edge of the cosmos: 'no matter how successful one is in the 
sociopolitical arena, the full measure of one's humanity cannot be accommodated without a 
reference to Heaven.'
967
 Rather than seeking enlightenment in the investigation of exotic cosmic 
phenomena, as Sartorius does in Tarkovsky's Solaris, we must, if we want 'to make ourselves 
deserving partners of Heaven', follow Kris Kelvin's example and remain 'constantly in touch with 
that silent illumination that makes the rightness and principle in our heart-minds shine forth 
brilliantly.'
968
 Tu contrasts 'exclusive' forms of post-religious secular humanism, which make human 
beings 'the measure of all things' and justify the instrumentalisation of all that is non-human, with  
'inclusive' Confucian humanism, in which 'humanity in its all-embracing fullness "forms one body 
with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things". Self-realisation, in the last analysis, is ultimate 
transformation, that process which enables us to embody the family, community,  nation, world, and 
cosmos in our sensitivity.'
969
          
 Although Tu stresses that this inclusive Confucian humanism has particular 'practical 
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significance for facing the current ecological crisis'
970
, we would add, without for a moment 
disagreeing, that Tu's 'anthropocosmic vision' helps us face other crises too, and in particular for our 
purposes, the identity crisis of the 21st-century humanities. Tu's is a vision utterly consistent with, 
for example, George Scialabba's view that canonical humanities texts 'are a superior kind of 
pedagogy; they touch chords deeper in one's psyche than most other experiences from which one 
might learn moral lessons' and are therefore 'profoundly political'
971
; or with Mark Bauerlein's 
lament that defenders of the humanities 'affirm, extol and sanctify the humanities, but they hardly 
ever mention any specific humanities content. […] In a word, the defenders rely on what the 
humanities do, not what they are.'
972
 Tu's anthropocosmic and ecumenical vision for the humanities 
– a simultaneously political and religious vision as well as a humanistic one – is based on the same 
faith in the oneness of the Moral Law, and in the possibility of transmitting that law via contact with 
'the best that has been thought and said in the world', which we find in Mahfouz, Tarkovsky and 
their Western counterparts, perhaps most notably in Tu's case in the work of his ecumenical 
colleague Hans Küng and their common Global Ethic Project run between Tu's Institute for 
Advanced Humanistic Studies at Peking University and the Global Ethic Institute at Küng's 
University of Tübingen, both of which occupy, at least for now, symbolically central places on their 
respective university campuses. Whether this attempt to reinvigorate the humanities as a gateway to 
moral truth and a single global Moral Law succeeds will depend on how many new Meri Mouns 
and Mahfouzes, how many new Rublevs and Boriskas and Tarkovskies, and how many new New 
Confucians and Tu Weimings such humanities programmes can inspire.    
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Conclusion: Warriors for Civilisation 
 
   Once you have taken a decision, which can only be based on the belief that 
   there is justice in the universe, and that it applies to you - once you have  
   asked for justice to apply to you - then you have created within yourself a 
   need to see justice of the same kind everywhere. Also, by asking for justice 
   for other people, you desire it for yourself; this immensely complicated  
   dialectic […] begins in the mind where you feel increasingly impelled by this 
   understanding to see every decision that you take and every action that you 
   take in this light. I have found that it makes more sense... I have found it  
   practically the case that if you believe that this is a purposeful universe with 
   justice built into it and eternity therefore unavoidable, and act accordingly, 
   then it responds to your 'punching the buttons' much more meaningfully than 
   if you assume that it's an enormous cosmic car crash in which nothing has 
   any explanation and there is no justice and no eternity and that death is the 
   end. [...] I can't see any reason for me to change my mind, and I have been 
   encouraged greatly by all that I have seen. [...] The artistic, the musical, the 
   literary, the poetic, rather than the mathematical, provide, not the proofs of it 
   to me because there are no poetic proofs as there are mathematical proofs, 
   but provide very strong arguments for maintaining it, and I think it's the most 
   important discovery I've ever made.
973
  
 
          Peter Hitchens 
 
 
Three men working in unrelated cultural contexts in the second half of the 20
th
 century, whose work 
survives and whose legacies evolve to this day, drew essentially the same conclusion about what 
civilisation is and why it matters. 'Civilisation' for Nagtardu (shorthand for Mahfouz, Tarkovsky and 
T(D)u) is as Peter Hitchens puts it an organisation of individuals which allows them to realise their 
highest natures by being unselfish. Although the point of this thesis was not to choose a single 
Western representative of this view but rather to show that a whole raft of contemporary Western 
intellectuals also subscribes to it, we might also propose the shorthand Nagtar Dutchens (a play on 
Terry Eagleton's 'Ditchkins') to represent the four legs of the argument. 
                                                 
973  Peter Hitchens, 'Head2Head with Matthew Stalden', http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LirrUUxZmI4, 
22/7/13. 
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 Mahfouz privileges conscience, Tarkovsky sacrifice, Tu self-cultivation, and Hitchens and 
company a brand of stoic unselfishness, and each chooses his own means of argument (literature, 
film, philosophy, journalism), but Nagtar Dutchens is clear that the humanities are not sciences or 
(only) suppliers of data to the sciences, but a discipline entirely apart, a political discipline aimed at 
promoting a vision of the good life that could be described as religious, or at the very least one 
which smashes the distinction between secular and sacred, church and state, and rejects the 
purported neutrality regarding conceptions of the good life on which modern liberal democracies 
are founded. The attempt to create a cosmopolitan world order through reason alone is doomed to 
failure because reason alone takes one only so far. Although Tu stresses that there is no 'leap of 
faith' in Confucianism but rather a 'refined spontaneity of inner feelings' which leads one to the 
unselfish principle of the 'continuity of being'
974
, the versions of monotheism presented by the other 
three members of our Nagtar Dutchens quartet are, as I have endeavoured to stress, so deprived of 
all reference to revelation, and so committed instead to the idea of moral self-cultivation, that 
Nagtar Dutchens can simply do away with the Abrahamic concept of the 'leap of faith' altogether 
and embrace Tu's Confucian metaphor. 
 One prominent Western intellectual to have headed in precisely this direction in recent years, 
and one not yet mentioned (in a spirit of saving the best for last) is a man with unrivalled liberal 
credentials: Ronald Dworkin. After spending a lifetime espousing liberal neutrality with regard to 
conceptions of the good life, Dworkin's late work defends the idea of a 'religion without God' under 
the banner of a 'moral monism'. As Moshe Halbertal puts it (and to put it mildly): 
 
  Dworkin’s affirmation of the independence and the inevitability of morality runs  
  against dominant contemporary modes of thought. Moral independence is fiercely 
  denied by the fashion in naturalism, which holds that we can provide an exhaustive 
  explanation of the moral realm through evolutionary biology and the structure of our 
  mind. Morality is thus not independent; it is something that ought to be reduced to 
  facts about ourselves. Dworkin’s insistence on moral inevitability and necessity  
  clashes also with the widespread postmodern argument that our moral convictions 
  are ideologically constructed structures that serve power elites—that they are  
  culturally dependent, with no objective value. […] Liberal thinkers maintain a  
  suspicious attitude toward religion because of its inherent tendency to monistic  
  absolute truths that seem in conflict with pluralistic free politics. But in a world in 
  which religion maintains its salience and even increases it, the closing of that  
                                                 
974  Tu Weiming, 'Embodied Knowledge', in The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity, p. 376.  
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  suspicion gap might be a good idea. What is so fascinating about Dworkin’s last  
  book is that it does not share this initial distance from the religious temperament, 
  though it refuses to depart from its original liberal outlook affirming an objective and 
  unified moral realm. He is well aware of the conflicts between religious   
  fundamentalism and liberalism, but he expresses a hope that his objective unified 
  convictions, which put human dignity at their center, will somehow converge with 
  the religious world.
975
 
 
It is dangerous to suggest that Nagtar Dutchens stands for this 'religious world', representing the 
traditions of Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Confucianism and Western Christianity respectively; 
Mahfouz is regarded as an atheist by millions of believing Muslims who not only haven't read his 
novels but couldn't read them; Tarkovsky 'the emigrant' with his less than traditional Orthodox 
views remains a marginal figure in Russian cultural life; Tu Weiming and his New Confucian creed 
have only just been officially embraced on the Chinese mainland after an entire Communist and 
Cultural Revolution designed to eradicate the last vestiges of Confucian backwardness from the 
land; and Peter Hitchens and those like him are both too religious and not religious enough for a 
Western public mired in liberal-conservative culture wars but basically given over to what Slavoj 
Zizek in a rare spark of meaningful genius defines as 'slightly enlightened Buddhist hedonism'
976
, in 
which the state is no longer calling on the citizen to sacrifice herself or to live for others, but rather 
encouraging her to pursue her own pleasure, her own 'conception of the good life', as long as she 
refrains from 'imposing' her views on others. The central question on which all the members of 
Nagtar Dutchens agree, including liberals like Ronald Dworkin, is that some conceptions of the 
good life are better than others, and that there is a 'best that has been thought and said in the world' 
that can lead us to embrace the best in ourselves if only we are exposed to it and can freely engage 
with it. Anyone who thinks this way would be in dereliction of duty if, as Peter Hitchens says, she 
failed to try to get people everywhere to adopt this way of life and to follow this Moral Law by 
trying to put her in front of these cultural products.  
 The humanities, for Nagtar Dutchens, are about this project of persuasion, this mission for 
moral improvement the core of which is realising one's own ultimate insignificance, getting us to 
feel what Elaine Scarry calls the 'opiated adjacency' of being in the presence of beauty and to live 
                                                 
975  Moshe Halbertal, ‘Can You Have Religion Without God?: Ronald Dworkin and a Religious Worldview for 
Secularists’, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114898/ronald-dworkins-religion-without-god-reviewed-religious-
worldview, 26/10/13. 
976  Slavoj Zizek, ‘Most of the Idiots I Know Are 
Academics’, http://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2013/10/slavoj-zizek-most-idiots-i-know-are-academics, 8/10/13. 
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for the ideals of justice and sacrifice which such beauty stirs.
977
 Recognising that groups within 
society have been victimised and deserve better treatment is of course - of course - part of this 
project, but identity politics and victim studies do not exhaust the options for a humanistic 
education and indeed risk obscuring the central point of one, at least according to Nagtar Dutchens: 
namely, to cultivate a sense of belonging which extends outwards from the self, the family and the 
tribe to cover, in Tu's 'felicitous' phrase, the whole 'anthropocosmic' shebang of existence itself.    
 Tolerance, or putting up with views you aren't accustomed to or don't like, is part of this 
anthropocosmic picture for two reasons: first, because the 'eternal holy battle' between 'tradition and 
freedom' (liberals and conservatives) so celebrated by Mahfouz allows for the emergence of new 
moral truth (and the recovery of old moral truth) and for the democratic evolution of our temporal 
laws in conjunction with scientific and social developments; and second, because there is no way to 
force people to be moral anyway. You can try to force them to act unselfishly, to be sure, and there 
are plenty of situations where laws are needed to force individuals to act unselfishly even when they 
otherwise wouldn't or don't want to (even Confucians like Tu stress the importance of the 'legal 
constraint'), but the ultimate point of a humanities education is that it is good for individuals by 
making them unselfish to themselves. If we fail, as believers in this Moral Law, to offer a 
humanities education to the next generation, we not only fail to make society more harmonious for 
our own benefit; we moreover fail in our duties to the human individuals who could benefit from 
such an education. As adults in a democratic society, Nagtar Dutchens argues, we have a 
responsibility to decide what this 'best that has been thought and said' is and to pass it on to future 
generations. What those future generations do with it will of course be up to them, but once our 
sphere of moral concern extends to those future generations, as Nagtar Dutchens tells us it should 
and will if we cultivate our moral faculties, there is no getting away from the responsibility of 
maintaining a canon and getting that canon taught. 
 I said in my introduction that there were geopolitical reasons for my choice of warriors; 
anyone who wanted to convince the whole world of something would do well to consider the 
makeup of that world. But 'world literature', as Mahfouz in particular points out and as the other 
members of Nagtar Dutchens agree, is a question of quality; by putting forward candidates from 
heavily geopolitically represented communities in our time, my aim is not to exclude other voices 
from Brazil, India or much smaller countries. In the end, Mahfouz, Tarkovsky, Tu and their Western 
counterparts ought to be judged by posterity on their own terms, independent of the urgency of the 
                                                 
977  Elaine Scarry, 'Poetry Changed the World: Injury and the Ethics of Reading', 
http://www.bostonreview.net/v2/BR37.4/elaine_scarry_poetry_literature_reading_empathy_ethics.php, July/August 
2012 (accessed 1/8/12). 
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political challenges we currently face. These universal civilisational terms are the terms on which 
they themselves wanted to be judged, just as Mahfouz judges his Egyptian leaders in Before the 
Throne; if I have neglected the historical and philological context of these three men's work in order 
to focus on its wider message, I trust the reader will understand why, and will understand that this is 
what each of these three men would have wanted. 
 This thesis juxtaposes for the first time arguably the most prominent, at least in the West, 
high cultural representatives of the Arab, Orthodox and Sinic worlds respectively of the last fifty 
years; the fact that I have uncovered such a deep harmony of vision, and one so relevant to our 
current Western predicament, is a kind of bonus. That none of these men represents God-like 
perfection in the realms of anthropocosmic unselfishness and love does not, in and of itself, 
represent a decisive argument against their vision of a Moral Law. Indeed, the whole point is that 
the only form of argument we have in this realm is argument by example. Even if the example is 
less than pure – and we may wish to seek out the purest examples – the kernel of charisma and truth 
can still be salvaged from it. Tarkovsky, for example, shows us how Jesus's message can survive 
even when Jesus is regarded as a mere mortal and even when his disciples are no match for him 
morally; if the flame of civilisation survives in them and they pass on what they can, to the best of 
their ability, then it is up to us to be better and go further than them, further even than Jesus himself.  
 The civilising missions inaugurated by Akhenaten, Confucius, Jesus and Mohammed, to 
which Nagtar Dutchens are modern heirs, were all inaugurated by exemplary men committed to the 
idea of a single Moral Law; in our time we have an unprecedented opportunity to unite these 
missions into a single global mission, and as Nagtar Dutchens stress over and over again, we may 
need to achieve this unity if we want civilisation to survive at all. This will mean a spirit of both 
giving and taking which, we hope to have shown, is part of them all; not an imperialistic giving or a 
gutless giving up of everything we hold dear, but a commitment to the best, and the idea of a best, 
wherever it may be, as Mahfouz's favourite hadith 'Seek knowledge even in China' reminds us. 
When we do so – and as no generation before us has had such means to do – we discover, as I have 
had the immense good fortune to discover, that the best everywhere, or at least the best of four great 
civilisations, agree: there is One Law governing all of civilisation, and the meaning of our lives 
consists in trying to uphold this law and defend this civilisation. From Mahfouzian hadara to 
Tarkovskian sacrifice and Tu's anthropocosmic vision, the best of three great non-Western 
civilisations echo the efforts of Peter Hitchens and company to combat 'selfism', the idea of 
'absolute personal autonomy' and a perversion of the best of the Western Enlightenment which has, 
according to Hitchens, become 'the most powerful cause in modern civilisation' (c.f. Zizek's 'slightly 
enlightened Buddhist hedonism') and which 'hates the idea that there may be a God and any 
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absolute source of law or goodness'.
978
 The likes of Hitchens and Ronald Dworkin would seek to 
place limits on this sphere of individual autonomy by appealing to a higher sense – indeed, a 
'religious' sense - of communal identity which, paradoxically, grounds the very individual human 
rights, also loudly championed by Mahfouz and Tu, which allow each of us, in Dworkin's words, 'to 
count for one and no more than one'. Michael Rosen summarises Dworkin's position – essentially 
the position of Durkheim a century earlier as introduced in Chapter 1 ('there is something in religion 
which seems to survive critique and keep us believing: morality...') - in the following terms: 
 
  What is it about the individual whose life would otherwise be sacrificed for the  
  collective good that makes the sacrifice wrong? To say that she or he has a right not 
  to be put to death in order to save others is just to put a name to the problem. We also 
  need, it seems, a satisfying reason why—something about the victim that explains 
  why he or she has a value that overrides instrumental calculations about the greatest 
  good. It is at this point that religious-sounding vocabulary tends to slip back into the 
  discussion. […] As Seneca once wrote, 'I do not obey God; I agree with him.' So, 
  Dworkin argues, any reasonable religion must acknowledge the priority of value over 
  the will of the Deity. But in that case, the supernatural narrative of creation,  
  revelation and prophecy that surrounds the moral teachings of religion is dispensable. 
  Dworkin still wants to call his attitude 'religious' because, although he does not  
  believe in the existence of God, he 'accepts the full, independent reality of value' and 
  hence rejects the naturalistic view that nothing is real except what is revealed by the 
  natural sciences or psychology.
979
 
 
At a certain point in his 'religious' defence of individual rights, however, Dworkin faces the fact 
that, like our other warriors, he has no more arguments to summon: 
 
  I will not have convinced some of you. You will think that if all we can do to defend 
  value judgments is appeal to other value judgments, and then finally to declare faith 
  in the whole set of judgments, then our claims to objective truth are just whistles in 
  the dark. But this challenge, however familiar, is not an argument against the  
  religious worldview. It is only a rejection of that worldview. It denies the basic tenets 
  of the religious attitude: it produces, at best, a standoff. You just do not have the  
                                                 
978  Peter Hitchens, 'The Selfists Strike Back', http://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/, 12/4/2014. 
979  Michael Rosen, ‘Beyond Naturalism: On Ronald Dworkin’, http://www.thenation.com/article/178330/beyond-
naturalism-ronald-dworkin?page=full#, 11/2/14. 
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  religious point of view.
980
  
 
In his late-life religious turn, Dworkin comes to resemble, of all the warriors for civilisation 
mentioned in these pages, none more than his virtual contemporary, the renegade Catholic 
theologian Hans Küng. In a sermon marking his 80
th
 birthday in Tübingen in 2008 titled 'The Good 
Battle Fought', Küng restores the honour of the word Kampf in German, describing life as 'a 
constant battle' ('ein ständiger Kampf) and seeking strength in the examples of Jesus and St. Paul in 
particular, though by no means exclusively, to achieve the goal of this battle: namely, the Arnoldian 
goal of 'human perfection' common to all our warriors for civilisation.
981
 Like Mahfouz's Shahriyar, 
Tarkovsky's Stalker and Tu's sage in the face of the Madman from Chu, Küng's St. Paul resists the 
promise of personal bliss – just as Arnold calls the person of culture to resist the illusion of 'a 
perfect welfare independent of the rest' of humanity and to remain 'obliged, under pain of being 
stunted and enfeebled in his own development if he disobeys, to carry others along with him in his 
march towards perfection, to be continually doing all he can to enlarge and increase the volume of 
the human stream sweeping thitherward' – and returns from the Platonic light to the hard happiness 
of the human cave: 
 
  If you read his relatively few letters, you will see that Paul announced and defended 
  his message, his Gospel, often with warrior-like emotion and strong rhetoric. [… 
  But] as far he himself was concerned, although he saw death as entirely to his  
  advantage because he would be, as he wrote to his Philippians, 'with the Lord  
  forever', he nevertheless, for the sake of the human beings for whom he was the  
  bearer of the message, wanted to live longer and to work more.
982
      
 
Although Küng - like Dworkin, Hitchens and our three main warriors - has no arguments to 
convince the committed 'selfists', his faith in the moral unity and purpose of the world has allowed 
him to 'live a better, more meaningful life than I could have had without this hope': 'The solution 
which was quoted and practised already in Paul's time of the conscienceless man of pleasure – "Let 
us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die" – is in the long run no consolation and no support.'983 Opting 
instead for the Pauline solution – 'I fought the good fight, stayed the course, preserved the faith' - 
Küng turns his gaze away from the promise of a merely personal, partial paradise and back to the 
                                                 
980  See Rosen, 'Beyond Naturalism'. 
981  Hans Küng, 'The Good Battle Fought' ('Den guten Kampf gekämpft'), in Karl-Josef Kuschel and Stephan 
Schlensog (eds.), Hans Küng: Up Close (Hans Küng: eine Nahaufnahme), (Münich: Piper Verlag, 2008), p. 145. 
982  Küng, 'The Good Battle Fought', p. 148. 
983  Küng, 'The Good Battle Fought', p. 150. 
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battle of securing the present and future of human civilisation: 'Understand all that I have said, my 
dear friends, absolutely not in terms of the consolation of any possible afterlife, but as a call to the 
here and now in a show of joy before life itself.'
984
  
 
 
                                                 
984  Küng, 'The Good Battle Fought', pp. 150-151. 
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